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This thesis will apply conventional methods of legal analysis to ask how New 
Zealand’s offshore petroleum liability regime came to be created from a pair of 
international shipping liability and fund conventions, and explaining how the EU 
and Member States developed and implemented the Environmental Liability and 
Offshore Safety Directives. New Zealand’s government has actively encouraged 
growth in its offshore petroleum sector in the belief that seabed drilling can be 
carried out safely and profitably at any depth, and that the owners of offshore 
petroleum installations will pay administrative penalties and damages to 
compensate for all oil pollution claims. The recent Deepwater Horizon disaster has 
had global repercussions for operators and regulators, but has sparked little 
discussion of legal liability issues in the New Zealand context.   
New Zealand’s offshore petroleum liability regime used two international shipping 
conventions which had created a system of strict and limited liability for oil 
pollution damage, channelled to the shipowner, and backed up by mandatory 
insurance and an industry-fed compensation fund. The shipping conventions 
became the standard model for many regional and international environmental 
damage liability regimes, because there is no international offshore liability 
convention, but New Zealand’s offshore petroleum liability regime has diverged 
from this ideal. New Zealand sought to capture a broad range of owners and 
operators of offshore installations in a net of strict and unlimited liability, but 
without providing adequate mandatory insurance regulations or a compensation 
fund. Meanwhile, the European Union created its own environmental damage 
liability regime and only later applied it to offshore oil and gas operators, but also 
without providing harmonized mandatory insurance regulations or an EU-wide 
compensation fund. Much like New Zealand, EU Member States have struggled to 
implement consistent and predictable environmental liability laws, or to develop 
appropriate financial security guarantees.   
Analysing New Zealand’s offshore petroleum liability regime in this context 
accomplishes two overall objectives. First, a detailed examination of the 
international shipping conventions will provide guidance about how New Zealand 




should interpret, quantify and allocate liability for the key elements of pollution 
damage liability. Second, the comparison of New Zealand and the EU Member 
States’ experiences demonstrates the difficulties that nations face in adopting 
disparate over-arching international or supranational legal frameworks to create 
domestic statutory liability systems. The discussion has profound implications, not 
just for the specifics of any one country’s liability laws, but also for future attempts 
to create a practical and durable regional or international offshore petroleum 
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The blowout that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico on 
20 April 2010 killed 11 men, cost BP and its joint venture partners and contractors 
an estimated $40.9 billion USD in fines and damages, and spilled approximately 
4.9 million barrels of oil impacting the coastlines of five American states. It was 
the largest accidental oil spill in history, exceeded in size only by damage caused 
by the Iraqi army’s deliberate targeting of 700 petroleum facilities following its 
retreat from Kuwait during the First Gulf War.1 The incident has had profound 
ramifications for the global petroleum, shipping and insurance industries, casting  
serious doubt upon the safety of current and future offshore petroleum exploration 
and extraction operations. Because of the tremendous cost, it forces us to question 
the adequacy of existing domestic and regional liability and compensation regimes.  
 
1.1 Research Question  
The Deepwater Horizon oil well blowout led this thesis to ask a deceptively simple 
question. How does New Zealand law hold the owners of offshore installations and 
operations responsible for the costs of oil pollution damage from offshore oil spills? 
To answer that question, it was necessary to see how concepts and definitions of 
marine pollution damage were adopted from international shipping oil pollution 
damage liability and fund conventions into New Zealand law to create a domestic 
liability regime for offshore oil spills, and to compare that international regime with 
the EU’s Environmental Liability and Offshore Safety Directives, highlighting their 
commonalities, their weaknesses and their strengths. This will enable the thesis to 
make recommendations that will improve New Zealand’s approach to oil pollution 
                                                 
1 Mervin F Fingas Oil Spill Science and Technology (Elsevier Science Ltd, Amsterdam 2010) Table 
2.3: Largest Oil Spills in History at 13. 




damage from offshore petroleum installations and and their exploration and 
extraction activities, and to cast light on the issue for anyone interested in the issue 
of liability for pollution damage.2  
International shipping and coastal oil well drilling operate in quite different legal 
jurisdictions, however. Ships travel the world, bearing little legal relationship to the 
territories to which they may cause harm. This makes international shipping the 
natural target for international law. Offshore installations, on the other hand, are 
anchored or embedded within the jurisdiction of an individual state. The state 
encourages and benefits from economic activities within its territorial waters and 
exclusive economic zone, and it is best placed to monitor and regulate those 
activities. The close proximity of offshore installations to a particular territory 
undermines but does not entirely eliminate the argument that international law 
should apply. It follows that it is not an easy thing to take international legal 
concepts and institutions and apply them to domestic law, and the process has 
caused problems for both New Zealand and European lawmakers. 
Offshore petroleum activities are an important element of New Zealand’s export 
economy, with earnings ranking only behind dairy and tourism. Soon after New 
Zealand established the right to control access to its vast EEZ, the push was on to 
extend offshore petroleum exploration to the full extent allowed. Production 
activities have been carried out in the Taranaki region quite safely for many years, 
but exploratory drilling is the riskiest stage of the production process, and petroleum 
operators were being offered permits to drill at even greater depths than those which 
claimed the Deepwater Horizon. At the same time, the New Zealand government 
appeared to be accepting the industry’s assurances that deepwater drilling activities 
could be carried out quite safely, that any oil spills were likely to be minor and 
within Maritime NZ’s capacities, and that it was unnecessary to consider the 
question of liability for any subsequent pollution damage. This thesis challenges 
those assumptions. 
                                                 
2 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage 
[2004] OJ L 143/56; Directive 2013/30/ EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC 





New Zealand law provides administrative penalties for unlawful discharges of 
harmful substances, including oil, from offshore installations and operations, and a 
civil damages liability regime that holds the owners and operators of offshore 
installations and operations strictly liable for the preventing and remediating 
pollution damage caused by oil contamination. This offshore petroleum liability 
regime uses definitions sourced from two international shipping conventions; the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 and the 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (“CLC and Fund Conventions” or 
“shipping conventions”), later updated by the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions.3  
The shipping conventions work by channelling strict and limited liability for oil 
pollution damage to a single shipowner who must obtain insurance up to the limits 
of its liability, and that requires the importers of that oil to contribute to an 
international oil pollution damage compensation fund. New Zealand law holds the 
owners and operators of offshore marine structures and operations strictly liable for 
marine pollution damage caused by contamination of oil, using definitions of 
pollution damage and preventive measures adopted from those Conventions. 
However, while liability for offshore oil spills caused by drilling and production of 
petroleum from offshore seabed sources is still strict, term “owner” has been 
designed to capture a wide range of operators, permit participants, and their 
managers, agents and employees. This means that almost any person involved in 
drilling activities which cause an oil spill in New Zealand’s EEZ,  could be subject 
to unlimited liability for the costs of preventing, remediating and compensating any 
damage claims. Furthermore, while the CLC and Fund Conventions oblige 
shipowners to maintain insurance up to the limits of their liability, and provide for 
that industry-fed compensation fund, New Zealand has been slow to require the 
owners of offshore installations to provide insurance, and the minimum insurance 
                                                 
3 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 973 UNTS 3 (opened for 
signature 23 June 1969, entered into force 19 June 1975); International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 11 ILM 284 
(opened for signature 18 December 1971, entered into force 16 October 1978); Protocol of 1992 
to amend the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention 1992) 1953 UNTS 330 (opened for 
signature 27 November 1992, entered into force 30 May 1996); Protocol of 1992 to amend the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 29 November 1969, 973 
UNTS 3, (opened for signature 27 November 1992, entered into force 30 May 1996). 




levels were inadequate for most of their history. The Deepwater Horizon has forced 
New Zealand lawmakers to reappraise the country’s marine pollution damage 
legislation with respect to offshore petroleum exploration and extraction activities, 
and it is this reappraisal that this thesis seeks to address. 
To be clear, New Zealand’s offshore petroleum liability regime may have been 
based on international shipping law, but this thesis is about the oil pollution damage 
caused by offshore oil spills. By offshore oil spill, this thesis means any situation 
when large quantities of petroleum are accidentally released or discharged by an oil 
rig or drillship drilling for petroleum beneath the surface of the ocean within New 
Zealand’s EEZ, but it could also refer to accidents involving pipelines, floating 
production storage and offloading vessels, and other related infrastructure. One of 
the key contentions will be that New Zealand’s offshore marine pollution damage 
regime suffers from some unintentional but fundamental flaws because its authors 
failed to consider the consequences of obtaining definitions of pollution damage 
lability from the CLC and Fund Conventions, while diverging from the model of 
channelled and limited liability, backed up by mandatory insurance and an industry-
fed compensation fund. As a result, there has been little scrutiny of the fundamental 
definitions of that liability, or whether the existing financial security requirements 
would be adequate to cope with the environmental and economic impact of a major 
offshore oil well blowout.  
For example, if liability is not to be channelled to a single owner, then who will be 
held liable? New Zealand law may use the CLC Convention’s definitions of 
pollution damage and preventive measures, but how is that liability defined, 
quantified and allocated? The definition of liability also has a bearing on standing. 
Is it only regulatory agencies that can bring claims, or will members of the public 
also be entitled to be compensated for damage to their property and interests? If 
liability is unlimited, then what are the implications for insurers, what level of 
insurance is to be required, and can offshore petroleum operators find products to 
match their pollution damage obligations? Are there any defences or exceptions to 
that liability, and what about the appeal process? Are there other penalties under 





Meanwhile, the European Union responded to the Deepwater Horizon crisis by 
expanding its existing environmental damage liability law to include operational 
activities in its Member States’ EEZs; specifically, Directive 2004/35/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, otherwise 
known as the Environmental Liability Directive (“ELD”) as amended by Directive 
2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations (“OSD”).4  The ELD 
provides that operators of occupational activities will be liable for the costs of 
preventing and remediating damage to the environment, but only if that damage is 
significant and only if it is caused to one or more of three categories. The Directive 
does not allow any EU citizen or organization to claim compensation for any harm 
it has suffered, however, as it was believed that Member State law provided 
sufficient protection for business, personal and property damage claims. The OSD 
has adopted this system, but because it does not provide cover for the sorts of claims 
that business and property owners affected by an oil spill are most likely to make, 
the danger now is that such a disaster could cause expensive and unpredictable 
litigation, swamping national courts with a myriad of poorly founded claims. Not 
only that, but neither the ELD nor the OSD can be used to force Member States to 
require offshore petroleum operators to guarantee their environmental liability with 
mandatory insurance, and there is no EU environmental damage compensation fund 
to cover any unpaid compensation claims. 
The comparison between New Zealand the EU’s experiences with creating offshore 
pollution or environmental damage liability regimes for offshore oil spills, shows 
that the unexpected challenges that can arise when seeking to craft new liability 
regimes from pre-existing international legal frameworks. This thesis will use the 
comparison to make recommendations regarding how oil pollution damage should 
be interpreted in New Zealand law, and to ensure that offshore installation owners’ 
liabilities are secured by appropriate minimum mandatory financial security 
requirements. The discussion will also explore the international community’s 
                                                 
4  Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage 
[2004] OJ L 143/56; Directive 2013/30/ EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC [2013] 
OJ L 178/66.. 




unwillingness to apply international legal principles to offshore petroleum 
exploration and extraction activities. National economic interests have a tendency 
to trump concerns about environmental damage caused by such a lucrative industry, 
and that has deterred all efforts to create an international offshore petroleum 
industry oil pollution damage liability and fund convention.  
 
1.2 Thesis Methodology  
Different academic disciplines may approach the same topic from different 
directions using their own specific methodologies. For example, an economist’s 
priority may be to maximise economic efficiency, and to design and model liability 
and compensation systems in order to deter only the most excessively 
environmental damaging activities. Marine biologists investigate the adverse 
effects that human activities have on coastal ecosystems, but may be more 
interested in diffuse and historic contamination that legal liability regimes struggle 
to address. Law can and should take a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing lessons 
from economic, science-based, and public policy methodologies in order to 
encourage efficiency, prevent environmental damage and incentivize positive social 
outcomes.  
In terms of legal liability, however, a lawyer must prepare for the worst-case 
scenario and for the eventuality that policy objectives, economic incentives, the best 
practices and process safety designs have all failed to prevent a catastrophic oil well 
blowout from occurring. As the clean-up begins, as the marine environment absorbs 
the damage and as the financial consequences reverberate through the local and 
national economy, lawyers must ask who should be held liable, who can bring a 
claim and what damages they may claim for, and, most importantly, whether the 
responsible parties have the money to pay. The thesis therefore pays attention to 
lessons from other disciplines, but its objective is to illuminate the civil, 
administrative, and criminal penalties that the owners and operators of offshore 






To address what is a conventional question of legal analysis, the thesis will employ 
conventional legal methods. In the words of Hubert Bocken, these include:5 
… grammatical or textual interpretation, historical interpretation on the basis 
of the travaux préparatoires as expression of the intent of the legislator; 
teleological interpretation in function of the objectives of the legislation; 
systematic or contextual interpretation in function of the characteristics and 
general principles of the legal order concerned; comparative interpretation in 
the light of solutions adopted in other legal systems. 
As far as comparative methodology is concerned, this thesis takes Ernst Rabel’s 
functionalist approach: “we compare the solutions produced by one state for a 
specific factual situation, and then we ask why they were produced and what 
success they had.”6 The thesis seeks to place New Zealand’s offshore liability 
regime in the international context because that is where the current marine 
pollution damage and resource management laws have come from in the past, it is 
where most of the models for success are to be found, and where most of the failures 
have been experienced, and because liability and compensation for damage caused 
by major offshore oil well accidents is a problem that cries out for an international 
solution. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure  
The thesis will therefore begin by assessing New Zealand’s recent efforts to enable 
offshore petroleum exploration and production activities in New Zealand’s 
continental waters. It will explore New Zealand’s historical oil pollution damage 
legislation, identifying the key stages in the development of the various statutory 
penalties and civil damages for marine pollution damage when it is caused by 
offshore petroleum installations and operations. This required an exploration of 
Parliamentary records, subcommittee reports, cabinet papers and ministerial policy 
documents. The thesis will look for key incidents that generated changes in the law, 
examining the resulting caselaw and the most influential or representative academic 
commentary. 
                                                 
5 Hubert Bocken “Financial Guarantees in the Environmental Liability Directive: Next Time Better” 
[2006] EELR 13 at 19. 
6 Translated in Mathias M Siems Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom, 2014) at 14. 




The next stage is to examine the incidents and legal concepts and institutions which 
contributed to the CLC and Fund Conventions, particularly those maritime disasters 
which raised issues of limited liability and the fault-based tort of negligence. The 
research drew liberally from the official records of conferences where those 
conventions were drafted and adopted.7 The Fund Convention is administered by 
the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, and the thesis made use of its 
decisions, records and policy documents, as well as examining other international 
shipping and pollution damage laws, and the various regional and international 
efforts to develop a stand-alone offshore petroleum liability and fund convention.  
The research then pivots to European law, analysing the ELD and the OSD, 
examining the context provided by the EU’s constitutional treaties, briefly 
reviewing earlier attempts to create industry specific pollution damage liability 
regimes, and the Green and White Papers that led the ELD to its current format as 
a public law environmental damage liability regime. It will seek to identify common 
features between the CLC and Fund Conventions and the European directives, 
which will allow us to make educated comments about how such environmental 
damage liability regimes can and should be designed. This will provide a context 
for the discussion of why previous international offshore petroleum industry 
liability and fund conventions have failed, and what the prospects are for future 
reforms. 
The main body of the thesis is broadly separated into three parts. Part One (Chapters 
Two to Five) will examine New Zealand’s offshore energy policy and the details of 
the offshore liability regime. Chapter Two will examine how a series of petroleum 
expert reports extolled the economic benefits to be had from attracting investment 
in offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction. It will review Maritime NZ’s oil 
spill response strategy with particular reference to the lessons taken from both the 
                                                 
7 International Maritime Organization Official Records of the International Legal Conference on 
Marine Pollution Damage, 1969 (International Maritime Organization, London, 1973); 
International Maritime Organization Official Records of the Conference on the Establishment of an 
International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (International Maritime 
Organization, London, 1978); International Maritime Organization Official Records of the 
International Conference on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connexion with the 
Carriage of Certain Substances by Sea, 1984 and the International Conference on the Revision of 






Rena and Deepwater Horizon disasters to explain why the government was 
confident that offshore oil disasters could be prevented and managed. Chapter 
Three will explore the development of New Zealand’s historic marine pollution 
damage liability laws, including the Marine Pollution Act 1974 which first accepted 
and ratified the CLC and Fund Conventions, and concluding with a detailed 
statutory analysis of the MTA’s offshore liability regime.  
Chapter Four will consider regulatory offences and their criminal penalties under 
the MTA and other statutory regimes, including the penalties for the discharge of 
harmful substances under the MTA, and which have been transferred to the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 
(“EEZ Act”) since October 2015, and similar penalties under the Resource 
Management Act 1991. It will look at penalties for failing to provide a safe work 
environment under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, and those relating to 
failures to carry out mining activities according to good industry practice under the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991. It will also look at the relationship between public 
liability and the private law of joint operating agreements. Chapter Five will 
consider the implications of mandatory insurance, and will conclude with an 
examination of the Ministry of Transport’s new offshore installation financial 
assurance regime.  
Part Two (Chapters Six to Nine) will examine the legal and historical context 
behind maritime limitation of liability and the fault-based tort law that applied 
before the CLC and Fund Conventions were created. It will show how the Torrey 
Canyon prompted their establishment, and how activist national courts used 
hypothetical environmental damage per se claims to penalise shipowners, 
challenging the IOPC Fund’s financial capabilities, and leading the IMO to attempt 
to restrict environmental damage claims with amendments that would create the 
new 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions. Chapter Nine will show how the IOPC Fund 
created the concept of the maritime transport chain to help distinguish “ships” from 
offshore craft or platforms, and it will consider how offshore craft are treated in 
international and in New Zealand law.  




Part Three (Chapters Ten to Twelve) will clarify the EU’s constitutional powers to 
regulate Member State laws via directives and regulations. It will explain how the 
ELD came to be proposed, including a discussion of the Seveso and Waste 
Directives, and why it shifted from a broad civil liability regime, which would have 
captured a broad range of possible environmental, traditional, historic and diffuse 
kinds of damage, to a public law framework giving competent authorities standing 
to pursue polluters for the costs of preventing and remediating environmental 
damage. Chapter Eleven will provide a comprehensive description of the ELD, and 
consider the difficulties that Member States have faced in its implementation. 
Chapter Twelve will then explore the debates that preceded the OSD and consider 
the implications of expanding the ELD to include offshore oil and gas activities, 
without also harmonizing the rules around mandatory insurance or providing for an 
environmental damage compensation fund.  
Chapter Thirteen will ask why it has been so difficult to establish an international 
offshore petroleum industry liability and fund convention, examining, amongst 
others, the example of the 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral 
Resources (“CLEE”).8 The CLEE Convention did result in the formation of the 
Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (“OPOL”) and this could offer an 
alternative solution for other marine regions in the EU and around the world. The 
Montara wellhead platform explosion prompted a serious discussion about whether 
the International Maritime Organization should adapt the CLC and Fund 
Conventions to include oil pollution damage caused by offshore petroleum 
exploration and extraction activities, and the thesis will explore the implications 
raised by that debate. 
Finally, the thesis will conclude with an overview and a consideration of how the 
CLC and Fund Conventions and the ELD and OSD can be used to improve and 
reform New Zealand’s offshore liability regime.  
                                                 
8  Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, London, 1977 16 ILM 1451 (opened for signature 1 May 





1.4 Why the EU and not the US? 
A final point needs to be made about the overall direction that this thesis takes. 
Although the Deepwater Horizon motivated the choice of topic, United States’ law 
is only occasionally mentioned. This is for a number of reasons. First, New 
Zealand’s marine pollution damage laws are based on the CLC and Fund 
Conventions. It makes sense then that the meaning of those laws should be 
ascertained by exploring the origins and development of the CLC and Fund 
Conventions.  
The United States of America  may have played a significant role in developing the 
CLC and Fund Conventions, but it never acceded to them. The United States  
preferred to develop its own system of federal laws, and it is those laws which were 
applied to the Deepwater  Horizon disaster. The Clean Water Act of 1972, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(“CERCLA”) or Superfund, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) which was 
created following the Exxon Valdez disaster, contain their own liability and 
compensation mechanisms. 9  These differ markedly from the CLC and Fund 
Conventions, and it is those differences which contributed significantly to the huge 
expense of the Deepwater Horizon. For example, Clean Water Act oil spill fines 
are calculated according to the volume of oil that is released, and may be multiplied 
four-fold in cases of gross negligence.10 As this thesis will explain, the CLC and 
Fund Conventions have been designed to compensate state authorities and victims 
for the actual costs of preventing and remediating oil pollution damage. In 
developing these Conventions, it was thought that punitive damages would be 
counter-productive and would destroy the balance between the shipowners’ strict 
liability, their mandatory insurance, and the oil industry compensation fund. 
The United States law also differs significantly in recognizing types of damages 
which have no equivalent in New Zealand law. For example, the Oil Pollution Act 
also bases penalties on a system of Natural Resource Damages, and that can involve 
                                                 
9 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No 114-38, 33 USC § § 1251-1377 
(1972); Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, Pub. L. No 114-
38, 42 USC § § 9601-9675 (1980); Oil Pollution Act, Pub. L. No 114-38, 33 USC § § 2701-2762 
(1990). 
10 Clean Water Act of 1972, § 311(b)(6) and (7), 33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(6) and (7) (2006). 




the use of Contingent Valuation Methodologies that survey people’s willingness to 
pay to save an area or species, or willingness to accept its loss.11 Such claims are 
again inconsistent with the pragmatic results-oriented approach of the CLC and 
Fund Conventions. New Zealand law does provide additional penalties for the 
unlawful discharge of harmful substances, but these are limited by statute, and the 
quantum of oil spill will only be one factor in sentencing. It follows that, even 
though the owners and operators of offshore installations face unlimited liability 
for oil pollution damage in New Zealand law, the various statutory regimes would 
not generate anywhere near the sum of penalties and damages that were generated 
by the United States law. 
Finally, the United States Oil Pollution Act requires industry operators to contribute 
to a $1bn USD Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. Contributions are based on the 
quantity of oil produced, and these revenues may be used to pay compensation to 
business owners and individuals suffering losses and damage as a result of an 
offshore oil spill. This differs from New Zealand’s oil pollution fund which is 
funded on a flat fee basis, is tiny in comparison, and can only be used to pay for the 
costs of maintaining and using New Zealand’s store of oil dispersants, skimmers 
and booms.  
While it would be interesting and possibly useful to explore the United States’ 
offshore oil pollution liability laws in comparison to New Zealand’s marine 
pollution damage liability regime, this thesis submits that the European Union’s 
approach is just as interesting, and possibly more relevant. Why so? This thesis will 
argue that there are many similarities between New Zealand’s adaptation of the 
CLC and Fund Conventions, and European lawmakers decision to expand its on 
environmental damage liability law to offshore petroleum activities. The EU 
Commission struggled for decades to create the ELD, but always assumed that oil 
pollution damage would be covered by the CLC and Fund Conventions. It was only 
in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon that the OSD was created to expand the 
ELD to include offshore petroleum activities. However, even though the early drafts 
of the ELD were inspired by the CLC and Fund Conventions, the ELD focussed on 
                                                 





damage to the environment itself, excluding the traditional damages claims such as 
property damage or losses of profits that the CLC and Fund Conventions were 
designed to provide, and has left the question of mandatory insurance to the 
discretion of the Member State. The EU also has no plans to institute a 
complementary environmental damage compensation fund.  
It appears then that New Zealand and the EU have taken similar paths in creating 
their marine pollution damage and environmental damage liability regimes. New 
Zealand adopted the CLC and Fund Conventions’ definitions of preventive 
measures pollution damage and simply stated that the owners and operators of 
offshore petroleum installations and activities would be strictly liable for any costs 
that fit within those categories. However, it failed to consider whether those 
definitions would cover all the costs that could arise from an offshore oil well 
disaster, and as a consequence it initially did little to ensure that those owners and 
operators would provide sufficient financial security to cover those costs, and failed 
to create a complementary oil pollution damage compensation fund. The EU has 
similarly expanded the ELD to cover offshore petroleum activities, but it too failed 
to consider whether the ELD’s definitions would cover all the claims that could 
arise from communities and businesses devastated by any potentially massive 
offshore oil spills, and it has failed to mandate minimum financial security 
requirements or a compensation fund. The result is that both New Zealand and the 
EU have taken measures which may provide a certain amount of security for the 
victims of an offshore oil well disaster, but the path to determining and 
implementing that liability is far from clear. Offshore petroleum operators will be 
subject to a hodgepodge of statutory and tortious liability laws, which vary widely 
between the Member States. This is less than ideal. 
The paradox is that, despite the fact that the CLC and Fund Conventions were 
designed to address traditional damages claims, and the ELD was designed to 
provide compensation for damage to the environment itself and not to provide 
compensation to any individual, both regimes eventually resolved that any 
preventive and remediation measures must be reasonable, quantifiable and 
effective. Like the CLC and Fund Conventions, ELD damage claims cannot be used 
for punitive purposes, the sole concern is to oblige the responsible operator to return 




the environment as near to the baseline condition as possible. Like New Zealand, 
the EU has struggled with issues surrounding mandatory insurance regulations, and 
has been unwilling or unable to institute an environmental damage compensation 
fund. It is these commonalities which make the EU’s law the more appropriate 
comparator, and it is in examining the process by which the EU came to apply its 
environmental damage regime to offshore petroleum activities that this thesis can 
find appropriate solutions to problems facing New Zealand lawmakers. 





2 New Zealand’s Offshore Energy Policy: Resource Exploitation and 
Oil Spill Contingency Planning 
New Zealand’s recent government policy has been to promote drilling for oil and 
gas and other seabed mining activities in the EEZ and continental shelf, extolling 
the economic gains from increases in oil industry jobs and revenues, while seeking 
to assuage public fears about the risk of a Deepwater Horizon sized blowout in New 
Zealand waters. At the same time as the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (“EEZ Act”) was being formulated, New 
Zealand suffered its worst-ever environmental disaster with the 2011 sinking of the 
MV Rena. Happening so soon after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident, and the 
2010 Pike River coal mine explosion, the Rena response also prompted questions 
about New Zealand’s offshore energy policy, oil spill contingency planning, and 
the adequacy of existing health and safety and environmental regulations.  
This chapter will provide a brief background to New Zealand’s history of offshore 
oil and gas exploration and extraction before showing how the government’s 
petroleum expert reports served as the basis for the 2009 Petroleum Action Plan. It 
will then examine how New Zealand’s National Oil Spill Contingency Plan was 
activated and tested by the Rena sinking. It will conclude with a discussion of two 
separate applications for judicial review of decisions permitting oil exploration 
activities in New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”).  
 
2.1 The Business Case for Offshore Petroleum Exploration and Production 
New Zealand’s settler society built its early economic prosperity on abundant and 
mostly untapped natural resources. Whaling, sealing, forestry, gold and coal mining 
were among the extractive industries that played a significant role in establishing 
the infrastructure of the new colonial state. Oil exploration has a long history in 
New Zealand, with the first well excavated at Moturoa, on New Plymouth’s 




foreshore, in 1865. 1  Operations at the Moturoa field ceased in 1972, but the 
discovery of the large 350PJ Kapuni onshore gas-condensate field in 1959, and the 
even larger 4,000PJ Maui offshore gas-condensate field in 1969, guaranteed that 
the oil and gas industry would continue to operate profitably for the foreseeable 
future. More recently the Kupe, Cheal, Pohokurua, Maari and Tui projects have 
contributed $2.9bn to the New Zealand economy, making oil and gas New 
Zealand’s third largest export in 2008.2 
2.1.1 The Petroleum Expert Reports 
The growing importance in New Zealand of offshore oil and gas activities and 
proposed seabed-mining projects created a conundrum, as there was no single law 
regulating economic activities in the EEZ and continental shelf. The Crown Mineral 
Act 1991 (“CMA”) and its regulations covered activities on the continental shelf, 
the Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”) provided a resource consenting 
process that took account of environmental impacts, but only to the 12nm limit of 
New Zealand’s territorial waters. Work towards the EEZ Bill began as early as 2007 
when the Ministry for the Environment published a discussion paper seeking 
suggestions for new EEZ regulations. The discussion paper expressed an intention 
to encourage innovation and investment in “new types of minerals exploration, 
marine energy generation, deep-sea aquaculture, or carbon capture and 
sequestration.”3 The paper’s release was timed to coincide with the moment when 
New Zealand acquired sovereign rights over an EEZ, which, depending on the way 
it is measured, is either the fourth or the fifth largest in the world.4  
The Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (“MBIE”) continued the 
momentum commissioning a number of “petroleum expert reports” to enable the 
                                                 
1 Paul Fried, Frank Handy and Peter Seccombe The Story of Maui (Maui Development, Wellington, 
N.Z., 1979) at 13. 
2 Venture Taranaki Trust The Wealth Beneath Our Feet: The Value of the Oil and Gas Industry to 
New Zealand and the Taranaki Region (Venture Taranaki Trust, New Plymouth, N.Z., 2011) at 3. 
3 Ministry for the Environment Improving regulation of environmental effects in New Zealand’s 
exclusive economic zone (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, NZ, 2007) at 4. 
4  New Zealand Petroleum & Minerals New Zealand Petroleum Basins (Ministry for Business, 
Innovation and Employment 2013) at 5; Ministry for the Environment Improving regulation of 
environmental effects in New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone (Ministry for the Environment, 
Wellington, NZ, 2007) at 1; See also Robert Makgill and Nicola de Wit “The Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill 2011” [April 2012] Resource Management 
Journal 1. 





government to “gain a better understanding of New Zealand’s petroleum 
resources.” 5  These include, but are not limited to, “East Coast Oil and Gas 
Development Study”, “East Coast Oil and Gas Development Study: Economic 
Potential of Oil and Gas Development”, (both of which focussed on hydraulic 
fracturing for onshore natural gas), and “Valuation of the Crown’s Royalty Streams 
from the Petroleum Estate” which estimated that the Crown’s expected that mid-
value future returns from oil and gas royalties over the ten years from 30 June 2010, 
would be up to $5.545bn NZD.6 MBIE and Venture Taranaki Trust added reports 
promising substantial increases in oil and gas royalties and taxes, with flow-on 
effects for the domestic economy, and the suggestion that New Zealand could make 
the transition from oil importer to oil exporter by 2030.7 All of the reports extolled 
the economic gains to be had from oil and gas exploration, but there was little 
mention of any risks of accidents causing environmental damage or loss of human 
life.  
In 2009, the Ministry of Economic Development commissioned energy industry 
brokerage firm McDouall Stuart to outline options to maximise returns from New 
Zealand’s petroleum and mineral resources. The McDouall Stuart report described 
the oil and gas sector as a “quiet, but already big achiever.”8 For example, New 
Zealand’s most valuable single export cargo ever was shipped in July 2008, when 
the MV Pacific Partner sailed for Hawaii carrying $114m worth of crude oil. Then 
there was the Tui oil field which had returned $700m in revenue to the Crown in 
just two years. The same report also made optimistic revenue projections about the 
newly opened Pike River coal mine. It was a cruel irony that the Pike River mine 
management encouraged shoddy mining practices that went unchecked by an 
                                                 
5  Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment “Petroleum expert reports” (4 August 2015) 
<www.mbie.govt.nz> (accessed 10 December 2015). 
6  Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment East Coast Oil and Gas Development Study 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Wellington, N.Z., 2013); Chris Schilling East 
Coast oil and gas development study: Economic potential of oil and gas development (New Zealand 
Institute of Economic Research, Wellington, N.Z., 2012); Woodward Partners Valuation of the 
Crown’s Royalty Streams from the Petroleum Estate (Ministry of Economic Development, 
Wellington, N.Z., 2011) at 1. 
7 Jason Leung-Wai Regional Impacts of a New Oil or Gas Field: Report to the Ministry of Economic 
Development (Business and Economic Research Ltd, 2012) at 21–22; James Zuccollo Value of Oil 
and Gas Exploration: Hypothetical Scenarios (NZ Institute of Economic Research Inc, 2012) at 1–
4. 
8 John Kidd, Michael Moore and Roger Paterson Stepping Up: Options for Developing the Potential 
of New Zealand’s Oil, Gas and Minerals Sector (McDouall Stuart, Wellington, NZ, 2009) at 1. 




underfunded inspection regime, and that it would shortly be destroyed by an 
explosion killing 29 men on 19th of November 2010.9 McDouall Stuart itself would 
later be fined $83,000 for breaching the NZX’s market rules and has since resigned 
from trading due to lack of capital, but its enthusiastic findings continued to 
reverberate in government circles.10 
McDouall Stuart’s basic logic was that if the Taranaki region had produced 2 billion 
barrels of oil equivalent (“BOE”), then New Zealand’s total oil reserves could be 
calculated by multiplying the area yet to be explored.11 Four hundred ‘Tui fields’ 
would amount to a $1 trillion NZD reserve, equivalent to that of the United 
Kingdom or Norway. The only obstacle in the way of accessing those resources 
was “an inherited legacy of weak leadership and vision from government”, the lack 
of “an integrated national strategy”, and an irrational fear of climate change.12 
McDouall Stuart recommended that the government disregard opposition, remove 
the RMA and the Emissions Trading Scheme, and open up Crown land to foreign 
and domestic mining companies. The Resource Management (Simplifying and 
Streamlining) Amendment Bill 2009 was a positive step forward, as it would 
“address the issue of vexatious objectors, decrease local authority resource consent 
processing timeframes”, and reduce local opposition to projects of national 
significance.13  
Much of that local opposition would come from local iwi, and the reports neglected 
to mention New Zealand’s controversial history with foreshore and seabed 
legislation. The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 had extinguished Maori claims to 
the foreshore and seabed until it was repealed and replaced by the Marine and 
Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. This restored Maori customary interests, 
while declaring that common marine and coastal areas were not owned by the 
Crown, or any other person, and were not capable of being owned. Maori retain the 
                                                 
9 See Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy Royal Commission on the Pike River 
Coal Mine Tragedy: Volume One + Overview (Wellington, N.Z., 2012). 
10 Tamsyn Parker “Broker McDouall Stuart fined, censured for NZX breaches” New Zealand Herald 
(22 December 2010) <www.nzherald.co.nz>; Gareth Vaughan “McDouall Stuart was ‘intensively 
supervised’ by NZX” (15 April 2010) <www.interest.co.nz>. 
11 Kidd, Moore and Paterson Stepping Up, above n 8, at 2. 
12 At 2–3. 
13 At 68. 





right to be consulted, but cannot make Waitangi Tribunal claims for ownership of 
the seabed or the mineral resources contained therein, and cannot block any 
offshore activities.14  
2.1.2 The Petroleum Action Plan 
This was the context within which the Ministry of Economic Development released 
its “Petroleum Action Plan” in November of 2009.15 The plan paralleled McDouall 
Stuart’s recommendations, with six workstreams separated into three Option 
Packages: minimal, moderate and significant stretch. 16  Minimal stretch would 
involve improved leadership, fiscal incentives, freedom of information and agency 
support. Moderate stretch involved legislative reviews, and reform of permitting, 
research and new investment models with improved technical support. Significant 
stretch would involve substantial government participation including direct state 
investment and underwriting of private financial risks. 
The Petroleum Action Plan’s final workstreams involved 8 Actions: 
Action 1: Communicating explicit Government support for development of 
petroleum resources; 
Action 2: Coordinating investment in R&D to maximise strategic 
management and investment; 
Action 3: Reviewing Crown’s ability to manage the petroleum estate; 
Action 4: Improving quality of petroleum reserve data from industry 
participants to the Government 
Action 5: Reviewing regulations and fiscal incentives, in line with the Aupec 
Report, to ensure the Government receives a fair share of petroleum 
revenue; 
Action 6: Reviewing Crown Minerals and existing permitting regimes; 
Action 7: Exploring gas hydrates potential; 
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16 Kidd, Moore and Paterson Stepping Up, above n 8, at 79. 




Action 8: Reviewing health and safety regulations and the RMA “to assess the 
adequacy of New Zealand’s regulatory environment for offshore 
petroleum operations.” 
This would put the Petroleum Action Plan squarely within the Moderate Stretch 
option. In other words, the policy would be to encourage petroleum and minerals 
exploration to the greatest extent possible, without requiring the government to 
either directly invest in a National Oil Company, such as Brazil’s Petrobras or 
Norway’s Statoil, or to promise that it would reimburse exploration companies for 
sunk costs in dry wells.  
The Petroleum Action Plan has since been quietly dropped from view and can no 
longer be found online, but it is mentioned in MBIE’s “New Zealand Energy 
Strategy 2011-2021”.17 This states that New Zealand’s energy policy is to pursue 
four priorities: diverse resource development; environmental responsibility; 
achieving efficient use of energy; and promoting energy security and 
affordability.”18 The Energy Strategy makes no mention of offshore petroleum 
operations, saying only that “New Zealand’s future competitiveness will … require 
innovative solutions in the sources and uses of energy – both renewable and non-
renewable.” 19  The Energy Strategy confirms that the government’s role is to 
“provide incentives and information, and to help remove barriers to markets 
operating effectively.”20 
Between 2012 and 2013, the Ministry for the Environment released two further 
discussion documents considering the coming regulation of the EEZ, and a risk 
assessment of offshore activities by the National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research (“NIWA”).21 These again lauded the economic benefits of 
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19 At 3. 
20 At 4. 
21 Ministry for the Environment Managing our oceans: A discussion document on the regulations 
proposed under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill 
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resource exploration and extraction in the EEZ but offered little discussion of the 
risk of oil pollution damage.22 For example, the NIWA report said that activities of 
“high environmental risk” included the use of surface flood lights, seismic 
surveying, ship strikes, and the displacement of the benthic ecosystem, but that 
there were “no activities associated with oil and gas extraction considered to 
represent an extreme environmental risk”.23 NIWA explained its omission, saying 
that:24 
We have not assessed the environmental risks from oil spills in this report. Oil 
spill risk and response is managed under the Health and Safety in Employment 
Act 1992 and the Maritime Transport Act 1994. We have assessed the 
potential risk from other oil and gas activities that are not already covered by 
existing legislation. 
A subsequent regulatory impact assessment lamented the time and administrative 
expense of dumping applications, with costs of between $250,000 and $1.5m NZD 
for a publicly notified application.25  Non-notified discretionary marine consent 
applications would cost between $100,000 and $450,000 NZD, depending upon 
their complexity, and would take 60 working days to process as opposed to 140 
working days for a fully notified marine consent. 26  
Applicants would cover these costs, but a longer and more expensive process could 
deter some operators from undertaking activities in New Zealand. The public would 
be prevented from submitting their opposition or appealing against non-notified 
discretionary consents.27 Any party would still be entitled to seek judicial review of 
marine consents, however. 
The government increased the penalties for interfering with an offshore structure or 
operation, or even entering a permitted prospecting, exploration or mining ‘non-
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interference zone’.28 Individuals could now be imprisoned for up to 12 months and 
fined up to $50,000, and body corporates, like Greenpeace, could be fined up to 
$100,000. A new EEZ Act regulation categorised exploratory drilling as non-
notified discretionary so that the public would no longer be notified or have the 
opportunity to submit on or appeal against any drilling activities.29 Along with the 
foreshore and seabed legislation, the net effect of these laws appeared to be to 
neutralise the local communities most vocal in their opposition to offshore 
petroleum exploration and production activities. Afterwards, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, Jan Wright, expressed her disappointment that 
the public’s concerns were not to be considered, but said that this was consistent 
with a trend towards centralisation of the resource management decision-making.30  
 
2.2 Judicial Review of Petrobras’ and Anadarko’s Marine Consent Applications  
The EEZ Act’s new permitting procedures would be brought under close scrutiny 
when Greenpeace filed two suits for judicial review. In the first case, brought before 
the EEZ Act came into force, Greenpeace joined with local hapu, Te Runanga o Te 
Whanau-A-Apanui, in challenging the Energy Minister’s decision to permit 
Petrobras’ application to drill in the Raukumara Basin. The second came under the 
EEZ Act’s transitional provisions in November of 2013, when Anadarko NZ 
Taranaki Company submitted an environmental impact assessment in support of its 
application to undertake an exploratory drilling programme off the west coast of 
the North Island.31  
Professor Kenneth Palmer has explained that the Petrobras case highlighted the 
lacuna in environmental regulation in the EEZ.32 The RMA may have provided for 
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comprehensive environmental impact assessment on land and in the 12 nautical 
mile (nm) coastal marine area, but the legal framework in the EEZ was far less 
developed and mining activities depended almost solely upon the Minister of 
Energy’s discretion. The case points out that the regulatory and allocation functions 
were deliberately separated between the RMA and the CMA in order to avoid that 
very conflict of interest.33 Indeed, the Minister’s affidavit stated that he “did not 
consider matters relating to the protection of the marine environment, as they were 
not matters for me to consider, as Minister of Energy and Resources exercising a 
power under the Act.”34 The Minister was therefore correct in disregarding New 
Zealand’s international obligations concerning environmental matters when 
administering the CMA, and was not required to demand that Petrobras provide any 
environmental impact assessment for activities in the EEZ.35  
In the second instance, Anadarko planned to use a drillship to drill a single 
exploration well approximately 115 km northwest of New Plymouth. Ignoring the 
thousands of protesters lining west coast beaches that weekend, and a flotilla of 
protest boats flouting the 500m non-interference zone, the drillship Noble Bob 
Douglas began drilling in the early hours of the 26th of November 2013.36 Anadarko 
had held a 25% interest in the Deepwater Horizon, and, by operating in waters 
1520m deep, drilling operations would be carried out at almost the same depth as 
the Macondo well. 37  That same day, Greenpeace sought a judicial review of 
Anadarko’s marine consent, asserting that the EPA had not properly assessed oil 
spill modelling reports and contingency plans, and had therefore committed a 
reviewable error of law.38  
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The EEZ Act had yet to come into force, but its transitional provisions allowed a 
planned permitted activity to begin without a marine consent on the condition that 
the person undertaking that activity prepared an environmental impact assessment 
(“EIA”) for the EPA.39 Anadarko was also required to provide Maritime NZ with 
an oil spill trajectory model study as part of the Discharge Management Plan.40 The 
model predicted that there was only a medium (1-3%) chance of oil beaching along 
the Waikato coastline. 41  However, the EIA predicted that deaths would occur 
amongst birds, marine mammals, sea turtles, fish and plants and that fishing 
operations would have to cease to avoid catching contaminated fish and ruining 
nets, and tourism would also be adversely affected.42 It conceded that:43 
…. significant impacts could possibly result should a loss of well 
control occur, Such impacts have been shown in such examples globally 
as being long-term and widespread, impacting various sensitive species. 
Accordingly the severity of such impacts is considered to be high. 
Anadarko promised to that its well trained staff could deal with any oil spill 
contingency, its Blow Out Preventer would be well maintained, and, as its spill 
response contractors planned for extreme weather, the likelihood of such an 
accident was “extremely unlikely”.44  Anadarko characterised the risk as falling 
within the category of ALARP, an acronym meaning “As Low as Reasonably 
Practicable … the point at which the cost and effort (time and trouble of further risk 
reduction is grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved.”45 
The Greenpeace suit averred that the EIA was incomplete because it failed to 
provide annexes detailing trajectory information for the spill on the seaward side of 
the EEZ zone.46 The EPA erred in accepting an EIA that neglected to specify all 
elements of the emergency spill response.47 However, the Court said that:48 
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A decision which is ‘wholly administrative in nature’ and ‘essentially 
mechanical’ is not readily susceptible to the sort of error which may justify 
judicial review. To succeed on the present application, Greenpeace must 
demonstrate an error of law by EPA. 
The Court was not prepared to substitute its decision on the merits of the application 
and Greenpeace’s challenge was dismissed. 
The plan also caused a stir in Parliament, after Labour Leader David Cunliffe 
claimed that the government had withheld a study based on the Deepwater Horizon 
experience which “undermined the National-led Government’s assurance that deep 
sea oil exploration off New Zealand’s coast was low-risk.” 49  The study, 
commissioned by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling, showed that there was a 10% chance of an accident occurring 
at operations in 500 feet of water, but this risk increased to 70% at 5,000 feet.50 
Environment Minister Amy Adams replied that, while risks increased with depth, 
the term “reported incident” included property damage, worker injuries and days 
shut down.51 It did not necessarily refer to spills, which, she said, averaged out at 
2.54 per 1,000 wells, and were mostly small and easily contained. 
However, Mr Cunliffe used the Official Secrets Act 1982 to obtain a Ministry for 
the Environment ministerial briefing note advising the Minister that the potential 
effects of an oil spill were likely to be serious and these applications required further 
consideration.52 The briefing note explained that the EEZ Act’s section 6(1)(f) 
defines “effect” as “any potential effect of low probability that has a high potential 
impact.”53 If an oil spill did occur, “it is highly likely to have a catastrophic impact 
on New Zealand’s coastline and huge economic consequences, regardless of other 
marine management regimes in place.”54 Even though there are few wells in New 
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Zealand waters, risk analysis would have to factor in water depth, the pressure 
characteristics of the field, the development phase of the well (both Montara and 
Deepwater Horizon blew out while transitioning from the exploratory to production 
phase), and the type of equipment being used.55 The worst-case discharge rate could 
be anywhere between 100,000 and 350,000 barrels per day, and containment would 
depend in part on the “proximity and availability of vessels, rigs and equipment 
with the capability to undertake capping or relief well drilling.”56 Much of this 
information was withheld from the initial OIA request on the grounds that it was 
out of scope, and it took a further request by Mr Cunliffe for the full report to be 
released.57  
The point to take away from the two cases challenging Petrobras’ and Anadarko’s 
offshore activities is that, in spite of credible information detailing the risks of a 
New Zealand Deepwater Horizon, is that neither the courts nor the Minister were 
prepared to thoroughly question these operators drilling plans. The permitting 
procedures had been conducted according to the law of the time, and the expectation 
was that these experienced operators would carry out their seismic surveying and 
exploratory drilling safely and without incident. As it happened, neither 
organization’s efforts resulted in a successful find, and subsequently, international 
interest in New Zealand as a hydrocarbon destination would gradually subside, if 
never disappearing altogether. 
 
2.3 New Zealand’s Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response 
Numerous reports had presented a rose-tinted economic case for offshore petroleum 
exploration and production activities, and considering that New Zealand’s 
petroleum industry had never experienced a serious blowout in its long history, 
there was reason to be confident in the future. However, block tenders were now 
being offered in waters even deeper than those which claimed the Deepwater 
Horizon, the question has to be asked, why were government policy makers so 
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confident that the risks of a catastrophic loss of well control incident were either 
negligible or manageable? To understand that aspect, it is necessary to look at how 
New Zealand’s oil spill contingency planning is intended to work, how the system 
was tested to its limits by the 2011 Rena disaster. 
2.3.1 Maritime NZ and New Zealand’s Oil Spill Response Strategy 
While the Ministry of Transport is responsible for regulating and developing policy 
for all transport in New Zealand, including shipping, Maritime New Zealand 
(“Maritime NZ”) is the crown entity tasked with protecting the marine environment, 
and managing New Zealand’s National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan. 58 
Maritime NZ’s Marine Pollution Response Services (“MPRS”) maintains New 
Zealand’s stores of oil booms and dispersants and provides contingency planning 
and response training. It has trained up to 400 responders and convenes the 
Maritime Incident Response Team (“MIRT”) whenever there is the potential risk 
of an oil spill at sea.59 The National On-Scene Commander (“NOSC”) makes the 
critical decisions about what response is to be taken, and the MIRT will provide 
independent strategic oversight, advice and support and will deal with political 
matters such as briefing Government minsters and the press. In addition, Maritime 
NZ is tasked with promoting maritime safety, investigating accidents, and ensuring 
that owners of marine structures have mandatory insurance, amongst other things.60 
Maritime New Zealand says its responsibility is to maintain “successful 
relationships and partnerships between Maritime NZ, regional councils and unitary 
authorities, government partners industry and domestic and overseas agencies”, to 
protect “human safety, health and welfare, and to ensure that decisions about 
“response options and clean-up standards” will be underpinned by Net 
Environmental Benefit Analysis (“NEBA”).61 Maritime NZ could also call upon 
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Massey University’s National Oiled Wildlife Response Team, New Zealand’s 
Defence Force and Police, private trucking companies and Fulton Hogan, and, in a 
major publicised incident, would expect to manage a massive cohort of public 
volunteers.62  
There are three to four levels of oil spill contingency planning. The operator of the 
ship or facility must deal with small Tier 1 spills, mid-sized Tier 2 spills are the 
responsibility of the regional council, and larger Tier 3 spills require a national 
response.63 The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Cooperation (“OPRC”) provides a fourth tier in that signatories must maintain 
oil spill response equipment and planning, and can request assistance from overseas 
states. 64  As well as that, New Zealand has a bilateral aid agreement with the 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority.65 It also maintains relationships with the 
international not-for-profit industry-funded organization, Oil Spill Response 
(“OSR”), which is based in Singapore and played a significant role in the 
Deepwater Horizon response effort.66 New Zealand is also a party to the Noumea 
Convention, which requires its signatories to cooperate in combating pollution in 
emergencies, and that may involve developing individual and joint contingency 
plans to deal with polluting incidents.67 However, the majority of the parties to that 
Convention are isolated island nations, and only Australia and New Zealand are 
likely to maintain significant stocks of oil spill response materiel.68 
If the spill is Tier 2 or above, or if the response costs exceed $250,000 NZD, then 
either the Regional or National On-Scene Commander is notified, and he or she will 
decide on the appropriate measures to prevent further pollution and to contain and 
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clean up the oil spill.69  Any spill in the EEZ automatically becomes a Tier 3 
emergency. On-Scene Commanders have wide-ranging powers and may:70 
(a) Direct the master or owner of the ship or offshore installation to 
“do anything, or refrain from doing anything that the on-scene 
commander considers necessary or desirable to control or clean 
up the marine oil spill”; 
(b) Remove any person obstructing the response from the area; 
(c) Evacuate people, vehicles and ships; 
(d) Completely or partially restrict public access; 
(e) Remove or forcibly enter any vehicle or ship impeding access; 
(f) Inspect any ship, vehicle or thing; and 
(g) Requisition any “land, building, vehicle, New Zealand ship, or 
any other real or personal property to place that property under his 
or her control and direction.” 
Owners of requisitioned property that is lost or damaged must be compensated from 
the New Zealand Oil Pollution Fund or by the Crown.71 Likewise, a person who 
carries out any oil spill response and suffers loss or damage to his or her personal 
property is entitled to compensation for the value of the lost property, or the 
reduction in value if it is only damaged.72 Otherwise, the Crown, Maritime NZ and 
the regional councils, their employees and on-scene commanders enjoy immunity 
from claims for damages to property due to any marine oil response, so long as they 
are exercising their functions, duties or powers in good faith.73 
2.3.2 Reviews of the Oil Spill Response Strategy 
New Zealand’s petroleum expert reports give little regard towards the risks of 
offshore oil well blowouts, yet it took the combined technological and logistical 
might of BP, Transocean, Halliburton and the United States federal and state 
governments 87 days to stop the Deepwater Horizon blowout.74  The Montara 
accident occurred in waters only 77m deep, and that took more than 10 weeks to 
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cap.75 New Zealand’s geographical isolation means that it will take much longer to 
find and deploy well control equipment or a second MODU, and months more if a 
second relief well has to be drilled. For example, Shell Oil has said that that it would 
take at least 14 days just to bring a capping stack to New Zealand.76 It is not clear 
how well that technology will work, considering that the United States’ Bureau of 
Safety and Environmental Enforcement observed that Shell’s oil spill containment 
dome was “crushed like a beer can” the first time it was deployed in sea trials.77  
It is also not possible to predict whether a New Zealand field might replicate the 
high-pressure, high-temperature characteristics of the Deepwater Horizon’s 
Macondo field. 78  However, New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals is offering 
blocks for offshore oil and gas exploration activities in the shallow waters near the 
coastline in depths of 1,750m off Cape Reinga, and at 2,400m in the Raukumara 
Block. 79  New Zealand’s difficult prevailing weather conditions could also 
complicate matters. Dayne Maxwell, Response Planning Officer at Maritime NZ, 
was quoted in Parliament saying that: “Most of the response equipment that we 
have is designed for near-shore sheltered conditions, and really there isn’t available 
internationally any equipment designed to operate in the rough kind of conditions 
offshore that we have in New Zealand.”80  
Perhaps in response to the Montara accident, in September 2009, Maritime NZ 
approved a three-stage review of the Marine Oil Spill Response Strategy, beginning 
with the Marine Oil Pollution Risk Assessment project (“MOSRA10”). 81 
MOSRA10 was updated to MOSRA15 in 2015, and anyone may visit the Maritime 
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NZ website and view its modelling of New Zealand’s coast.82 The model breaks the 
coastline into 20km coastal ‘cells’, and each cell’s risk level is assessed according 
to “current vessel activity and associated movement of oil.”83 MOSRA15 could be 
used in conjunction with the NEBA system to decide how to allocate emergency 
response measures, with the most effort going to save the most precious and 
sensitive areas. MOSRA10 predicted “a general lowering – over a 10 year period – 
of the probability of a given quantity of oil being spilled and arriving at the New 
Zealand coastline.”84 Despite the public’s concerns following the Rena, the latest 
MOSRA15 report determined that the risk levels from shipping and offshore 
activities have remained basically unchanged since that 2010 review.85  
Thompson Clarke Shipping also conducted a “Review of New Zealand’s Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response Capability” (“TCS Review”) in 2011.86 The 
TCS Review concluded that, while it could not identify “any significant gaps in the 
present response system that could lead to a response not being mounted”, there 
were a number of issues which could be detrimental to an effective response. These 
included:87  
1. A shortage of skills at Maritime NZ; 
2. Concerns about communication from the Oil Pollution Advisory 
Committee; 
3. Confusion between several Government Ministries and their 
Departments roles under the 2006 Strategy; 
4. No strategy for dealing with wāhi tapu; 
5. No coordination with the Royal New Zealand Navy; and 
6. Diminishing Oil Pollution Fund reserves. 
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Maritime NZ maintains capacity for a 1-in-100 years spill event of 3,500 tonnes.88 
The TCS Review recommended increasing that capacity to cope with a 5,500 ton 
event, such as if a 100,000 tonnes tanker suffered damage to one wing. The review 
does not explain why it assumes that a tanker might only suffer partial damage, and 
not the complete loss of the vessel, but the report did acknowledge that New 
Zealand’s “unpredictable” coastal waters would make coping with offshore oil 
spills “extremely difficult.”89 
The report further acknowledged that New Zealand has had some experience with 
offshore oil spills, with OMV New Zealand reporting two small spills from its 
FPSO Raroa in October and November of 2010.90 As for the “Lessons learned from 
Deepwater Horizon and Montara”, the TCS Review accepted that the incidents 
“demonstrated patterns of industry complacency and failure to adhere to Standard 
Operating Procedures.”91 New Zealand was also similar to the United States and 
Australia in that its offshore oil and gas industry was also overseen by several 
Government agencies with overlapping responsibilities, and the possibility existed 
for “similar oversight breakdown”. 92  The solution was to accept the 11 
recommendations from Maritime NZ’s “Deepwater Horizon Discussion Paper”.93 
Amongst other things, these argued that:94 
• Command structures aim to deal with spills that crossed regional 
boundaries or were of national significance and not assume that 
Coordinated Incident Management Structures (“CIMS”) can be 
scaled up, or that the National Contingency Plan is already 
sufficiently detailed; 
• Electronic incident response systems must have the capacity to 
deal with the data generated by the largest spill; 
• Maritime NZ should build “strategic relationships with a number 
of logistics companies and military logistics specialists and 
exercise this aspect of responding”; 
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• MNS should involve itself in other international oil spill events 
and funding should be allocated for that purpose. 
Nowhere was it argued that New Zealand should itself maintain a capacity to deal 
with multi-million barrel spills, or have the financial resources to do so, rather 
Maritime NZ concluded that its system was “’scalable’ and robust.”95  A 2010 
MPRS audit report had considered whether a Tier 3 response might exceed 
Maritime NZ’s capabilities, but that this was not a problem because New Zealand 
could always obtain international assistance.96 Bruce Anderson, General Manager 
of Monitoring and Response at Maritime NZ, had travelled to the Gulf of Mexico 
to aid in the Deepwater Horizon response. He reiterated the point that “New 
Zealand has relationships and agreements in place to quickly call on international 
assistance in the event of a major disaster, which puts the country in a position to 
response effectively in any situation.”97 The Australian National Plan for Maritime 
Environmental Emergencies appears to be heavily dependent upon operators’ 
mutual aid agreements, and the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre may not be any 
better equipped than Maritime NZ.98   
The “New Zealand Marine Oil Spill Response Strategy 2015-2019” explains that 
New Zealand’s strategies will mirror BP’s Deepwater Horizon “cone of response 
model.”99 The response begins with the point of the cone at the source, then expands 
out as the oil reaches the surface, then outwards over the immediate source area, 
then to the near shore, and finally to where its widest arc impacts with the coastline. 
The government takes responsibility for treating any surface oil, and will use 
dispersants, containment and recovery with booms and skimmers, with in-situ 
burning where possible, and by manual and mechanical clean-up on the shoreline. 
The government will also take responsibility for cleaning up oiled wildlife, but it is 
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also likely that local community groups will be actively involved. Meanwhile, the 
operator will be responsible for the sub-surface response and must provide detailed 
plans for all “well interventions including activating blowout preventers, 
introduction of subsea dispersant injection and well control either through capping 
systems or relief well drilling are the responsibility of industry.”100 The discussion 
of issues of liability and compensation was again conspicuous by its absence. 
2.3.3 New Zealand’s Oil Pollution Fund 
New Zealand does have an oil spill contingency fund known as the New Zealand 
Oil Pollution Fund (“NZOPF”) which is governed by the MTA and by the Maritime 
Transport (Oil Pollution Levies) Order 2013. The NZOPF is used to meet the costs 
of the Oil Pollution Advisory Committee, Maritime NZ, and the various regional 
councils in planning for and responding to oil spills, and to compensate for private 
property that may be requisitioned or damaged because of the response.101 It is also 
used to “purchase plant, equipment, or any other thing to make preparations for, or 
to implement, or assist in implementing, any response to marine oil spills.”102 
However, it only provides funding for a few million dollars each year and its funds 
cannot be used to pay compensation for pollution damage claims.   
The NZOPF might usefully be compared with the United States’ Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund (“OSLTF”) instituted under the 1990 Oil Pollution Act. OSLTF imposes 
levies of 8 US cents per barrel of crude oil received or petroleum products entered 
for consumption, use or warehousing.103 The United States’ offshore petroleum 
industry is vast in comparison to New Zealand’s, and the OLSTF is able to allocate 
up to $1bn USD per incident towards the costs of oil removal and environmental 
damages, costs related to the Intervention on the High Seas Act, penalties imposed 
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, for the Deepwater Port Liability 
Fund, and for the payment of liabilities under the Offshore Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund.104 More specifically, section 1012 of the OPA states that the 
fund provides for the payment of removal costs and “for assessing natural resource 
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damages and for developing and implementing plans for the restoration, 
rehabilitation, replacement or acquisition of the equivalent of damaged resources”. 
In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations provides for mandatory insurance, in 
that each person who owns or operates a facility used for drilling, producing, 
processing or storing more than one thousand barrels of oil must submit evidence 
of financial responsibility of $35m USD.105  
The NZOPF is also funded by owners and masters of ships, Floating Production, 
Storage and Offloading installations (“FPSOs”) and oil sites, but instead of 
calculating levies on the volume of oil produced, New Zealand levies are based on 
a flat annual rate.106 The NZOPF only gathered $3.1m in funds per year, and, since 
it was completely spent in pay for the Rena response, the Maritime Transport (Oil 
Pollution Levies) Order 2013 was passed to increase annual revenues to $4.5m 
NZD. 107  Each Oil Site must pay a base levy, a capability levy and a capital 
expenditure levy. For FPSOs, the base levy is $85,186 per annum, and for other 
offshore installations, it is $8,888.89 per annum. If we assume that a major accident 
will occur once every 35 years, then at these rates, the operator of each offshore 
installation would only have contributed a little over $311,000 NZD in that time. 
The NZOPF may be helpful, and its payments may be used to “meet any other 
expenditure for which [the MTA] contemplates that reimbursement may be made 
from the Fund”, but it has neither the capacity nor the intent to provide 
compensation for pollution damage claims.108  
The Inland Revenue Department does administer an environmental restoration 
account scheme to encourage businesses to set aside funds for environmental 
restoration costs with tax deductions and interest payments.109 It is not clear how 
many operators, if any, have taken advantage of this scheme, so the fact remains 
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that there is neither a public nor a private dedicated offshore petroleum 
environmental damage compensation fund in New Zealand. 
 
2.4 Lessons from Rena  
The Rena grounded on the Astrolabe Reef off Tauranga on the 5th of October 2011 
and despite initial hopes that it could be saved, the sea tore the ship to pieces, 
spilling oil and scattering debris up and down the Bay of Plenty coastline over the 
following weeks. It became one of the most expensive and complicated salvage 
efforts in history, costing in excess of $500m NZD which makes it second in 
expense only to the 2012 capsize of the Costa Concordia.110 The New Zealand 
government’s bill of $46,891,000 was spread across 17 government departments 
and agencies, but this sum did not include the additional costs to local government 
or local businesses, ongoing damage to the environment, or the man-hours 
expended by volunteers in the clean-up operation. 111  The sinking provided 
Maritime NZ’s first real test and led many environmental activists to conclude that 
New Zealand was not fully prepared for future offshore oil spills, particularly if 
they became more prevalent due to the proposed increases in offshore petroleum 
exploration and extraction activities. 112  Simon Murdoch’s independent review 
reassuringly concluded that the scale and complexity of Rena caused Maritime NZ 
to “buckle initially” but to “adapt, adjust and create resilience”. 113  However, 
Murdoch explains that this was only so because the vessel held together long 
enough for an alliance to form between Maritime NZ, the Swedish P & I Club, and 
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other foreign and domestic contributors and salvors.114 Atkins et al. reported that 
Maritime NZ’s capacity to deal with major incidents on its own had been limited 
by funding constraints and “historical policy choices about acceptable risk”.115 
Maritime NZ may have been lulled into a false sense of security by the recent 
Thompson Clarke review, by an over-reliance on the MOSRA10 project that 
focussed on medium sized Tier 2 incidents and that assumed that more serious 
incidents would gradually build in scale and intensity, allowing the logistical build-
up to keep pace.116 The Rena involved a “cold-start Tier 3 response”, however, 
which was an eventuality that nobody appears to have anticipated.117  
As the Rena was a cargo ship, the pollution damage did not fall under the 1992 CLC 
and Fund Conventions. The incident would have fallen under the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 (“Bunkers 
Convention”) which holds shipowners strictly liable for pollution damage from fuel 
carried in their ship’s bunkers, requires the shipowner to maintain insurance to 
cover bunker fuel pollution damage, and allows claimants to bring direct action 
against the ship’s insurer.118 However, the New Zealand government had failed to 
adopt the Bunkers Convention, or the latest protocol of the Convention on 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1996 (“LLMC”). The effect of this is 
that owners of non-CLC ships like the Rena would not be subject to the Bunkers 
Convention’s rules for liability and compensation for pollution damage caused by 
fuel oil spills, and their limits of liability would be set according to the lower levels 
of the LLMC 1976. The point reveals that the government was not paying close 
attention to developments in international law, and that could have lessened the 
Rena’s owner’s and insurer’s liability. 
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Fortunately, Rena was owned by Daina Shipping Co., a subsidiary of the Greek 
shipping company Costamare Inc., and Costamare were members of the Swedish 
Club. The Swedish Club is one of 13 members of the International Group of 
Protection and Indemnity Clubs, and it agreed to meet the full $500m NZD cost of 
the salvage effort.119 Less fortunately, the vast majority of these funds were spent 
on dismantling and partially removing the wreck, and as little as $11m NZD was 
left to compensate private business losses.120 It is not clear whether the Swedish 
Club were motivated by generosity, by the fear of damage to reputation, or in 
anticipation of expensive litigation. The MTA does provide third parties with the 
right to take direct action against insurers of regulated ships and this may have been 
a motivating factor.121 Regulated ships are ships of 400 gross tonnage or more, not 
including oil tankers, and would include the Rena.122 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
The government’s petroleum expert reports had made a strong case for attracting 
investment in extractive industries in New Zealand’s EEZ, and New Zealand’s oil 
and gas sector was expected to provide a tremendous economic contribution for 
some time to come. As the Ministry of Economic Development put it:123 
There is no single answer to New Zealand’s, and the world’s, energy 
challenges. Renewable energy has an increasingly important role to play, but 
we cannot shift from using non-renewables overnight. We need to ensure 
secure and affordable energy for our households and businesses and to achieve 
that we need to be realistic. For the next few decades at least, the world and 
New Zealand will need oil, gas and coal. 
The Petroleum Action Plan appeared to follow Stuart McDouall’s 
recommendations, that New Zealand should explicitly support the private 
development of petroleum resources, both offshore and onshore, while reviewing 
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permitting, health and safety and environmental regulations, especially those that 
might be a barrier to development.  
If an accident does occur, then Maritime NZ has the resources to manage up to a 
Tier 3 spill and is expected to coordinate emergency responses with central 
government, the regional or local authority, and the owner and operator of the 
activity that is the source of the spill. New Zealand can also request international 
assistance under the OPRC and the Noumea Convention, and can appeal for aid 
from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority and Singapore’s Oil Spill Response 
Limited. The Rena incident provides some assurance that Maritime NZ can cope 
with the unexpected, at the same time, the incident shocked and galvanized the 
public into opposing plans to expand offshore petroleum exploration and 
production activities.  
The government has also followed McDouall Stuart’s recipe for ignoring and side-
lining opposition and has actively sought to reduce public participation in the 
consenting process. Exploratory activities are to be non-notified and the criminal 
penalties applying to those who enter 500m non-interference zones around drillrigs 
and ships have been strengthened. Marine consents are only reviewable on points 
of law, and as the two cases discussed above demonstrate, the courts will not 
challenge the merits of drilling off even the most pristine and iconic coastlines. As 
it happens, neither Anadarko nor Shell’s foray into New Zealand waters was 
successful, and the current government will not grant any further permits, but 
current permits are being honoured, and a change of government could see that 
policy quickly reversed.  
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3 New Zealand’s Marine Pollution Legislation: Developing an 
Offshore Marine Pollution Damage Liability Regime 
 
The previous chapter explored how the New Zealand government had 
commissioned a number of reports to emphasize the economic benefits of offshore 
petroleum exploration and production activities while downplaying potential risks 
to the environment. The assumption is that if any accident does occur, then 
Maritime NZ will be able to scale up its response, and can appeal for aid from other 
countries in extreme situations. Yet, even amongst the optimism, the reports had to 
concede that any serious offshore accident could cause significant financial and 
environmental damage to New Zealand.  
This chapter will examine the development of New Zealand’s liability laws relating 
to pollution damage caused by maritime and offshore activities. It will explain how 
New Zealand law has created a dual liability regime, with penalties for the unlawful 
discharge of harmful substances coinciding with civil liability for pollution damage 
caused by harmful discharges. These penalties and damages have come largely 
from international shipping law, but now also apply to damage caused by marine 
structures and operations used to explore for and exploit oil and gas resources from 
the seabed. In the post-Deepwater Horizon era, and with New Zealand’s 
government actively seeking to expand offshore petroleum activities to the limits 
of the country’s EEZ and continental shelf, it is vital to provide a clear picture of 
the liability that the owners and operators of those activities could face.  
New Zealand has historically taken a piecemeal approach to regulating its offshore 
resource development. New Zealand governs its marine environment with 
numerous statutory regimes. In alphabetical order, these include: 
• Continental Shelf Act 1964; 
• Crown Minerals Act 1991 (“CMA”); 




• Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental 
Effects) Act 2012 (“EEZ Act”); 
• Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (“HSWA”); 
• Health and Safety at Work (General Risk and Workplace Management) 
Regulations 2016; 
• Health and Safety at Work (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) 
Regulations 2016; 
• Marine Protection Rules Part 200 (now Part 131);  
• Marine Protection Rules Part 102;  
• Maritime Transport Act 1994 (“MTA”); 
• Resource Management Act 1991 “(RMA”);  
• Resource Management (Marine Pollution) Regulations 1998; and 
• Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977. 
 
The result is that there is no single comprehensive offshore liability and 
compensation framework governing oil pollution damage in New Zealand’s 
coastal, marine and continental waters, and a single incident could incur multiple 
penalties under multiple statutes. For example, if the mining operation is taking 
place inside New Zealand’s 12nm territorial waters, operators will be subject to the 
RMA’s resource consent procedures and its penalties for failing to abide by 
resource consent conditions, and for the unlawful discharge of harmful substances. 
Mining operations in New Zealand’s the seabed beneath its continental waters are 
subject to the EEZ Act’s marine consenting regime. The EEZ Act also has a range 
of penalties for discharging harmful substances and failing to abide by the 
consenting regime, and these link to the CMA which has its own system of 
permitting and information sharing requirements. As well as that, operators must 
satisfy workplace safety rules under the HSWA and its regulations. The next 
chapter will examine these issues in more detail. 
The Maritime Transport Act 1994, or MTA, is the primary Act enforcing civil 
liability for marine pollution damage. This chapter will explain how that civil 
liability regime was created after the CLC and Fund Conventions were first 
accepted and ratified in New Zealand law by the Marine Pollution Act 1974 
(“MPA”). It will show how the CLC and Fund Conventions’ definitions for 
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pollution damage liability came to be applied to both shipping and offshore 
petroleum activities. However, it will show that there are significant differences 
between CLC and Fund Conventions’ systems for channelling and security liability, 
and those imposed on the owners and operators of offshore installations and 
operations.  
It should be noted that the RMA’s amending legislation, the Resource Legislation 
Amendment Act 2017, has also made changes to the EEZ Act, but these are mostly 
in relation to the marine consent process for dumping and decommissioning plans.1 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the oil well blowouts that are statistically 
most likely to occur during the exploration phase, and it only mentions the 
decommissioning aspect for the sake of completeness.  
3.1.1 Before the CLC and Fund Conventions? The Petroleum, Public 
Works and Oil in Navigable Water Acts  
Before New Zealand accepted and ratified the CLC and Fund Conventions 
1969/1971, the rules governing clean-up and compensation for oil pollution damage 
caused by petroleum prospecting or mining operations were primarily to be found 
in the Petroleum Act 1937 and the Public Works Act 1928. The Petroleum Act 1937 
stated that:2 
Every person having any right, title, estate, or interest in any land injuriously 
affected by the exercise of any powers conferred by this Act or by any licence, 
or suffering any damage from the exercise of any powers conferred by this 
Act or by any licence, shall be entitled to full compensation for all loss, injury 
or damage suffered by him. 
Land included “Native land, and also any land below the sea or below any other 
water”, so the Act applied to prospecting and mining operations offshore as well as 
on land.3  
The Public Works Act 1928 ruled that if any person caused damage to another’s 
land, then the two parties should settle any claims by agreement. It is only if that 
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was not possible that the person suffering damage could seek “full compensation”.4 
A Compensation Court would determine the price “which the land if sold in the 
open market by a willing seller on the specified date might be expected to realize”.5 
The problem with market valuations is that they depend upon their being a market 
for the affected resource or land. Coastlines and associated marine resources usually 
fall into the res communes omnium¸ they are not and cannot be owned, and that 
complicates issues of standing and valuation. Even if a market valuation is possible, 
the award may not cover the actual costs of preventive and remedial measures. 
Nevertheless, this was the method preferred in New Zealand at that time. 
During the same period, the Continental Shelf Act 1964 vested the right to explore 
for and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf in the Crown and 
provided that New Zealand’s civil and criminal laws applied on-board offshore 
installations. The Crown had the right to pass regulations about the construction of 
offshore installations, to establish safety zones around offshore operations, and 
concerning any “measures to be taken in any such safety zone for the protection of 
the living resources of the sea and the natural resources of the continental shelf from 
harmful agents.”6 The 1960s also witnessed the passage of the Oil in Navigable 
Waters Act 1965 which introduced penalties to enforce the 1954 OILPOL 
Convention. The Act required polluters to pay the costs of removing oil from the 
sea, and made them subject to criminal penalties for discharging oil into prohibited 
sea areas, whether that oil came from a ship, from a place on land, or from some 
apparatus used to transfer oil to or from a ship.7 The Act omitted discharges caused 
by offshore petroleum activities, however. 
3.1.2 The Torrey Canyon and the Marine Pollution Act 1974 
A new era began when New Zealand’s Parliament debated its response to the 1967 
sinking of the Torrey Canyon and the subsequent CLC Convention 1969 
conference, and the Santa Barbara oil well blowout that same year. The 1969 Santa 
Barbara blowout is not well remembered today, but it was the largest offshore oil 
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spill in history before the Deepwater Horizon.8 The two incidents were raised on 
the 7th of August 1969, when Sir Basil Arthur, Labour MP, asked what 
“precautionary measures had the Marine Department taken to prevent or combat 
major oil pollution of the New Zealand coast?”9 In particular, he was concerned to 
know whether New Zealand had enough chalk powder coated with sodium stearate; 
a sinking agent French authorities used on the Torrey Canyon spill.10 
The Minister replied that two committees had been set up since the sinking of the 
Torrey Canyon. The first would be tasked with visiting any tanker casualty and 
assessing salvage and clean-up options. The second body, the New Zealand 
Committee on Pollution of the Sea by Oil, duly reported back in March 1970, saying 
that:11 
The problem of fail-safe devices for oil rigs drilling offshore is under 
consideration by Mines Department, and, in conjunction with Marine 
department, draft regulations will be submitted to Government under the 
Continental Shelf Act 1964 and the Petroleum Act 1937. 
The matter was raised again in Parliament in April of 1970, when the Minister of 
Mines was asked:12 
1. What steps has he taken to minimise the risk of oil pollution 
of New Zealand beaches arising from possible accidents from 
offshore drilling operations; and  
2. Does he intend to introduce legislation similar to that 
introduced in the U.S. making the owners of off-shore and on-
shore installations liable for the costs of spills? 
The plan the Minister then outlined was a familiar one. First, the operator would 
have to submit a drilling plan to the Inspector of Petroleum making provision for 
adequate “safety devices and safety precautions”, and to ensure that the well would 
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be plugged safely before abandonment.13 If an accident did occur, then “the full 
resources of the New Zealand Committee on the Pollution of the Sea by Oil would 
be available to deal with the cleaning up process.”14 The Petroleum Act 1937 made 
explorers fully liable for all damage caused to land, or at least its market value, as 
well as the costs of cleaning up beaches. The Minister had to concede that if a Santa 
Barbara sized spill occurred in New Zealand then “there would be a similar quite 
bad result because it is impossible to control oil once it had escaped.”15  
Between 1972 and 1974, the new Labour government would introduce a new 
Marine Pollution Bill that Sir Basil Arthur MP would proudly call “as modern and 
up to date as any in the world.”16 The Marine Pollution Act 1974 (“MPA”) would 
govern liability for oil pollution from shipping and offshore drilling for the next 
twenty years. It repealed the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1965, and accepted and 
ratified the CLC Convention 1969 which entered into force in 1975.17 The Fund 
Convention 1971 was also incorporated, but that did not enter into force until 
1978.18 It applied to all New Zealand waters, which included the internal waters, 
the territorial sea and the sea, seabed and subsoil as described in section 9 of the 
Territorial Sea Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, which 
extends from New Zealand’s territorial waters to the 200nm outer limit.19  
The MPA’s obligations with respect to harmful discharges were virtually identical 
to those contained in the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1965, and under section 30, 
the responsible party was liable for the costs of removing the oil, pollutant, waste 
or other matter. The penalty for illegal discharges was a fine not exceeding 
$100,000, and just as in the 1965 Act, the offender would also be liable to pay for 
the costs of removing, cleaning up or dispersing any oil from New Zealand waters, 
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or any foreshore or harbour works.20 However, it was the first time those duties and 
penalties had been expanded to apply to those who owned or were in charge of 
installations or devices, or to “anything afloat (other than a ship)” and any structure 
used to explore and exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the 
continental shelf.21 These criminal provisions were tested in Union Steam Ship 
Company of New Zealand Ltd v Northland Harbour Board, where the company 
unsuccessfully argued that oil spilled from a fractured pipe was an escape and not 
a discharge.22 The Court was satisfied that the ordinary and natural meaning of 
discharge or escape was broad enough to encompass any type of spillage, which 
suggests that it would also have been happy to include oil well blowouts. Richmond 
P. mentioned that the MPA incorporated the CLC Convention 1969, but said that 
he “did not intend to go deeply into these matters.”23   
The MPA drew a distinction between CLC Convention ships that carry bulk cargoes 
of oil, and other possible sources of marine oil pollution such as non-CLC ships, 
that is, general cargo ships and ferries, land-based sources, offshore installations, 
pipelines, any operations aimed at exploring and exploiting seabed resources, and 
apparatus used to transfer oil or pollutants.24 The distinction was necessary because 
the CLC Convention’s rules only channelled strict and limited liability to the 
owners of CLC ships, and the IOPC Fund only grants compensation under the Fund 
Convention if the damage is caused by CLC ship.  
It is not possible to know what specific considerations went into the decision to use 
the 1969 CLC Convention’s definitions to create a civil liability regime for marine 
pollution damage caused by offshore installations and operations because the 
cabinet papers, select committee reports or other policy documents on the subject 
were either never produced or cannot be found. It would be logical to assume, 
however, that the shipping conventions provided a convenient source of definitions, 
and it was decided at the time that, in the absence of an international offshore 
petroleum liability convention, that they provided the most analogous and 
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convenient source of definitions of oil pollution damage. But why would the MPA 
also abandon channelling, and why would it fail to provide for limited liability, 
mandatory insurance or a compensation fund?  
The MPA was particularly timely as Christmas of 1973 saw New Zealand’s worst-
ever oil pollution incident when 6000 tonnes of bunker oil spilled from the Olympic 
Goal, a tanker owned by Aristotle Onassis.25 The spill left “a black, sticky film up 
to an inch thick along 15 miles of coast” and caused $21,000 worth of damage, but 
Mr Onassis escaped the owner’s liability as the ship was on a charter at the time, 
and the charterer escaped liability because it was not the responsible owner.26 One 
of the MPA’s goals would, therefore, be to ensure that the “owner” would be 
broadened into a catch-all term that applied to all the parties responsible for causing 
oil spills.   
In relation to offshore installations, the owner would include:27 
(i) The person having any right or privilege or licence to explore 
the seabed and the subsoil and to exploit the natural resources 
thereof in connection with which the offshore installations is or 
has been or is to be used; and 
(ii) The agent or servant of the owner or the manager or licensee 
for the time being of the installation, or the person in charge of 
any operations connected therewith: 
Under section 31(9), the owner of an offshore installation, pipeline, or person 
carrying on any operations to explore for and exploit natural resources would be 
liable for pollution damage. The pollution damage definition was paraphrased from 
the CLC Convention 1969, and it included:28 
… damage of any kind whatsoever occurring in New Zealand or in New 
Zealand waters which is attributable to the discharge or escape of oil, or 
(except in the case of any provision relating only to damage attributable to oil) 
any pollutant [, or which is attributable to the dumping of waste or other 
matter,] into the sea, whether New Zealand waters or not; and includes the 
costs of reasonable preventive measures taken in New Zealand or in New 
Zealand waters or outside those waters to prevent or reduce pollution damage 
and any further loss or damage occurring as a result of such measures; and in 
Part V of this Act also includes expenses reasonably incurred and sacrifices 
reasonably made by the owner of a ship voluntarily to prevent or reduce 
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pollution damage; and for the purposes of this definition the term ``damage'' 
includes loss: 
The definition is much wordier than Article 1(6) of the CLC Convention 1969, but 
it has the same basic elements. Owners of both ships and offshore installations are 
liable for “damage of any kind” caused by the escape of oil, for the reasonable costs 
of preventive measures, and for any subsequent losses or damage caused by 
preventive measures. The term “pollutant” was to have been further defined by a 
declaration by the Governor-General, but no such declaration was ever made.29 The 
MPA also incorporated the 1969 Convention’s defences.30 
CLC shipowners were required to maintain insurance sufficient to satisfy the CLC 
Convention’s requirements, and third parties were granted rights of direct action 
against those insurers.31 The owners of offshore installations, land-based facilities, 
pipelines or the persons carrying on operations, were merely warned that 
regulations might be passed requiring them to “maintain insurance or other financial 
security up to the limits of an aggregate amount of liability specified in the 
regulations.”32 Mandatory insurance regulations would not be passed until after the 
Maritime Transport Act 1994 was enacted, and Marine Protection Rules Part 102 – 
Certificates of Insurance came into force on 20 August 1998.  
To summarise then, the MPA continued earlier criminal penalties for harmful 
discharges and created a marine pollution damage civil liability regime and 
expanded both systems to apply to the owners and operators of offshore seabed 
mining operations. The shipping conventions did not apply to damage caused by 
offshore installations and petroleum exploration and exploitation operations, so 
there was no requirement to channel or limit their owners’ and operators’ liabilities. 
As long as there was some person to be held accountable, then broad and unlimited 
liability would offset the lack of insurance or a compensation fund.  
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3.1.3 Criticisms of the MPA and the Maritime Transport Bill 
The MPA was criticized from the outset, and by the early 1990s the time had come 
for the establishment of a new statutory regime.33 Complaints focused on its narrow 
geographical scope that only captured activities in territorial waters, the overly 
broad defences, the point that successive governments had failed to pass regulations 
defining ‘pollutant’ or mandating insurance for offshore activities, and also because 
the CLC Convention’s narrow channelling provisions might allow potential 
wrongdoers to escape. 34  For example, a 1991 report by the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment pointed out that the oil pollution control laws 
were “far from satisfactory” as they underestimated the scale of damage that could 
be caused by large tankers that regularly visited Marsden Point.35 The Maritime 
Transport Department acknowledged the PCE’s criticisms, adding that the MPA 
failed to provide for oil spill response planning and training and that it featured 
“awkwardly structured provisions relating to liability for oil pollution.” 36  Its 
solution was to propose the creation of a single liability regime for all ships with a 
separate regime for offshore installations, pipelines and transfer facilities.37 This 
appears to have misunderstood that it was necessary to keep CLC and non-CLC 
ships separate for the purposes of the CLC Convention 1969, but it was prescient 
in anticipating the need for a separate civil liability framework for damage caused 
by the offshore oil industry.  
The resulting 1993 Transport Law Reform Bill was initially felt to be too long and 
complex to be workable, and it was substantially revised and reintroduced.38 The 
new Maritime Transport Act 1994 (“MTA”) would take account of the newly 
minted Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”) and of new international laws 
such as MARPOL 73/78 and the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions.39 The Bill dealt 
                                                 
33 H.A. Versteeg “The International and National Response to the Problems of Marine Pollution” 
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34 Versteeg at 228. 
35 Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment The Control of Marine Oil Pollution 
in New Zealand: A Review of the System (Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, Wellington, N.Z., 1991) at 3. 
36 Maritime Transport Review of the Marine Pollution Act 1974 (Maritime Transport, Wellington, NZ, 
1992) at i. 
37 At 48. 
38 (9 June 1994) 540 NZPD 1610 at 1611. 
39 Maritime Transport, above n 36, at 3. 
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equally with maritime safety and marine pollution, regulating the discharge of 
harmful substances, and hazardous ships or structures, and providing for the 
collection of monies for oil pollution responses.40 There were still no regulations 
mandating minimum insurance for offshore activities, however, and the Bill’s chief 
objective was to deregulate coastal shipping making it easier for foreign companies 
to compete.  
Public submissions on the Bill provide sparse evidence of concern for pollution 
from offshore installations, however. Shell Todd Oil Services Ltd commented that 
there should be a single definition of offshore oil installation which could cover all 
possible offshore oil and gas activities.41 Auckland Regional Council pointed out 
that the cost of prosecutions could be very high, and asked that the New Zealand 
Oil Pollution Fund be used to refund its legal bills.42  PEANZ, the Petroleum 
Exploration Association of New Zealand, submitted that it was “fundamentally 
inequitable” that the owners of foreign flag vessels could limit their liability, when 
the owners of offshore installations could not.43 Oil Spill Service questioned the 
need for any “detailed planning system of oil spills” as:44 
- there has never been a major spill in New Zealand; 
- no analysis of the pollution threat to New Zealand has been carried out; 
- regional councils have little expertise in the area and the cost of 
developing and maintaining regional plans will be expensive; and 
- complicated plans are notorious for falling apart. 
 Clause 402 of the Bill addressed “Liability for pollution damage from marine 
structures and operations”, but the clause attracted zero submissions.  
What conclusions can we draw from this legislative process? The MTA continued 
the MPA’s dual system of levying polluters with the costs of removing harmful 
substances from coastal facilities, backed up with administrative/criminal penalties, 
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and of civil liability for pollution damage as that term was now expressed by the 
1992 CLC and Fund Conventions. It is difficult to prove a negative, and it may be 
that there are other cabinet papers available that this research could not discover, 
but it certainly appears that little consideration had been given to the potential risks 
of a major offshore petroleum disaster. The basic and unshakeable assumption was 
that strict and unlimited liability for pollution damage would provide adequate 
compensation, so long as it was spread to a broad swathe of potential owners and 
operators of offshore installations and operations. 
 
3.2 Civil Liability for Marine Pollution Damage from Offshore Installations and 
Operations under the MTA 
The MTA continues the MPA’s practice of applying administrative penalties for 
discharging harmful substance, while holding the owners and operators of offshore 
installations and operations strictly liable for damage caused by oil spills. Up until 
October of 2015, Maritime NZ had the power to prosecute offshore operators for 
unlawfully discharging harmful substances into New Zealand’s territorial sea, 
marine waters and continental waters. Since October 2015, the enforcement role 
has been transferred to the Environmental Protection Authority, and the penalties 
are to be found in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012. (“EEZ Act”).  
The MTA states that it intends to “protect the marine environment”, “to continue, 
or enable, the implementation of obligations on New Zealand under various 
international conventions relating to pollution of the marine environment” and “to 
regulate maritime activities and the marine environment in the exclusive economic 
zone and on the continental shelf as permitted under international law.” These 
international laws include the “International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1969; and the International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, and any 
subsequent protocol or amendments and revisions of those conventions if they have 
been accepted or ratified by New Zealand.”45 This means that the owners of CLC 
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ships and importers of contributing oil will be subject to the 1992 CLC and Fund 
Conventions, as it entered into force in New Zealand on the 25th of June 1999.46 
The offshore petroleum liability regime is contained in Part 26A, “Civil liability for 
pollution of marine environment from marine structures”. The two most important 
sections, for this thesis, are section 385B, which holds the owners and operators of 
marine structures and operations liable for the costs of removing harmful 
substances, and section 385C, which contains the offshore civil liability regime. 
3.2.1 Section 385B – Costs of Removing Harmful Substances Discharged 
from Marine Structures and Operations 
Under section 385B, “the person in charge of a marine operation or the owner of a 
marine structure” is liable to the Crown or marine agency for any costs reasonably 
incurred in dealing with the discharge or escape of harmful substances, waste or 
other matter, or for any costs in preventing the “grave and imminent threat” of such 
a discharge or escape.47 A marine operation refers to “any operations or operation 
for, or connected with, the exploration for, or the exploitation or associated 
processing of, any mineral in the sea or the seabed.”48 A marine structure includes 
offshore installations, pipelines, “or any facility, site, structure, or thing used to 
transfer a harmful substance to or from a ship or offshore installation.” 49  The 
definition of offshore installation remains much the same as it was in the MPA, and 
means “any artificial structure (including a floating structure other than a ship) used 
or intended to be used in or on, or anchored or attached to, the seabed for the 
purposes of the exploration for, or the exploitation or associated processing of, any 
mineral; but does not include a pipeline.”50  
The marine agencies with standing to bring claims for clean-up costs include 
Maritime NZ and any regional council or operator of a port facility.51 “Harmful 
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substances” include oil and such materials as are specified in the Marine Protection 
Rules.52 A discharge includes “any release, disposal, spilling, leaking, pumping, 
emitting, or emptying”, but it does not include permitted dumping, or the release of 
harmful substances for the purpose of “legitimate scientific research into pollution 
abatement and control”.53 It could be argued that the term “discharge” was not 
meant to apply to accidental oil well blowouts, and only referred to operational 
discharges. However, that point was specifically addressed when the MTA was 
amended in 2015 to prohibit unlawful discharges from mining activities, which 
includes taking or extracting minerals from the sea or the seabed.54 
 “Dealing with” means:55 
… any reasonable action taken in relation to the discharge or escape of a 
harmful substance … including (but not limited to)— 
(a) removing, containing, and rendering harmless the harmful substance, or 
the waste or other matter, or doing any of those things; and 
(b) any reasonable measures taken to prevent or minimise the discharge or 
escape of a harmful substance. 
This would include the use of booms and dispersants, but it also means that owners 
and operators have to pay for all the costs of bringing wells back under control, and 
that could include operations to deploy capping stackers or to drill relief wells. That 
point would become more relevant during the consultation process over the new 
mandatory financial assurance regime, as it became apparent that the mandatory 
insurance regulations only required owners of offshore installations to provide 
insurance to cover the costs of pollution damage, and not the costs of preventing 
discharges of harmful substances under section 385B. 
Generally, shipowners are entitled to the benefit of limited liability. The owners of 
ocean-going tankers are subject to limits under the CLC and Fund Conventions, and 
non-CLC shipowners’ liability is limited by the Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims (“LLMC”). However, the LLMC specifically 
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excludes “floating platforms constructed for the purpose of exploring or exploiting 
the natural resources of the seabed or the subsoil thereof”.56 This means that owners 
and operators of marine operations and structures will face unlimited liability under 
the MTA. That liability is strict and not absolute, and section 385E does allow for 
a number of defences, which have also been incorporated from the CLC and Fund 
Conventions.  
Part 7 allows offshore petroleum operators to limit their liability for those parts of 
the operation that do make use of a ship, on damages claims for loss of life, injury, 
and loss or damage to goods under the LLMC and its 1996 Protocol.57 As will be 
explained further below, this thesis has taken the point of view that offshore craft 
are not ships for the purposes of New Zealand law when they are anchored and 
engaged in oil and gas exploration activities, and the owners of offshore craft would 
be preventing from limiting their liability under Part 7. Others have taken the 
opposite point of view, however.58 The Bunkers Convention will also apply, as it 
includes any “seaborne craft”, and any ship of over 1000 gross tonnes is now 
required to carry a Bunker Oil Certificate of Insurance.59  
3.2.2 Section 385C – Liability for Pollution Damage from Marine 
Structures and Operations   
One of the central points of this thesis is that many of the features and definitions 
of the CLC and Fund Conventions have been used to create a civil liability regime 
for pollution damage from marine structures and operations. We recall that the CLC 
and Fund Conventions provided a framework for liability and compensation for oil 
pollution damage caused by accidents involving ships carrying bulk cargoes of oil. 
The four basic features of that system are that strict liability is channelled to the 
shipowner, liability is limited based on the size of the ship, the shipowner must 
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maintain insurance up to the limits of that liability, and the importers of oil in the 
Contracting States are obliged to contribute to a complementary compensation fund. 
The CLC and Fund Conventions therefore provide a comprehensive system to 
allocate and financially secure liability for oil pollution damage.  
When it comes to liability for pollution damage caused by offshore oil and gas 
exploration and extraction activities, section 385C states that: 
(1) Subject to sections 385D and 385E and Part 7, the owner of the marine 
structure or the person in charge of a marine operation is liable in 
damages, including goods and services tax (if any), for – 
(a)  all pollution damage in New Zealand, or to New Zealand’s 
internal waters or continental waters or the seabed below those 
internal or continental waters caused by – 
(i) a harmful substance that is discharged or escapes from that 
structure or operator; or 
(ii) any waste or other matter that is dumped from that structure 
or operation; and 
(b) the costs reasonably incurred for any reasonable preventive 
measures taken by the Crown (or marine agency) to eliminate or 
reduce a grave and imminent threat that a harmful substance may 
be discharged or escape from that structure or operation into the 
internal waters of New Zealand or into New Zealand continental 
waters or on to the beds below those internal or continental waters. 
How does this compare to the four basic features of the CLC and Fund Conventions? 
The owner of the marine structure and the person in charge of marine operations is 
subject to strict liability, but liability is not channelled to any one owner or operator, 
instead being spread widely to a range of potentially liable parties. Second, while 
the CLC and Fund Conventions limit the shipowner’s liability and link those limits 
directly to the mandatory insurance level, owners and operators of marine structures 
and operations face unlimited liability under the MTA. It is only the owner of the 
offshore installation that must provide insurance, and then only to cover the costs 
of oil pollution damage claims. Further, the amount of insurance required is 
minimal and not related to the owner’s unlimited liability. Finally, there is no 
domestic industry-fed compensation fund capable of providing the same 
complementary compensation role as that performed by the IOPC Fund.   
New Zealand’s Marine Pollution Legislation: Developing an Offshore Marine 




What does it mean to say that someone is liable in damages, when damages is a 
term that is usually associated with tortious rather than statutory liability? For 
example, damages has been defined as:60 
…pecuniary compensation, obtainable by success in an action, for a wrong 
which is either a tort or a breach of contract, the compensation being in the 
form of a lump sum awarded at one time, unconditionally and in sterling. 
The tort of breach of statutory duty is not unusual, however, and it is entirely within 
Parliament’s authority to create a duty that may be enforced by private action.61 As 
Lord Steyn said in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council, “the 
central question is whether from the provisions and structure of the statute an 
intention can be gathered to create a private law remedy.”62 Section 385C therefore 
creates an actionable remedy for pollution damage, based upon the CLC and Fund 
Conventions, and which contains both public and private law elements.  
Section 385A defines “pollution damage”, in relation to damage caused by marine 
structures and marine operations, as: 
… damage or loss of any kind and— 
(a) includes the costs of any reasonable preventive measures taken to 
prevent or reduce pollution damage and any damage or loss occurring 
as a result of those measures; and  
(b) includes the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the 
environment that are undertaken or to be undertaken; and 
(c) includes losses of profit from impairment of the environment; but 
(d) does not include any costs in relation to the impairment of the 
environment other than the costs referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c). 
This definition is almost identical to the way that the MTA treats pollution damage 
caused by CLC shipping, the only difference being that section 342 of Part 25 
specifies that the harmful discharge must have come from a ship.63 Is it safe to 
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assume that New Zealand courts will interpret pollution damage in Part 25 and Part 
26A in the same way? A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that statutes 
are to be interpreted consistently with their underlying international treaties.64 By 
using the same 1992 CLC Convention definitions of pollution damage, preventive 
measures and the same defences in both Part 25 and Part 26A, Parliament signalled 
its intention that incidents involving marine structures and marine operations would 
be treated, as far as possible, in the same was as if the damage was caused by a CLC 
ship.  
Part 26A does not specify who has standing to bring a pollution damage claim, or 
whether the claim must be proved on the balance of probabilities or on the criminal 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. The only requirement is that the claimant 
suffered damage or loss caused by the escape or discharge of a harmful substance, 
or the dumping of water or other matter, from a marine structure or operation in 
New Zealand waters. Marine agencies, such as Maritime NZ and local and regional 
authorities, would be more focussed on recouping the costs of preventive and 
remedial measures; bird and animal wildlife rescue organizations would be 
interested in reimbursement for the costs of reinstating the environment; and private 
individuals, such as tourism and fishing operators, would be most interested in 
recovering losses of profit resulting from impairment of the environment. The MTA 
is also silent on the appeal process, and appeals must be subject to the general rules 
of court and civil procedure.  
Instead of channelling liability to a single “shipowner” and requiring that person to 
maintain insurance up to a pre-set limited liability, as in the CLC Convention and 
as under Part 25 of the MTA, Part 26A seeks to capture a very broad range of 
potentially responsible parties in a net of unlimited liability. It becomes very 
important then to decide who is the “owner”, and who is the “person in charge of 
operations”. The term “owner” as it is defined in Part 18, “Preliminary provisions 
relating to marine pollution”, is designed to capture legal and natural persons at 
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almost every level of the operation. In relation to offshore installations, it 
includes:65 
(i) the person having any right, privilege, or licence to explore for or 
exploit minerals in connection with which the installation is being, 
has been, or is to be used; and 
(ii) the manager, lessee, licensee, or operator of the installation; and 
(iii) any agent or employee of the owner, manager, lessee, or licensee, or 
operator of the installation, or the person in charge of any operations 
connected with the installation. 
The first category of owner is the person “having any right, privilege, or licence to 
explore for or exploit minerals”. Petroleum prospecting, exploration and mining 
permits are authorised by New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals under the Crown 
Minerals Act 1991 (“CMA”).66 The CMA states that every permit holder must 
appoint a permit operator who will be responsible for the “day-to-day management 
activities under the permit.” 67  This is consistent with the industry practice of 
carrying out offshore petroleum activities by way of a joint venture between two or 
more permit participants. The operator is not just responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the permitted activity, but also plays a pivotal role as the agent for 
the parties to the joint venture.  
The CMA and the MTA both provide rules stating that principals will be held liable 
for the offences of their agents, and it would be assumed that the same rules would 
apply to civil damages under the Act.68 If the operator is a corporate entity, then 
even though strict liability means that there is no need to ascertain the corporate 
mens rea, the primary rules of attribution will operate so that the acts of agents and 
company directors are attributed to the company. 69  A company can be held 
vicariously liable for the acts of its employees and there is no practical difference 
between that and the liability of the principal for the acts of its agents.70 It is only if 
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the employee is acting outside of the normal course of his or her employment that 
the company is generally not liable. 
While it might not be difficult to prove that a harmful discharge came from a 
particular installation or operation, it might be very difficult to prove exactly who 
caused the discharge. Offshore petroleum activities are complex and, as the 
Deepwater Horizon showed, may be the result of cascading failures resulting from 
the actions or omissions of multiple parties. The court may be called upon to decide 
how that liability should be allocated, and again the MTA is not entirely clear about 
whether liability should be allocated proportionally, in relation to the part each 
owner might have played in causing the accident, or jointly and severally. 
The common law holds that where two or more tortfeasors acting independently 
cause different damage to the same plaintiff, then each will be separately liable for 
the specific damage that it has caused.71 Where two or more tortfeasors cause the 
same damage to the plaintiff, then the common law has long held that the victim 
may sue all or any of the tortfeasors and obtain judgment against each one for the 
full amount of the loss until that loss has been satisfied.72 Multiple tortfeasors are 
jointly responsible when their concurrent acts cause damage.73 Joint and several 
liability means that all named parties will each be considered liable for the full 
amount of any claims.74 This can be contrasted with proportional liability which 
holds the parties responsible only for their share in the cost of damages. 
Proportional liability may be calculated either by determining each person’s 
responsibility for the accident, or according to their share in the ownership of the 
common property of the venture. This has the downside that if any party is unable 
to pay their share of the damages, then that share will simply not be paid, and that 
shifts some or all of the risk to the victims. Joint and several liability spreads the 
risk amongst all the parties equally, so increases the chances that the damages will 
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be paid, but that can mean that plaintiffs will focus upon the owner or person in 
charge with the deepest pockets, or which can be brought before a court, rather than 
the one who bore most responsibility for the accident. 
Section 385D of the MTA holds that if the damage that one owner or person in 
charge of a marine operation has caused cannot be reasonably separated from the 
damage caused by another, then each will be considered jointly and severally liable 
for the whole cost, subject to the defences available in section 385E. This could 
mean that owners and operators will only be held jointly liable if the damage each 
has caused cannot be separated, for example if two different structures or operators 
simultaneously discharged harmful substances, creating one immense spill, 
although that does open the way for arguments about the volume of outflow each 
has discharged. However, given that the common law would hold multiple 
tortfeasors jointly responsible when they contribute to the same accident, the 
section should mean that if more than one party involved in an offshore operation 
contributes to the damage, then all should be considered jointly liable for the 
consequences.  
A related issue is how the MTA treats other causes of action that could arise from 
the same incident. The CLC Convention 1992 provides that “[n]o claim for 
compensation for pollution damage may be made against the owners otherwise than 
in accordance with this Convention”.75 The MTA provides a statutory bar in that its 
rules are the only avenue for pollution damages claims against CLC shipowners.76 
This rule is also consistent with Article II of the Fund Convention 1992, which 
states that the rules of the convention “shall apply exclusively” to the costs of 
pollution damage and preventive measures in the territory, territorial seas and 
exclusive economic zones of its contracting states.77 The point is to ensure that the 
national courts which have exclusive competence to determine the outcome of 
pollution damage claims will conclude the argument, and that their rulings will not 
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be undermined by actions in other forum. In other words, the CLC and Fund 
Conventions have incorporated the principle of res judicata, the Latin phrase 
meaning that a matter has been finally adjudicated.78 
The MTA does not bar claims outside of the statutory regime against the owners 
and operators of marine structures and operations, however, and other statutory and 
criminal penalties might apply.79 The consequence is that while a CLC shipowner 
would only face liability for pollution damage under the MTA, the owners and 
operators of offshore petroleum activities could face multiple legal challenges with 
multiple causes of action resulting in complicated and prolonged litigation. It 
should also be noted that the common law has extended liability to local authorities 
and building inspectors charged with inspecting and permitting building activities.80 
On that rationale, the installation’s inspectors, and by extension the Crown, could 
be held liable for issuing marine consents that revealed defects in the operator’s 
discharge management plan, or even faults in the marine structure and if those 
defects or faults are causative of any damage.  
The MTA does contain a general time limit on claims in respect of pollution damage 
claims, however, and proceedings must commence no later than three years from 
the date when the claim rose, and no later than six years after the event or the first 
of the events incurring liability.81 This time limit only specifically refers to the 
discharge or escape of oil from CLC and Bunkers Convention Ships, which raises 
the question of whether that general time limit would apply to pollution damage 
from other sources, such as decommissioned and abandoned offshore installations. 
If it did, then offshore operators would need to carefully consider the safety of all 
stages of not only their own activities, from exploration right through to 
decommissioning and beyond, as the time limit would begin to operate from the 
                                                 
78 Jonathan Law A Dictionary of Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 
2015). 
79 See Paul David “The Search for Oil in New Zealand Waters: Work to be Done?” (2011) 25 
A&NZ Mar LJ 49 at [13.2]. 
80 See Brown v Cole (1995) 14 BCLR (3d) 53, [1996] 2 WWR 567 (BCCA), where both builder and 
building inspector were held jointly liable for a defective building; See Smaill v Buller District 
Council [1998] 1 NZLR 190 (HC) where the local authority issued building permits that were 
contrary to statutory requirements. 
81 Maritime Transport Act, s 361. 
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moment that the harmful discharge actually escaped, rather than from when drilling 
activities ceased. 
Similar to section 385B, the availability of the defences in section 385E means that 
liability is not absolute, however. The MTA’s defences are drawn from Article III 
of the CLC Convention 1992 and the owner of the marine structure or the person in 
charge of marine operations may exclude their liability if the damage was caused 
by:82 
• acts of “war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection”; 
• the occurrence of a “natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and 
irresistible character”; 
• damage caused by the intentional acts or omissions of a third party;  
• the negligence or wrongful act of the government, authority or other person 
responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids; and 
• the negligent or intentional act or omission of any claimant, or by their 
employees or agents. 
Under section 385F, the court may reduce the claimant’s damages as far as “it thinks 
just and equitable” if the damage was caused wholly or in party by the claimant’s 
own intentional acts or omissions, or their negligence. If damage was caused by a 
third party, then proceedings may be brought directly against that person.83 Thus, 
even though liability under section 385C is strict, and may be jointly apportioned 
between many owners and operators, every incident will be fact specific and the 
court will have regard for each owners’ role in causing the damage complained of.84  
Owners will only be held liable for the reasonable costs of preventive and remedial 
measures, but the MTA does not specify what costs will be consider reasonable. 
Presumably, the National On-Scene Commander and the Director of Maritime NZ 
will cooperate in formulating an emergency response plan. Under section 233, the 
Director has substantial powers to order the owner of a ship, offshore installation 
or pipeline to “take all necessary steps” to rectify any hazardous conditions if he or 
she has reasonable grounds to believe that a ship, offshore installation or pipeline 
                                                 
82 Section 385E. 
83 Section 385G. 
84 New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Watts [1967] NZLR 205 (CA). 




is responsible for the discharge or escape of harmful substances. Section 424 of the 
MTA provides that any person may appeal the exercise of any power conferred on 
the Director by any section of the MTA to the District Court, so long as the section 
involved has provided the right of appeal. The court might then assess the 
reasonableness of the Director’s decisions using the NEBA methodology and the 
MOSRA15 system. A MOSRA15 analysis could show whether the affected area 
was valuable enough to justify the costs of an expensive emergency response. The 
less valuable the area, the greater the benefit of allowing the oil to disperse naturally, 
and vice versa, more valuable areas should attract greater efforts. 
The MTA’s civil liability provisions and their defences have never been tested in 
court, so it is difficult to say more about them other than that they exist. Bevan 
Marten argues that the MTA’s civil liability regime is the “product of an unusual 
evolution, in that as well as being sourced from the CLC and Fund Conventions and 
the remnants of earlier domestic regimes, it also contains elements from the 
Bunkers Convention.85 He says that courts would be expected to interpret the law 
consistently with those conventions, in some instances its language departs from 
the international laws and that this leaves room for the notion that the New Zealand 
Parliament intended that the parties should have “substantially different rights.”86 
Marten may have been referring to CLC shipowners’ liabilities under Part 25, but 
the same point could be made about offshore installation owners’ and operators’ 
liabilities for oil pollution damage under Part 26A.  
A New Zealand court may be guided in part by the recommendations and guidelines 
in the IOPC Fund’s Claims Manual, and Chapter 5 will show how the CLC and 
Fund Convention influenced (or failed to influence) the Ministry of Transport’s 
interpretation of offshore installation’s mandatory insurance rules.87 However, one 
point needs to be clear. The CLC and Fund Conventions do not apply to oil pollution 
damage caused by offshore petroleum installations and activities. Consequently, 
New Zealand courts will be more interested in finding a reasonable solution to a 
                                                 
85 Bevan Marten Maritime Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2016) at 187-188. 
86 At 188. 
87 International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds Claims Manual (October 2016 Edition) 
(International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, London, 2016); See Navigatus Consulting Ltd 
Financial Assurance Review - Integrated Damages Assessment Model (Ministry of Transport 
2015). 
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complex damages action consistent with the overall objective of the law, than in 
obeying the precepts of an international convention that is one step removed.  
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has identified the development of a dual regime of penalties and civil 
liability for pollution damage in New Zealand law. The broad stages in the 
development of New Zealand’s marine pollution regulation reflect New Zealand’s 
growing interest in governing and exploiting the resources of its EEZ and 
continental shelf. During the 1920s and 1930s, pollution damage fell under Public 
Works and Petroleum Acts, and later under the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1965. 
Persons suffering pollution damage were entitled to compensation calculated 
according to the market value of the damaged property, and the polluter was obliged 
to cover the clean-up costs. The Torrey Canyon and Santa Barbara oil well blowouts 
in 1967 and 1968 brought the issue of marine oil spills front and centre before 
Parliament, leading to the Marine Pollution Act 1974, and the adoption of the CLC 
Convention 1969 and Fund Convention 1971. 
The intent behind the MPA was to avoid further ignominious incidents like that of 
the Olympic Goal, where the owner escaped all liability because the ship was on 
charter at the time of the accident. It sought to capture a wider range of shipowners 
and hold them strictly liable for pollution damage as that definition was paraphrased 
from the CLC Convention 1969. Yet as this chapter has demonstrated, there is no 
evidence that the MPA’s authors were aware that the CLC and Fund Conventions 
do not apply to pollution damage from offshore activities, and that the arrangements 
might be inadequate to deal with a Santa Barbara sized oil well blowout. Offshore 
mandatory insurance regulations were promised but were not adopted, leaving a 
palpable gap in the MPA’s compensation regime. 
The Maritime Transport Act 1994 (“MTA”) updated New Zealand’s marine 
pollution law to keep it in line with the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions. Marine 
Protection Rules – Part 106 only became effective in 2004 and oblige the owners 
of offshore installations to maintain a minimum of 14m IMF units of account worth 




of pollution damage insurance. The minimum level was already obsolete, however, 
as the figure of 14m IMF units of account was taken from the 1976 Protocols to the 
CLC Convention and Fund Conventions 1969/1971, and not from levels mandated 
by the updated 1992 Conventions. The insurance requirements were a step in the 
right direction, but again there was no consideration of the need for additional 
financial security to offset the gap left by the IOPC Fund, or the role that a specialist 
funding body could play in shaping compensation policy. 
Without more guidance on the meaning of terms like “pollution damage”, offshore 
industry participants faced a great deal of uncertainty under New Zealand’s strict 
and unlimited marine pollution liability law. The MTA’s definitions of owner and 
operator are intentionally broad, sweeping platform, pipeline and drillship owners, 
joint venture permit participants, their directors, installation managers, agents, 
employees and third party contractors alike up in a web of individual, vicarious and 
even joint and several liability. The extent of this liability could come as a shock to 
many, especially to permit participants who might have believed that their 
obligations were allocated proportionally under a joint operating agreement.  
Much may depend upon the strength of the operator’s and permit participant’s 
financial security guarantees. As this thesis will explain, the current mandatory 
insurance requirements are minimal, and in 2014 the Ministry of Transport (“MOT”) 
began consulting with petroleum operators on a preproposal to increase the 
minimum insurance level to $300m NZD. The consultation process is the most 
interesting development in recent times, as it involves the first explicit attempt by 
any New Zealand government to address question of liability and compensation for 
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4 The Penalties for Harmful Discharges from Offshore 
Petroleum Installations and Operations in New Zealand 
This chapter will review the penalties that may apply to the owners and operators 
of offshore oil and gas installations and operations in the event of an accidental oil 
spill. It will begin with by describing how the criminal penalties for the unlawful 
discharge of harmful substances were incorporated into New Zealand law in the 
Marine Pollution Act 1974 (“MPA”) and from there to the Maritime Transport Act 
1994 (“MTA”). Since 2015, the MTA has been amended so that these penalties 
have been transferred to the EEZ Act and the task of regulating harmful discharges 
has been transferred from Maritime NZ to the Environmental Protection Authority 
(“EPA”).1 What effects has this transfer in responsibility had, and have the penalties 
changed at all? 
The chapter will then consider penalties in other statutory regimes, including the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”), the Crown Minerals Act 1991 
(“CMA”) and the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (“HSWA”). A number of 
academics have considered New Zealand’s marine regulations, including issues of 
environmental protection, and this section draws liberally from their work, as well 
as from the various policy documents. 2  It will not discuss penalties under the 
Maritime Crimes Act 1999, or the recent Maritime Crimes Amendment Bill that 
                                                 
1  Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental (Environmental Effects) Amendment Act 2013 (; 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental (Environmental Effects) Amendment Act 2013 
Commencement Order 2015. 
2 Barry Barton “Offshore Petroleum and Minerals: Plugging Gaps in the Present Framework” [2011] 
NZLJ 211; Nicola de Wit “A Gaping Abyss: Environmental Regulation of New Zealand’s Oceans” 
(LLB (Hons) Dissertation, University of Otago, 2011); Paul David “The Search for Oil in New 
Zealand Waters: Work to be Done?” (2011) 25 A & NZ Mar LJ 49; For reviews of New Zealand 
legislation pertaining to the RMA, MTA, CMA and marine areas generally see Paul David “Marine 
Pollution” in Derek Nolan (ed) Environmental Resource Management Law (5th ed, LexisNexis NZ 
Ltd, Wellington, [NZ], 2015) 638; Trevor Daya-Winterbottom “The Prosecution of Environmental 
Offences in New Zealand” (paper presented to Sentencing Conference, Canberra, 8-10 February 
2008)”; Trevor Daya-Winterbottom “Protection of the Coastal and Marine Environment” in Peter 
Salmon and David P Grinlinton (eds) Environmental Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters New 
Zealand Ltd, Wellington, NZ, 2015); Bevan Marten “The Rena and Liability” [2011] NZLJ 341; 
Bevan Marten “Limitation of Liability in Maritime Law and Vessel Source Pollution: A New 
Zealand Perspective” (2013) 2 N. Z. Law Rev. 199. 




focus on acts of violence, hijackings and other terrorist acts on board ships and fixed 
platforms. 
It should be noted at the outset that what makes these penalties criminal in nature, 
is that the offenders must be convicted in a court proceeding, the criminal burden 
of proof will apply, and the court will apply the principles of the Sentencing Act 
2002. Some statutes provide for civil pecuniary penalties, which are decided by a 
court according to the civil standard of proof and do not result in a criminal 
conviction, but such penalties do no feature in the MTA or EEZ Act.3 The RMA 
and the EEZ Act do provide fixed administrative penalties that may be imposed 
directly by a regulatory agency, for example, if an operator breaches an enforcement 
order, and these will be discussed below. This thesis is mostly concerned with the 
administrative penalties for the discharge of harmful substances, however. 
4.1.1 Penalties for Harmful Discharges from Marine Structures and 
Operations Prior to 2015 
Maritime NZ has the primary role enforcing a number of relevant regulations, 
including those specifying oil importers’ and shipowners’ financial obligations 
under the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions, and under the Supplementary Fund 
Protocol. 4  In addition, Maritime NZ has the power to impose instant fixed 
administrative fines for infringement offences. For example, Maritime NZ has 
power under the Marine Protection (Offences) Regulations 1998/205 to fine 
offshore installation operators for failing to implement a proper discharge 
management plan.  
Maritime NZ’s Prosecution Policy and Compliance Operating Model are available 
on its website.5 The website states that Maritime NZ’s Legal Services Team, or a 
Crown Solicitor acting on the instructions of the Legal Services Team, will decide 
                                                 
3 See New Zealand Law Commission Civil Pecuniary Penalties (Issues Paper 33) (Law 
Commission, Wellington, NZ 2012) at 8–9 and 23 for a discussion of the nature of civil 
pecuniary and administrative penalties; Australian Law Reform Commission Principled 
Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australia (2003), Chapter Two - "The 
Nature of Penalties". 
4 Maritime Transport (Fund Convention) Levies Order 1996 (SR 1996/337); Maritime Transport 
(Maximum amounts of liability for pollution damage) Order 2003 (SR2003/260). 
5 Maritime New Zealand “Maritime New Zealand’s Prosecution Policy” <www.maritimenz.govt.nz> 
(accessed 9 September 2016). 
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whether circumstances merit prosecution according to the Evidential and Public 
Interest Tests required by the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution guidelines. 6  Any 
decision to prosecute will be coordinated with the New Zealand Police, the 
Environmental Protection Authority, local and regional councils, the Ministry for 
Primary Industries, and with WorkSafe New Zealand in health and safety cases. 
The District Court has jurisdiction over offences against both the MTA and the 
RMA.  
 
New Zealand’s approach to regulating the discharge of harmful substances was 
heavily influenced by the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (“OILPOL”). 7  This was superseded the 1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its Protocol 
of 1978 (“MARPOL 73/78”), and by the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste or Other Matter (“London Dumping 
Convention”). 8  As the Maritime Transport Department’s discussion paper, 
“Review of the Marine Pollution Act 1974” explained, the MPA’s penalties for 
harmful discharges were introduced to implement New Zealand’s obligations under 
OILPOLs provisions. 9  The later report, “Proposals for Regulations under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 to control Marine Pollution”, stated that 
“MARPOL and the London Convention are two long-established international 
conventions that are both designed to prevent marine pollution”.10 MARPOL 73/78 
focussed on preventing operational and accidental discharges from shipping, 
                                                 
6  See Crown Law Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines (Crown Law, 2013) 
<www.crownlaw.govt.nz> (accessed 2 December 2016). 
 
7 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 12 UST 2989 
(OILPOL) (opened for signature 12 May 1954, entered into force 26 July 1958). 
8  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its Protocol of 1978 
(MARPOL 73/78) 12 ILM 1319 (1973), 17 ILM 546 (1978) (opened for signature 2 November 
1973, entered into force 2 October 1983); 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1046 UNTS 120 (opened for signature 29 
December 1972, entered into force 30 August 1975); Paul David “Marine Pollution”, above n 2, at 
670. 
9 Maritime Transport Review of the Marine Pollution Act 1974 (Maritime Transport, Wellington, NZ, 
1992) at [18.1]. 
10 Ministry for the Environment Proposals for Regulations under the Resource Management Act 1991 
to control Marine Pollution (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, N.Z., 1996) at 5–8. 




however, and not on safety regulations or penalties aimed at preventing oil well 
blowouts.   
Prior to 2015, Part 19 of the MTA - “Protection of marine environment from 
harmful substances” - prohibited and criminalized the discharge or escape of 
harmful substances, unless that discharge was provided for by the marine protection 
rules. In particular, Marine Protection Rules: Part 200 provided rules to prevent 
pollution of the marine environment from offshore installations, and gave effect to 
both MARPOL 73/78 and to the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990 (“OPRC”).11  Harmful substance 
was defined to include any “substance which is ecotoxic to aquatic organisms and 
considered hazardous for the purposes of the Hazardous Substances (Minimum 
Degrees of Hazard) Regulations 2001” and oil.12 Maritime NZ published a guide to 
the marine protection rules explaining that the term “harmful substance” includes 
“petroleum oils, noxious liquid substances (chemicals and other types of oil), 
marine pollutants in packaged form, sewage and garbage.”13  
Every person who discharged a harmful substance in breach of the MTA was liable 
(on conviction):14 
(a) To imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine not 
exceeding $200,000 and, if the offence is a continuing one, to a 
further fine not exceeding $10,000 for every day or part of a day 
during which the offence is continued; and 
(b) To pay such amount as the Court may assess in respect of the 
costs incurred in respect of or associated with removing, 
containing, rendering harmless, or dispersing any harmful 
substance discharged as a result of the offence; and 
(c) To an additional penalty under section 409 of this Act. 
                                                 
11 Marine Protection Rules Part 200: Offshore Installations - Discharges; International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) 12 ILM 
1319 (1973), 17 ILM 546 (1978) (opened for signature 2 November 1973, entered into force 2 
October 1983); International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation (OPRC Convention) 1891 UNTS 78 (opened for signature 30 November 1990, entered 
into force 13 May 1995). 
12 Marine Protection Rules Part 200, rule 200.2. 
13 Maritime New Zealand Marine Protection Rules: Your Guide (2010) <www.maritimenz.govt.nz> 
(accessed 8 July 2015) at 4. 
14 Maritime Transport Act 1994, [reprint as at 8 June 2015], s 244. 
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It was also an offence to fail to report any discharge or escape of a harmful 
substance, or any other pollution incident.15 Section 409 provided that the Court 
could impose a fine equivalent to: 
… 3 times the value of any commercial gain resulting from the commission 
of that offence if the Court is satisfied that the offence was committed in the 
course of producing a commercial gain. 
The financial penalties could be substantial if the discharge was prolonged or 
profitable. The court could also pass a sentence of imprisonment on persons other 
than the masters or owners of foreign ships, if it was satisfied:16 
(i) That the person intended to commit the offence, or the offence 
occurred as a consequence of any reckless act or omission by the 
person with the knowledge that the act or omission would or 
would be likely to cause serious damage to the marine 
environment; and 
(ii) That the commission of the offence has caused or is likely to 
cause serious damage to the marine environment within the 
territorial sea: 
The mens rea set a high bar for imprisonment, and would only be applied in the 
most egregious cases. 
Maritime New Zealand v Prosafe Production Services PTE provides a good 
overview of sentencing practices prior to 2015. 17  This was a case of harmful 
discharge under section 237(b) of the MTA, involving a joint venture between the 
Singaporean company Prosafe Production Services Pty Limited (“Prosafe”) and 
Australian Worldwide Exploration Limited (“AWE”). Prosafe owned an FPSO 
called the MV Umuroa which had accidentally discharged several tonnes of “black 
water” containing “subterranean well fluids, sulphate reducing bacteria and crude 
oil.”18 The Court found that the defendants were guilty for three reasons. Prosafe 
and AWE failed to proper operational guidelines, allowing the black water 
treatment process to take place in the full knowledge that measuring equipment was 
                                                 
15 Sections 238–239, 248. 
16 Section 244(2)(b). 
17 Maritime New Zealand v Prosafe Production Services PTE Ltd DC New Plymouth CRI-2008-043-
2447, 7 July 2009. 
18 At [5]. 




faulty and that it was “fully dependent upon human intervention, which lapsed.”19 
The Court considered cases such as Machinery Movers Ltd v Auckland Regional 
Council and Northland Regional Council v Thalassic Steamship Agency Inc, and 
the mitigating and aggravating factors provided by the Sentencing Act 2002.20 
Given the financial capacity of the defendants, and that the maximum possible 
penalty under the MTA was a $200,000 fine, the fine was set at $52,500 each, plus 
Court costs of $130.  
Section 410 of the MTA makes principals liable for the acts of their agents and 
employees, “in the same manner and to the same extent as if he, she, or it had 
personally committed the offence.” Therefore, if any director or other person 
involved in the management of the company committed an offence, then both they 
and the corporate body could be held liable. The principal has a good defence if the 
act causing the offence took place without their authority, permission or consent, 
and if they did not know that the offence was being committed, or could not be 
taken to have reasonably known about the offence, and if the individual took all 
reasonable steps to prevent the offence from occurring. 21  Trevor Daya-
Winterbottom has written about the RMA’s equivalent section 340, and describes 
how company directors may be held personally liable for their actions.22 In R v 
Lorenzen, for example, the Crown proceeded directly against the defendant director 
because he either contravened the law, permitted its contravention, or had aided, 
abetted or incited the company so was a party to the offence under s 66 of the Crimes 
Act 1961.23 In Canterbury Regional Council v Newman, the Court described section 
340’s absolute liability with vicarious implications as a “harsh regime”, but 
necessary in the public interest.24 
                                                 
19 At [22]. 
20 Maritime New Zealand v Prosafe Production Services PTE Ltd DC New Plymouth CRI-2008-043-
2447, 7 July 2009, at [35]–[39]; Machinery Movers Ltd v Auckland Regional Council HC Auckland 
AP No 23/93, 23 June 1993, (1993) 1A ELRNZ 411, [1994] 1 NZLR 492, (1993) 2 NZRMA 661; 
Northland Regional Council v Thalassic Steamship Agency Inc DC Whangarei CRN208800160913, 
28 June 2000. 
21 Paul David “Marine Pollution”, above n 2, at 677. 
22 Daya-Winterbottom “The Prosecution of Environmental Offences in New Zealand”, above n 2, at 
5–6. 
23 R v Lorenzen [2004] NZRMA 24, [2004] DCR 173 at [26]. 
24 Canterbury Regional Council v Newman (2001) 7 ELRNZ 137 at 155. 
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4.1.2 Penalties for Harmful Discharges from Marine Structures and 
Operations under the EEZ Act since 2015 
In 2010, the Ministry for Economic Development published a report entitled 
“Comparative Review of Health, Safety and Environmental Legislation for 
Offshore Petroleum Operations.”25 The review compared regulatory frameworks in 
the UK, Australia, Ireland and Norway, and recommended that New Zealand 
establish a petroleum permitting regime administered by a new environmental 
agency, with consolidated jurisdiction over offshore oil and gas activities.26 The 
government would go on to enact the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, and empower the Environmental 
Protection Authority (“EPA”) with oversight over marine consenting for offshore 
activities. The justification was that a specialist oil and gas regulator would have 
“sound knowledge of the operational parameters of the installations and activities”, 
and that a focus on process safety would have the additional benefit of preventing 
the “major environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas activities (i.e. large 
volume oil spills).”27 
In 2011, Cabinet approved a proposal to transferring the regulation of the discharge 
of harmful substances from offshore installations and pipelines to the EPA. The 
transfer was accompanied by a statement clarifying that “the Maritime Transport 
Act will continue to regulate, and Maritime New Zealand continue to be responsible 
for, marine oil spill contingency planning, preparedness and response, and 
discharges from ships.”28 The rationale was that the transfer creates:29 
…greater certainty and reduced compliance costs for industry, avoids 
inefficiencies from duplicating processes, enhances environmental effects 
management such as consideration of cumulative effects, and provides the 
opportunity for improved public and iwi participation. 
                                                 
25 Atkins, Holm, Joseph and Majurey Ltd Comparative Review of Health, Safety and Environmental 
Legislation for Offshore Petroleum Operations (119465) (Ministry of Economic Development, 
2010) 
26 At i-ii. 
27 At 11. 
28 Ministry for the Environment Managing our oceans: A discussion document on the regulations 
proposed under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill 
(Ministry for the Environment 2012) at 5; John Bay, Robert Makgill and James Willis “Exploration 
and Development within the EEZ - offshore oil and gas” (New Zealand Law Society Continuing 
Legal Education, March 2014). 
29 Marine Legislation Bill 2012 (58-1), Explanatory Note, at 7. 




The EEZ Act was duly amended, and the transfer took effect from the 31st of 
October 2015.30 As the EPA has all powers that are “reasonably necessary to enable 
it to carry out its functions”, it is EPA enforcement officers who will monitor 
compliance with marine consents, and who will initiate criminal proceedings for 
offences against the Act if necessary.31 Maritime NZ and the EPA are still expected 
to work closely together, and the EPA will provide Maritime NZ with any 
information which may assist in the performance of its functions, and vice versa.32 
Section 20A provides that the EEZ Act will now regulate harmful discharges from 
structures, submarine pipelines and ships involved in mining, into the sea and into 
or onto the seabed of the EEZ or the continental shelf. The MTA will continue to 
regulate “the discharge of harmful substances (other than a mining discharge)” from 
ships, including those involved in mining activities, but Part 19 has been amended 
to reflect the fact that discharges from structures, pipelines, and mining discharges 
from ships will now be regulated under the EEZ Act.33 The Director of Maritime 
NZ maintains powers to investigate the discharge or escape of harmful substances 
in breach of the MTA, the RMA, the EEZ Act, as well as any pollution incidents.34 
The EEZ Act states that a harmful substance means “any substance specified as a 
harmful substance by regulations under this Act.” The relevant regulations confirm 
that harmful substances are substances that are “ecotoxic to aquatic organisms, and 
are hazardous for the purposes of the Hazardous Substances (Minimum Degrees of 
Hazard) Regulations 2001 or because they are oil”.35 Like the MTA, the EEZ Act 
defines discharge to include “any release, disposal, spilling, leaking, pumping, or 
emptying”, but does not specifically include the term “blowout”.36 Section 20 also 
                                                 
30  Part 2 was replaced by section 11 of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Amendment Act 2013, “Duties, restrictions, and prohibitions”. 
31 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 ("EEZ Act"), 
ss 13-15 and 136. 
32 Section 158A; Maritime Transport Act, s 231. 
33 EEZ Act, s 20A(3); Maritime Transport Act, Part 19. 
34 Maritime Transport Act, Part 5, ss58-59 and s 235. 
35 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects - Discharge and Dumping) 
Regulations 2015 LI 2015/228, ss 4 and 16; Hazardous Substances (Minimum Degrees of Hazard) 
Regulations 2001 (SR 2001/112); Environmental Protection Authority “Decision on Marine 
Discharge Consent Application: OMV New Zealand Limited; Application to discharge harmful 
substances from the Maari Offshore facilities (EEZ300004)” (24 April 2017) <www.epa.govt.nz> 
at [13]. 
36 EEZ Act, s 4. 
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imposes general restrictions on activities related to mining, such as the 
“construction, placement, extension, removal, or demolition” of a structure or 
submarine pipeline on or under the seabed, and the “removal of non-living natural 
material from the seabed or subsoil”, or “the disturbance of the seabed or subsoil in 
a manner that is likely to have an adverse effect on the seabed or subsoil”.37 
Section 20B of the EEZ Act prohibits the discharge of harmful substances from 
New Zealand structures or other structures, submarine pipelines, into the sea, or 
into the EEZ or onto the seabed beneath it, unless the discharge is a permitted 
activity or is authorised by a marine consent or under sections 21 to 23. Section 20C 
similarly restricts discharges of harmful substances from mining ships, and extends 
that jurisdiction to include discharges into or onto the continental shelf. Section 134 
makes it an offence to breach sections 20B and 20C, and section 132 applies to 
breaches of section 20. The EEZ Act defines “owner” in just the same terms as the 
MTA, so that these criminal penalties will continue to apply to a broad range of 
licensees, managers, agents and employees.38 
There are differences in the defences available to offenders against section 20 and 
sections 20B or 20C. Section 133 - “Strict liability and defences” – asserts that it is 
“not necessary to prove that the defendant intended to commit the offence” of 
breaching section 20. The defendant may still claim two defences, reasonable 
necessity and absence of fault for certain intervening acts or events. 39  The 
reasonable necessity defence requires the defendant to show that the action or event 
was “reasonable in the circumstances” and was necessary “for the purposes of 
saving or protecting life or health, or preventing serious damage to property, or 
avoiding an actual or likely adverse effect on the environment or existing 
interests”.40 The absence of fault defence allows the defendant to claim that the 
damage “resulted from an event beyond the control of the defendant, including 
natural disaster, mechanical failure, or sabotage”.41 The event must be one which 
“could not reasonably have been foreseen or been provided against by the 
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defendant”.42 Both defences require that the defendant must have taken adequate 
actions to mitigate or remedy the harm. 
Section 134, relating to the breach of sections 20B and 20C, does not specifically 
state that these are strict liability offences. It simply provides that if the sections are 
breached, then the owners of the offshore installation, pipeline, the master and 
owner of the ship, the person in charge of and the person carrying out any mining 
activities, or the person who caused the damage if they have not otherwise been 
referred to, will have committed an offence.43 Section 134I may then require that 
the person convicted must pay the costs incurred or associated with “removing, 
containing, rendering harmless, or dispersing any harmful substance”, as well as 
“removing or dispersing any waste or other matter to which the offence relates.”  
The section 134A defences are copied directly from the MTA and differ from the 
defences under section 133.44 The defendant may claim the defence of necessity, 
but action that caused the damage must have been a reasonable step to secure the 
safety of the ship or the offshore installation, or to save life. Unlike section 133, the 
defendant cannot argue that the discharge was necessary to avoid damage to the 
environment, which makes sense because it is the discharge that causes the damage. 
Section 134A also provides an absence of fault defence if the discharge occurred 
due to “damage to the ship or its equipment, to an offshore installation or its 
equipment, to a pipeline, or to any apparatus (other than a ship) used in connection 
with any mining activity”. The damage must have occurred without the “negligence 
or deliberate act of the defendant”, and all reasonable preventive steps must have 
been taken to stop or minimise the escape. It is not clear why this equipment damage 
defence differs from section 133, with its requirement that the damage be caused 
by “natural disaster, mechanical failure or sabotage”. The differences between the 
two sections are probably a consequence of the copy and pasting from the MTA, 
rather than from any specific intent to distinguish them from one another and the 
overall effect of each should be the same. 
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The EEZ Act’s penalties differ significantly from the old penalties contained in the 
MTA.45 If a natural person is convicted of an offence against the Act, they may be 
fined up to $300,000 NZD, up from the MTA’s maximum fine of $200,000 NZD, 
and $10,000 NZD for every day or part of every day that the offence continues. A 
person other than a natural person may be fined up to $10m NZD. The most 
significant change, however, is that the EEZ Act no longer provides for sentences 
of imprisonment. Natural persons may be arrested and remanded in custody or on 
bail, so long as they are New Zealand citizens or residents, or with the Attorney 
General’s consent, but there is no custodial penalty under the EEZ Act itself.46 The 
omission may simplify sentencing, but it reduces the personal impact of offending, 
allowing corporate officers to treat a conviction for an environmental offence as 
just another business expense. 
The Attorney-General has said of these penalties that:47 
We are satisfied that the offences described in the Bill are in the nature of 
regulatory offences and that the information to make out the defences are 
particularly within the realm of the individual’s knowledge. However, we note 
that the maximum penalty of 12 months imprisonment for offences in the 
MTA Act is the upper limit of what we would consider reasonable for strict 
liability offences. The $10 million maximum penalty for non-natural persons 
for offences in the EEZ Act is also above the normal penalty range for strict 
liability offences. 
While this indicates the Attorney-General considered these penalties quite onerous, 
it considers environmental offences to be mere “regulatory offences”. The intention 
should be to deter operators of hazardous activities from carelessness, not to lighten 
penalties to the point that crimes against the environment are treated as a mere cost 
of doing business. 
Otherwise the EEZ Act replicates penalties that are standard in the MTA or the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”), including: 
• ordering a review of the offender’s marine consent;48  
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• ordering the offender to disgorge up to three times the value of 
any commercial gain which arose from the offence;49  
• that any fines be applied to defray the costs of “removing, 
containing or rendering harmless, or dispersing the harmful 
substance” or “repairing the damage resulting from the 
discharge”; and50 
• that the principal may be held liable for acts of its agents, 
including contractors, or employees.51  
The EEZ Act also provides a system of enforcement orders and abatement notices, 
which is virtually identical to the system in the RMA.52 Enforcement orders may 
be used to prevent people from doing things which breach the EEZ Act, its 
regulations or marine consents, and to ensure that people comply with the law, or 
that they avoid, remedy, or mitigate any damage they may cause to the environment 
or existing interest.53  This could include requiring the person to pay the costs 
incurred by such damage and “actual and reasonable costs” of the measures taken 
to avoid, remedy or mitigate any adverse effects on the environment, and the court 
has broad powers to craft the order to suit the occasion.54 
Generally what we see is that the EEZ Act has borrowed liberally from the MTA 
and the RMA, and has continued the tradition of holding people liable for oil 
removal clean-up costs that dates back to the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1965. It 
will no longer impose sentences of imprisonment and instead introduces the penalty 
of a $10m fine for corporate offenders. The system has been broadened to capture 
operators of offshore structures, but the offences are essentially the same as 
previously existed under the MTA. Since 1965, the geographical scope of New 
Zealand’s maritime laws has expanded somewhat, and the MTA and EEZ Act now 
reach to the fullest extent allowed by international law.  
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53 Section 115. 
54 Section 115(1)(c). 
The Penalties for Harmful Discharges from Offshore Petroleum Installations and 




4.2 Discharges of Harmful Substances and the RMA 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”) also prohibits and criminalizes the 
“Discharge of harmful substances from ships or offshore installations”, but only if 
they occur in New Zealand’s coastal marine area.55 Coastal marine area includes 
the foreshore, seabed and coastal water, and the airspace above, and essentially 
refers to New Zealand’s territorial seas.56 The government has passed the Resource 
Legislation Amendment Act 2017 amending elements of the EEZ Act’s marine 
discharge consent regime, but that appears to have had no effect on the penalties 
discussed here.57 
The primary offence is described by section 15B of the RMA. This states that “[n]o 
person may, in the coastal marine area, discharge a harmful substance or 
contaminant from a ship or offshore installation” into or onto the water, land or air. 
Discharges are allowed where they are “permitted or controlled by regulations made 
under this Act, a rule in a regional coastal plan, proposed regional coastal plan, 
regional plan, proposed regional plan, or a resource consent” or, if after “reasonable 
mixing”, the discharge is unlikely to have harmful effects. That there are offences 
regulating ship-source pollution in both the MTA and the RMA has been described 
as “unhelpful”, but that is the legacy of a bifurcated system which has historically 
considered shipping and land-based pollution to be separate issues.58 
Harmful substances are defined by the RMA and its regulations to include “crude 
oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and refined petroleum products”, as well as a wide 
range of fossil fuel products as are listed in its Schedules.59 The RMA defines a 
“contaminant” as any substance or energy that “changes or is likely to change the 
physical, chemical or biological condition of water”.60 Discharge means to “emit, 
deposit, and allow to escape.”61 According to section 338, sections 15A, 15B and 
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15C (which prohibits dumping radioactive waste, or storing radioactive, toxic or 
hazardous waste in the coastal marine area) are all strict liability offences, and it is 
not necessary to prove intent.62 If the discharge is from an offshore installation, then 
the owner is deemed to be the responsible party, and “owner” is given the same 
meaning as in section 222(2) of the MTA.63 
Section 15A prohibits the dumping of waste or other matter from ships, aircraft or 
offshore installations in the coastal marine area, and also prohibits the dumping of 
entire ships, aircraft or offshore installations, “unless expressly allowed to do so by 
a resource consent.”64 Dumping raises interesting questions, but the subject goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The point to be taken is that the owners of marine 
structures should plan to prevent pollution damage at all stages of the operation, 
from the initial exploration, through the production stages, and on to 
decommissioning and abandonment.  
Every natural person who commits one of these offences is liable on conviction to 
imprisonment for up to two years, or to a fine of up to $300,000, and every other 
person (meaning corporate entities and other artificial persons) can be fined up to 
$600,000.65 If the offence is a continuing one, then the penalty can include an 
additional $10,000 per day or part of every day the offence continues.66 Like the 
MTA and the EEZ Act, the RMA provides for additional penalties of up to three 
times the offender’s profit where the offence occurred in pursuit of commercial 
gain.67 If it is the local authority which has laid the complaint, then the court must 
order that the fine is paid to the local authority with a ten per cent deduction to the 
Crown.68 This ensures that the local authority will be at least partially reimbursed 
for any costs it suffers in dealing with the discharge. 
                                                 
62 Section 338. 
63 Sections 338(1B) and 2. 
64 Section 15A(2). 
65 Section 339(1); For examples of sentencing practice see Northland Regional Council v Thalassic 
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Council v Southern Storm Fishing Limited DC Christchurch CRN3009015850, 18 June 2003. 
66 Section 339(1A). 
67 Section 339B; Compare with Maritime Transport Act, s 409. 
68 Section 342; David, “Marine Pollution”, above n 2, at 678. 
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The RMA also appears to be the source of the defences under the EEZ Act’s section 
133, as section 341 allows offenders to utilise the same two general defences. The 
first allows the defendant to claim that the harmful discharge was “necessary for 
the purposes of saving life or protecting life or health, or preventing serious damage 
to property or avoiding an actual or likely adverse effect on the environment”. The 
second excuses the defendant if the discharge was caused by circumstances 
“beyond the control of the defendant, including natural disaster, mechanical failure, 
or sabotage”. 
The guiding case on RMA sentencing criteria is Machinery Movers Ltd v Auckland 
Regional Council, and we recall that the court applied these principles in the MTA 
case of Maritime New Zealand v Prosafe Production Services PTE Ltd.69 Machine 
Movers involved the negligent spilling of various toxic chemicals into a stream in 
Glen Eden, Auckland, in 1992, that killed over a hundred ducks, also burning a 
number of local people who had entered the water to save the dying birds. 
Machinery Movers Ltd argued that sentencing should be guided by the former 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, and that the appropriate range was for the 
fine to be up to $20,000.70 The Auckland High Court rejected their submission, 
saying that the RMA was “informed by a wholly different environmental 
philosophy which places far greater emphasis on environmental protection and 
introduces a much more stringent regime of penalties and punishment than did the 
1967 Act.”71 The RMA’s sanctions were intended to be more stringent and the 
“levels of penalties under the 1967 Act [would] have no relevance under the RMA 
with its strong and pervasive emphasis on avoidance of adverse effects on the 
environment.”72  The Court balanced the harm against the company’s financial 
position, taking their remedial efforts into account and settled on a financial penalty 
which reflected the seriousness of the offence, but which would not drive the firm 
into liquidation. The Court was also critical of the suggestion that small operations 
should be treated more leniently, saying that harm was always a “matter of degree”, 
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where much depended upon the culpability of the offence and the extent of the 
damage.73  
In McKnight v New Zealand Biogas Industries Ltd, the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal considered the mens rea elements required for a strict liability offence. The 
Court explained that “[in] the ordinary and natural use of language, a person 
discharges something when he causes it to be discharged.”74 Causing something to 
happen might be taken to mean that the person must do some positive and 
intentional act, but the Court of Appeal applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in R v City of Sault Ste Marie. 75  There Dickson J said the terms 
“discharging, causing or permitting pollution” were closely interwoven into a single 
“generic” offence. 76  As well as “direct acts of pollution” and the “active 
undertaking of something which it is in a position to control”, this should include 
the defendant’s “passive lack of interference or, in other words, its failure to prevent 
an occurrence which it ought to have foreseen.”77 Discharges could result from 
omissions as well as actions, but while there was no need to prove exactly how or 
why an oil emission occurred, there would still need to be some causal link between 
the person accused and the discharge.78  
Section 338 was tested most recently following the sinking of the Rena in Maritime 
New Zealand v Daina Shipping Co.79 The District Court of Tauranga described the 
charge as one of strict liability, which “means the owner cannot escape liability in 
such circumstances.”80 The Court considered earlier sentencing cases involving 
“public welfare offences”, and “the nature of the environment affected, the extent 
of the damage afflicted, the deliberateness of the offence and the attitude of the 
defendant.”81 Given that the offence was not deliberate, and the defendant had 
                                                 
73 At 13. 
74 McKnight v New Zealand Biogas Industries Ltd (1994) 1B ELRNZ 263, [1994] 2 NZLR 664, [1994] 
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75 R v City of Sault Ste Marie (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161. 
76 At 184. 
77 At 184. 
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shown remorse and attempted to mitigate the harm, and bearing in mind that the 
maximum possible sentence was $600,000, the Court reduced the penalty from the 
prosecution’s suggested starting point of $450,000 down to $300,000. This result 
could be contrasted with cases like Maritime Safety Authority v Dong Won 
Fisheries Co Ltd, where the errant company was fined $20,000 and ordered to pay 
$1.5m in clean-up costs after their vessel grounded and discharged 230,000 litres 
of diesel.82 The only reason the Court did not take a harder line in the Daina 
Shipping Co. case, for example by imposing continuing costs, was because “it is 
more important for co-operation and goodwill, that the difficulties associated with 
this are to be resolved in a satisfactory way.”83 If the Rena’s owners and insurers 
had not been so forthcoming in paying the salvage costs, it would have been open 
to the Court to impose quite substantial removal costs.84 
Interestingly, fines or monetary penalties imposed for breaches of sections 15A, 
15B or 15C, can be recovered by the distress and sale of the ship or its equipment, 
which raises the possibility that equipment related to offshore operations could be 
seized and sold.85 If that equipment included items such as helicopters, buildings at 
on-shore support sites, and drilling equipment, then the recovery powers could be 
significant, which suggests that there could be good reason to add these powers to 
the MTA and the EEZ Acts. 
Sentencing might also involve the Environment Court undertaking a review of the 
conditions of the person’s resource consent, or granting an enforcement order under 
section 314. Enforcement orders give the court broad powers to require a person to 
stop doing, or not commence doing anything which might contravene the Act or 
any regulations, rules or resource consents, or which might be “noxious dangerous, 
offensive, or objectionable to such an extent that it has or is likely to have an adverse 
effect on the environment.”86 The person can be required to comply with their 
obligations under the Act and so forth, and might also be ordered to “avoid, remedy, 
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or mitigate any adverse effect on the environment caused by or on behalf of that 
person”.87 
Enforcement orders can also require the guilty party to pay for “any [actual and] 
reasonable costs and expenses which that other person has incurred or is likely to 
incur in avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effect” on the 
environment. 88  These “actual and reasonable costs” can include “the costs of 
investigation, supervision, and monitoring of the adverse effect on the 
environment”, as well as the direct costs of avoidance, remediation and 
mitigation.89 Any person may apply for an enforcement order, so long as they use 
the prescribed form, but only the consent authority or the Minister may apply to the 
Environment Court for orders requiring the resource consent holder to “adopt the 
best practicable option to avoid or minimise any adverse effect of the discharge to 
which the consent or rule relates.”90 
The RMA’s prohibition on discharges of harmful substances, with its system of 
enforcement orders and penalties, appears to create a tougher regime against the 
discharge of harmful substances than that of the MTA. If offshore petroleum 
operators choose to undertaken drilling operations inside the 12nm limit, they 
would then be subject to the RMA’s resource consent process as it is administered 
by the local authority, with possible fines of up to $600,000 for body corporates 
that discharge harmful substances, but also the possibility that individuals may be 
imprisoned for up to 2 years. Operators in the EEZ now face the prospect of a 
maximum fine of $10m NZD for the same unlawful discharge but not a custodial 
sentence. Operators must drill where the oil is to be found, but all things being 
equal, it would make more sense from a legal liability standpoint to drill outside of 
the 12nm limit and avoid even the remotest possibility of a lengthy prison sentence.  
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4.3 The Crown Minerals Act 1991 and Good Industry Practice 
The EEZ Act and the MTA both use a definition of owner which includes “the 
person having any right, privilege, or licence to explore for or exploit minerals in 
connection with which the installation is being, has been, or is to be used”.91 To be 
completely accurate, the EEZ Act’s definition refers to a “person having a right”, 
while the MTA uses the phrase, a “person having any right”, but that should not 
make any real difference in the way that ownership is ascribed. Every CMA permit 
must specify the names of the permit operator and of all permit participants, and 
each permit holder is then considered jointly and severally liable to perform the 
permit holder’s obligations.92 The Crown Minerals (Petroleum) Regulations 2007 
(“CMA regulations”) also require any application on behalf of two or more persons, 
must identify an operator and declare each person’s interest in the permit.93 The 
permit holder’s obligations come from four specified Acts, the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 2015 (“HSWA”), the MTA, the RMA and the EEZ Act as its four 
specified Acts, and it is an offence under section 33 to fail to comply with the 
specified Acts.94 It is an offence to carry out mining activities without a permit, 
punishable by imprisonment for up to two years or a fine of up to $400,000 NZD, 
and $20,000 for every day or part of every day the offence continues.95 
Essentially, permit applicants must satisfy all the relevant regulatory agencies under 
those specified Acts that their systems are sufficient to meet health and safety and 
environmental requirements.96 The key phrase here is that permit holder or holders 
must perform their activities “in accordance with good industry practice”.97 The 
CMA takes this point seriously, as is evidenced by the fact that it is an offence if 
the permit holder fails to comply with the conditions of its permit, or those in the 
CMA or the HSWA and their regulations, or to follow good industry practices.98 
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The Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2013 outlines the government’s 
management policies regarding Crown minerals, and details the procedures and 
provisions for implementing those policies.99 The minerals programme outlines the 
permitting regime and explains how permits are allocated, rules for compliance, 
and how they may be revoked for any failure to carry out operations. It cites section 
2(1) of the CMA’s definition of “good industry practice” as “acting in a manner 
that is technically competent and at a level of diligence and prudence reasonably 
and ordinarily exercised by experienced operators engaged in a similar activity”.100 
The standard reflects international norms. For example, the EU’s Offshore Safety 
Directive also remarks that best practice means subjecting mobile offshore drilling 
units to independent safety and environmental verification according to recognized 
industry codes.101 
Maritime NZ and the Ministry for the Environment published “Environmental Best 
Practice Guidelines for the Offshore Petroleum Industry” in 2006. Operators must 
conduct their activities to the standard of a “reasonable and prudent operator” and 
apply “best practicable options to minimise or prevent adverse effects on the 
environment.” 102  As the guidelines were not backed up by any sanctions or 
penalties for failure to comply, they have been criticised as being nothing more than 
self-regulation.103  Barry Barton has explained that although the Minister could 
theoretically revoke an operator’s permit, the concept of good oilfield practice is 
“uncertain and difficult to enforce.”104 Bay et al. also point out that the CMA was 
primarily concerned with the efficient allocation and of rights to prospect, explore 
and mine for Crown-owned minerals in order to maximise the Crown’s revenues. 
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The CMA requires good industry practice, but it was not designed to regulate 
environmental impacts.105 
Any failures to abide by the practices expected of a “reasonable and prudent 
operator” could affect the availability of defences, however. For example, the 
reasonable necessity defence only applies if the defendant’s actions were 
reasonable. Similarly, absence of fault assumes that the event was unforeseeable. 
The failure to follow proper best practice would tend to undermine the defendant’s 
claims that their actions were reasonable, or that they had taken precautions against 
foreseeable eventualities.  
 
4.4 The Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 
There is also a close relationship between “good industry practice” and the HSWA. 
Under the HSWA employers have a general duty to protect “workers and other 
persons against harm to their health, safety, and welfare by eliminating or 
minimising risks arising from work or from prescribed high-risk plant”.106 Their 
primary duty is to ensure that their worker’s health is not put at risk, “as far as is 
reasonably practicable”, and that includes providing and maintaining “safe plant 
and structures” and “safe systems of work”.107 Other duties may be found in the 
Health and Safety at Work (General Risk and Workplace Management) Regulations 
2016 and the Health and Safety at Work (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) 
Regulations 2016. The regulations impose a general duty on the employer to ensure 
that the installation is “safe for any person on or near the installation” and that any 
work is carried out safely.108 The permit operator or drilling contractor must take 
all reasonably practicable steps to “prevent the uncontrolled release of hazardous 
liquids, vapours, or gases” and the “uncontrolled accumulation of hazardous 
vapours or gases”, especially in confined spaces.109 Failure to comply may make an 
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individual liable to a fine not exceeding $10,000, and other persons will be liable 
to a fine not exceeding $50,000.110 The same penalties apply if the permit operator 
or drilling contractor breaches its duties to ensure the safe disposal of waste 
petroleum, to take precautions with ignition sources, or to prepare and review major 
accident prevention policies.111  
New Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) 
Regulations 2013 were developed in response to the 2010 Pike River Coal Mine 
disaster, but they have since been updated by the Health and Safety at Work 
(Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2016. 112  WorkSafe’s High 
Hazards Unit is responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the 
regulations and safety cases. The operator has the primary responsibility to ensure 
that the well is “designed, constructed, commissioned, equipped, operated, 
maintained, modified, suspended and abandoned” so that the “risks to the health 
and safety of any person from the well or anything in it, or from strata to which the 
well is connect, are as low as is reasonably practicable.”113 They must carry out a 
full and ongoing assessment of the subsurface conditions and any hazards 
underground formations may pose.114 The well must be designed so that activities 
can be safely suspended or abandoned, every part of the well must be composed of 
suitable materials, and there is a duty to ensure that “suitable well control equipment 
and associated control systems are provided to protect against the uncontrolled 
release of petroleum.”115 The regulation appears to be comprehensive in accounting 
for a wide range of possible incidents, but its penalties are weak, with fines not 
exceeding $10,000 for an individual or $50,000 for any other person.  
All criminal penalties, including those in the EEZ Act, the MTA, the RMA and the 
HSWA, will be meted out according to the general sentencing principles in the 
Sentencing Act 2002.116 The Sentencing Act 2002 requires the court to consider the 
necessity of holding the offender to account for the harm they have caused, to 
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provide for the interests of the victim, to pay reparations, and the sentence’s 
deterrent effects.117 A reparations report will take account of the type of harm, and 
the value of any property damaged, emotional harm and consequential losses, the 
offender’s financial capacity and the maximum amount they may be able to pay.118 
Aggravating factors include the “extent of any loss, damage or harm resulting from 
the offence”, any previous convictions, the person’s safety record and any 
aggravating factors, and whether the person has offered amends or taken or 
proposed any remedial action “in relation to the circumstances of the offending”.119 
Employers may also face individual criminal liability, for failing in their duty to 
take reasonable precautions to protect their employees when dealing with 
dangerous things under sections 150A and 156 of the Crimes Act 1961.120 Section 
150A requires proof that the “omission or unlawful act is a major departure from 
the standard of care expected of a reasonable person to whom that legal duty applies 
or who performs that unlawful act.” The bar is set quite high, but it should also be 
noted that any “omission without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal 
duty” is grounds for prosecution for culpable homicide.121 
 
 
4.5 Civil Liability and Joint Operating Agreements  
Offshore petroleum extraction operations are often complex and expensive, with 
multiple parties subjected to various joint operating agreements and upstream 
service contracts.122 The Crown Minerals Act 1991 takes this practice into account, 
and is designed so that every party to a joint venture is required to be a permit 
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participant, and so that one of the participants must be designated as the operator. 
Because Joint Operating Agreements (“JOAs”) operate as a sort of private 
constitution, they seek to reallocate liability by agreement, and that can raise 
interesting questions concerning the interaction between private and public law.  
Even the largest oil companies prefer to hedge their bets by entering into JOAs, 
believing quite rightly that a quarter interest in four projects is safer than sole 
ownership of one.123 These agreements may be divided into two broad categories: 
service contracts between operators, or between operators and state-owned national 
oil companies, and JOAs between the operator and their co-venturers. 124  The 
chances are that any venture to explore for oil or gas offshore will be unsuccessful, 
and the legal structure must allow the participants to set off losses against taxable 
income, and allow the parties to carry on if one or more chooses to withdraw at any 
stage.125 Standardized JOAs and service contracts are therefore only the beginning 
point of negotiations between the various parties to any complicated venture.  
As T. N. McFadgen put it, the JOA is almost solely the “creature of the lawyer’s 
pen not of judges’ or legislators’ good (and misguided intentions). Therein lies its 
attractiveness, and its failings.”126 Black and Dundas define a JOA as an agreement 
between “two or more natural or legal persons combining property and expertise to 
carry out a single business enterprise in which they have a joint proprietary interest, 
a joint right to control and a sharing of profits and losses.”127 The JOA therefore 
provides a private constitution, allocating rights, duties and obligations between the 
participants.128 The usual elements of the JOA are:129 
1. community interest in the object of the undertaking; 
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2. pro-rata right to direct and govern the conduct of each other with respect 
thereto; 
3. share to the extent of their respective percentage interest in the losses or 
profits; 
4. close, possibly fiduciary, relationship between the parties. 
No operator would accept unlimited liability for all the consequences or losses that 
may affect the successful completion a project. Carolin Schramm et al. explain the 
various contracting strategies parties to other kinds of oil and gas project contracts 
undertake in order to allocate tasks, risks and responsibilities.130 There are four 
possible risk management strategies contained in Engineering, Procurement and 
Construction (“EPC”) contracts, Engineering, Procurement and Construction with 
Long Lead Items (“EPC with LLIs”) contracts, Engineering, Procurement, 
Construction and Management (“EPCM”) contracts, and Progressive Lump Sum 
(“PLS”) contracts. These create a continuum of risk management, from EPC 
contracts obliging the contractor to undertake almost all the risks in delivering a 
completed facility for a confirmed price at a guaranteed date, to EPCM contracts 
which leave much of the risk and the overall control of the venture in the owner’s 
hands. EPC with LLIs accept that some items may not be delivered on time, and 
PLS contracts allow the venture to evolve via a progressive sequence of contracts.  
A mining permit, such as those New Zealand operators must obtain under the CMA, 
typically will not concern itself with the rights and obligations of that permit holders 
owe to one another, but simply treats all permit participants as jointly and severally 
liable for carrying out any statutory obligations.131 JOAs typically seek to share 
liability between participants on a proportional basis, or for specific occurrences up 
to a pre-set capped amount, and this may conflict with any statutorily imposed joint 
and several and unlimited liability.  
As was mentioned above, one of the participants to the JOA, usually the one with 
the greatest percentage share in the venture, will be appointed to be the operator. 
The operator has overall control of the venture and the authority to act as agent for 
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all the participants in any negotiations and legal disputes.132 Each participant is 
liable for any offences committed, or obligations incurred, by the operator to the 
same extent as if he, she or it had incurred that offence or obligation. The operator 
is not expected to gain a profit or suffer a loss merely by reason of their position. 
Like any other participant, it will share profits and losses severally in proportion to 
its percentage ownership in the venture. The other participants are expected to 
actively defend the operator, and to indemnify it for any additional costs it might 
face in representing the venture, even if this sometimes results in legal squabbles 
over matters such as contributions to legal fees. The operator only loses this right 
to be indemnified if it is guilty of some act of gross negligence or wilful misconduct. 
Strangely, while the MTA allows shipping agents to enter into contracts of 
indemnity with shipowners, for any civil or criminal proceedings, including under 
the MTA, the RMA or the EEZ Act, but it does not explicitly extend the same right 
to agents of owners and operators of marine structures.133 
4.5.1 Indemnity Clauses: From Piper Alpha to the Deepwater Horizon  
JOAs use various indemnity clauses to allocate liability to the party in the best 
position to prevent, absorb or insure against the loss.134 Exemption clauses may be 
separated into three categories: indemnification or ‘knock for knock’ clauses, 
exemption or excluded loss clauses, and pre-set limitation of liability clauses.135 
Knock for knock clauses, also known as ‘mutual hold harmless’, or ‘bury your own 
dead’ clauses, require the participant to own their own damage, without attempting 
to pass responsibility for third party damage claims on to their fellow co-venturers, 
or to innocent third parties.136 The arguments in favour of knock for knock clauses 
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is that are said to allow for speedy compensation for injured workers or their 
grieving families, and reduce the duplication of insurance coverage.137  
Knock for knock indemnity clauses were tested following both the Piper Alpha and 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster. The 1988 North Sea Piper Alpha disaster was the 
deadliest, most expensive, and possibly most legally complex accident ever to occur 
in the North Sea.138 The entire platform was destroyed by an explosion, resulting in 
losses of $3.304 billion USD, killing 167 men and injuring another 59.139 Lord 
Cullen’s damning review of safety practices on the Piper Alpha prompted a shift 
from prescriptive to a goal-setting approach to health and safety regulations in the 
United Kingdom, and around the world.140  
The subsequent 2002 “London Bridge” House of Lords judgment saw 147 separate 
actions against 24 different contractors, who between them employed 134 of the 
167 men killed.141 The House of Lords quoted a United States Court of Appeals 
Judge who said that:142 
… in the complicated offshore drilling environment with its intricate 
divisions of responsibility and countless contractors and 
subcontractors, a simple slip-and-fall can turn into a multiparty 
morass of contribution cross-claims, third- and fourth-party 
defendants, reciprocal indemnity agreements, and the ever popular 
warranties of workmanlike performance. The plaintiff in this 
litigation has long since settled and departed but the other parties have 
chosen to remain on the field of battle to contest the appropriate share 
of the plaintiff’s settlement to be borne by each of them. 
This rather undercuts the argument that knock for knock clauses necessarily ease 
the burden on the injured or killed worker and their grieving family. The House of 
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Lords upheld the party’s right to reallocate their liability by contract. It held that the 
operators right to indemnity is only excluded when it has committed some 
negligence or breach of statutory duty that was the sole cause of the death or injury, 
otherwise each party assumed the “ultimate responsibility for compensating its own 
employees regardless of fault.”143  
The Deepwater Horizon disaster again raised the issue of indemnity clauses, this 
time to consider their effect on statutory penalties. BP Exploration and Production 
Inc, as the operator and primary leaseholder of the block within which the Macondo 
well was drilled, was contractually required to indemnify rig-owner Transocean for 
any pollution damage claims stemming from incidents under the water, even if the 
damage was due to Transocean’s own negligence, or even gross negligence.144 BP 
denied that the indemnification applied to strict liability statutory penalties, 
however, and that would have excluded the massive fines BP faced under the Clean 
Water and Oil Pollution Acts for the discharge of 4.9 million barrels of oil. The 
Court disagreed and argued that the balance should be in favour of freedom of 
contract, saying that:145 
… competent persons have the utmost liberty of contracting, and therefore 
agreements voluntarily and fairly made are upheld. … Although a contract can 
be invalidated on the grounds that it violates public policy, courts are 
instructed to apply this principle with caution and only in cases plainly within 
the reasons on which that doctrine rests, because the phrase ‘public policy’ 
can be vague and variable.  
As there was no explicit prohibition on contractual indemnity in the Oil Pollution 
Act 1990 (“OPA”), and such indemnities were even provided for in certain sections, 
the Court held that contractual indemnities for even gross negligence were not 
inconsistent with the OPA.146 This only applied to compensatory damages, however, 
as punitive damages cannot be avoided by private agreement. Likewise, Clean 
Water Act 1972 environmental remediation costs could be reallocated by mutual 
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agreement, but civil penalties under that Act, which are intended to punish and deter, 
could not.147 
4.5.2 Examples of JOA Indemnity Clauses 
The classic example of the standard ‘knock for knock’ form is the “2012 Mutual 
Indemnity And Hold Harmless Deed”, which may be found on the websites of 
Leading Oil & Gas Industry Competitiveness (“LOGIC”), and Oil and Gas UK 
(“OGUK”). Specifically, the signatories agree to:148 
… be solely responsible for and shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless the 
other Signatories and the other members of their respective Groups against all 
Claims arising from, out of, or relating to the Services in connection with: 
(i) personal injury to or sickness, disease or death of Personnel of the 
Indemnifying Signatory or any other members of its Group; and 
(ii) loss of, recovery of, or damage to any Property of the Indemnifying 
Signatory or any other members of its Group; and 
(iii) Consequential Loss suffered by the Indemnifying Signatory or any other 
members of its Group. 
This entails more than passively accepting any losses which may befall the 
signatory, they must also actively defend other signatories and may be required to 
contribute to the legal costs of any defence.  
Joint operators in Australian States and Territories have traditionally accepted that 
participants will share proportionate liability for any claims in torts or contract law, 
or for penalties relating to statutory and regulatory offences, and typically use the 
Australian Mining Petroleum Law Association’s Model Petroleum Joint Operating 
Agreement (“AMPLA JOA”).149  John Grace, the author of the AMPLA JOA, 
argues that traditional proportional liability sharing approach has been re-examined 
following the large-scale disasters of the Montara, Deepwater Horizon and the 
2006 Sidoarjo mud volcano in Java. Grace says that the shift to strict liability in 
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Australian legislation following these recent drilling catastrophes may impact on 
the traditional proportional approach to liability, and almost certainly will interfere 
with an operator’s ability to obtain environmental and civil liability insurance.150  
 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
New Zealand’s law has a long history of providing for regulatory penalties for 
causing harmful oil spills, going back to the Petroleum Act 1937 and the Oil in 
Navigable Waters Act 1965. Landowners were also entitled to be reimbursed for 
damage to land, but the Public Works Act 1928 envisaged a system where 
compensation would be decided by a compensation court according to the market 
value of that land, but only if agreement could not be reached between the parties. 
The MPA also contained penalties intended to ensure that New Zealand operators 
abided by oil spill prevention policies required by international laws such as 
OILPOL, the London Dumping Convention, and then MARPOL 73/78. These 
penalties have then been incorporated into the MTA and the RMA, and since 2015, 
to the EPA under the EEZ Act. In order to consider the effect of this transfer in 
responsibility, it was necessary to compare the criminal penalties in the MTA with 
those in the EEZ Act. 
The MTA’s criminal penalties for the discharge of harmful substances were 
generally well designed. If there could have been one improvement, it would have 
been to have added the term “blowout” to ensure that seabed eruptions of oil were 
covered under the term “discharge”, but perhaps that reflected the international 
laws’ concerns with operational and deliberate discharges rather than with drilling 
accidents. Nevertheless, the MTA cast the same wide net to capture owners and 
operators in criminal liability as it did in civil liability. This would implicate not 
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only the primary owner and operators, but the rules of agency and vicarious liability 
could also capture joint venture participants and employers for the wrongful acts of 
their company officers, agents and employees. For example, corporate entities 
would be held vicariously liable for any damage caused by directors acting within 
the scope of their employment.  
The MTA’s fines were quite stiff, they included triple damages for any profits 
earned in the wrongdoing, and there was the distinct possibility that, if the crime 
was sufficiently serious, the offenders could see sizeable prison time. The impact 
of that on an executive’s personal life and reputation would have to be taken 
seriously. However, now that harmful discharges are to be regulated by the EPA, 
custodial sentences are off the table. Fines for individuals have slightly increased, 
and a corporate body may be fined up to $10m NZD, but the EEZ Act no longer 
provides for custodial sentences.  
Saying that, the RMA still gives local authorities the power to prosecute persons 
dumping or discharge harmful substances in the coastal marine area without 
permission. Discharge means to “emit, deposit and allow to escape.”151 These are 
strict liability offences, and the owner of the installation may be liable on conviction 
to imprisonment for up to two years, to a fine of $300,000 or $600,000 if the owner 
is a corporate entity. The RMA allows for triple damages for profits, and 90% of 
the fine must be paid to the local authority to provide for the costs of clean-up. 
Further, the operator may lose its resource consent. The defendant may claim that 
the discharge was necessary to save life or prevent damage to property or the 
environment, or that the discharge was caused by circumstances beyond its control. 
Machinery Movers emphasized that the RMA was intended to be punitive, 
McKnight held that a person discharged something when they caused it to be 
discharged, and Newman reiterated that the RMA’s absolutely liability regime was 
intended to be a harsh regime.  
This is not the end of the story, however. A failure to carry out activities according 
to “good industry practice” could result in the revocation of the operators CMA 
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mining permit, and that could doom an otherwise lucrative venture. The Health and 
Safety at Work (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regulations 2016 
especially require that the employer must ensure that it prevents the accumulation 
or release of hazardous liquids, vapours or gases, and this could easily apply to an 
uncontrolled well blowout. Worksafe’s High Hazards Petroleum and Geothermal 
team will carry out regular inspections to ensure that the operator complies with 
their safety case. The fines for a failure to safely design or operate a well are 
minimal, but the employer could be made to pay substantial and prolonged 
reparations if the employee is injured. The Sentencing Act 2002 provides 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the court will use a reparations report will 
take account of the interests of the victim, the offender’s financial capacity, and 
sentence’s deterrent effects. Employers may also face individual criminal liability 
under sections 150A and 156 of the Crimes Act 1964 for failing to take reasonable 
precautions to protect their employees when dealing with dangerous things. A 
custodial sentence may be appropriate. 
None of the criminal financial penalties are significant compared to the multi-
million dollar damage suits that could result from a major offshore accident. For 
example, even EEZ Act’s maximum fine of $10m NZD would only have covered 
approximately one quarter of the government’s bill for cleaning up the Rena. The 
fact that they could be levied against company officers, managers, agents and 
employees personally, and against principals and employers by the laws of agency 
and vicarious liability, is what gives them their true impact. Add to this the prospect 
of facing actual prison time for failing to prevent an employee’s death, and the 
owners and operators of offshore activities in New Zealand waters do have some 
very real incentives to ensure that their activities are carried out safely.  
 
 





5 Mandatory Insurance and Offshore Installations  
Mandatory insurance is one of the key features of the CLC and Fund Convention 
regime. The basis of the CLC Convention 1969 was that shipowners would bear the 
sole burden of strict liability for the costs of oil pollution damage and preventive 
measures, so long as that liability was limited, and so long as the limits of liability 
were calculated according to the availability of insurance. Without the guarantee of 
insurance, the entire edifice would crumble. Shipowners would have every 
incentive to evade or deny liability, daring oil spill victims to prove their claims, 
and thrusting an insupportable compensation burden onto the Fund.  
New Zealand’s offshore petroleum liability regime may have obtained its basic 
terms and conditions from the CLC and Fund Convention regime, but the structure 
of that liability could not be more different. Instead of channelling strict liability to 
a single shipowner, liability is spread widely to capture as many offshore 
installation “owners” and operators as possible. While that liability is unlimited, the 
MTA’s mandatory offshore installation insurance regulations, or Marine Protection 
Rules: Part 102 (“MPR Part 102”), set a minimal insurance level that had not been 
updated since it was introduced in 1996. 
At the time of writing, however, the Ministry of Transport (“MOT”) had completed 
a consultation process reviewing a proposal to substantially increase the MPR Part 
102 insurance requirement. This has resulted in the creation of an entirely new 
financial assurance regime. This is an exciting development as it is the first time 
that a New Zealand government department has given serious consideration to the 
question of liability and compensation for offshore oil pollution. How would such 
a regime deal with issues of quantifying and defining unlimited liability for 
pollution damage, and what lessons, if any, would it take from the CLC and Fund 
Conventions?  
 





5.1 Marine Protection Rules: Part 102 Prior to 2014 
We recall that minimum offshore installation insurance regulations were first 
promised under the Marine Pollution Act 1974.1 Yet it was not until 1998 that the 
owner of every regulated offshore installation was required to provide “a current 
certificate of insurance in force issued or recognised by the Director”. 2  That 
contract for insurance or other financial security must provide “public liability 
coverage of a kind and scope suitable to meet the owner’s potential liability under 
Part XXV of the Act, and is for a sum not less than 14 million international 
Monetary Fund Units of Account”.3 Part 26A was inserted into the MTA in October 
of 2013, and it is telling that the MPR was not immediately amended to reflect that 
fact.4 However, insurance was originally supposed to cover all the costs of liability 
under Part 26A, including liability to the Crown to marine agencies for cleaning up 
pollution under section 385B, and liability for the costs of pollution damage and 
preventive measures under section 385C. 
MPR Part 102 was a positive step, but 14m IMF units of account is currently 
equivalent to approximately $26m NZD. That figure is not arbitrary, but is the same 
level that appears in two 1976 Protocols to the CLC and Fund Conventions 
1969/1971.5 It is not clear what reasoning went into the decision to set the minimum 
mandatory insurance at a level that was very soon to become obsolete, as Maritime 
NZ only received six submissions after advertising the rule in the New Zealand 
Gazette in 1996.6 The responses came from HIH Winterthur Insurance, the New 
Zealand Fire Service, New Zealand Shipping Federation and Coastal Tankers Ltd, 
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the Auckland Regional Council and Union Shipping. 7  None of the submitters 
recognised that the IOPC Fund would not accept claims for pollution damage 
caused by offshore oil and gas activities, or even that it might be necessary to ask 
how much damage an offshore oil well blowout could cause, and that it might be 
necessary to raise the minimum insurance requirement beyond an already obsolete 
minimum.  
How could offshore installation owners meet the mandatory insurance 
requirements? Offshore oil and gas operators are generally able to obtain first party 
property insurance, business interruption and loss of production income, D&O 
insurance, which covers personal liability claims directed against company 
directors and officers, environmental, marine, comprehensive general liability, and 
employer and worker compensation insurance.8 In addition, the Operator’s Extra 
Expense (“OEE”) and Energy Exploration and Development (“EED 8/86”) forms 
include cover for Control-of-Well, Redrilling/Restoration/Recompletion, Seepage 
and Pollution/Clean-up and Contamination, and Care, Custody and Control (Third 
Party Equipment).9 Neither form covers third party liability claims, which will have 
to be addressed by the operators and contractors’ general third party liability 
insurance. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon, Transocean maintained $560m 
worth of hull insurance to secure the possible loss of the rig, it had $1bn USD of 
workers casualty insurance, and $150m worth of contingent OEE insurance to cover 
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pollution damage claims.10 Halliburton, the well service contractor, and Cameron 
Iron Works, which supplied the BOP, maintained third party liability insurance of 
$600m USD and $500m USD respectively.  
One example of insurance in the Asia Pacific area is that XL Group Insurance’s 
“Pollution and Remediation Legal Liability Policy”.11 The XL Group’s policies, 
including the Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance in the Asia Pacific 
region, provide cover against claims for bodily injury and property damage, and for 
natural resource damages as that term is defined in the EU’s Environmental 
Liability Directive. The ELD was designed to cover a very broad conception of 
damage to the environment itself. It follows that the New Zealand owners of 
offshore installations would be able to find a range of insurance products to cover 
their liability for property and environmental damage claims, but they might have 
to rely upon their parent companies’ general liability insurance to cover other third 
party claims. 
5.1.1 Mandatory Insurance, Market Crises, Adverse Selection and Moral 
Hazard  
Before examining amendments to New Zealand’s financial assurance regime, it 
would be helpful to consider the implications of mandatory insurance in more detail. 
Mandatory insurance is key to the proper functioning of the CLC and Fund 
Conventions as they apply to oil pollution damage from ocean going oil tankers. 
However, it has been very difficult to develop a comprehensive international 
offshore oil and gas industry liability and compensation regime in large part 
because of resistance to the idea of mandatory insurance requirements. 
Theoretically, insurance provides a free market solution to the problem of 
regulating and compensating damage caused by hazardous industries. Mandatory 
insurance provides an important source of delegated legislation, in that the 
insurance industry’s terms and conditions enter into caselaw, and become as much 
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a part of the legal framework as any regulation passed by Parliament.12 Insurers are 
able to monitor the insured, using large actuarial databases which allow insurers to 
classify risks before underwriting them, and to verify claims and separate the valid 
from the spurious, while deductibles, exclusions and experience ratings can 
incentivise private parties to reduce their risks.13  
Adverse selection describes the dilemma that the persons most in need of insurance 
are those insurers would least like to do business with.14 Insurers are able to monitor 
and accurately price risk by their use of the Law of Large Numbers. The law takes 
advantage of the statistical tendency that, the more times a particular type of 
incident occurs, the closer the expected cost will come to the average cost.15 
Historical accident data can be modelled to predict future losses, and that makes the 
calculation of insurance premiums a matter of simple arithmetic. While this 
technique may work very well at predicting the expected costs of millions of motor 
vehicle accidents, it cannot account for the one in ten thousand industrial disaster. 
The irony is that it is because large scale environmental disasters are so few and far 
between that they pose such a serious risk for the insurance industry.16 Mandatory 
insurance provisions may then undermine insurers’ ability to exclude the riskiest 
operators, undermining their ability to segregate risk, and that may drive the 
conditions that lead to market collapse.17 
The consequence is that insurance markets can only operate with the insurance 
industry’s willing cooperation, As Colin Mackie explained, insurers fled the United 
States environmental insurance market in the 1980s after they became alarmed at 
the increased liability costs for historic pollution damage created by the CERCLA 
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Superfund legislation.18 George Priest argued that the insurance crisis was not due 
to CERCLA alone, but because the judiciary expanded expensive third party 
product tort liability. 19  As insurance markets unravelled and premiums 
skyrocketed, providers of products as various as medical vaccines, intrauterine 
devices, wine, aircraft, sports equipment, and services such as obstetrics, ski lifts, 
commercial trucking and day care, were forced to withdraw from the market 
altogether.20 Commentators have seen similar difficulties attending the rollout of 
the United States’ Affordable Care Act.21 Insurers seek to identify and exclude the 
highest risk operators, and that can make it very difficult for operators in the most 
hazardous industries to obtain mandatory insurance.22  
Faure suggests that third party insurance negates the efficiency benefits of first 
party insurance, as it opens the door to potentially endless claims from unknown 
and unknowable persons.23 The insurer must have confidence that the insured will 
behave as carefully with that insurance cover as they would without, otherwise risk 
models lose their predictive power, and again the market may collapse.24 Third 
parties can bring unprovable claims, in the knowledge that the polluter is fully 
covered by insurance. Alternatively, the fear is that operators will only take as much 
care as is necessary to prevent their cover being voided, and have perverse 
incentives to lie and cheat to obtain and retain that cover. We recall the coffin ships 
of old, incidents where unscrupulous shipowners would send over-insured but 
worthless hulks to near certain doom.25 This is the problem of moral hazard. 
Kenneth Arrow introduced the concept of moral hazard to neoclassical economics 
in the 1960s, with his insight that medical insurance increases demand for medical 
                                                 
18 Bergkamp, Herbatschek and Jayanti, at 120–121; Colin Mackie “The EU Environmental Liability 
Directive: A Commentary (Book Review)” (2014) 16 Env. L. Rev. 81 at 83. 
19 George Freeman “Tort Law Reform: Superfund/RCRA Liability as a Major Cause of the Insurance 
Crisis” (1985) 21 Tort & Ins. L.J. 517. 
20 Priest, “The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law”, above n 15, at 1521. 
21  Editorial Board “Why Obamacare Failed” Chicago Tribune (9 September 2016) 
<www.chicagotribune.com>. 
22 Priest, “The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law”, above n 15, at 1552–1553. 
23 Michael Faure "Environmental Damage Insurance in Theory and Practice" in T. Swanson, An 
Introduction to the Law and Economics of Environmental Policy: Issues in Institutional Design 
(Elsevier Science Ltd, 2002) at 291. 
24 At 288. 
25 Gordon Jackson “Marine Insurance Frauds in Scotland 1751-1821” (2004) 35 JMARLC 431. 




care.26 Steven Shavell describes it as “the tendency of insurance protection to alter 
an individual’s motive to prevent loss.”27  The tendency arises in situations of 
informational asymmetry, when the insured has knowledge of circumstances or 
events that could invalidate their insurance coverage but keeps those material facts 
from the insurer.28 As Scrutton LJ put it in Rozanes v Bowen:29 
As the underwriter knows nothing and the man who comes to him to ask him 
to insure knows everything, it is the duty of the assured, the man who desires 
to have a policy, to make a full disclosure to the underwriters without being 
asked of all the material circumstances, because the underwriters know nothing 
and the assured knows everything. This is expressed by saying that it is a 
contract of the utmost good faith – uberrima fides. 
New Zealand’s Marine Insurance Act 1908 implicitly provides for the possibility 
of moral hazard, that it requires that the assured must disclose all material facts to 
the insurer, and any failure to make such a disclosure is grounds for avoiding the 
contract.30 The MTA likewise preserves the insurer’s right to avoid claims resulted 
from the insured’s wilful misconduct.31 
One way that the operator can circumvent the difficulties of a mandatory insurance 
regime is to self-insure. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon, BP, which owned 
65% of the well and 25% of the overall venture, self-insured $700m USD of its 
OPA mandatory insurance requirements through its $6bn USD captive self-
insurance company, Jupiter Insurance Ltd.32 This would allow BP to set its own 
terms and conditions, to avoid the extra expenses of deductibles and premiums, or 
the possibly devastating impact of exclusionary wilful misconduct or gross 
negligence clauses. Aside from the significant tax advantages, self-insurance allows 
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the company to control the outcome of claims and to avoid disadvantageous 
arbitration, while satisfying and lowering the costs of mandatory insurance 
requirements.33 Captive companies must satisfy the laws pertaining to insurance 
companies in its domicile, and in New Zealand that means the Insurance (Prudential 
Supervision) Act 2010 and its regulations. Insurance providers must be licensed and 
must carry out their business in prudent manner, including taking all practicable 
steps to comply with a risk management programme and employing an actuary.34 
However, captive insurers are not required to prove their current financial strength 
rating by an approved rating agency.35  The downside of self-insurance for the 
regulator, and the public in general, is that it must rely upon another layer of 
regulation and penalties to ensure that the captive company carries out its business 
in a prudent manner, and manages its risk objectively and independently from the 
interests of its parent. The upside is that the self-insured company does not need to 
pay premiums, the administration and actuarial costs are reduced, and that creates 
fewer liquidity problems. Indeed, this aspect makes them especially suitable for 
expensive and unpredictable environmental disasters, where the lack of actuarial 
data may make it impossible to calculate a fair premium.36  
The moral of the moral hazard/adverse selection argument is that society benefits 
when risk is left to the free market, and that insurers should be free to exclude the 
riskiest customers, or at least to charge premiums and create terms and conditions 
appropriate to that risk. Adverse selection and moral hazard arguments are hostile 
to mandatory insurance regulations, because of the fear that the insurance industry 
will not be able to carry the bill for strict and unlimited environmental damage 
liability, and that it will therefore fall upon the polluter themselves. The subtext of 
the moral hazard/adverse selection argument is that there should be no strict 
environmental liability laws and no mandatory insurance regulations.  
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To see how the marine insurance industry assesses and excludes uninsurable clients, 
it is necessary to review some of the methodologies that classification societies, 
engineers and regulators use to anticipate and prevent disasters.  
5.1.2 Assessing Insurance Risk 
Marine insurers depend upon classification societies to provide them with 
information about the vessels and offshore structures they have underwritten, 
including whether or not they conform to private classification standards and to 
international public laws regarding safety at sea. 37  Protection and Indemnity 
associations, or P&I Clubs, provide the bulk of marine insurance to their members, 
and they carry out regular inspections and assessments incorporating both 
operational aspects and human factors.38 Under threat of highly publicised tanker 
disasters, the larger oil companies have established their own vetting systems, and 
appoint their own in-house tanker surveyors.39 
Serious offshore oil accidents in UK and Norwegian waters also led regulatory 
authorities to cooperate with oil companies in developing Quantitative Risk 
Assessment methodologies.40 These focus on matters such as crew safety in the 
event of a capsize or explosion, dropped object and diving risks, and the modelling 
of hydrocarbon releases. 41  This information could then be used as part of an 
Environmental Impact Assessment in support of an application for a licence to drill. 
The downside for the oil company is that the EIA can contain information that could 
be used by its opponents, as was the case when a recent application by Anadarko in 
New Zealand was challenged in court on the grounds that the EPA had failed to 
consider all the consequences of the company’s own oil spill modelling.42 
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Quantitative Risk Assessment helps to ensure that risks have been made As Low 
As Reasonably Practicable (“ALARP”), that risks for various accident scenarios are 
dealt with in a cost effective matter, adverse trends are identified, and that critical 
safety equipment and procedures are in place where needed.43 Undesired outcomes 
include blowouts, process leaks, riser/pipeline leaks, capsize, fire and explosions, 
transport accidents, and even structural failure.44 However, Det Norske Veritas, the 
pre-eminent Norwegian classification society, advise that such lists, no matter how 
exhaustive, can never include every possible risk. As Aven and Vinnem point out, 
the danger with the use of these systems and methodologies is that they can give 
rise to a check-box mentality.45 It is still incumbent upon crew and management to 
follow procedures and to avoid shortcuts. 
Engineers address three basic categories of risk analysis when designing platforms: 
strategic, qualitative design and operative risk.46 Strategic risk analyses use event 
tree, fire and explosion models to assess typical risk scenarios. Qualitative design 
analyses concentrate on the system’s specific technical elements, such as the 
blowout preventer or mud system. Operative risk analyses use risk matrices, such 
as probability trees and Bayesian networks, to identify hazards or events and 
determine the qualitatively acceptable risk of each occurring.  
According to Vatn and Haugen, risk analysis can fail in three ways: by not 
accounting for the possibility of a particular scenario, by identifying the possibility 
but not the extent of the risk of an accident, or finally, if no risk analysis is done at 
all.47 The Gullfaks C and the Deepwater Horizon incidents both happened because 
risks were either underestimated or not identified. Both could have been avoided if 
management had made better use of hazard logs to identify and integrate evolving 
data into decision making. Wang et al. observe that QRA methodologies focus 
primarily on equipment and structural failures, paying insufficient attention to the 
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human and organizational errors that case most offshore fires and explosions.48 The 
humans did “not_comply_with_instruction” and the organizational factor of 
“inefficient_emergency_plan” were the two issues most likely to contribute to a fire 
on board an offshore platform.49  
Insurers also use fault and event-tree analysis developed over decades in the 
weapons and nuclear industries, to anticipate and intercept catastrophic chains of 
events.50 Bayesian networks graphically represent more complex possibilities, and, 
unlike event-trees, they do not rely upon arbitrary or historical probabilities, but can 
include fuzzy variables, such as “very unlikely” to “very likely”.51 However Rees 
and Sharp argue that insurers have not considered the potential scope of offshore 
oil pollution incidents because there had not been a significant oil well blowout 
since the Santa Barbara incident in January 1969.52 Both event trees and Bayesian 
networks rely upon historical experience to a certain extent, and if anyone had asked 
the experts of the possibility of a Deepwater Horizon before October 2010, he or 
she would have said “very unlikely”.  
James Reason proposes a Swiss cheese model that shows how hazards may 
penetrate gaps in safety barriers, either because human, technical, organisational or 
environmental factors, that allow the operator to thread the needle to disaster.53 As 
he says, more complex systems have more layers of defence. This makes it less 
likely that a complex disaster will have a single cause, rather, various unlikely 
combinations of factors reveal latent defects in these defensive barriers, defects that 
could have laid dormant for long periods of time and are only revealed by 
investigators in the aftermath of a catastrophe.54 The very complexity of the defence 
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system means that no one person is able to see the risk unfolding in its entirety, 
while at the same time, all assume that safeguards are fool proof.   
The Deepwater Horizon fits the Swiss cheese model, as according the National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Oil Drilling, the 
“Macondo blowout was the product of several individual missteps and oversights 
by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean, which government regulators lacked the 
authority, the necessary resources, and the technical expertise to prevent.”55 If the 
immediate cause of the accident was the Halliburton’s failure to construct a reliable 
primary cement job to contain hydrocarbon pressures at the bottom of the well, then 
BP contributed by its decision to employ a long string well design, and by failing 
to inform Haliburton of its decisions to make changes to the well design that made 
the proper construction of the cement plug even more critical. The well 
abandonment plan called for contractors to carry out a cement bond log to confirm 
the integrity of the surface plug, but BP helicoptered its contractors off the platform 
without carrying out those tests and the cement plug failed shortly afterwards.56 BP 
Well Site Leaders and Transocean’s crew then misread the negative pressure test 
that would have signalled the failure of the cement plug, and once the blowout was 
underway, the last ditch activation of the blowout preventer (“BOP”) was unable to 
prevent the outflow of gas onto the rig floor, and an explosion soon followed.  
The Deepwater Horizon Study Group argued that the disaster represents a profound 
industry failure to recognise the riskiness of deepwater drilling, or the consequences 
of failure, and that both the operator and regulator were guilty of “compliance 
mentality.” 57  Boyer and Porrini argue that regulators may have specialist 
knowledge and centralized command structures, which makes them more 
appropriate decision-makers than courts with a general jurisdiction but little directly 
relevant expertise. 58  However, this only makes regulators more vulnerable to 
regulatory capture.  
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The capture problem was exemplified by the Deepwater Horizon after the United 
States Department of the Interior identified irreconcilable conflicts of interest in the 
BP’s relationship with the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”). The report 
confirmed rampant corruption, illicit drug and alcohol abuse, sex scandals, rubber 
stamping of dangerous drilling practices and an overall “culture of ethical failure” 
at MMS.59 The National Counsel’s Report to the President found that MMS had 
been compromised right from its inception by incentives that were designed to 
prioritise revenues over health and safety or environmental concerns.60 Regulators 
and regulated alike subverted oversight procedures, while poorly trained officials 
left decisions about crucial aspects of drilling operations to BP, at least one of which 
directly contributed to the disaster.61 
BP asked MMS for permission to set the cement plug need for temporary 
abandonment at the unprecedented depth of 3,300 feet, when the maximum depth 
according to MMS regulations was 1000 feet below the mud line. Despite the fact 
that neither BP nor any other operator had ever set a plug so deep before, and the 
decision to do so was a significant change from the permitted plan, the MMS 
official approved the request less than 90 minutes later. In the aftermath MMS was 
disbanded and separated into three federal agencies to disconnect the collection of 
oil and gas royalties from the roles of safety and resource management regulator.62 
The ultimate cause of the Deepwater Horizon then was not the failure of the best 
available technology or risk management procedures. A long history of generally 
safe and profitable offshore petroleum operations led to a cosy and complicit 
relationship between BP and the MMS. Compounded by poor regulatory design, 
this resulted in a general willingness to disregard vital safety procedures and 
standard industry practices.  
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If this account sits oddly in a chapter on mandatory insurance, it only goes to show 
that even the best risk assessment and safety procedures can be defeated by complex 
systems. BP avoided the additional expense and oversight of an insurer by self-
insuring the venture through its captive vehicle Jupiter Insurance Ltd. This made it 
all the more important that the regulatory body was competent and provided with 
the resources, powers and incentives to do its job, a job that should not have been 
left to the operator. Indeed, one of the recommendations from the National 
Commission was that insurance underwriters should play a more active role in 
auditing and evaluating, and possibly excluding, participants from entry into 
offshore drilling activities.63  
 
5.2 Reviewing MPR Part 102: New Zealand’s New Financial Assurance Regime  
The MOT’s review of MPR Part 102 was long overdue, especially given the level 
of public concern over the prospect of ever more intense offshore petroleum 
activities. If the thrust of the earlier petroleum expert reports was on promises of 
economic growth, the early stages of the financial assurance review aimed to assure 
the public that offshore petroleum activities were already well regulated. The 
argument was that offshore petroleum operators already had to prove their financial 
capabilities and would be subject to oversight from multiple regulatory agencies. 
The implication was that it was unnecessary to institute any more stringent pollution 
damage laws, however, the financial security requirements referred to were mostly 
concerned with ensuring that the permitted operator could carry out its oil spill 
contingency and discharge management plans, and had little to do with 
compensating for pollution damage as that term is defined by the MTA.  
The Ministry of Economic Development first addressed New Zealand’s offshore 
installation insurance requirements shortly after the Deepwater Horizon. 64 
However, that report argued that existing health and safety regulations effectively 
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prevent accidents, and stated that it was “beyond the scope of this Review to 
evaluate detailed questions concerning liability and insurance but these are clearly 
important issues in the event of a major accident or oil spill.”65 Maritime NZ’s 
report entitled “Deepwater Horizon: Lessons for New Zealand” also asserted that 
offshore owners were only obliged to pay for “the actual response and oil recovery 
operations, not restoration of the environment”.66 Yet the MTA’s term “pollution 
damage” clearly includes claims for loss of profits from impairment of the 
environment and the reasonable costs of reinstating the environment, so it is not 
clear why Maritime NZ would have made that assertion at the time.67 
The MOT sought Cabinet’s approval to review the offshore petroleum financial 
security regime in 2014, explaining that New Zealand’s 2009 Petroleum Action 
Plan had called for just such a review.68 The MOT’s “Consultation Document: 
Increasing the minimum financial assurance requirement for offshore installations” 
(“Consultation Document”) recommended that the MPR Part 102’s minimum 
financial security requirement be increased to 162 million International Monetary 
Fund units of account, or approximately $300m NZD.69 It was the Consultation 
Document that stated that “at separate stages of the regulatory regime, multiple 
agencies oversee the financial security regime that aims to ensure operators are able 
to financially meet their proposed activities and subsequent legal obligations”.70 
New Zealand’s Crown minerals estate is managed by Petroleum & Minerals (“NZ 
P&M”), which also insisted that offshore petroleum activities are subject to 
oversight from six government agencies and 16 regional councils, and that its 
permitting process will take account of all aspects of the applicant’s financial 
performance, its financial position, its cash flow and funding streams, and the costs 
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of the work programme. 71  While there are a number of agencies that review 
offshore operators’ financial capabilities, it is only Maritime NZ that is specifically 
concerned with offshore installation’s pollution damage insurance.  
Offshore petroleum operators are subject to permitting requirements under the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991 as outlined in the Crown’s Minerals Programme for 
Petroleum.72 Under the CMA, offshore petroleum operators must apply to NZ P&M 
for a Petroleum Prospecting Permit, a Petroleum Exploration Permit or a Petroleum 
Mining Permit.73 Operators must demonstrate their financial capability to carry out 
the proposed work programme, and that their systems will “meet the health and 
safety and environmental requirements of all specified Acts for the types of 
activities proposed under the permit.” 74  The MOT has stated elsewhere that 
operators can demonstrate their financial capability using “net worth; future cash 
flows; loans from banks and other financial institutions; directors’ loans; parent 
company support (deed of guarantee); and the issue of additional share capital.”75 
In addition, the EPA or the regional council can require applicants to provide a 
financial bond or to obtain public liability insurance of a “specified value” as a 
condition of the marine consent.76   
MPR Part 131: Offshore Installations – Oil Spill Contingency Plans and Oil 
Pollution Prevention Certification gives effect to MARPOL 73/78 and the 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 
1990 (”OPRC”) and obliges operators to provide emergency response and oil spill 
contingency planning. 77  It replaced MPR Part 200: Offshore Installations – 
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Discharges after the regulation of the harmful discharges from offshore activities 
was transferred to the EPA on 31 October 2015. Every operator of an offshore 
installation must obtain written approval for its Oil Spill Contingency Plan, and if 
that identifies a risk of an oil well blowout, then the operator must also provide a 
Well Control Contingency Plan, including evidence of its financial capacity to 
undertake any proposed plans.78 The operator’s Well Control Contingency Plan 
must provide details of the actions it will take to “stop, minimise or mitigate the 
effects of a spill”.79 That includes determining what action to take, how to prevent 
the spill escalating, stopping the spill at its source, identifying the consequences of 
any action for safety or the environment, and determining whether the spill can be 
contained or cleaned up using the resources available. MPR Part 102 did not require 
the owner of the installation to provide well control insurance, however, and the 
mismatch between the permitting requirements and the mandatory insurance 
requirements would become a priority during the financial assurance review.80 
5.2.1 MPR Part 102 Consultation Document Submissions 
The Ministry of Transport (“MOT”) received at least four responses to the 
Consultation Document. These were from Shell New Zealand (“Shell”), Local 
Government New Zealand, OMV New Zealand Limited (“OMV”), and the 
Petroleum Exploration & Production Association of New Zealand (“PEPANZ”). 
The four submitters were most concerned that Maritime NZ had changed its policy 
towards civil liability for pollution damage and that their existing insurance 
arrangements would no longer be sufficient. As OMV explained, it had been using 
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the same products as its United Kingdom affiliates, which had been sufficient 
until:81 
… about August 2013, when MNZ materially revised its approach in 2013, 
without prior notice and consultation with industry, effectively ruling out 
insurance as a means of satisfying the financial insurance requirements. 
MNZ’s new approach includes a much broader application of the definition of 
potential liabilities under the Act, so as to extend beyond the boundaries of the 
standard forms of insurance available to operators and owners of offshore 
installations in NZ. 
Likewise, Shell complained that the New Zealand rules substantially differed from 
the available insurance options that were geared to major international offshore 
liability regimes.82 OMV agreed that the insurance minimum was inadequate, but 
suggested that the operator’s financial security requirements should be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis, with risk modelling that accounted for the smaller scale of 
New Zealand operations. 83  The United Kingdom’s OPOL mutual indemnity 
agreement between operators provided a good model, as it only required operators 
to provide “evidence of financial assurance to cover for direct loss or damage 
associated with a potential pollution event, not for indirect costs as currently being 
applied by MNZ.”84  
The most substantial response came from petroleum industry association, PEPANZ. 
Its suggestion was that each different type of activity should be assigned a different 
risk profile, and that the financial security requirements should be scaled 
appropriately.85 PEPANZ submitted that there was an “apparent partial mismatch 
between currently available and utilised insurance policies and the requirements 
emanating from Part 26A of the Act and Part 102 as applied by Maritime NZ”.86 
PEPANZ proposed that it might be possible to address the different individual 
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elements of the pollution damage definition separately, and to make different 
security arrangements for each. 
In a related document, the MOT agreed with these concerns and said that the 
problem goes beyond the fact that the insurance level is too low. As it stands, 
“current insurance products on the market appear to preclude owners or operators 
from meeting their legal requirements under MPR Part 102 solely through 
insurance.”87 This is because operators have indicated that the insurance products 
available on the market today do not cover consequential economic losses to third 
parties, and therefore would not cover all aspects of the MTA’s definition of 
pollution damage.88 It is worth noting that the United Kingdom’s current Offshore 
Petroleum Licensing (Offshore Safety Directive) Regulations 2015 requires that 
prospective licensees demonstrate their financial capability to “cover liabilities 
potentially deriving from the offshore petroleum operations in question, including 
liability for potential economic damages.”89 (emphasis added). The point is worth 
noting because the review would ultimately recommend that MPR Part 102 should 
exclude cover for losses of profit caused by impairment of the environment. 
5.2.2 Maritime NZ’s Response 
When the author approached Maritime NZ for a response, they replied that:90 
There has been no change to Maritime New Zealand internal policy. Maritime 
New Zealand has always applied the criteria as set out in Marine Protection 
Rules Part 102. However, Maritime New Zealand did improve its procedures 
for assessing applications. Previously, an insurance certificate was accepted 
as sufficient evidence of meeting the criteria at Part 102. Since 2013 Maritime 
New Zealand has required detail of the contract of insurance itself to ensure 
the appropriate cover is held with particular attention paid to the extent of 
cover, the specific triggers to cover, the limits, the effect of any double 
insurance clause, the effect of any partial interest clause, and exclusion 
clauses. As a result, some policies that had previously been accepted as 
meeting the requirements were assessed as inadequate. In these cases, 
alternative financial assurance is required. One form of alternative financial 
assurance is a Parent Company Guarantee. 
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In other words, it was not that Maritime NZ had changed its interpretation of 
pollution damage liability, it was that a closer look at the owner’s insurance 
contracts revealed that they would not perform as advertised. Maritime NZ’s 
response also attached a letter to offshore installation owners explaining that 
Maritime NZ’s assessment would consider whether the certificate of insurance:91 
• responds to any event that can lead to liability under the Act 
– that is to any actual or threatened discharge of oil causing 
pollution or damage or economic loss – and not just to a 
certain subset of these; 
• does not exclude events that may arise from fault or 
negligence or failure to apply best practice; 
… 
• does not exclude claims where the event resulting in liability 
may have arisen in circumstances involving a violation of 
regulatory requirements; 
• responds to economic claims (as above); 
… 
• is actually available for pollution damage; 
(For example, where the policy has a single limit, the cover available may be 
absorbed first by control of well and re-drilling costs) 
• is not rendered ineffective by; 
o discovery and reporting requirements, 
o by warranties of compliance by the operator that are 
likely to have been breached if pollution has occurred, 
or 
o by ‘pay to be paid’ clauses; 
Permit participants may have signed joint venture agreements with partial interest 
clauses requiring them to provide insurance in proportion to their interest in the well 
or joint venture, and that could reduce the total insurance cover below the rule’s 
minimum requirement.92 Problems may also arise if the operator has suffered prior 
losses in other jurisdictions, as they may accumulate eroding the total cover the 
insurer will provide under that policy. As for the claim that Maritime NZ would not 
accept parent company guarantees, Maritime NZ says that it considers assurances 
that the reserves of the whole group may meet liabilities to be “unpersuasive”.93 
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They do “nothing to establish the financial capacity of the actual insurer to meet 
claims” and “appear contrary to the logic behind using locally incorporated 
operating subsidiaries with limited liability and providing them with insurance from 
a group’s captive insurer on specified policy terms.”94 This suggests that Maritime 
NZ has a sophisticated understanding of insurance law and a determination to pay 
greater attention to the practicalities of implementing MPR Part 102.  
Nevertheless, submitter’s arguments persuaded MBIE and MOT to prolong the 
consultation process, commissioning Navigatus Consulting to produce the 
“Financial Assurance Review – Integrated Damages Assessment Model” in 
November of 2015.95 The review used an OPOL oil spill model to estimate that the 
costs of 120 day oil well blowouts at hypothetical well locations in the Deepwater 
Taranaki Basin, the Canterbury Basin and the Pegasus Basin would be $926m NZD, 
$58m NZD and $12m NZD, respectively.96 It concluded that financial assurances 
should vary depending upon “factors such as well location, nature of activity 
(production or exploration), and whether the reservoir requires pressure support.”97 
Places with strong onshore prevailing winds would be likely to suffer more damage, 
and shallow, low pressure wells were unlikely to blowout and would be easier to 
contain.  
What is most revealing is that Navigatus were briefed to focus on the direct financial 
costs, which it defined as:98 

 Damage to other parties
 Costs incurred by public agencies in preventing and cleaning up a spill
 Costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the environment
 Losses of profit from impairment of the environment.
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Direct damages included:99 
• Direct pollution damage to first parties 




• Clean-up Costs  
• Preventative measures to reduce pollution damage 
• Commercial customary fishing 
Other Navigatus studies estimated the costs of offshore spills on tourism and fishing 
and for clean-up.100 Clean-up costs are not specifically defined, but New Zealand’s 
“National Oil Spill Contingency Plan 2017” does describe clean-up as:101 
Actions taken to confirm the presence of an oil spill, to stop the oil’s flow 
from its source, contain the oil, collect it, protect areas from damage by it, 
mitigate its effect on the environment, and clean up wildlife and areas 
contaminated by it. 
The brief excluded indirect damages such as non-commercial customary fishing, 
social, recreational and cultural damages (including harm to the mauri or lifeforce), 
the impact on New Zealand’s brand, and fines and other punitive penalties. 
Navigatus acknowledged that measures taken to “accelerate natural recovery of 
environment” are recognized by the IOPC Fund, but it assumed that these should 
also be excluded.102  
Why was the focus only on direct damages? OMV had expressed the view that 
direct costs are a feature of the OPOL regime, and that was a good model for New 
Zealand to follow.103 Maritime NZ has also concluded that operators are not liable 
for the costs of environmental restoration under the MTA.104 The MTA defines 
                                                 
99 At 10, Figure 2.1 Damages inside and outside scope of project brief. 
100 At 10; “Method for Estimating Damages to Tourism”, “Method for Estimating Damages to 
Fisheries”, and “Method for Estimating Clean-up Costs” (Navigatus Consulting, 2015). 
101 Maritime New Zealand National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Maritime New Zealand, 
March, 2017) at iv. 
102 Figure 2.1, at 7. 
103 At 3. 
104 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (“OPOL”) (effective as of 1 April 2015) 
<www.opol.org.uk>, cl 1(13). OPOL defines pollution damage to mean “direct loss or damage 
(other than loss of or damage to any Offshore Facility involved) by contamination which results 
from a Discharge of Oil.” 




pollution damage to mean “damage or loss of any kind”, and there is no distinction 
between direct and indirect costs.105 The focus on direct costs can only be explained 
as evidence of a willingness to suit the financial assurance requirements to the 
operators’ requirements, and not according to the content of the law.  
As a result of these estimates and recommendations, Simon Bridges, Minister of 
Transport, released a cabinet paper entitled “Consulting on amendments to the 
Financial Security Regime for Offshore Installations.” 106  This suggested two 
possible options:107 
a) Increase the minimum level of financial assurance to better reflect the 
potential costs of an event, and 
b) Introduce a scaled requirement reflecting the potential impacts from each 
installation. 
The first option would involve simply raising the minimum level of insurance to 
$300m NZD. The second would involve using the Integrated Damages Assessment 
model to assess the possible financial impact of a spill from a specific installation, 
then to place that site into one of 8 bands, ranging from a minimum insurance level 
of $25m NZD to a maximum of $800m NZD. The report acknowledged that both 
options would raise operators’ costs, but that most could rely upon their parent 
company’s global insurance policy. 
As for the problem of finding the appropriate insurance cover, the report again 
offered two options. The first would be to “refine the scope of financial assurance 
required” and the second was to “introduce separate financial assurance 
requirements for different aspects of liability.”108 The first option would still leave 
the operator liable for all costs and damage, but ease the requirement that all such 
costs be covered by insurance. The second option suggested maintaining a 
minimum of $27m NZD to cover loss of profits, but to scale the financial assurance 
for other types of pollution damage. The report suggested that further work is 
required on issues to do with what financial assurance would be appropriate, 
                                                 
105 Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 385A. 
106 Ministry of Transport Consulting on amendments to the Financial Security Regime for Offshore 
Installations (Ministry of Transport, 2016). 
107 At 5. 
108 At 6. 




whether regulatory changes are necessary, and whether Maritime NZ should be in 
charge of implementation, and also whether “an industry fund is appropriate or 
necessary.”109  
5.2.3 The New Financial Assurance Regime 
These suggested amendments were consolidated in a 2017 report inviting 
comments on final amendments to the financial assurance regime (“Invitation to 
Comment”). 110  The final proposed plan aimed to make use of the integrated 
assessment model to place operators into the 8 band scaled framework, and to refine 
MPR Part 102 so that it no longer requires the owner to provide insurance for all 
aspects of their pollution damage liability under the MTA. The Invitation to 
Comment explained that Rule 102.8(2)(b) would be revoked, and henceforth 
offshore installation owners would only be required to provide insurance suitable 
to meet their liability for:111 
i. costs of dealing with pollution under section 385B of the Act 
ii. pollution damage to property and costs of reasonable preventive 
measures under section 385C of the Act … 
Operators were no longer to be required to provide insurance to cover losses of 
profit from impairment of the environment, or the reasonable costs of reinstatement 
of the environment. The MOT acknowledged that this created a “small risk that 
third parties might not be compensated for losses of profit resulting from 
impairment of the environment, if permit holders are not able to cover their 
liabilities in this area.”112 It is not clear how great such damages claims might be, 
but the Navigatus report found that damages from a hypothetical spill in the 
Taranaki region could cost as much as $926m NZD. In the case of the Deepwater 
Horizon, the U.S. District Court in New Orleans consolidated and settled 100,000 
private economic loss claims against BP and the other defendants in 2012, and 
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awarded more than $5bn USD in damages as of 31 March 2015.113 More work 
needs to be done in this area, and an assessment of business interests could have 
been incorporated into the financial assurance scaled framework. 
MPR Part 102 has since been amended, as of 3 September 2017, with the addition 
of a new clause 102.8(2)(b) providing that the contract of insurance will be for an 
amount to be determined by the Director, and that it will be:114 
… of a kind and scope suitable to meet the owner’s potential liability under 
Part 26A of the Act for: 
i. costs of dealing with pollution under section 385B of the Act 
ii. pollution damage to property and costs of reasonable preventive 
measures and measures of reinstatement under section 385C of the Act. 
In a surprising twist, owners will now be required to obtain insurance to cover the 
costs of “measures of reinstatement”, although it is not entirely clear whether that 
phrase refers to measures of reinstatement of the environment, or to reinstating 
fishing and tourism operators’ losses of profits.  
The Invitation to Comment explains that the MOT was far more concerned that the 
MPR Part 102 omitted the costs of well control.115 The Director is therefore to 
establish and apply a new scaled financial assurance framework, up to a maximum 
of $600m NZD. The framework is to be based on: 
(a) the nature of the hydrocarbon being explored or mined 
(b) the location of the exploration or mining activity 
(c) the total volume of hydrocarbon likely to be released in the event of an oil spill 
(d) the potential impact of hydrocarbon on the shoreline in the event of an oil spill 
(e) relevant technical information, data, advice and guidance. 
The MOT’s second major concern was that two of the major statutes governing 
offshore petroleum activities used different terminology, and that the CMA refers 
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to “permit holders”, while the MTA refers to “owners”. 116  The Invitation to 
Comment seems to prefer the term “permit holder”, and assumes that the permit 
holder is the entity responsible for fulfilling obligations under both Acts. The report 
argued that the Minister’s existing powers provide him with the authority to make 
changes to the MPR, without changing the MTA itself. However it also states that 
the difference in terminology between owner and permit holder “cannot be 
addressed in a new rule without first amending the primary legislation.”117 The 
matter appears to have been resolved, and the MPR states that it is the installation 
owner’s responsibility to provide insurance, but the Director may have regard for 
the operator’s oil spill contingency plan, its financial resources and may consider 
whether that insurance coverage might be eroded by any first party property damage 
claims.118 
The Invitation to Comment promised that “guidelines to accompany the amended 
offshore financial assurance regime will clarify the relationship between the 
owners’ and the permit holders’ responsibilities.”119 Appendix 2 explains that the 
guidelines will, amongst other things, clarify liability and terminology, explain 
what costs and activities must be covered, what must be excluded, and what forms 
of assurance will be acceptable.120 The guidelines will also address the difference 
between an offshore installation, FPSOs and ships, and how vessels are treated 
when they are outside of the permit area, or when they are not engaged in 
exploration or mining. It will also consider joint ventures and companies that own 
multiple installations, and will explore how the assurance rules will interact with 
“other parts of the New Zealand regime.” It is curious that the MOT has attempted 
to finalize its financial assurance regime before addressing the fundamental details 
of that liability, and it will also be important to consider exactly what form these 
guidelines take and whether they are produced as a legally enforceable instrument, 
or merely as a brochure expressing the Ministry’s opinions. Owners and operators 
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and other interested parties will need to remember that liability may only be 
determined according to a close legal analysis of statutes, regulations and caselaw.  
 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
The Ministry of Transport has finally begun the process of addressing these gaps 
by calling for submissions on the proposal to increase the minimum mandatory 
insurance levels in MPR Part 102, and more importantly, by commissioning 
Navigatus Consulting to carry out the first in-depth analysis of liability for pollution 
damage caused by offshore petroleum activities. The Navigatus Review and the 
Ministry of Transport’s subsequent Invitation to Comment call for the 
establishment of a scaled financial assurance framework, where installations will 
be placed into one of 8 bands up to a maximum of $600m. It is curious that the plan 
does not take account of the value of the shoreline, either in terms of its ecosystem 
services and its specific biodiversity, or on the basis of more traditional property 
values. It was troubling that insurance regime was being designed to exclude two 
of the three major elements of pollution damage, that is, the “costs of reasonable 
measures of reinstatement of the environment” and “losses of profit from 
impairment of the environment”.121 It came as a surprise then that the final draft of 
the MPR will now require owners to provide insurance to cover “measures of 
reinstatement” under section 385C of the MTA. Does this refer to measures of 
reinstatement of the environment? Does it mean that owners and operators must 
insurance against the cost of all measures, and not just the reasonable ones? The 
MPR still lacks consistency and displays an unwillingness to adhere to the MTA’s 
marine pollution damage terminology. 
The Navigatus Review made a further error in asserting that the insurance 
obligation is to be satisfied by the operator, when MPR Part 102 refers to the “owner” 
of the installation, a term that is significantly broader and could capture permit 
holders, managers, leaseholders and operators of the installation, their agents and 
employees, and any person in charge of operations that are merely “connected” with 
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the installation. 122  The Ministry of Transport’s “Invitation to Comment” also 
asserted that it is the permit holder who is responsible for providing insurance, and 
that will only be to cover the costs of dealing with harmful discharges, for property 
damage, and reasonable preventive measures. The MPR attempts to resolve the 
point by directing that it is the owner’s responsibility to provide insurance cover, 
but the Director can take account of the operator’s financial resources and oil spill 
contingency plans. Does this mean that the owner can provide less insurance cover 
if its operation is being carried out by a person with ample financial resources? 
What happens if that person suffers unexpected losses and goes into insolvency?  
The justification for the overall approach is that, while there are standard offshore 
insurance policies that will cover the costs of well control, redrilling and clean-up 
costs, and third party damage claims are usually addressed by the parent company’s 
global insurance policy. Submissions regarding the 2014 Consultation Document 
complained that Maritime NZ was not accepting parent company guarantees 
anymore, and that response may have been a factor in the decision to refine the 
scope of financial assurance in this way. This is a concession excusing parent 
companies and their insurers from liability via the MTA’s direct action provisions. 
The possibility that insurance could be supplemented by an industry-fed 
compensation fund or mutual indemnity association has either been forgotten, or 
was never seriously considered.  
A cursory reading of Appendix 2 makes it clear that there are a multitude of issues 
that have yet to be resolved, most of which have already been considered by this 
thesis, and all of which are key to understanding who the owner is, what it will be 
held liable for, and therefore, what financial securities will be appropriate. It seems 
that the financial assurance regime is being driven by the availability of insurance, 
rather than by the scope of liability in the Maritime Transport Act 1994 itself. In 
fact, one could go further, and say that the new regime appears to be an effort to 
return New Zealand’s pollution damage liability laws to the days of the 1930s 
Petroleum and Public Works Act era, when polluters were only required to clean 
up oil and to reimburse property owners for the market value of their damaged or 
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lost assets. Granted, the MOT’s papers emphasize that owners of marine structures 
will continue to be liable for the full extent of pollution damage under Part 26A of 
the MTA, but unlimited liability without financial security amounts to a bare 
assurance.  
What is glaringly absent from the entire consultation process is any attempt to 
address Maritime NZ’s concerns. Maritime NZ’s letter to the industry pointed out 
that that any Certificate of Insurance had to cover all aspects of pollution damage 
liability, ensuring that cover would not be excluded if the event was caused by the 
insured’s failures, or would be eroded by the costs of well control and redrilling, by 
pay to be paid clauses, by partial interest clauses or by claims in other jurisdictions. 
Instead of requiring the owner to bolster its financial security with parent company 
guarantees, demanding that owners and operators craft their public liability 
insurance to cover all aspects of third party and environmental damage liability, or 
obtain other forms of financial security such as a captive insurance company, a 
mutual indemnity agreement, or create some form of industry-fed compensation 
fund, the objective has been narrow the scope of that liability so that it can be easily 
satisfied by the standard existing OEE forms. 
There is nothing wrong with that channelling objective, per se, but it is only truly 
effective if the liable operator is also obliged to provide adequate financial security 
for that liability. The CLC and Fund Conventions are effective because strict 
liability is backed up by mandatory insurance and a compensation fund. The EU’s 
Offshore Safety Directive also directs Member States to ensure that the permitted 
operator is also the party that would be held liable for environmental damage, and, 
even though it does not go so far as to require operators to obtain insurance, the 
Member State is expected to assess the operator’s financial capacity to ensure that 
it is capable of meeting its environmental damage obligations under the ELD.  
New Zealand’s offshore petroleum liability regime abandoned channelling in the 
hope that, by spreading liability as widely as possible, some owner or operator 
would be held financially responsible for the damage their activities had caused. 
Broad liability was felt to be in the interests of justice, but it was also vital because 
there was no offshore liability and fund convention that the victims of oil pollution 




damage caused by offshore installations and operations could appeal to and because 
it was very difficult to obtain insurance or other financial security guarantees to 
secure that liability. The new financial assurance regime undermines this objective, 
however, because it effectively channels that liability to the offshore installation 
owner, and not to the various permit holders, contractors, and joint venture partners 
who had hitherto been included in the MTA’s definition of the term. 
The question then is, is the government’s current approach to the financial 
assurance requirements based upon a proper understanding of the meaning of 
pollution damage? By examining the historical legal, technological and political 
developments that caused the CLC and Fund Conventions to be established, it is 
possible to understand what the MTA means when it refers to terms like “pollution 
damage” and “preventive measures”, but also why it is significant that the New 
Zealand law has diverged from the Conventions’ model of strict, channelled and 
limited liability. This investigation entails asking why liability had to be channelled 
to a single shipowner, why strict liability was preferred to fault-based, why that 
liability had to be limited, and why those limits were closely related to the 
availability of insurance and the capacities of the industry-fed International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund (“IOPC Fund”) which administers the Fund 
Convention. Furthermore, the discussion will consider how the IOPC Fund 
grappled with issues of quantifying and defining pollution damage, how it 
differentiated between quantifiable and unquantifiable losses, including 
environmental damage per se claims, how it managed the separation between ships 
and offshore installations, and what this means for the future of an international 
offshore oil and gas industry liability and compensation convention. 





6 Maritime Law before Torrey Canyon: Limited Liability and 
the Tort of Negligence 
As the previous chapters have explained, New Zealand first adopted the CLC and 
Fund Conventions 1969/1971 into the Marine Pollution Act 1974, then copied its 
1992 iterations into the Maritime Transport Act 1994. These acts were created to 
implement the CLC and Fund Conventions and their system of strict liability for 
pollution damage caused by ship-source oil spills in New Zealand waters. However, 
it was also quickly realised that that the same definitions could be used to hold the 
owners and operators of offshore petroleum exploration and extraction activities 
and operations strictly liability for damage caused by offshore oil spills as well.  
What this policy neglected to provide for, at least initially, was to be certain that the 
owners and operators of offshore drill rigs, pipelines would also have the financial 
resources to pay for those damages claims. The most recent financial assurance 
review has solved some of these issues, but it allows financial security requirements 
to be scaled to the risk posed by the particular offshore installation. Continuing gaps 
in understanding of the specific meaning the IMO and the IOPC Fund have given 
to terms like “pollution damage” and “preventive measures” may have caused New 
Zealand’s Ministry of Transport to exclude important elements of the installation 
owners’ liabilities from the mandatory insurance requirements, and that could 
complicate efforts to obtain comprehensive compensation following any future 
offshore oil spill incidents. 
The CLC and Fund Conventions were created to address liability and compensation 
for oil pollution damage caused by tankers. They were not designed for and do not 
apply to oil spills from offshore petroleum exploration and extraction installations 
or activities. Their systems of strict and limited liability, channelled to the 
shipowner, and backed up by mandatory insurance a complementary industry-fed 
compensation fund, were only possible because of the context provided by pre-
existing maritime legal systems and principles, and because their continuing 




existence is based on an alliance between the shipping, insurance and oil importing 
industries.   
To understand what role those maritime laws and industries played in forming the 
CLC and Fund Conventions, and why that system has not expanded to include oil 
pollution damage caused by offshore petroleum exploration and extraction 
installations and activities, either in New Zealand or internationally, we must 
carefully review how the Conventions were formed in the first place. Why was 
liability channelled to a single shipowner? Why was liability strict and not fault-
based? Why was liability limited, and how were the limits of liability calculated? 
How was the risk of pollution damage claims spread amongst the insurance and 
petroleum industries, and how was that agreement reached? How were the terms 
for “preventive measures” and “pollution damage” first created, and why did it 
become necessary to redefine the Convention’s scope of liability with respect to 
environmental damage per se claims in 1992? Answering these questions will help 
to explain any misgivings about New Zealand’s offshore marine pollution damage 
liability regime, and may help to point to sensible recommendations for its 
reformation. 
 
6.1 The Basis of the Maritime Privilege of Limited Liability  
International trade has long been seen as a matter of national interest, and limited 
liability has been called “one of the first examples of state support for the shipping 
industry.”1 The privilege dates back to Roman times, and limits were originally set 
according to the value of the ship. According to Oliver Wendell Holmes, the 
principle was based on the Roman legal term, noxae deditio, meaning to surrender 
that which has caused damage.2 A man could discharge his liability for damage 
caused by his children or slaves, by handing them over to the injured party. Setting 
aside the morality of treating humans as chattels, the principle came to be applied 
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to maritime law, and provided the basis that liability limits should be set according 
to the value of the ship itself. It was Hugo Grotius who first condemned the idea 
that shipowners should be “absolutely bound by the acts of the masters employed”, 
suggesting that it would be far better to follow the Dutch example and limit the 
shipowner’s liability to the sum value of the ship and its cargo.3   
Noxae deditio can be found in more modern sources of Roman Law, such as the 
Amalphitan tables of 11th century Italy, the 17th Century Statutes of Hamburg, 
Hanseatic Ordinances of 1614 and 1644, and the 1667 Maritime Code of Sweden.4 
The principle was first introduced in England in 1733, after a shipowner was found 
liable for a cargo of bullion stolen by his ship’s master. A group of highly alarmed 
shipowners submitted to Parliament that:5 
… when they became Owners of Ships, [they] did not apprehend themselves 
exposed to such Hazard or liable or Owners to any greater Loss than that of 
the ships and Freight… unless some Provision be made for their relief, Trade 
and navigation will be greatly discouraged since Owners of Ships find 
themselves, without any Fault on their Part, exposed to ruin, from which their 
greatest Circumspection cannot secure them, through their Malversation of the 
Masters or Mariners, who they are obliged to employ. 
Lord Mustill explained that ship and cargo owners expected to be parties to a joint 
venture, but that the value of the cargo frequently exceeded that of the ship.6 It 
would not be fair to hold the shipowner liable for the loss of the cargo, particularly 
when, in an era before the telegraph was invented, they had no possibility of 
contacting and instructing their ships at sea. The best an owner could do was to 
ensure that his ship was well stocked, well maintained, and worked by a competent 
captain and crew. Maritime limited liability emerged at the same time as the joint 
stock company, and it played in great part in the early success of the great merchant 
fleets of nations like Great Britain and the Netherlands. 
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For most of recorded history, including the time that Grotius was writing, 
shipwrecks seldom caused significant environmental damage, and the chief burden 
fell upon the cargo owner and the unfortunate crew.7 A wrecked ship could even be 
a boon and popular fiction glamourized images of wreckers luring cargo ships onto 
rocky and isolated shores. 8  Edward Cowan even notes an Eighteenth Century 
chaplain’s plea:9 
We pray thee, O Lord, not that wrecks should happen, but if wrecks do happen 
Thou wilt guide them into the Skilly Isles for the benefit of the poor 
inhabitants. 
As the Industrial Revolution gained pace ships became larger and their cargoes 
became more hazardous, however. The limitation right therefore became less about 
the “malversation” of dishonest masters, and more about insulating shipowners 
against an increasing number of deaths and ever greater property and environmental 
losses.10 The United States acted on the issue with the Limitation of Liability Act 
of 1851, limiting the shipowner’s liability to the value of his legal interest in the 
vessel and freight at the conclusion of the voyage.11 That right could be lost if the 
cause of the accident was within the privity or knowledge of the owner, a safeguard 
against incidents where unscrupulous owners sent over-insured but hopelessly 
dilapidated “coffin” ships to their certain doom at sea.12 The Act was procedurally 
complicated and required that each ship and its cargo be individually valued, but its 
fatal flaw was that if the ship was completely destroyed before the end of the 
voyage, then the ship and cargo would have no value and shipowner would face no 
liability. This feature would play a key role in deciding the liability of the owners 
of the Torrey Canyon, as the next chapter will explain. 
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The United Kingdom took a more sensible path with the Merchant Shipping Act of 
1854 limiting liability by the gross tonnage of the ship. 13  This became the 
international standard after the major shipping nations rejected a 1924 convention 
that followed the United States’ example.14 The United Nations’ newly established 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (“IMCO”) drafted the 
1957 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners 
of Seagoing Ships (“1957 Limitation Convention”). 15  This set the shipowner’s 
liability at 1000 francs or $67 USD per adjusted net ton of the ship, subject to the 
“actual fault or privity” exception. 16  Its limits were superseded by the 1976 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (“LLMC”) which 
substantially increased the limits of liability, but extended that protection to a much 
wider range of persons, and which has been criticised for making those limits 
virtually unbreakable, however.17 
David Steel argues that limited liability still has a role to play in encouraging 
investment, levelling the playing field internationally, protecting the insurance 
industry and guaranteeing compensation rather than punishment. It is still true, he 
says, that “it is better for the victim to have a limited claim which he can be certain 
that can be paid than to have an unlimited claim against an insolvent party.”18 
Likewise, Billah has argued that limited liability may have been about encouraging 
investment in merchant shipping, but that it can now be justified by the fact that it 
would be prohibitively expensive and futile to expect the insurance industry to 
cover unlimited liability.19 Bevan Marten agrees that the second beneficiary of the 
global limitation of liability is the insurance industry, which uses limitation caps to 
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set accurate and lower premiums.20 However, he points out that such limits should 
not come at the expense of the innocent third party with no connection to the 
shipping industry, and that full priced liability would give shipowners more of an 
incentive to improve their safety standards.  
By the end of the 1950s, channelled and limited liability were indispensable features 
of international maritime law that IMCO would have to take into consideration 
during the development of the CLC and Fund Conventions.21 Even so, the 1957 
Limitation Convention did not come into force until 1968. It therefore did not play 
a direct part in the 1967 Torrey Canyon incident, but if it had, its limits would have 
protected the ship’s owners against the full financial cost of the spill.22 1954 also 
saw the adoption of the Oil Pollution Convention (“OILPOL”), but this only 
focussed on prohibiting excessive intentional discharges of oil from ships, and there 
was still no international maritime liability convention.23  
 
6.2 Fault Based Maritime Tort Law in the 1950s  
The period of the 1950s and 1960s was then one in which the shipping industry was 
able to enjoy the protection of limited liability, with limits that could only be 
breached if the cause of the accident was within the shipowner’s “actual fault or 
privity”. This thesis will explain how two quite different shipping accidents would 
demonstrate just how vulnerable this situation left the victims of shipping accidents. 
First, this chapter will describe how the grounding of the Inverpool in 1950 showed 
how difficult it was for plaintiffs to obtain a remedy from contemporary maritime 
tort law, laws which still apply today, and which offer no greater hope to future 
victims of offshore oil spills. Then, in the next chapter, it will describe the 1967 
sinking of the Torrey Canyon that would demonstrate the absurd result of the 
existing limited liability laws. This will help to explain why the CLC and Fund 
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Conventions 1969/1971 would opt to hold tanker owners strictly liable for oil 
pollution damage, instead of basing liability on fault as had been the case in tort 
law, and why the shipowners’ liability would be limited, but why that liability 
would be based upon the size of the tanker, rather than on its value at the conclusion 
of a voyage which could end in the total loss of the ship. 
In Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Southport Corporation, the claimants from Southport 
attempted to employ the res ipsa loquitur principle to reverse the burden of proof 
onto the defendant oil company.24 It was the first marine pollution case to reach the 
House of Lords, and was the last word on tortious liability for maritime oil spills 
before the development of the CLC and Fund Conventions. It is worth noting that 
the trade name Esso is the phonetic version of the initials for Standard Oil, for two 
reasons.25 First, Standard Oil was one of the largest companies in the world at the 
time, and the case could be likened to David meeting Goliath but forgetting to bring 
the right slingshot. Secondly, Standard Oil was a predecessor to Exxon Mobil, the 
owner of the infamous Exxon Valdez, a ship whose name is synonymous with oil 
pollution damage and whose destruction would contribute to the United States 
decision to reject the CLC and Fund Conventions regime and form its own Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990. It is also worth noting that Devlin J, the High Court judge in 
that case, would become Lord Devlin and would actually represent the United 
Kingdom at the 1969 CLC Convention conference in Brussels.26  Lord Devlin 
would play a pivotal role in shifting the CLC Convention 1969 from fault based to 
strict liability, and it is possible that his support for a strict liability regime stemmed 
from his experience with the Inverpool.  
6.2.1 The Inverpool Case 
It was on the 3rd of December 1950, that the Inverpool grounded on a revetment 
wall in the river Ribble outside the town of Southport, in the northwest of England. 
The drama began when the Inverpool’s steering failed just after she entered the 
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shallow, narrow channel leading towards Southport.27 The seas were moderately 
heavy, and the master elected to proceed only to see the ship sheer sideways and 
ground to a halt on a revetment wall. As the tide fell, the full weight of the ship bore 
down on the wall, threatening to break the ship in two. The master tried to back the 
ship off the wall, but the propeller fouled on some unknown object and the engines 
had to be stopped. The decision to discharge the ship’s cargo of heavy oil was a last 
resort. It refloated the ship and saved the lives of all on board, but contaminated 
seven and a half miles of the town’s adjoining riverbank. 
When the town of Southport brought Esso Petroleum before the High Court, Devlin 
J observed that Parliament had yet to enact legislation dealing with liability for the 
discharge of oil, so he could only consider causes of action in trespass, nuisance 
and negligence.28 He was inclined to think that the discharge of oil was sufficiently 
direct to amount to a trespass, but declined to treat that issue. Private nuisance 
claims require “interferences for a substantial length of time by owners or occupiers 
of property with the use or enjoyment of neighbouring property”, allowing the 
defendants to argue that the oil had come from the sea and not a neighbouring 
property.29 Devlin J agreed, but said that publicly navigable waters were most 
analogous to public highways and the proper course of action was in negligence. 
He restated Blackburn J’s highway rule from Rylands v Fletcher to mean that:30 
… owners whose property adjoins the sea, equally with owners whose 
property adjoin the highway, take the risk of damage being done by users of 
the sea or of the highway who are exercising with due care their rights of 
navigation or of passage. 
Property owners therefore must accept the risk of damage done by lawful users of 
the sea, unless they are able to prove that the shipowner or his master had not 
exercised “due care”. However, Devlin J could not fault the master’s decision to go 
ahead that day, even if the actual cause of the accident remained “a mystery and a 
puzzle to him.”31 Only those on board the Inverpool really knew what had occurred, 
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and all they would say was that the steering had failed after the propeller hit some 
object. In the absence of any explanation or evidence of wrongdoing, the plaintiffs 
may sometimes use the res ipsa loquitur rule. This says that:32 
…the happening of an accident may in certain circumstances itself be 
reasonable evidence of negligence; and when there is reasonable evidence of 
negligence put forward by the plaintiff and no explanation put forward by the 
defendant, the plaintiff is, of course, entitled to succeed. 
Res ipsa loquitur reverses the burden of proof so that the onus is on the defendant 
to explain why they should be exonerated. It is, in effect, a form of strict liability. 
The rule stems from the case of the Merchant Prince, where Lord Esher said that:33 
Unless you can get rid of it, it is negligence proved against you that you have 
run into a ship at anchor… the only way for a man to get rid of that which 
circumstances prove against him as negligence is to shew that it occurred by 
an accident which was inevitable by him – that is, an accident the cause of 
which was such that he could not by any act of his have avoided its result. He 
can only get rid of that proof against him by shewing inevitable accident, that 
is by shewing that the cause of the collision was a cause not produced by him, 
but a cause the result of which he could not avoid. 
The three elements then are that: 
1.  there must be damage that would not ordinarily happen without some 
negligence; 
2. the accident must be caused by something in the defendant’s care; and 
3.  there must be the absence of an explanation by the defendants.34  
The presumption of liability can only rebutted if the defendant can show the 
accident was inevitable and that no amount of reasonable care and skill could have 
prevented it.35 The defendants argued that the discharge was necessary to save the 
lives of those on-board. Devlin J accepted that, and applied the rule from Woods v 
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Duncan, that “if a defendant can satisfy the court that he personally was not 
negligent, he does not have to explain how the accident occurred.”36 The master 
had made the best of a choice between two evils, and it was not for the court to fault 
that decision.  
The master’s exoneration also saved Esso Petroleum from any vicarious liability. 
Furthermore, because the plaintiffs failed to question Esso Petroleum’s “actual fault 
or privity” in their pleadings, the rules of civil procedure barred them from raising 
the question at trial, even after evidence emerged that the propeller had been fouled 
because part of ship’s stern had broken away. Devlin J elected to side-step that 
question and simply apply Lord Blackburn’s traffic rule. People who live by the sea 
have to assume the risk of accidents unless they can prove negligence. 
On appeal, Denning LJ agreed that the master may have been justified in 
discharging oil, but the more important question was “how came she to get upon 
the wall?”37 Either the ship was running out of control, in which case she was a 
public nuisance, or it was under the master’s control and:38 
… that was plain negligence. The ship seeks to escape from this charge of 
negligence by saying that her steering gear had failed and she was out of 
control. But that is no answer unless she proves – and the legal burden is on 
her to prove – that it was no fault of hers that the steering gear had failed. She 
has not discharged that burden, or even attempted to discharge it. She is, 
therefore, liable. 
The House of Lords had the last word and reversed the Denning LJ’s judgment 
because, without proof of negligence on the part of either the defendant company 
or the master of the ship, there was no case to answer.39 But here we come again to 
the point of procedure alluded to earlier:40 
If the plaintiffs’ case had been put in the alternative, either that there was some 
navigational error or that the ship was unseaworthy, the case would no doubt 
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have been developed on wholly different lines. Had any such case been made, 
the ambit of discovery would have been enlarged and the theory advanced by 
the Elder Brother that the Inverpool may have broken her stern frame against 
the bed of the channel would have been explored. 
Lords Normand, Morton, Radcliffe and Tucker would all agree: “There was no 
notice in the pleadings of any other cause of actions, such as the appellants 
negligently sending the vessel to sea in an unseaworthy condition.”41 The only 
question was the negligence of the master and his acquittal also completely 
exonerated the shipowners. Lord Blackburn’s traffic rule is decisive, those who own 
property next to a public highway assume the risk of damage and “the person who 
has suffered damage cannot recover in trespass in the absence of negligence on the 
part of the person who has caused the damage”.42  
The Inverpool case is the classic example of the difficulties plaintiffs must 
overcome to obtain relief in maritime tort law, and explains why it was so 
significant that the CLC and Fund Conventions opted for strict liability.43 Fault 
based liability, or even fault based liability with a reversed burden of proof, creates 
too much of a danger for the victims of industrial or shipping accidents. Even today, 
oil pollution accidents outside of the CLC and Fund Convention regime, including 
those involving offshore oil and gas activities, may be decided under the fault based 
torts.44 Tort law has evolved since the Inverpool, but victims of offshore accidents 
may find their remedies limited by civil tort law’s burdens of proof and standing 
requirements.   
6.2.2 Tort Law since the Inverpool 
Despite the advent of the CLC and Fund Conventions, private tort law still applies 
to oil spills from other sources, including the offshore petroleum industry. As an 
alternative to the fault-based tort of negligence, plaintiffs could try a cause of action 
in public nuisance. Public nuisances are those that affect the “life, health, property 
or comfort of the public, or obstructs the public in the exercise or enjoyment of 
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rights common to all her Majesty’s subjects”, and it could be argued that a spill of 
oil at sea would obstruct the public in exercising its rights of navigation, fishing or 
leisure.45 Public nuisance essentially reverses the burden of proof, as once the 
plaintiff has established that a nuisance has been created it is for the defendant to 
explain how it occurred. The defendant may argue that the nuisance was reasonable, 
but Bill Atkin adds that if the interference has been found to be unreasonable, then 
it is no answer that the defendant took all due care, or that the benefits outweigh the 
harm.46 The creator of the nuisance must reduce the interference to a reasonable 
level or cease it altogether, so in the case of an offshore oil spill, the polluter would 
be absolutely liable for the costs of removing oil and restoring the environment to 
its former state. Trespass is also a strict liability tort, but it only applies if the 
hazardous substance is poured directly onto the claimant’s property, and, unlike 
negligence, there is no need to prove a breach of a specific duty of care.47   
F. H. Newark has said that it would be wrong to decide highway cases according to 
the tort of public nuisance, because highway users should only be required to take 
reasonable care, and the appropriate action is in negligence.48 Atkin agrees and says 
that the two torts overlap so completely that there is no practical advantage in 
describing the injury as a nuisance.49 In The Wagon Mound (No 2), Lord Reid 
confirmed that, while public nuisance and negligence were still distinct torts, 
highway cases should be decided according to the fault based rules of negligence.50 
However, Simon Rainey has argued that the tort continues to play an important role 
in punishing polluters, for example, it would have provided a better outcome 
following the 1996 sinking of the Sea Empress, where the statutory fines amounted 
to a mere £750,000.51 Clerk and Lindsell have pointed out that nuisance can still be 
used to provide compensatory damages, especially in situations where the regulator 
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will not take action.52 However, public nuisance requires that the plaintiff prove 
that he or she has suffered special damages over and above that suffered by the 
public, and the remedy is usually an injunction rather than compensation, which 
limits its usefulness.53 
An alternative to public nuisance might be to apply the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.54 
This case states that:55 
…the person who for his own purpose brings on his lands and collects and 
keeps there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it in at his 
peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage 
which is the natural consequence of its escape. 
C.W.M. Ingram points out that Rylands v Fletcher has been applied to the escape 
of things as various as “gas, electricity, explosives and poisons”, but not to pollution 
stemming from the carriage of oil by sea.56 His view was that Rylands v Fletcher 
only applies to non-natural users of land and that there is nothing unusual about 
using the ocean as a public highway. Greg Gordon asked whether Rylands v 
Fletcher rule should apply to those who hold permits to occupy the United 
Kingdom’s seabed and explore for petroleum, as it has in other tenancy situations.57 
The major flaw in that argument, he says, is that the defendant operator has not 
brought the oil onto the land, but is merely collecting the oil that is already there.58 
Secondly, a licence to operate is not the same as a proprietary right. Indeed, no one 
may own the EEZ and continental shelf, but the state merely has sovereign rights 
to explore and exploit natural resources outside the 12 nm territorial water limit.59 
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Finally, he says that the rule only applies to a very narrow concept of property 
damage so it would exclude claims for personal injury or pure economic losses.  
In the 1994 case of Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Plc, Lord Goff said 
that there was a close relationship between nuisance and the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher¸ even if nuisance almost always required some foreseeability of harm.60 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has endorsed Cambridge Water Co, and the 
current position is that Rylands v Fletcher is a subcategory of nuisance.61 The effect 
of these decisions is to largely subsume Rylands v Fletcher into the principles of 
public nuisance. If a dangerous thing escapes from land that a person owns or is 
occupying, then that person may be liable, but only if the escape was reasonably 
foreseeable. If Ingram is correct and the only question is whether public’s right to 
navigate the highway freely has been infringed, then the nuisance will cease once 
the oil has been cleared from the shipping lane. If the escape causes damage to 
adjoining properties, then, as in Esso Petroleum v Southport Corporation, the 
plaintiff would need to prove that the owners or operators of the offshore 
installation were negligent. Nuisance still requires some evidence that the harm was 
foreseeable in that the tortfeasor knew, or should have known, that their actions or 
omissions would result in the kind of harm that actually occurred. 
Issues of standing and compensation arose in the Canadian case of British Columbia 
v Canadian Forest Products.62 As a private landowner the Crown would have to 
show that it had suffered special damages, but it could also represent the public 
interest in preventing public nuisances. As the Court explained, “the notion that 
there are public rights in the environment that reside in the Crown has deep roots in 
the common law”.63 The problem was that the Crown had not made use of any 
specific methodology, but had simply made unsubstantiated assertions about the 
environmental and financial value of its non-harvestable trees. The Court said that 
it was acceptable to pursue the twin objectives of compensation and deterrence, but 
                                                 
60 Cambridge Water Co v Easter Counties Leather Plc [1994] 2 AC 264 (HL) at 297. 
61 Claire Kirman and Justice Christian Whata “Environmental Litigation and Dispute Resolution” in 
Derek Nolan (ed) Environmental and Resource Management Law (2015) 1220 at 1326; Hamilton v 
Papakura District Council [2002] 1 NZLR 265 (CA). 
62 British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd [2004] 2 SCR 74. 
63 At [74]-[75]. 





any valuation methodology had to have a proper evidentiary basis.64 As Binnie J 
put it, a “claim for environmental loss, as in the case of any loss, must be put 
forward based on a coherent theory of damages, a methodology suitable for their 
assessment, and supporting evidence.”65 The Court referred to F.B. Cross and his 
analysis of passive use or existence value and inherent value methodologies in the 
seminal work, “Natural Resource Damage Valuation”. 66  The IOPC Fund has 
rejected these particular kinds of valuation methodologies, so they may not be 
applicable to an offshore oil spill either, but the broader point stands. Public 
nuisance claims may allow for compensatory damages for environmental damage, 
so long as the damages are supported by the evidence and by a suitable 
methodology. 
  
6.3 Concluding Remarks  
What this chapter illustrates is that maritime laws evolved over several centuries to 
protect the interests of shipowners. In particular, the maritime privilege of limited 
liability was created because nation states had a strong interest in protecting their 
mercantile fleets. However, as the Industrial Revolution gathered pace, the cargoes 
these fleets carried became more and more hazardous, posing ever-greater threats 
to coastal communities. Limited liability was so deeply engrained into maritime law 
that the only real question was whether the limits should be based on the size of the 
ship, as in the United Kingdom, or using the United States’ measurement according 
to the value of the ship and its cargo at the end of the voyage. 
The Inverpool case demonstrated how hard it could be for the victims of shipping 
accidents to find a remedy in tort, and particularly in the fault-based law of 
negligence. The House of Lords affirmed Devlin J’s reading of Rylands v Fletcher 
so that plaintiffs must bear the burden of proving that the shipowner or ship’s master 
caused that oil pollution damage, or else the must assume the risk of suffering 
damage caused by users of publicly navigable waterways. The case also 
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demonstrates that procedural pitfalls can swallow up even worthy cases that do 
reveal evidence of wrongdoing.  
As the next chapter will demonstrate, the concepts of limited and fault-based 
liability would play a key role in shaping the CLC and Fund Conventions. A new 
generation of massive oceangoing oil tankers were now sailing international 
waterways, and the international community would no longer permit their owners 
to pollute the seas with impunity, sheltering behind what had become ludicrously 
generous limited liability laws. The CLC and Fund Conventions would impose 
strict liability, but they would retain limited liability, so long as that liability was 
set according to the size of the ship, not its value at the end of the voyage, and that 
liability would have to be secured with mandatory insurance and a complementary 
industry-fed compensation fund. 
The situation facing the victims of offshore oil spills caused by offshore petroleum 
exploration and extracting activities in New Zealand waters is quite different. The 
owners and operators of offshore petroleum installations and operations face strict 
liability for pollution damage, but that liability is unlimited, insurance is mandatory, 
but there is no international compensation fund available to cover any unpaid 
claims. Unlike for the pollution damage caused by CLC ships, there is no statutory 
bar preventing the victims of offshore oil spills from bringing actions in tort outside 
of the MTA. The assumption will still be that the proper cause of action is in 
negligence. The onus is then on the plaintiff to prove that the owner or operator of 
the offending marine structure or operation was at fault, and that their wrongful 
actions caused harm to the plaintiff. The outcome of that litigation is far from 
certain. It may be very difficult to bring the tortfeasor before a court, and in the 
absence of adequate statutory liability or mandatory insurance laws, there is little 
to prevent defendants from engaging in complicated delaying tactics, denials of 
wrongdoing, or even declaring insolvency and disappearing from the scene. The 
tort of public nuisance may offer an easier path to compensatory damages, but it 
may be difficult for a member of the public to prove its standing to bring such a 
cause of action. It is for this reason that tort law continues to be of relevance to our 
understanding of liability and compensation for offshore oil spills. 





7 The CLC and Fund Conventions 1969/1971 
This chapter will begin by describing the developments in international maritime 
law that led up to the creation of the CLC and Fund Conventions. It will explain 
how the United Nations’ special maritime agency, the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (“IMCO”), played a key role in developing 
international shipping law in the post-war period and in the in providing a forum 
for the CLC and Fund Conventions 1969/1971.  
As the previous chapters explained, the CLC and Fund Conventions are relevant to 
this thesis because they were incorporated into New Zealand law and their 
definitions were used to create a strict offshore liability regime. They have also been 
relevant to efforts to create an international offshore petroleum industry liability 
and fund convention. For example, the CLC and Fund Conventions’ model of strict 
liability, backed up by mandatory insurance and a compensation fund, did provide 
a starting point for the 1976 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of Sea Bed Mineral Resources 
(“CLEE”).67 CLEE never came into force, but it did prompt the creation of the 
Offshore Pollution Liability Association (“OPOL”), a mutual indemnity agreement 
between oil and gas operators from 13 countries in the North Sea region which will 
be discussed further in a later chapter.  
The CLC and Fund Conventions were also very influential in the debate leading up 
to the creation of the European Union’s Environmental Liability Directive, which 
now applies to environmental damage caused by offshore oil and gas activities in 
EU Member States’ EEZs, as will be discussed later in the thesis. The CLC and 
Fund Convention regime again came into focus after the 2009 Montara oil rig 
disaster prompted Indonesia to propose that the International Maritime 
Organization (“IMO”) – IMCO’s successor - should expand its work programme to 
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include pollution damage caused by offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction 
activities. The intention was to either expand the CLC and Fund Conventions of 
include oil pollution damage caused by offshore activities, or to create a new 
international liability and compensation regime specific to the offshore oil industry. 
This proposal was defeated, but it seems that the issue will continue to arise 
whenever offshore petroleum and extraction activities cause oil pollution damage. 
 
A number of academics have argued that the CLC and Fund Conventions represent 
the gold standard of environmental liability and compensation conventions.68 The 
Conventions’ authors were highly motivated, they carefully considered the 
advantages of strict and limited liability over a fault based system, and they 
designed the regime to making the best use of the insurance industry, while sharing 
that liability with the oil industry through the establishment of the International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund. It follows that, to have the best understanding of the 
CLC and Fund Conventions and their influence on the development of international 
environmental liability laws, the thesis should examine how the United Nations 
sought to instil international legal norms into international maritime law, 
culminating with the 1969 and 1971 conferences where the CLC and Fund 
Conventions were first debated and adopted.  
 
7.1 Developments in International Law Prior to the Torrey Canyon  
In the years immediately following the Second World War, the newly formed 
United Nations began regulating the activities in the global commons, establishing 
IMCO in 1948.69 IMCO was a specialist maritime agency, tasked with preventing 
anti-competitive practices, developing safety regulations and with facilitating 
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general cooperation and the free exchange of information between governments.70 
Its original purpose statement was:71 
… to provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of 
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds 
affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and to encourage the general 
adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime 
safety and efficiency of navigation…72   
Despite a majority consensus that harmonized international shipping laws were 
needed, several more suspicious maritime nations delayed the IMCO convention’s 
entry into force until 1958.73 The delay was rooted in a reluctance to allow IMCO 
to have any say in commercial matters, and the view that it should confine itself to 
purely technical questions.74  Offshore oil industry matters are notable by their 
absence. 
It was not until 1954 that the international community agreed on a plan for 
preventing and reducing operational oil spills from all ships with the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954, or OILPOL.75 
OILPOL prohibited excessive operational discharges from shipping within 50 miles 
of land or inside “special areas” of particular ecological significance.76 Operational 
discharges result from practices such as ballast pumping, or when tanker’s holds 
are scrubbed out with seawater; practices which caused regular and significant oil 
incidents, with the affected state never knowing just which passing ship was 
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responsible.77 IMCO had only formally met the first time the previous year when it 
took charge of OILPOL in 1960, evincing an early and admirable resolve to grapple 
with thorny legal issues.78  
OILPOL was never fully accepted by governments, even after it was strengthened 
by amendments in 1962, 1969 and 1971, and was sharply criticised as being 
ineffective and unworkable.79 As Legault explains, OILPOL’s major defects relate 
to detection and jurisdiction.80 Flag states, whose entire raison d’être is to attract 
shipowners with the easiest shipping regulations, employment and tax laws, had to 
be relied upon to vigorously prosecute their own merchant fleets at the behest of 
the affected coastal state. It required major investments in port state infrastructure 
and that shipowners install “load-on-top” systems to separate oil from the water 
used to scrub tanks. It also failed to address accidental discharges, and would not 
have affected the outcome of incidents like the Inverpool case. Even so, OILPOL 
was a valuable forerunner to the modern era, and largely became incorporated into 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 (“MARPOL 73/78”).81 Global geopolitical events 
would shortly drive the development of a new wave of super tankers, setting the 
stage for oil pollution incidents orders of magnitude greater than the Inverpool. 
7.1.1 The Torrey Canyon Disaster 
In 1956, Israel, followed closely by Britain and France, invaded Egypt, seizing 
control of the recently nationalized Suez Canal and attempting to force President 
Nasser Hussein from power.82 The invasion was unsuccessful. The Suez Canal 
carried 60 percent of Europe’s oil, and its closure forced Saudi oil shipments to take 
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the much longer route to Europe around the Cape of Good Hope.83 The ensuing oil 
price rises and increased voyage times sparked a demand for much larger tankers.84 
The first 100,000 ton tanker was launched in 1959 and by the mid-1960s the first 
Very Large Crude Carriers of 200,000 tonnes deadweight were on order. The 
Torrey Canyon was typical of this trend as, although her hull was laid down in 1959, 
the vessel was broadened and lengthened at a Japanese shipyard in 1965, doubling 
in capacity.85 Thus, international military and political crises, increasing ship sizes, 
and advances in offshore petroleum exploration and production activities, were 
combining to increase the risk of oil spill disasters in the post-war era.86 Despite the 
objectively spiralling risks, Tormod Rafgard, the first Managing Director of tanker 
industry association Intertanko and member of the Norwegian delegation to the 
1969 Brussels conference, describes the attitude of tanker owners and operators at 
that time as “fairly relaxed”.87 In much the same way as the Deepwater Horizon has 
now focused world attention on the risks of deepwater oil and gas exploration, it 
would take the spectacular sinking of the Torrey Canyon to raise awareness of the 
increasing threat posed by the new generation of super tankers. 88  Even half a 
century on, the Torrey Canyon still features in the top ten list of the worst oil spills 
in history.89 
The Torrey Canyon was owned by the Liberian Barracuda Tanker Corporation, but 
she was on a 20 year time charter to Union Oil Company of California, and voyage 
chartered to British Petroleum (“BP”), when she ran aground on rocks near Scilly 
Isles off the south-eastern tip of the United Kingdom on Saturday the 18th of March 
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1967. 90  The charter arrangement was typical, as shipowning companies often 
financed the construction of their vessels by assigning long term charter revenues 
to the major oil companies. 91  This gave the oil company the advantages of 
operational control, without the disadvantages of legal liability that came with the 
appellation of shipowner. Union Oil was Barracuda’s own holding company, and 
BP owned the oil.92 The Torrey Canyon was on time charter to Union Oil when she 
and her sister ship, the Lake Palourde, were “jumboized”; a detail that would factor 
into the later court case.93  
Matters were further complicated by the fact that her master and crew were Italian, 
the victims were British and French, and sinking took place in international 
waters.94 The Scilly Isles form part of territory of the United Kingdom, but the 
Torrey Canyon actually ran aground on the Seven Stones Reef, mid-way between 
the Scilly Isles and Land’s End and twelve nautical miles off the British Coast on 
the high seas as they were defined at that time.95 The location of the accident made 
the United Kingdom’s decision to bomb the Torrey Canyon without the owner’s 
consent legally problematic.96 It is for that reason that the accident would lead to 
the development of an Intervention Convention, complementary to and 
simultaneous with the CLC and Fund Conventions, giving states to the right to take 
action on the high seas to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate the danger of oil pollution 
damage to their coastlines.97  
                                                 
90 In re Barracuda Tanker Corp (Torrey Canyon) 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969) at 1013–1014. 
91  Swan “International and National Approaches to Oil Pollution Responsibility: An Emerging 
Regime for a Global Problem”, above n 18, at 521. 
92 Chao Wu Pollution from the Carriage of Oil by Sea: Liability and Compensation (Kluwer Law 
International, London ; Boston, 1996) at 10. 
93 Edward Cowan Oil and Water: The Torrey Canyon Disaster (William Kimber and Co Ltd, London, 
1969) at 25. 
94 Nina von Borries “The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and 
Recklessness” (PhD Dissertation, Universität Hamburg, 2009) at 8. 
95 Claude Emanuelli “The Right of Intervention of Coastal States on the High Seas in Cases of 
Pollution Casualties” (1976) 25 U.N.B.L.J. 79 at 79 
96 International Maritime Organization Official Records of the International Legal Conference on 
Marine Pollution Damage, 1969, above n 7, "Observations and Proposals of Governments 
Concerning Draft Articles on the Right of a Coastal State to Intervene When a Casualty Which 
Causes, or Might Cause Pollution of the Sea [By Oil] Occurs on the High Seas”, LEG/CONF/C.1/1. 
97 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties, 11 ILM 284 (opened for signature 18 December 1971, entered into force 16 October 
1978) 




The Torrey Canyon was running late, and BP ordered the master, Captain Rugiati, 
to make all speed to reach port before the tide turned.98 He decided to risk a faster 
course through rocky, confined waters east of the Scilly Isles, but shortly found that 
the great ship was bearing down on a local fishing boat. The helmsman desperately 
tried to bear hard left, but was stymied by the fact the Captain had left the auto-pilot 
on, and the fully laden tanker ran hard aground on Pollard Rock.99 One hundred 
thousand tonnes of Kuwaiti crude spilled forth from the rents in the Torrey 
Canyon’s hull, most of the damage was caused to the south-western coast of Britain, 
but over the following week the mid-channel islands and the French coast of 
Brittany were also heavily impacted as a vast black plume spanned the entire 
English Channel.  
The salvors, Bureau Wijsmuller, airlifted pumps and compressors from Cornwall 
in an attempt to refloat the ship, and large amounts of toxic industrial detergents 
were sprayed into the sea.100 Famed Dutch salvage expert Hans Stal rushed to the 
scene only to be killed by one of two explosions at the stern of the ship.101 The 
British Cabinet considered towing the ship away to be scuttled in the Atlantic, but 
concluded that they had no right to intervene without the owner’s consent. Union 
Oil, apparently ignoring the legal fiction that the ship belonged to Barracuda, would 
only agree if they were paid $10m USD. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, speaking 
from his holiday cottage on the Scillies, warned that, whatever occurred, the tanker 
would not be allowed into United Kingdom territorial waters.102  
All hopes of a successful salvage disappeared on Monday, 27th of March 1967, 
when the beleaguered tanker’s back was broken as four tugs attempted to pull her 
off the rocks in heavy seas.103 Eight Royal Navy Buccaneers and three RAF Hunters 
bombed the remaining 40,000 tonnes of crude oil, but the fire only lasted a few 
hours and by Friday further bombing runs were aborted. Attempts by the French 
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government to prevent pollution damage were likewise futile and it was later 
claimed that fifty per cent of the bird life of the North Brittany Coast was lost.104 
Annar Poulsson, of the International Group of Protection and Indemnity clubs, 
would describe the clean-up effort as “fantastic and hopelessly inadequate” and that 
it immensely increased the total expense.105 The total cost of the clean-up was 
estimated at £14.24 million GBP, yet the ship and cargo were only insured for 
around £6.49 million GBP.106 
A Liberian Board of Inquiry ascribed the blame solely to Captain Rugiati and 
absolved the owner from any “actual fault or privity” in causing the accident.107 
Union Oil argued that it owed a duty to the underwriters to make all efforts to save 
the ship, and that the aerial bombing was the proximate cause of most of the 
damage.108 Captain Rugiati, who had an exemplary record and may have been 
seriously fatigued after having served aboard the Torrey Canyon without leave for 
an entire year, lost his licence and never sailed again. 
Because the sinking had occurred in international waters, it raised jurisdictional 
difficulties that would bedevil later attempts to bring the Torrey Canyon’s owners 
before either an English or a French court. Under Phillips v Eyre, actions could be 
brought before an English court if the wrong was actionable both in England and 
the place where it occurred, while the rule in Boys v Chaplin gave competence to 
“the law of the country with which the parties and the act done have the most 
significant connection.” 109  Barracuda Tanker Corporation had no assets in the 
United Kingdom, and simply refused to appear when summoned by the United 
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Kingdom in Singapore, or by the French in Rotterdam.110 Its fatal mistake was to 
allow the Torrey Canyon’s sister ship, the Lake Palourde, to enter the port at 
Singapore, where she was captured by an action by the United Kingdom 
Government. The ship was only released when Barracuda handed over a bond of 
$8m USD, a sum that would ultimately be used to effect a settlement in the Torrey 
Canyon dispute. The Lake Palourde was arrested again by French authorities after 
it entered Rotterdam, however, allowing the French to demand their own security 
payment of $7.8m USD.111  
To pre-empt further court actions, Barracuda and Union Oil jointly instituted 
proceedings in the United States District Court of New York on September 22 
1967.112 There Bryan J confirmed that Barracuda’s stipulated interest in the vessel 
was just $50 USD under the United States Limitation of Liability Act of 1851.113 
This figure appears ludicrous, but we recall that the Act set liability limits according 
to the value of the particular ship and its cargo at the end of the voyage. All that 
remained of that great ship was a single lifeboat valued at $48 USD. Even if the 
matter had been decided under the English law, the owners would still have been 
entitled to limit their liability to £1.25m GBP, so limited liability would have played 
a significant role either way.114  
The United States Court of Appeal eventually concluded that the accident could 
have been caused by Union Oil’s involvement in the original design and 
manufacture of the vessel in 1958 and its modifications in Japan in 1965.115 The 
matter was ultimately settled out of court for the balance of the $8-9m USD bond 
Union Oil had provided for the release of the Lake Palourde from Singapore, and 
that figure was largely covered by hull insurance. The Court should have been 
concerned that Captain Rugiati only had access to a $2 USD map of the south-
western tip of England and the Scillies. The British Admiralty’s Channel Pilot 
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advised that “the greatest vigilance is necessary, and a vessel’s position, even in the 
clearest weather, should be checked by cross bearings at short intervals.” 116 
According to Edward Cowan’s account, the Scilly Isles had claimed 257 ships from 
1679 to 1923, and the failure to maintain all necessary navigational aids is evidence 
of a shipowner’s actual fault and privity. 
This account may have been lengthy in a thesis directed at liability for oil pollution 
damage caused by offshore oil well blowouts, but it does illuminate some very 
important aspects, not just of the CLC and Fund Convention regime, but that may 
be necessary for any environmental damage liability regime including New 
Zealand’s own offshore liability regime, and the EU’s Environmental Liability 
Directive. There was a need for clear rules allocating and defining liability and 
ensuring that compensation would be speedily made. These rules needed to account 
for the existing obstacles posed by public and private laws that sought to limit or 
evade that liability, either sweeping them aside or incorporating them on reasonable 
terms. Complicated charter arrangements and limited liability statutes were being 
used to shield owners from the consequences of their decisions, not just in how 
shipping activities were conducted, but in how ships were constructed or altered. 
States had a right to protect themselves from oil spills on the high seas, and if they 
suffered oil pollution damage, or were forced to carry out expensive preventive 
measures, then they needed the power to bring shipowners to court without the 
farcical necessity of chasing ships across the globe in order to hold them hostage 
for ransom. Shipowners needed the certainty of knowing that their liability would 
be subject to appropriate limits, that insurance would be available to meet those 
limits, that they would have recourse to suitable defences, and that cargo-owners 
would take some responsibility for the additional costs.  
The shipping and oil industries had already taken significant steps with TOVALOP 
and CRISTAL, two agreements that would break ground for the CLC and Fund 
Conventions.  
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7.1.2 The Industry Response: TOVALOP and CRISTAL 
March of 1968 also saw the Ocean Eagle break in two off the coast of Puerto Rico, 
and the General Colocotronis grounded on a reef in the Bahamas.117 The incidents 
prompted the seven major oil companies to form a mutual insurance syndicate 
called the Tanker Owners’ Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil 
Pollution (“TOVALOP”). 118  The discussions leading up to TOVALOP had 
predated the Torrey Canyon disaster by several years, evidence that tanker owners 
had anticipated the need to pre-empt any unilateral legislation.119 
TOVALOP was signed by over ninety-eight per cent of the world’s tanker owners, 
making it the first successful agreement allowing national governments to claim 
against individual owners and charterers for the reasonable costs of oil removal.120 
The agreement defined “damage by pollution” as “physical contamination damage 
to Coast Lines resulting directly from a Discharge of Oil, and does not include 
damage from fire or explosion, consequential damage, or ecological 
impairment.”121 Liability was fault based with a reversal of the burden of proof, and 
was limited to the lesser of $100 per gross ton or $10m per incident; an ironic result 
given that Esso Petroleum had vigorously rejected res ipsa loquitur in the Inverpool 
case just a decade before.122  
A parallel scheme, the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker 
Liability for Oil Pollution (“CRISTAL”), required oil cargo owners to contribute to 
a compensation fund.123 The level of compensation would be set according to the 
size of the ship and measured in International Monetary Fund Special Drawing 
Rights (“SDR”). Compensation would only be paid if the damage exceeded the 
shipowner’s limited liability. TOVALOP and CRISTAL were precursors to the 
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CLC and Fund Convention regime and only lapsed following the 1992 amendments 
to the shipping conventions.124 
 
7.2 The Draft CLC Convention 1969 
The CLC Convention 1969 then did not spring fully formed from the earth, but was 
part of an ongoing debate about the role that ship and industry figures could play in 
preventing and compensating oil pollution damage. Yet while TOVALOP and 
CRISTAL had made valuable concessions, they still restricted claims to personal 
injury and property damage while largely ignoring damage to the environment.125 
The CLC Convention 1969 would therefore involve difficult negotiations before 
the shipping and oil industries would agree to share more of the costs of oil pollution 
damage.  
In 1967, prompted by the United Kingdom and France, IMCO published a paper 
entitled “Conclusions of the Council on the Action to be taken on the Problems 
Brought to Light by the Loss of the ‘Torrey Canyon’”.126 IMCO’s Legal Committee 
provided two alternative drafts.127 Alternative A would impose fault based liability 
on the shipowner but with a reversed burden of proof along the lines of the 
TOVALOP agreement. Alternative B would impose strict liability, but with certain 
defences. At that stage, neither alternative considered holding the cargo owner 
liable. The Belgian based Comité Maritime International (“CMI”) also formed a 
working group chaired by Lord Devlin, the former High Court judge at the centre 
of the Esso Petroleum v Southport Corporation case. 128  Lord Devlin strongly 
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supported a strict liability approach, but the CMI draft opted to follow TOVALOP’s 
fault based liability on the shipowner with a reversed burden of proof. 
Before the Brussels conference, IMCO issued a questionnaire asking states to 
describe “… the major incidents of marine pollution by oil which have occurred in 
its coastal waters since 1959, together with their known consequences and other 
pertinent information”. Fourteen countries reported 47 major incidents.129 Lebanon 
also reported a burst pipeline in 1961 and Senegal reported a collision between two 
ships in 1967, making for a total of 48 major incidents involving ships. Annar 
Poulsson, Managing Director of P & I Club Assuranceforeningen Skuld, reported 
that there had been 850 oil spill insurance claims of more than kr. 5000 between 
1960 and 1968, not counting the Torrey Canyon.130 Most spills were caused when 
ships stranded or collided, but sometimes the offending ship would never be 
identified. For example, the Dutch reported that “… the Netherlands coast is 
frequently polluted by oil – very often of unknown origin and not always of a 
serious nature.”131 A few countries like Brazil, Denmark, New Zealand and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reported that there had been no major 
incidents.132  
7.2.1 The Brussels Conference 1969: Strict Liability and a Compensation 
Fund 
The International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage was duly 
convened at Brussels from 10 to 29 November 1969. Debate was often heated, and 
the agenda and work schedule had not even been set when Mr Jamieson from 
Canada demanded a substantial revision of both draft conventions.133 Why was it 
that shipowners and coastal states should bear the financial burden, when “pollution 
was mainly attributable to the nature of the substance carried, and was only 
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incidentally the carrier’s fault.”134 The Canadian proposal was therefore to hold 
shipowner and cargo owner jointly and severally liable on a strict and progressive 
basis, with liability backed up by compulsory insurance.135 Two days later, Mr 
McGovern from Ireland declared that the first task of any convention was to ensure 
adequate compensation for the victims of maritime accidents.136 Liability laws, 
whether strict or fault based, could be easily avoided by one-ship companies. The 
most sensible solution would be to impose compulsory insurance on all shipowners, 
and supplement that by a fund paid for by oil industry levies. After all, as the Torrey 
Canyon proved, “it was the cargo which caused the damage and not the ship”.137 
The delegates were well aware that more and possibly even larger spills were likely 
to follow.138 Mr Appiah of Ghana feared that too much reliance was being placed 
on assessments of the damage caused by Torrey Canyon, and future damages could 
be much greater.139 Mr Poulsson of P&I Club Assuranceforeningen Skuld agreed, 
saying that:140 
… future maritime casualties would doubtless be on a much larger scale than 
the ‘Torrey Canyon’ disaster; but since the size of ships would have increased 
the limits of liability under Article 3 of the 1957 Limitation Convention would 
increase proportionately. For instance, for a 500,000 ton tanker, it would vary 
from $26 million to $30 million. 
The expectation that the costs of a major oil spill would be limited to just $30m 
USD seems a little laughable now, but that was the estimated cost of the Torrey 
Canyon. Adjusted for inflation, would come to over $200m USD at today’s rates.141  
Despite Lord Devlin’s evident preference for the strict liability standard, the United 
Kingdom delegation threw its efforts behind fault-based liability on the shipowner, 
with adequate liability limits. Their concern was that it would not be as easy to hold 
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the oil industry liable as some of the delegates seemed to think, and liability should 
lie with the shipowner. Unlike the shipowner:142  
… the shipper and cargo owner could not exercise any control over the cargo 
while it was on the high seas. Furthermore, it was difficult to identify the cargo 
owner, particularly as the cargo might change ownership during the voyage. 
The United States agreed, saying that “the only unchanging point of reference was 
the shipowner, for the operator might change from time to time and the cargo might 
change hands several times in mid voyage.”143 Mr Douay from France concurred, 
adding that the Torrey Canyon had displayed flaws in the existing maritime law, 
and litigation only increased the victim’s costs.144 Shipowner’s liability backed up 
by compulsory insurance seemed the obvious answer, but what was the insurance 
industry’s response?  
Mr Poulsson said that to “get the highest insurance coverage, liability must be based 
on fault.”145 Fault based liability could be covered up to $15m USD, but strict 
liability would only be covered to a maximum of $10m USD. He did not mention 
the fact that fault based insurance could afford to be set at a higher level because it 
rewarded far fewer successful claimants.146 Mr Nordensson from Sweden retorted 
that oil companies had more than enough money and if new insurance markets were 
required then they could be created, just as had occurred when strict liability was 
imposed on nuclear shipments fifteen years previously.147  
With a multiplicity of strongly opposing views and with time fast running out, it 
was becoming apparent that the conference might fail altogether. At this point, Mr 
Cuvelier put forward the Belgian proposal, echoing the earlier Canadian and Irish 
proposals, insisting that “an international fund should be established for 
compensating the victims of oil pollution, constituted by a levy on the carriage of 
oil.” 148  Lord Devlin complained that only the IMCO draft Articles had been 
                                                 
142 LEG/CONF/C.2/SR.3 at 626. 
143 At 630. 
144 LEG/CONF/C.2/SR.4, at 632. 
145 At 633. 
146  von Borries, “The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and 
Recklessness”, above n 28, at 43. 
147 LEG/CONF/C.2/SR.4, at 634. 
148 At 637. 




thoroughly discussed and to depart from them would only thwart the convention.149 
Mr Douay’s reply was that the best course of action was to:150 
… begin studying the other alternatives immediately, even at the risk of failing 
to produce a Convention at the present Conference, rather than hasten to adopt 
a Convention which would not satisfy the State’s concern and so might never 
be ratified, much less applied. 
Discussions continued without success throughout a further two meetings, and with 
the weekend adjournment looming, the Chair suggested that the delegates give an 
indicative vote of their first choice between four options.151 Strict liability on the 
shipowner gained 14 votes versus 8 votes for fault based liability, strict liability for 
the cargo owner took 10 votes, with progressive joint strict liability on ship and 
cargo attracting only 4 votes. A consensus in favour of shipowner focussed strict 
liability was beginning to emerge, but with no clear majority a second vote would 
be necessary.152  
Now convinced of the need to be decisive, Lord Devlin took charge, demanding 
that the Belgian proposition “was the one proposal put forward which offered a way 
of meeting the gap over the cover offered by the insurance market” and that would 
easily work with the shipowner’s strict liability as suggested by Alternative B of 
the draft Civil Liability convention.153 Galvanised by his declaration, the delegates 
decided, 25 votes to 12, that liability should rest on the shipowner, by 25 votes to 7 
that liability should be supplemented with a compensation fund, and finally by a 
vote of 22 to 17 against, with 3 abstentions, that liability should be strict.  
Despite the breakthrough some delegates continued to express their dismay, and 
discussions stretched into the 11th meeting. By the 12th meeting, Mr Zhudro of the 
USSR remarked that the fund was beginning to be a distraction from the main 
questions the conference was supposed to be considering and that it was fraught 
with difficulties which might prove “insuperable”.154 Lord Devlin agreed, adding 
that the “Committee had allowed itself to become so dazzled by the idea that all 
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problems could be solved by an international fund that it had not even started 
discussing the IMCO draft articles.”155 There was no point in spending any more 
time on a scheme which might never come to fruition, and it was decided that a 
working group would put together a draft proposal to be the subject of a separate 
conference to be convened in two years. 
Even so, the delegates at the Brussels Conference were able to agree that the 
shipowner was to be the sole liable party, and would be considered strictly liable 
for the costs of pollution damage and preventive measures.156 The shipowner was 
entitled to limit their liability according to the size of the ship, so long as the incident 
had not been a result of the actual fault or privity of the owner.157 Article 1 defined 
pollution damage as: 
… loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination 
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such 
escape or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of preventive measures 
and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. 
Preventive measures referred to “reasonable measures taken by any person after an 
incident has occurred to prevent or minimise pollution damage.” The CLC 
Convention 1969 also settled the jurisdiction question by granting competence to 
the courts of any countries where pollution damage occurred, or where preventive 
measures had to be taken.158 Insurance was to be mandatory and sufficient to cover 
the owner’s limited liability.159 Article III(8) allowed for direct action against the 
insurer or person providing financial security and that insurer or person would be 
able to “avail himself of the limits of liability and other defences other than the 
bankruptcy of the owner which the owner himself is entitled to invoke.” Wu Chao 
says that the concept of direct action was “revolutionary”.160 Limited liability with 
mandatory insurance had been a feature of the earlier 1962 Brussels Convention on 
the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, however, so that description is not 
strictly accurate.161  
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What might happen if the shipowner’s conduct was so delinquent that it lost both 
the protection of limited liability and its insurance cover? The rule from the 1957 
Limitation Convention was that the owner was entitled to limit his liability, “unless 
the occurrence giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or privity of 
the owner.”162 The Draft CLC Convention adopted the same principle.163 What is 
meant then by terms like “actual fault or privity”, “seaworthiness” and “wilful 
misconduct”? “Privity” requires that the assured knew about the unseaworthiness 
of the ship or the condition of the thing likely to cause harm.164 As Buckley LJ 
defined it, “actual fault and privity” demands:165  
… something personal to the owner, something blameworthy in him, as 
distinguished from constructive fault or privity such as the fault or privity of 
his servants or agents. But the words ‘actual fault’ are not confined to 
affirmative or positive acts by way of fault. … It is not necessary to shew 
knowledge. If he has means of knowledge which he ought to have used and 
does not avail himself of them, his omission so to do may be a fault, and, if 
so, it is an actual fault and he cannot claim the protection of the section. 
Actual fault and privity therefore should be limited to the owner’s own 
blameworthy conduct, rather than any wrongful deeds committed by servants or 
agents. It could include wilful blindness where the owner could have ascertained 
the true state of affairs if only he had asked. That knowledge could be inferred to 
the owner, for example, if the ego or controlling mind of a company had actual fault 
or privity.166  
Whether or not the shipowner had been guilty of some “actual fault or privity”, the 
insurer would be entitled to enjoy the CLC Convention 1969 limits of liability.167 
Insurers would be entitled to invoke any of the defences that the owner would have 
been entitled to, and would have the additional defence that the shipowner had been 
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guilty of “wilful misconduct.” The concept of wilful misconduct appears mainly in 
insurance law, and applies to circumstances where:168 
… the assured intended to achieve a loss or the damage or that he was 
recklessly indifferent whether such loss or damage was caused and that his 
immediate purpose was to claim on his insurers or that he subsequently 
advanced such a claim. 
The wilful misconduct exception was intended to protect insurers from both the 
negligent shipowner who carelessly sent an unseaworthy vessel to sea, and the 
criminal who fraudulently or recklessly destroyed their own vessel to perpetrate 
insurance fraud.169  
Direct action against insurers is generally only allowed where the plaintiff has 
obtained a judgment or an arbitral award against the assured and a winding up order 
for that company.170 The general rule in insurance is “pay to be paid”, however. 
This creates an obstacle to direct action, because it requires the assured to pay any 
creditor’s claims before being indemnified himself. A creditor may not obtain direct 
action as that would create a paradox where the creditor would have to pay their 
own debt before being indemnified by the insurer.171 These finer points of insurance 
law had the potential to complicate some of the easy assumptions that were being 
made at the Brussels Conference.  
7.2.2 Finalizing the CLC Convention 1969 
The CLC Convention 1969 represents a remarkable achievement in international 
diplomacy and demonstrates what a highly motivated group of people can achieve 
when given a clear objective and a limited space of time. Yet so much time was 
spent on debating the issue of a compensation fund that there had been little 
discussion of specifics. Decisions had to be quickly made the meaning of terms 
such as pollution damage and preventive measures, the categories of damage and 
types of ships and oil that would be covered. As little time remained, these vital 
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discussions were by necessity rather perfunctory, but still indicated the basic 
direction the CLC Convention 1969 would take.  
The Draft CLC Convention contained only broad general definitions of pollution 
damage and preventive measures. For France it was clear that the convention should 
include damage from fire and explosion as it would be “immoral” to exclude or 
limit personal injury claims, especially if lives had been lost.172 The Netherlands 
suggested that it should include loss or damage caused by the preventive measures 
themselves, for example, the harm dispersant spraying might cause to marine life.173 
For the United Kingdom, the priority was to ensure that claims would be restricted 
to the damage actually caused by oil pollution.174  
Ireland pointed out that providing for different limitations and rules of liability in 
the CLC Convention could bring it into conflict with the 1957 Limitation 
Convention.175 A pollution damage claim might be made in the jurisdiction where 
the damage occurred, and there could be a separate action for personal injury and 
collision damage in the country where the ship was arrested. 176  The CLC 
Convention 1969 ensured that actions could only be brought in the courts of the 
Contracting State whose territorial waters were affected, and only those national 
courts would have competence to decide how limitation funds should be 
distributed. 177  Ingram quite rightly points out that the decision to discard the 
“hallowed maritime practice of having a choice of many jurisdictions in which to 
sue” was a result of the difficult time the United Kingdom and French authorities 
had in bring the owners of the Torrey Canyon to court.178 
As for defences, the shipowner would escape liability when the damage was wholly 
caused by the negligence of the government in maintaining lights or other 
navigational aids.179 In addition, the shipowner had a defence if they could prove 
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that the pollution damage was caused by the intentional or negligent act or omission 
of the claimant.180 If damage was caused by more than one ship, and the damage 
was not “reasonably separable”, then the owners would be considered jointly and 
severally liable. Liability would still be capped at 2000 francs per ton of ships 
tonnage to a maximum of 210 million francs, so long as the shipowner had not 
committed some disqualifying act.181  
Theoretically, all that remained to be done was to agree upon the compensation 
fund’s terms and conditions. A further Fund Convention conference was scheduled 
to meet in 1971, and this would provide reluctant delegates with another 
opportunity to challenge strict liability and other basic tenets of the CLC 
Convention 1969. 
7.2.3 The Fund Convention 1971 
It is very likely that the 1969 Brussels Conference would have failed if the delegates 
had not agreed on the necessity for an additional oil industry-fed compensation 
fund. The Resolution on the Establishment of an International Compensation Fund 
for Oil Pollution Damage tasked a working group with a range of questions 
regarding the Fund’s organization and management.182 The great task was to decide 
whether the Fund Convention’s terms should mirror those in the CLC Convention, 
or whether it should provide cover in all circumstances where people suffered oil 
pollution damage from shipping. Too much liability would imperil the Fund’s 
existence, too little would undermine its legitimacy.  
In broad terms, the Working Group recommended a $30m USD Fund, funded by 
cargo owners, and administered by some existing international organization. The 
Working Group stated that:183 
… the purpose of the Fund should be the complete compensation of the 
victims and therefore it should intervene not only beyond the liability but also 
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in the absence of the liability of the ship … [but it] reserved examination of 
the case if the victim was at fault and excluded acts of war, hostility, civil war, 
insurrection or cataclysms of an exceptional nature. 
Article 2(a) of the Fund Convention 1971 stated that the IOPC Fund must aim “to 
provide compensation for pollution damage to the extent that the protection 
afforded by the Liability Convention is inadequate”. Article 4 stated that the Fund’s 
liability would arise in three possible scenarios: “because no liability for the damage 
arises under the Liability Convention”; because the liable shipowner or its insurer 
was “financially incapable of meeting his obligations in full” and after the persons 
suffering damage had not been sufficiently compensated even after taking all 
reasonable steps to pursue their legal remedies; and if the damage exceeded the 
owner’s CLC Convention 1969 limits of liability. As well as that, the shipowner 
itself could make a claim for reimbursement for any expenses it had incurred for 
preventing and minimizing pollution damage.184 
The extent of the Fund’s liability can be illuminated by the discussion around the 
issue of the “Act of War” and “Act of God” defences. These exceptions to liability 
conjure images of tankers being blown apart by terrorists or torpedoed by 
submarines, or whole ships and even fleets swallowed by hurricanes or 
overwhelmed by great tsunamis. The point is that these are forces and events that 
are so far beyond any person’s control, that it would not be reasonable to hold the 
shipowner responsible. The question then was whether or not the Fund Convention 
should take the shipowner’s place, and provide relief in any and all 
circumstances.185  
The United States strongly opposed both the Act of War and the Act of God 
defence, saying that the “innocent victims of pollution damage” should never be 
denied relief, and all “costs should be borne by those producing, transporting and 
consuming the oil.”186  The French delegate, Mr Douay, pointed out that other 
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international conventions excluded war damage, in particular those dealing with 
nuclear materials, and that to do so would place too great a burden on the Fund.187 
The Belgian delegate added that insurance companies would not cover war damage, 
to which the United States delegate replied that it was all the more reason for the 
Fund to fill that gap.188 The Act of War proposal was defeated by 25 votes to ten 
with 7 abstentions, with the result that Article 3 excluded the Fund from 
responsibility for the costs of pollution damage from acts of war.189 This decision 
proved fortunate, as oil tankers were deliberately targeted during the Iran-Iraq war 
of the 1980s, and Iraqi forces destroyed approximately 700 oil facilities during their 
retreat from Kuwait in 1991, causing the largest oil spill in history.190 
The Greek proposal that the Fund should not be held liable for Acts of God was 
defeated, however. 191  Referred to in French law as cas de force majeure, the 
defence holds that there should be no liability for natural occurrences of such a great 
and devastating scale that they could not be avoided by even the most conscientious 
shipowner. Mr Kennedy from Canada put it that the Fund should pay for natural 
disasters, just as Canadian and American farmers could seek crop-insurance against 
hail damage, as “that was precisely the sort of risk which by very definition the 
Fund should cover.”192 The exasperated United States delegate exclaimed that if 
“the number of cases where there was no obligation were continually increased, 
they would soon reach a position where the Fund’s only expenses were its running 
costs: would it then still deserve to be called a Compensation Fund?” 193 The 
delegates accepted the argument, and the Fund would pay for pollution damage 
resulting from Acts of God, up to a maximum of 450 million francs.194  
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The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (“IOPC Fund” or “Fund”) was 
established only after the Fund Convention 1971 came into force in 1978, was 
involved in 149 incidents and paid out over £567m.195 The Fund Convention 1971 
ceased to be in force from 24 May 2002, after the number of participating Member 
States fell below 25.196 
 
7.3 Concluding Remarks 
While the Inverpool showed the flaws of the fault-based tort system, the Torrey 
Canyon case demonstrated the need for an international agreement on a more just 
liability and compensation regime for oil spills from shipping. There had to be some 
standardized process for bringing shipowners before a court, for determining the 
specifics of liability, and to ensure the availability of suitable and adequate 
compensation. Yet, even with strong impetus and broad agreement that a new 
regime was called for, the Brussels conference very nearly failed to achieve its 
objectives. It was only after the United Kingdom delegation threw its support 
behind the Belgian proposal of strict liability, channelled to the shipowner, and 
backed up by mandatory insurance and an oil industry-fed compensation fund that 
the CLC Convention 1969 was able to be adopted. The 1971 Fund Convention 
conference would reveal further sources of disagreement, and the overall concern 
was that if the Fund accepted too great a scope of liability, then its contributing 
states could withdraw their support. On the other hand, if there were too many 
exceptions to liability, then the regime would lose its legitimacy.  
The decisions that were made at those two conferences decided the ultimate shape 
of the CLC and Fund Conventions, but they have had far reaching consequences 
for other environmental damage regimes. As the previous chapters explained, the 
New Zealand’s offshore petroleum liability regime uses definitions from the 
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shipping conventions, but it has abandoned channelling, seeking to capture as many 
possible owners and operators of offshore installations as possible, their liability is 
unlimited, and the mandatory insurance obligations have been inadequate for some 
time. These choices may have been the result of a lack of forethought, or, more 
likely, because it was a compromise forced upon legislators by the lack of an 
appropriate international offshore liability and fund convention.  
Owners and operators face strict liability under the MTA, but that liability is not 
absolute. Owners of marine structures and persons in charge of marine operations 
may not be held wholly or partially liable in circumstances where the damage or 
costs of preventive measures were due to an Act of War or an Act of God, a third 
party act or omission, the government’s or other person’s negligence in the 
maintenance of lights or navigational aids, or the claimant’s contributory 
negligence.197 These defences were adopted from the maritime law of the time and 
were incorporated into the CLC and Fund Conventions in order to protect the IOPC 
Fund from overwhelming compensation claims. In New Zealand there is no 
compensation fund, so any successful defence would only shift those costs to the 
New Zealand government or public, however. An argument could be made that 
offshore operators should be subject to absolute liability, though it would be 
necessary to consider the impact that this would have on the availability of 
insurance.    
What the drafters of the CLC and Fund Conventions could not anticipate was how 
the Conventions would operate in practice, and how national courts would react. 
For one thing, it would quickly become apparent that the Conventions’ limits of 
liability and compensation were inadequate to cover the costs of ever-larger and 
more complex tanker accidents. For another, national courts would push the 
boundaries of pollution damage liability, especially in relation to environmental 
damage per se claims. As these claims grew in expense and complexity, the IMO 
realised that there was a need to increase the limits of liability and compensation, 
while at the same time amending the Conventions’ fundamental definitions. A 
further conference would be convened in 1984, producing a pair of amending 
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Protocols which would form the basis of the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions 
which are in force today.  




8 Creating the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions 
The Fund Convention 1971 had not even come into force on March 16 1978, when 
the Amoco Cadiz sank spilling 223,000 tonnes of oil and contaminating 500 
kilometres of Brittany coastline.1  Amoco Transport set up a limitation fund of 
77,371,875 French Francs, but clean-up costs and pollution damage claims mounted 
to $800 million USD. Then on March 7 1980, the Tanio spill, a mere 13,500 tonnes, 
contaminated more than 200 kilometres of the same Brittany coastline costing 527 
million French Francs to restore. The one bright point was that the sinking of the 
Amoco Cadiz convinced the French government to accede to the Fund Convention 
1971, and with that the Fund Convention 1971 had the 14 Member State quorum 
needed to come into force.2  
The CLC and Fund Conventions were designed to cope with damage from tankers 
with the 120,000 tonne capacity of the Torrey Canyon, but since then supertankers 
had undergone a dramatic technological evolution. To give a sense of the rapid 
pace, the Glueckauf, built in 1886, and weighing just 3,060 tonnes, would have fit 
comfortably inside of the fuel bunker of an Ultra Large Crude Carrier like the 1978 
Batillus.3 The exponential growth in tanker size was driven by two economic and 
political factors. First, global oil production grew from 524 million tonnes in 1950 
to 3,049 million tons in 1977, and, secondly, the Suez Canal had again been closed 
following the 1967 Six Day War, another of the episodic Arab-Israeli wars to rack 
Israel and the Sinai peninsula.4 This forced tankers to again take the long route 
around Africa to European markets. Fewer, larger ships meant lower transportation 
costs and, by 1976, there were 689 supertankers, 46 of which weighed more than 
300,000 tonnes. Larger ships may have meant larger accidents, but the large 
expense of the Tanio demonstrated that there was no linear relationship between 
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spill size and expense. What was clear, however, was that the cost of tanker spills 
was exceeding the CLC and Fund Conventions’ limits of liability and 
compensation. 
National courts were proving more willing to pierce shipowner’s limited liability 
protections, but oil importers believed that the shipowner’s limits of liability were 
still too low and had shifted too much of the financial burden onto the Fund and its 
major contributing countries. 5  The IOPC Fund Assembly suggested that 
compensation levels should be raised to 675 million francs, and the P & I Clubs 
were now able to offer reinsurance of up to $300m USD, so there was no reason 
not to amend the limits of liability and compensation.6  
As this chapter will explain, the driving issue of the day was about how to quantify 
losses, especially when the award was directed at damage that may have been 
caused to the environment itself. Where the 1969 Convention’s definition of 
pollution damage had focussed on property damage and costs of preventive 
measures, the new pollution damage definition would include claims for losses of 
profits caused by the impairment of the environment, and the reasonable costs of 
reinstatement of the environment. At the same time, it would seek to exclude more 
ambitious and hypothetical environmental damage valuation methodologies.  
The 1992 Conventions provide the definitions which are in use force in New 
Zealand’s current marine pollution damage liability regime today, and therefore it 
is these definitions which govern the liability that the owners and operators of 
offshore petroleum exploration and extraction installations and operations face if 
they cause an offshore oil spill. New Zealand’s Ministry of Transport initially 
considered reasonable measures of reinstatement of the environment to be too 
indirect to be included in the new offshore installation financial assurance regime. 
This means that offshore owners and operators may not have to provide insurance 
to cover such claims, and may not have the funds to reinstate the environment 
should that become necessary following an offshore oil well disaster. 
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It follows that it is very important to consider how that definition came to be, and 
how the law values damage to the natural world itself. These continuing 
developments in the CLC and Fund Conventions’ treatment of oil pollution damage 
caused by shipping have also informed the EU’s treatment of environmental 
damage caused by offshore petroleum exploration and extraction activities, as the 
ELD was intended to cover just the kinds of pure environmental values that the EU 
Member States’ existing property and tort laws neglected to protect.  By 
understanding how the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions have developed to treat 
environmental damage caused by ship-source oil spills, we can make informed 
decisions about how New Zealand and the EU should treat environmental damage 
caused by offshore oil spills. 
 
8.1 Environmental Damage Per Se Claims under the CLC and Fund Conventions 
One of the key features of the CLC and Fund Convention regime is that the courts 
of the affected Contracting State have exclusive competence to determine the scope, 
quantity and distribution of compensation claims from both the shipowner and the 
IOPC Fund.7 The shipowner and the IOPC Fund have standing to challenge those 
awards, but must accept the courts’ final judgments. Two widely separated cases 
indicated a strong trend amongst national courts towards judicial recognition of 
environmental damage per se claims, providing a fresh and unexpected challenge 
to the Fund’s compensation limits.  
Environmental damage per se claims concern damage to the environment itself; 
land, water, or species which are considered common property. Unlike traditional 
property damage claims, there is no individual owner with standing to bring a claim. 
Furthermore, the land, water or species affected may not be subject to market forces. 
For example, seabirds may form a vital part of the marine and coastal ecosystem, 
but there is no market for seagull meat, so technically seagulls are worthless. The 
lack of an owner, or a clear market value, presents the court with a quandary. It 
must establish that the state, or some organization or individual has the standing to 
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bring a claim, and it must find a system for measuring, quantifying and monetising 
the loss outside of the price signals normally sent by a free market.  
The first case involved the Zoe Colocotroni, which grounded in Puerto Rico in 
1973, and the second was about the Antonio Gramsci, which sank off the coast of 
Latvia in 1979. Even though the United States is not a party to the CLC and Fund 
Conventions, and therefore the case of the Zoe Colocotroni is outside of the liability 
and compensation system, both cases involved the use of hypothetical models to 
quantify and monetise environmental damage, resulting in awards that their critics 
would see as punitive and symbolic, not restorative. Both cases played a central role 
in the debate around the formation of the 1984 Protocols and their redefinition of 
accepted terms of pollution damage liability.    
8.1.1 The Zoe Colocotroni 
The Zoe Colocotroni was a tramp oil tanker which ran aground three and a half 
miles off the coast of Puerto Rico on March 18 1973.8 Just as in the case of the 
Inverpool, the Captain sought to save the ship by discharging its cargo of more than 
5000 tonnes of crude oil onto an area of shoreline known as Bahia Sucia. The case 
centred on how the court might quantify damage when it was caused to an area of 
great natural beauty, with significant biodiversity, but without a great deal of 
commercial value.  
The immediate cause of the accident was that the ship’s crew was “hopelessly lost”, 
and the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found that the 
ship was unseaworthy which barred the owners from seeking the protection of the 
United States Limitation of Liability Act.9 As the damage was caused to a publicly 
owned area of coastline, no person had standing to claim that they had suffered an 
actionable harm to their own property. However, the Court applied the parens 
patriae doctrine, which holds that the state has:10 
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… a sovereign interest in the general welfare of its citizens which transcends 
any injury which may be caused to its proprietary interests or to the property 
of its individual citizens. Particularly when a nuisance of disastrous 
proportions occurs such as in the case of a maritime oil spill, the special status 
of the body politic vis-a-vis its citizens gives rise to a right to seek redress on 
behalf of the collective community which is not limited to the abatement of 
the nuisance but which can allow for recovery for damages by the body politic.   
The effect of the doctrine is that unlike in private or public nuisance claims, there 
is no need to find a property owner who has suffered any particular damage, or that 
any individual member of the public, or sector of the public, had suffered a 
nuisance.11 It was the collective community interest that had been offended and this 
gave the Commonwealth standing to seek damages. 
How then should damages be calculated? Before the accident, Bahia Sucia had been 
“a healthy functioning estuarial ecosystem, typical of those found in the southern 
coast of Puerto Rico and similar tropical environments.”12 The United States Coast 
Guard and various Commonwealth agencies had made use of booms, pumps, 
bulldozers and even bailing by hand, but oil could still be found amongst the 
mangroves five years after the incident. 13  Scientific surveys provided by the 
plaintiffs estimated the loss of some 92,109,720 marine animals.14 Replacing those 
animals from biological supply laboratories would cost at least be at least $0.06 
USD per individual animal, with some species selling for between $1.00 and $4.50 
USD. The Court accepted the $0.06 USD valuation, and multiplying by the nearly 
one hundred million lost animals, with the added costs of the preventive and 
environmental reinstatement measures, found for the plaintiffs in the amount of 
$6,164,192.09 USD, with interest of 6% and additional civil penalties of $7,500 
USD.15 
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In the Court of Appeal, the Colocotroni brothers claimed that the District Court 
erred in failing to apply the common law’s “diminution in value” rule.16 Damages 
should have been calculated with reference to the $5000 USD per acre prices 
comparable properties were sold for on the local property market, and damage to 
five acres could not possibly exceed this $30,000. The Court responded rather drily 
that:17 
We believe that [the] defendants have misconceived the character of the 
remedy. The EQB [Puerto Rican Environmental Quality Board] is not 
concerned with any loss in the market or other commercial value of the 
Commonwealth’s land. In point of fact, the EQB concedes the land has no 
significant commercial or market value. 
What mattered was whether the EQB had the statutory power to award damages 
other than on the traditional basis. The implication of federal statutes, like the Clean 
Water Act 1972, was that valuation was not to be used for purely compensatory 
purposes, and was only one element of any practical environmental restoration 
plan.18 A market valuation would “deny the state any right to recover meaningful 
damages for harm to such areas, and would frustrate appropriate measures to restore 
or rehabilitate the environment.” 19  It was never going to be practical or even 
possible to replant the damaged mangroves, or to replace the now oil soaked land, 
and the plaintiffs had no intention to actually purchase 92 million invertebrate 
animals, so awarding damages on that scale would be unfairly punitive. The Court 
of Appeal concluded that the award should be vacated until the full extent of 
damage was known, and a reasonable restoration plan could be put in place. 
8.1.2 The Antonio Gramsci 
The Antonio Gramsci grounded in the Baltic Sea off the coast of Ventspils, Latvia, 
USSR, on the 27th of February 1979, spilling 5,500 tonnes of crude oil.20 By the 2nd 
of April, the oil had spread as far as the Swedish Archipelago near Stockholm, 
polluting some 4,000 islands. The defendant state-owned Latvian Shipping 
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Company claimed that all the oil had either been recovered or burnt off or had 
remained in Soviet waters, but the Swedish government was able to provide 
analysis proving that the oil on the Swedish coast had the same chemical fingerprint 
as the oil from the stricken ship.21  
The USSR Ministry of Waters asked for three times more damages than the claims 
by the Swedish, soaking up the bulk of the available limitation fund and thereby 
increasing the compensation claims against the Fund.22 The USSR claim was so 
large in part because it was based on a statutory formula known as the “methodica”. 
This estimates the volume of seawater that will be polluted by a given amount of 
oil, such that Q = x/50 ∗ 106 m3 where Q is quantity of water, and x is the volume 
of oil spilled. If 1,100 tonnes of oil had been spilled from the Antonio Gramsci, then 
22 million cubic meters of water were affected. Damages were then calculated by 
multiplying that figure by 2 Soviet Roubles. The total Soviet claim was therefore 
48,331,535 Soviet Roubles, or £34,326,373 GBP. 
The IOPC Fund’s response was to issue a 1980 Resolution stating that 
compensation would not be based on “an abstract quantification of damage 
calculated in accordance with theoretical models.”23 The IOPC Fund’s Executive 
Committee affirmed this stance following a second spill from the Antonio Gramsci 
in 1987.24 The IOPC Fund reached a very similar conclusion to that of the United 
States Court of Appeals in the Zoe Colocotroni case. Any award must go towards a 
plan for restoring the environment, and the amount must be directly related to the 
actual monies spent on preventing and remediating the damage. Compensatory or 
punitive damages which inflate the shipowner’s liability will only ultimately impact 
on the Fund, and that is contrary to the agreement between shipowners and cargo-
owners which underpins the CLC and Fund Conventions. 
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8.2 The 1984 Protocols and Environmental Damage Per Se Claims 
Cases like the Zoe Colocotroni and the Antonio Gramsci appeared to threaten to 
open the floodgates to further expensive damage claims at the same time as the 
increasing size and complexity of spills and oil spill responses challenged the 
Conventions’ limits of liability and compensation. The newly renamed 
International Maritime Organisation (“IMO”), as the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organisation had come to be known, decided that the time was right 
to consider increase those limits and whether to redefine the terms of 
compensation.25 The International Conference on Liability and Compensation for 
Damage in Connexion with the Carriage of Certain Substances by Sea, 1984, was 
convened to consider two new draft protocols; the “Draft Protocol to the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969” and 
the “Draft Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1984.”26 The 1984 
Protocols, as they shall be referred to, were never adopted, but they provided the 
substantive basis for the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions, and influenced the IOPC 
Fund’s thinking in the interim period.27 The 1984 Protocols took eight years to 
come into force because they failed to attract the support of the United States of 
America. The United States wanted greater scope to address natural resource 
damages claims, higher limits of compensation, and to establish a national oil 
pollution damage fund. The 1989 sinking of the Exxon Valdez spurred the United 
States to adopt its own Oil Pollution Act 1990, however, and the CLC and Fund 
Convention regime would have to make do without further contributions from the 
United States.28  
It was on the 12th of January 1984, that the IMO’s Legal Committee opened 
discussions into the terms “pollution damage”, “preventive measures” and 
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“incident”.29 These discussions make it clear that the environmental damage per se 
claims in the Zoe Colocotroni and the Antonio Gramsci cases were at the forefront. 
One would expect that the IOPC Fund’s response would be a kneejerk rejection of 
environmental per se claims, but the actual result was more nuanced.  
The Legal Committee proposed that pollution damage be defined as:30 
(a) costs actually incurred as a direct result of contamination outside the 
ship resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, 
wherever such escape or discharge may occur; 
(b) economic loss actually sustained as a direct result of contamination 
set out in (a); 
(c) actual costs of preventive measures and economic loss actually 
sustained as a direct result of such preventive measures 
Poland proposed a text which added loss of life or personal injury, “impairment of 
the environment”, and the economic losses caused by that impairment. 31  The 
problem for several delegations, including the observer from the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), was that “impairment of the 
environment” could not be assessed in dollar terms, and even if it could, no one had 
standing to sue on behalf of the environment.32 As the United Kingdom delegate 
vividly put it:33 
It would be best to insert a proviso that forms of damage considered excessive 
would be excluded. As for reinstatement of the environment, there should be 
a reference to compensation for reasonable measures actually undertaken or 
to be undertaken. Alternatively, a proviso could be inserted to exclude 
theoretical or abstract calculations of costs not actually incurred. Likewise, 
environmental restoration costs should exclude so-called ‘bug-count’ 
damage, namely damage to resources of no exploitable value which would not 
be replaced (emphasis added). 
The term “bug-count damage” appears to be a direct reference to the way scientific 
surveys of lost animal life were used to calculate damages in the Zoe Colocotroni 
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case. The Comité Maritime International (“CMI”) was also determined to prohibit 
“speculative claims for economic loss” based on hypothetical or arbitrary 
assessments of environmental harm.34 For Mr Trotz from the German Democratic 
Republic:35 
It was necessary to make a choice: should one compensate for any loss in value 
of the environment resulting from the damage, or, conversely, limit 
compensation to reimbursement of costs reasonably incurred to restore the 
environment? 
Mr Carly from Belgium agreed saying that, “one could surely not claim to be able 
to reconstitute the micro-organisms destroyed, it could only be a matter of cleaning 
up and letting nature do the rest.”36  
Ecological damage was an evolving concept that some argued was for national 
courts to define, but there was still a need for lucid terminology to remove as much 
ambiguity as possible.37 The Legal Committee therefore agreed to turn the matter 
over to a Working Group, which produced two alternative drafts. Alternative I 
defined “pollution damage” as:38 
(a) reasonable costs actually incurred or to be incurred, and other damage 
or loss, including loss of profit, actually sustained as a direct result of 
contamination outside the ship resulting from the escape or discharge 
of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur; 
provided that compensation for impairment of the environment other 
than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of 
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken; 
(b) reasonable costs of preventive measures and damage or loss actually 
sustained as a direct result of such preventive measures. 
The phrases “actually incurred”, “actually sustained”, and “direct result”, aimed to 
prevent speculative claims, but the British delegation complained that definition 
was too “overloaded with qualifying terms which had little meaning in certain 
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jurisdictions”. 39  For example, the words “direct result” would have excluded 
hoteliers’ consequential losses under French law. A proposal by the CMI to include 
the phrase, “diminution in value, if any”, was problematic too as, according to 
United Kingdom law, “the marine environment possessed no real value, since it 
could not be marketed, nor could the sea creatures or fish in it until they were 
caught”.40  
Alternative II limited damages claims to:41 
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination 
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever 
such escape or discharge may occur; provided that compensation for 
impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such 
impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of 
reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken; 
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures. 
It is worth noting that the Liberian delegate opposed this second draft with a 
reference to the Zoe Colocotroni case, saying that the CLC Convention 1969 had 
never been intended to compensate for environmental damage.42 The Malaysian 
delegate objected to the term “loss of profit”, because subsistence fishermen made 
very little profit, and he would have preferred the term “loss of income”.43 Mr 
Holman, observer from the Friends of the Earth International, reminded the 
delegates that the sea was more valuable than the income that could be derived from 
it, but he supported Alternative II. 44  While the delegates spent more time in 
discussions, the important decision had already been made. Both alternatives 
rejected “speculative claims based on a theoretical model and included claims for 
restoration costs actually incurred.”45 Alternative II was perceived to be simpler and 
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more predictable, and the delegates approved it by a vote of 28 to 19 with 1 
abstention.46 
As for the limits of liability and compensation, the delegates agreed to raise the 
shipowner’s maximum liability to 3 million SDR, plus 420 SDR for every gross ton 
above 5,000 GRT, up to a maximum of 59.7 million SDR.47 The new plan was for 
the IOPC Fund to create a second tier system of funding of between 135 million 
and 200 million SDR, but which would only be activated if the top three 
contributing states had imported at least 600 million tons of oil that year. This bore 
a striking resemblance to an earlier United States’ proposal that Japan and South 
Korea had emphatically rejected, indicating that the IMO still fervently hoped to 
bring the United States on-board.48 The failure to adopt the 1984 Protocols meant 
that the CLC and Fund Conventions 1969/1971 continued to provide the basis for 
pollution damage claims, but they did guide the IOPC Fund’s thinking as it 
continued to be faced with claims ranging from the traditional to the ingenious, and 
some with strong environmental damage per se elements. The case of the Patmos 
provides further evidence of this tendency.49  
8.2.1 After the 1984 Conference: The Patmos 
In 1985, the Greek tanker Patmos and the Spanish tanker Castillo de Monte Aragon 
collided, killing three men and spilling between 700 and 2,000 tonnes of oil into the 
Straits of Messina, between Sicily and Italy.50 The Italian government lodged a 
claim against the Fund for £9.1 million, which the IOPC Fund’s Director rejected 
on the grounds that the IOPC Fund’s 1980 Resolution excluded abstract or 
hypothetical damages. The Court at Messina agreed, adding that the Italian Ministry 
of the Merchant Marine had no standing to claim for damage to areas in the res 
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communes omnium, or public domain. The Ministry did not own the coast, so it had 
not suffered any compensable loss. 
The Italian Court of Appeal appointed a team of experts who calculated damages 
in a fashion similar to the Soviet Union’s “methodica”.51 The team estimated the 
volume of polluted water and the numbers of unborn fish resulting from that 
pollution, and then based its award on the market price for the uncaught fish. A 
second report would concede that the team’s “conclusions were only hypothetical 
and not confirmed by factual evidence”, and the court would have to make its own 
valuation.52 Yet the Court of Appeal only rejected the experts’ calculations because 
the market price used had been too high. By correcting for the actual market price 
for fish at the time of the spill, the Court was able to use the formula to award the 
Italian Government the sum of £837,000.  
As for the standing question, the Court of Appeal stated that:53 
Under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions the term ‘pollution damage’ 
embraces deterioration and destruction in whole or in part of the environment 
and includes any damage caused to the coast and to the interest of the coastal 
states which related to the environment, such as interest in the preservation of 
marine biological resources, both insofar as fauna and flora are concerned. 
Therefore, just as in the case of the Zoe Colocotroni, the Court held that the state 
had standing because it has a legitimate interest in preserving its coastal marine 
environments. For its part, the IOPC Fund decided not to appeal, as the amount 
payable was within the shipowner’s limit of liability, and, in any event, the Patmos’ 
flag state was not a party to the Fund Convention.  
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8.3 The 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions 
Cases like the Patmos and the escalating costs of ever larger tanker spills showed 
that the problems the 1984 Protocols had addressed had not abated and it would be 
necessary to convene a further conference to revisit the question. In his opening 
statement at the subsequent 1992 conference, Mr O’Neil, Secretary-General of the 
IMO called the conventions a “globally effective regime”, but one where the 
compensation levels were “gradually become less adequate”. 54  The answer, 
according to the intersessional working group, was that the 1984 Protocols could 
and should be adopted almost in their entirety.55  
The new pollution damage and preventive measures definitions still posed 
challenges that the IOPC Fund would have to address. As early as 1994, the IOPC 
Fund began reassessing its views about the difference between quantifiable and 
unquantifiable losses. The Seventh Intersessional Working Group reported that 
quantifiable losses meant the “reasonable costs of reinstatement of the damaged 
environment” and losses of profits if they were suffered by “fishermen, hoteliers 
and restaurateurs at seaside resorts.”56 However, it stated that any attempt to use 
environmental valuation methodologies to quantify damage to non-commercial 
natural resources would be “highly theoretical and speculative, and give 
inconsistent and arbitrary results.”57 The first priority was to return the affected area 
as near as possible to its baseline condition, but the general view was that there were 
“limits to what man could actually do in taking measures to improve on the natural 
process.”58  
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The 1996 IOPC Fund Claims Manual was the first manual to explain that, under 
1992 Fund Convention’s guidelines, reinstatement measures must be reasonable, 
proportionate to the results achieved, and have a reasonable prospect of a successful 
outcome.59 The problem is that a decision about remediation measures depends 
upon a multitude of factors, including predictions about how the affected area will 
respond well into the future.60 Clean-up is carried out by commercial businesses, 
and the feeling was that an open ended definition could invite unnecessarily gold 
plated reinstatement measures. Strangely, at least as of 2009, there appeared to have 
been virtually no successful claims for reinstatement of the environment.61 The 
sinking of the Erika in 1999 did prompt a claim from the union of salt producers 
that the incident had caused a “proliferation of harmful animals and plants.”62 That 
claim was rejected after a professor from the Laboratory of Marine Biology in 
Nantes concluded that the proliferation had been caused by heavy rains, and not by 
the oil contamination.  
The IOPC Fund has been averse to proposals that it should fund compensatory 
restoration measures aimed at developing alternative habitats to compensate for a 
loss of biodiversity. In 2001, the French supported the proposal to develop a third 
tier supplementary fund, in part because it could be used to fund compensatory 
restoration. 63  ITOPF, the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation 
Limited, opposed the proposal asserting that marine habitats recover very quickly 
on their own, and that introducing new species or habitats would only upset the 
“natural balance of existing ones.”64 Japan and Korea also opposed compensatory 
restoration as it imposed “higher costs for spurious or negligible benefits.”65 The 
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Fund Assembly decided not to put the question of compensatory restoration to a 
vote, even though it had the support of the majority. 
More recently, the 2016 Claims Manual says that measures will be considered to 
be reasonable if they satisfy the following conditions:66 
• The measures should be likely to accelerate significantly the natural 
process of recovery. 
• The measures should seek to prevent further damage as a result of the 
incident. 
• The measures should, as far as possible, not result in the degradation 
of other habitats or in adverse consequences for other natural or 
economic resources. 
• The measures should be technically feasible. 
• The costs of the measures should not be out of proportion to the extent 
and duration of the damage and the benefits likely to be achieved. 
The 2016 Claims Manual also speaks of the marine environment’s great potential 
for natural recovery but says that as it is:67 
… virtually impossible to bring a damaged site back to the same ecological 
state that would have existed had the oil spill not occurred, the aim of any 
reasonable measures of reinstatement should be to re-establish a biological 
community in which the organisms characteristic of that community at the 
time of the incident are present and functioning normally.  
Reinstatement should be applied to the existing habitat only, and therefore there is 
no requirement to create a new habitat to replace the one destroyed.68  
The IOPC Fund has also accepted that authorities should make use of expert post-
spill studies so long as they are “carried out with professionalism, scientific rigour, 
objectivity and balance.”69 Indeed, as early as 2001 the French had noted that post-
spill studies had moved on from the days of the Antonio Gramsci, and were “no 
longer really abstract”.70 The Fund itself would play an active role in making sure 
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that only “appropriate techniques and experts are employed.”71 Damage estimates 
must be calculated using a “recognized and reliable economic model” that must be 
“derived from actual data closely associated with the loss claimed and taken from 
the relevant sector and industry.”72 Methods like contingent valuation, which bases 
values on surveys of peoples’ willingness to pay to protect the area, are rejected 
because the CLC and Fund Conventions do not recognise or compensate lost 
recreational activities, cultural, non-use, or heritage values.73 
Liliana Monsalve, Head of the IOPC Fund Claims Department since 2014, has said 
that Net Environmental Benefit Analysis (“NEBA”) will be a factor in determining 
whether the costs of reinstatement of the environment are reasonable, although that 
term does not appear in the 2016 Claims Manual.74  Dr Ian White, Managing 
Director of ITOPF, has also written about NEBA in regards to decisions about the 
contingency planning for spill responses and the use of dispersants.75 NEBA works 
by calculating the expected fish and seabed mortality, both in the water column and 
on the shoreline, for a given volume of oil, then assessing the cost and effectiveness 
of various remediation options, including mechanical recovery, in-situ burning and 
chemical dispersion.76 The IOPC Fund can then choose to fund the best of the 
available options, or none of them if it determines that the marine environment will 
recover well enough on its own. 
The IOPC Fund’s Claims Manual (October 2016 edition) now explains the types 
of damage that the IOPC Fund will compensate.77 Under the heading, “What types 
of damage are covered”, it includes clean-up and preventive measures, property 
damage, consequential loss, pure economic loss, use of economic models, 
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environmental damage, and the use of advisers.78 Clean-up costs might include 
compensation for cleaning and rehabilitating wildlife, and preventive measures 
must include the parts of the response that completely prevent oil contamination 
from occurring, so long as there was a grave and imminent threat of pollution 
damage. Property damage includes the “reasonable costs of cleaning, repairing or 
replacing property that has been contaminated by oil.”79 Consequential losses refers 
to losses of earnings suffered by those whose property has been damaged, and 
specifically refers to fishermen whose nets have been contaminated by oil. Pure 
economic losses refers to those who lose earnings because their property has been 
damaged or their opportunities to carry out business activities have been 
diminished. For example, fishermen who lose access to fisheries, or restaurant or 
hotel owners who suffer loss of business through falling guest numbers. Preventive 
measures might include marketing campaigns aimed at restoring visitor numbers 
and averting business losses.   
 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
The CLC and Fund Conventions 1969/1971 were established on the basis that 
shipowners and cargo-owners agreed to share the costs of oil pollution damage. The 
Conventions’ authors did their best to anticipate how national courts might respond, 
but appeared to have been taken aback by the outcomes of cases like that of the Zoe 
Colocotroni, the Antonio Gramsci and the Patmos. The 1984 Protocols were 
therefore drafted to expand the limits of liability and compensation to account for 
the increasing size and cost of tanker spills, but at the same time, to refine the 
concept of pollution damage liability itself to exclude abstract and hypothetical 
methodologies.  
What is interesting is that, with the amendments, the IOPC Fund is now favouring 
methodologies not too far removed from those it criticized in the Antonio Gramsci 
and the Zoe Colocotroni incidents. The IOPC Fund now accepts that it will pay for 
scientific surveys aimed at quantifying environmental losses, but that does not mean 
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that it will pay for the costs of replacing those lost animals. Measures aimed at 
reinstating or accelerating environmental recovery must be reasonable, pragmatic 
and effective. The assumption is still that the environment will recover quickly 
enough on its own. The Director of the IOPC Fund supports Net Environmental 
Benefit Analysis, for example, because it demands that the costs and benefits of any 
human intervention must be justified in comparison with the option of taking no 
action.  
Similarly, the IOPC Fund accepts that it should pay for pay for losses of profits 
suffered by fishing and tourism operators, but only if the economic models used are 
credible and acceptable to its own experts. The Soviet Methodica was unacceptable, 
not just because it was arbitrary, but because it assumed that there was a linear 
relationship between economic losses and the quantity of oil spilled. This is not the 
case, and even small quantities of oil can cause massive amounts of damage. We 
should also recall that a major element in the Deepwater Horizon’s massive $40bn 
USD cost was generated because the penalties under the United States Clean Water 
Act were calculated according to the volume of oil spilled. The point of such fines 
is to punish and deter bad behaviour. Shipowners, insurers and oil importers have 
already agreed to accept strict liability for oil pollution damage, but only on 
reasonable terms. Monies must be spent on actual quantifiable losses, to ask for 
more would bring the Convention regime into disrepute and disarray.  
What implications does this have for New Zealand’s offshore petroleum marine 
pollution damage laws? The Ministry of Transport promised to increase the MPR 
Part 102 minimum insurance requirements for offshore installations from 
approximately $26m NZD to $600m NZD, but, apparently intended to limit the 
installation owner’s  financial obligations by scaling the requirement depending 
upon such things as the location of the activity and the potential impact of any spill. 
Navigatus Consulting were briefed to confine their discussion to direct damages, 
Rule 102.8(2)(b) was to be revoked, and henceforth operators would only be 
obliged to obtain financial security to meet their liability for the costs of dealing 
with pollution, for damage to property, and the costs of reasonable preventive 
measures and measures of reinstatement under the MTA. While the MOT’s 
Invitation to Comment promised that it would provide guidelines to clarify issues 




of liability and terminology, these had not been produced at the time this thesis was 
being produced.  
If New Zealand is to enforce liability for marine pollution damage onto the owners 
and operators of offshore oil rigs, drillships, pipelines and FPSOs for oil spills 
resulting from their activities, as that term was adopted from the 1992 CLC and 
Fund Conventions, then offshore oil and gas operators must be prepared to pay for 
a wide range of preventive and reinstatement measures, as well as losses of profit 
caused by contamination of oil. According to the latest Claims Manual, damage 
estimates must be calculated using recognized economic models. For example, 
Maritime NZ may use the NEBA system to assess the reasonableness of 
remediation options against the alternative of taking no action. Clean-up costs could 
involve cleaning up oiled wildlife and removing contaminated sand. Reinstatement 
measures might entail replanting mangroves, dredging up contaminated mud and 
sand, and stabilising dunes with grass planting. As well as that, local businesses 
will need to be compensated for their losses of profits, and supported with public 
information and marketing plans to restore consumer faith in the area and its 
products. Operators will therefore need to look beyond the bare costs of restoring 
well control or removing oil from the coastlines, and be aware of the wider costs to 
the local economy and marine environment. Furthermore, this holds true regardless 
of whatever the MOT may indicate with its financial assurance guidelines, as it 
must be remembered that all persons and entities falling within the MTA’s 
definition of an owner or person in charge of an offshore installation will be liable 
for the costs of pollution damage and preventive measures, as well as penalties in 
other statutory regimes, and under the tortious forms of liability that the New 
Zealand law still allows. 
 
  




9 Offshore Craft and the CLC and Fund Conventions 
 
Offshore oil and gas exploration and production activities make use of a multitude 
of differing craft and structures. The challenge for lawmakers is that, while the CLC 
and Fund Conventions have provided a well-funded and comprehensive oil 
pollution damage compensation regime for shipping, there is no equivalent 
international regime for offshore petroleum exploration and extraction activities. 
The CLC and Fund Conventions only apply to “ships” that are engaged in the 
carriage of bulk cargoes of hydrocarbons, and they are not intended to apply to 
pollution damage from the exploration and exploitation activities actually 
producing those cargoes. As Maria Gavouneli has said, the “multifacetedness [of 
offshore craft] creates a strange legal being that partakes of the qualities of an island, 
a mining site and a ship.”80 Many offshore craft float, they can be propelled from 
place to place, store large quantities of hydrocarbons, and, if they are involved in 
an accident, will cause as much or more oil pollution damage than any tanker. If the 
victims of such offshore oil spills can bring their case within the rubric of the CLC 
and Fund Conventions, then the IOPC Fund can be compelled to compensate their 
claims. It is necessary then to determine exactly when a particular vessel is or is not 
a “ship”.  
This chapter will address the issue by first undertaking a brief overview of the types 
of structures, craft and facilities that are used in the exploration, production, storage 
and distribution of oil and gas. It will explain how the IOPC Fund’s offshore craft 
policy was challenged by the Slops case, and how it has developed a “hybrid 
approach”, considering lists of types of craft in the context of the role they play in 
the “maritime transport chain”. The IOPC Funds views can then provide a 
perspective to assess the choices that New Zealand and EU lawmakers have made 
in defining and applying liability for damage from “marine structures” and 
“offshore craft” respectively.  
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9.1 Offshore Structures, Craft and Ships 
Just like the tanker industry, offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction 
activities have seen intense and rapid technological evolution since their primitive 
beginnings in the late 19th century. The Spindletop well, drilled in the late 1890s, 
operated in such shallow, near-shore waters that it was possible to reach the derrick 
with a simple wooden pier.81 By the 1940s, wooden piers had given way to mobile 
tenders servicing more distant prefabricated steel fixed platforms, allowing drill rigs 
to be built and deployed further from shore.82 Colonel Leon B. DeLong pioneered 
the jack-up rig in 1950, using a barge to drop leg-like caissons to the seabed, and 
then to jack the platform as high above the water was required. 83  Seabed 
installations reached their logical zenith with the 1988 Bullwinkle; a conventional 
fixed based platform of vast size.84 The Bullwinkle was able to drill in 1,354 feet of 
water, but with a pyramidal base of 400 by 480 feet, and comprising of 54,000 tons 
of steel, the configuration had reached its financial and physical limits. 
When fixed platforms become unfeasible due to water depth, cost, remoteness, or 
even because of political instability, then floating systems, such as drillships and 
semi-submersible platforms, provide a more cost effective alternative, and one that 
can be removed relatively quickly and easily when necessary. When Shell deployed 
the first semi-submersible, the Bluewater I, its Coast Guard application avoided the 
term “ship”, not necessarily because the Bluewater I was not thought of as a ship, 
but to sidestep entanglements with the maritime unions.85 Inevitably, the use of 
floating craft to carry out mining operations has blurred the line between shipping 
and mining law. 
Floating systems allow operations to take place in waters of a much greater depth. 
The current record was set off the coast of Uruguay by a drillship owned by Danish 
drilling contractor Maersk Drilling, which was able to drill at a water depth of 3.4 
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kms.86 By comparison, the Deepwater Horizon was operating in a mere 1.52 kms 
of water when a loss of well control caused it to explode and sink.87 Remembering 
that water pressure increases by approximately one atmosphere every ten meters, 
Maersk’s drilling gear had to survive 338 atmospheres, or 350 kilograms of force 
per square centimetre, equivalent to nearly 5000 psi. This is not to mention the 
additional pressures and high temperatures suffered when drilling kilometres deep 
into the seabed itself.  
The first purpose built drillship was the 1961 CUSS I, a barge with a derrick placed 
over a central access hole (moonpool).88 The derrick held up a birdcage structure 
with guide wires which stretched down to the ocean floor landing base. The drill 
string would then be run through a surface pipe to the point on the seabed where 
initial drilling or spudding would begin. Blowout preventers would then be lowered 
to the bottom, and the pipe cemented in place allowing hydrocarbons to be safely 
extracted. One of the major challenges for such floating systems, especially in 
stormy conditions with drill strings literally kilometres in length, is how to maintain 
a stable position over the spudded well. Later drill ships, like the 1962 Eureka, used 
rotatable bow and stern propellers to move the ship in any direction, but its rotatable 
propeller design wore out quickly and used far too much fuel. The first proper 
dynamically positioned drill ship was the Sedco 445.89 Its 11 fixed thrusters proved 
to be more durable and fuel efficient, and that configuration would become the 
drillship industry standard.   
Today there are three basic types of development systems: fixed, floating, and 
subsea.90 Fixed platforms now include compliant towers that are far more flexible 
and able to reach much greater depths than massive pyramid shaped derricks like 
the Bullwinkle. Their slender design minimises the base area, and they sway in the 
water just as a reed does, indeed an early compliant tower was called the Roseau, 
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the French for reed. 91  For harsher environments, there are reinforced concrete 
gravity platforms that, as the name suggests, are held in place by their sheer size 
and weight.  
It was Brazil’s state-owned oil company Petrobras that converted tankers into the 
first permanent Floating Production Systems (“FPS”) and Floating Production, 
Storage, and Offloading ships (“FPSOs”).92 FPSs and FPSOs are moored over the 
producing field, providing a loading point for shuttle tankers, eliminating the need 
for subsea pipelines or shore based infrastructure and shortening the average 
discovery-to-production-of-first-oil time span by years. Floating systems utilize a 
variety of floatation and mooring configurations, and, as well as FPSs and FPSOs, 
include tension leg platforms, spar platforms, floating drilling production storage 
and offloading systems (“FDPSO”) and floating liquefied natural gas systems 
(“FLNG”). The scale of some of these systems is epic, their steel wire or polyester 
rope moorings stretch thousands of feet down to a final length of chain links at the 
seabed, where each link in that chain can weigh up to 1,320 pounds and stand 3 feet 
in height.93 Once the well has been completed and is producing, then a subsea 
system can be built and connected by flowlines and risers to fixed, floating or 
landbased storage and offloading systems. This allows the rig or drillship to move 
to another site, and to allow safe production to continue regardless of water depth.  
The unintended result of all of this technological development is that the global 
offshore oil and gas industry now makes use of a vast array of craft, some of which 
may be part drill rig, part storage facility and part ship. When one is involved in an 
accident, and the responsible parties are insolvent or insufficiently insured, then the 
pressure is on to find some compensation option. In the absence of any other 
international liability and compensation regime, the victims of these accidents may 
be tempted to turn to the IOPC Fund and argue that the particular craft should be 
treated as a “ship”. How then has IOPC Fund developed its policy with respect to 
ships and offshore craft?  
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9.2 Defining Offshore Craft for the CLC and Fund Conventions 
The 1969 CLC Convention defined a ship as “any sea-going vessel and any 
seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo.”94 The 
1992 CLC Convention refined this definition somewhat to include “seaborne craft 
of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as 
cargo”, as long as the craft was actually carrying a cargo of oil, or if the damage 
was caused by oily residues from the previous voyage.95 The question is whether 
they could also apply to vessels used in the offshore petroleum production process 
itself. For example, the Conventions’ definition of a ship could apply to floating 
installations when they are used to store and/or to transport oil from production 
installation to shore, from ship-to-ship, or outside of the oil field’s normal area of 
operations. That more flexible definition could expand to include tankers that had 
been converted into FPSOs and floating storage and offloading units (“FSOs”), and 
this is exactly what happened in the Greek case of the Slops.96 
9.2.1 The Case of the Slops  
The Slops was a tanker converted into an FPSO for processing and separating the 
oily residues from other ships, presumably in order to satisfy MARPOL 73/78 
requirements at the Greek port of Piraeus.97 In 2009, a fire broke out on board the 
Slops. The subsequent explosion and discharges contaminated a 4000 m2 to 5000 
m2 area of the harbour. Two companies hired to undertake clean-up and preventive 
measures were never paid and brought a claim against the IOPC Fund under the 
1992 Fund Convention.  
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Since 1999, the IOPC Fund’s position has been that:98 
i. Offshore craft should be regarded as ‘ships’ under the 1992 Conventions 
only when they carry oil as cargo on a voyage to or from a port or 
terminal outside the oil field in which they normally operate. 
ii. Offshore craft would fall outside the scope of the 1992 Conventions 
when they leave an offshore oil field for operational reasons or simply 
to avoid bad weather. 
The IOPC Fund therefore refused to make payment as the Slops was permanently 
moored in Greek territorial waters, its engine was deactivated, its propeller 
removed, and it had not undertaken a voyage of any sort in five years.99 The Greek 
Court of Appeal agreed; the vessel must be undertaking a voyage at the time of the 
accident in order to be covered by the CLC and Fund Conventions.100 In the Greek 
Supreme Court, however, the majority decision was that it was sufficient:101 
… for these ships to be able to move self-propelled or under tow and to have 
the capacity to carry oil in bulk as cargo, without it being necessary, in order 
for the International Conventions to be applicable, for an accident to take place 
during the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo in the course of the voyage. 
That the Slops was “static” at the time of the accident was therefore of less 
importance than that fact that it could be moved if necessary.102 The case was 
referred back to the Court of Appeal and the IOPC Fund was ordered to pay 
€2,323,360 plus costs and interest.103 
The Slops decision forced the IOPC Fund to reconsider its 1999 position, especially 
regarding FPSOs and FSOs.104 The new position was informed by an opinion from 
Professor Vaughan Lowe of the University of Oxford, which focussed on whether 
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the craft was one capable of carrying oil on a voyage at sea, and was actually doing 
so.105 The IOPC Fund’s Director subsequently recommended that if a vessel was 
stationary for more than one year, then it could no longer be said to be carrying oil. 
At that point, the most that could be said is that the Member State where the vessel 
ended up had received oil counting towards that country’s IOPC Fund 
contributions. However, tankers often have to sail very slowly or to wait for 
significant periods of time before they can be offloaded, and the Director’s views 
threatened to disrupt maritime practices.106 
9.2.2 The Hybrid Approach and the Maritime Transport Chain 
In October of 2015, the 1992 Fund’s Administrative Council attempted to shine 
new light on the issue, accepting a Working Group’s recommended lists of vessels 
that either are or are not ships.107 The vessels that are ships include:108 
1. A seagoing vessel or seaborne craft constructed or adapted for the 
carriage of oil in bulk as cargo when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as 
cargo; 
2. A seagoing vessel or seaborne craft in ballast following a voyage 
carrying oil with residue of oil onboard; 
3. A craft carrying oil in bulk as cargo being towed (or temporarily at 
anchor for purposes incident to ordinary navigation or force majeure or 
distress); 
4. A ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes (ie an Oil Bulk Ore 
carrier (OBO)) when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and 
during any voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has 
no residues; 
5. Offshore craft that have their own independent motive power, steering 
equipment for seagoing navigation and seafarer onboard so as to be 
employed either as storage units or carriage of oil in bulk as cargo and 
that have the element of carriage of oil and undertaking a voyage;109 and 
6. Craft that are originally constructed or adapted (or capable of being 
operated) as vessels for carriage of oil, but later converted to FSOs, with 
capacity to navigate at sea under their owner power and steering retained 
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and with seafarer onboard and that have the element of carriage of oil 
and undertaking a voyage. 
The vessels that clearly do not fall within the list of CLC ships includes “non-
tanker” vessels such as cruise ships and fishing vessels, but crucially also 
includes:110 
3) Vessels or craft involved in: 
(a) Exploration, for example jack-up rigs or Mobile Offshore 
Production Units (a jack-up platform whether or not it carries oil, 
gas and water separation equipment); or 
(b) The production or processing of oil, for example Drill-ships, 
FDPSOs, and FPSOs, including separation of water and gas, and 
its management. 
Any “grey areas” are addressed on a case-by-case basis using a “hybrid approach” 
that involves compared the specific vessel with the listed examples, and considered 
the role the craft played in the “maritime transport chain”.111 “Maritime transport 
chain” is intended to supplant the term “voyage”. It will capture all maritime 
transport activities that pose a risk of pollution damage, including containment or 
storage, but will exclude production or processing activities. The chain begins:112  
…from the moment when the oil left the production, processing or treatment 
plant, whether land or off-shore, until it was delivered to its final destination, 
whilst noting that the transport chain only covered carriage by sea under the 
1992 CLC. 
The moment that the vessel is loaded and disconnects from the platform or mooring 
buoy, then it enters into the maritime transport chain. According to the IPOC Fund’s 
guidelines, this includes “ship-to-ship (STS) operations; periods of waiting; storage 
(excluding those without navigational capability), and anchoring pending final 
delivery to a port terminal installation or final consumer/recipient”.113 It does not 
matter if the final destination is unknown or if the vessel has to anchor and wait for 
an “extended period of time”, the “carrying vessel or seaborne craft nevertheless 
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remains within the maritime transport chain until the cargo is finally delivered.”114 
The exclusion of vessels “without navigational capacity” appears to be squarely 
aimed at permanently moored craft like the Slops.115 The guidelines also specify 
that exploration, drilling, production and processing activities are strictly outside of 
the scope of the compensation regime.  
The hybrid approach gives the IOPC Fund more flexibility in the matter of deciding 
whether or not a vessel is a ship. If the offshore craft carrying out production or 
processing of oil, whatever its type and configuration, is permanently anchored in 
place then it is not a ship. Ships are vessels if they are carrying bulk cargoes of oil 
on voyage, or the voyage immediately following delivery. The Slops would be 
excluded, not because it was not capable of being moved, but because it had not 
detached from its mooring and therefore had not initiated a new maritime transport 
chain. The hybrid approach therefore refines but does not deviate from the 1992 
CLC Convention’s fundamental requirement, that the vessel be engaged in a voyage 
carrying a bulk cargo of oil. The IMO would be asked to address the issue of oil 
pollution damage again after the Montara disaster, as Chapter Thirteen will explain. 
9.2.3 The Status of IOPC Fund’s Decisions in International Law 
Whether national courts will agree with the IOPC Fund’s specifications is another 
question. Under Article IX of the 1992 CLC Convention, the court of the affected 
Contracting State has exclusive competence to entertain “actions for compensation” 
and to “determine all matters relating to the apportionment and distribution” of any 
funds. Similarly, Article 7 of the 1992 Fund Convention guarantees that the 
competent court of the state affected by the oil spill has jurisdiction to determine 
the extent of the IOPC Fund’s liability. The Fund is only excluded from liability if 
certain exceptions apply, and is always liable for the costs of preventive 
measures.116 The Fund does have a right to be heard, and is not bound by any 
settlements or decisions that it has not been party to, but the Slops case proves that 
national courts are capable of contradicting the Fund’s most basic assumptions.   
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James Harrison’s review of the Slops case points out the ambiguity with which 
IOPC Fund decisions continue to be treated, and calls into question the legal status 
of international organizations’ decisions.117  He explains how the IOPC Fund’s 
Administrative Council, cognizant of its precarious position, asserted that it was 
“crucial for the proper and equitable functioning of the regime establishing these 
Conventions that they are implemented and applied uniformly in all States 
Parties”. 118  The Resolution reminded Contracting States of Article 235, the 
UNCLOS obligation to cooperate in the implementation of international maritime 
law, and of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.119 Article 
31 directs that treaties shall be interpreted in good faith, and that parties to any treaty 
will take into account any subsequent agreement or practice regarding interpretation 
of the treaty or its provisions. As it is a party to the 1992 Fund Convention, the 
IOPC Fund argues that States Parties will not choose interpretations that conflict 
with the Fund’s views.  
That point of view is debateable. Alarez has pointed out that institutional practices 
have more “inherent value” than the self-interested policies of individual states, and 
should have more persuasive effect. 120  However, Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention only requires states to take parties’ agreements “into account”. State 
sovereignty was integral to the original 1969 CLC Convention, which is why 
national courts have the final word in interpreting and apportioning costs. Harrison 
is right in pointing out that more cases like the Slops will arise in future, and this 
may raise litigation costs, but it remains the case that the IOPC Fund’s decisions 
are not binding precedents. 
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If the offshore craft causes pollution damage, and that damage does not fall under 
the CLC and Fund Conventions, then the issue will be deciding the owners and 
operators’ liability under the laws of the states where the damage occurred. The 
discussion will now review how offshore structures and craft are treated in New 
Zealand law, before turning to the EU’s Offshore Safety Directive.   
9.2.4 Marine Structures and Offshore Installations in New Zealand Law 
How then does the New Zealand law distinguish between ships and offshore craft? 
New Zealand currently has five oil and gas fields and six offshore installations, all 
off the Taranaki Coast.121 These are the Maui A and B Platforms, the Tui FPSO, 
the Maari wellhead platform and FPSO, the Kupe wellhead platform and Pohokura 
wellhead platform. New Zealand’s offshore petroleum production operations make 
use of fixed permanent platforms. The platforms at the Maui, Kupe and Pohokura 
fields pipe the hydrocarbons they produce to onshore production facilities for 
processing. In contrast, the Tui and Maari FPSOs receive hydrocarbons, then 
process, store and offload the produced products to tankers for transport to 
market.122 Permanent production facilities are less risky to operate than exploratory 
drilling operations because there is less chance of a loss of well control once a well 
has been completed, however, New Zealand’s policy of encouraging more intensive 
offshore drilling operations has seen exploratory drilling being undertaken by 
drillships. Other kinds of mobile offshore drilling units (“MODU”) will be 
deployed in future exploratory drilling operations at possibly even great depths.123 
These ships and ship like structures could be captured by international conventions 
like the CLC and Fund Conventions, MARPOL 73/78, the Convention on Limited 
Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 and the LLMC and the International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation. It becomes 
very important then to discern how New Zealand law distinguishes between CLC 
ships, regular ships, and the floating ship-like installations that are used in offshore 
petroleum operations.  
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The MTA defines a New Zealand ship with reference to the Ship Registration Act 
1992.124 According to both Acts, a ship means “every description of boat or craft 
used in navigation, whether or not it has any means of propulsion”.125 That would 
mean that a ship included floating craft and structures that lacked the means of 
propulsion, for example, barges or even decommissioned tankers like the Slops. 
However, Part 25 of the MTA agrees with the 1992 CLC Convention, defining a 
“CLC ship” as:126 
(a) any ship carrying oil in bulk as cargo; or 
(b) any ship on a voyage immediately following a voyage where that ship was 
carrying oil in bulk as cargo (unless it is proved where that ship was 
carrying oil in bulk as cargo (unless it is provide that it has no residues of 
the carriage of oil in bulk aboard), — 
This means that so long as the ship is carrying oil in bulk as cargo on a voyage, then 
the craft will be defined as a CLC ship, and the normal rules of the 1992 CLC 
Convention will apply. If an accident befalls the ship, then it will be possible to 
lodge a claim for compensation with the IOPC Fund.  
Under Part 26A of the MTA, “Civil liability for pollution of marine environment 
from marine structures”, a marine structure is defined as “an offshore installation, 
a pipeline, or any facility, site structure, or thing used to transfer a harmful 
substance to or from a ship, or an offshore installation.”127 “Offshore installation” 
means “any artificial structure (including a floating structure other than a ship) used 
or intended to be used in or on, or anchored or attached to, the seabed for the purpose 
of the exploration for, or the exploitation or associated processing of, any mineral; 
but does not include a pipeline”.128 However, a “regulated offshore installation” is 
any offshore installation in New Zealand’s continental waters, and that does include 
connected pipelines. 129  Finally, the Act refers to the term “marine protection 
product”, which means the parts of a ship, offshore installation or pipeline, that are 
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used to prevent, limit or control the escape or discharge of harmful substances, and 
includes dispersants and emulsifiers.130 
Offshore craft, such as drillships and FPSOs, can easily undertake navigation, and 
can carry bulk cargoes of oil, and are used or intended to be used to explore for and 
exploit and process seabed minerals. Employing the IOPC Fund’s logic, the vessel 
should be categorised as a ship if it is taking part in a new maritime transport chain. 
That is, if a vessel is anchored or attached to the seabed for the purpose of oil 
exploration and extraction activities, then it is no longer a ship, but becomes an 
offshore installation. The moment the vessel breaks that connection to the seabed, 
weighs anchor and commences to navigate, whether under its own power or under 
tow, then it becomes a ship. If that ship happens to be carrying bulk quantities of 
oil on a voyage, then it commences to form part of a maritime transport chain, and 
if that voyage ends in disaster, then and only then, will the victims be able to apply 
for compensation according to the rules of the CLC and Fund Conventions. 
If the craft is no longer being used, or is no longer anchored or attached to the seabed 
but is not undertaking a voyage that fits the definition of a maritime transport chain, 
then is the owner liable for any pollution damage? The answer seems to be found 
by looking at the term “marine operation”. Marine operation is defined in Part 18, 
section 222, and means “any operations or operation for, or connected with the 
exploration for, or the exploitation or associated processing of, any mineral in the 
sea or the seabed.” That could capture the entire period of time in which the craft is 
in New Zealand waters. However, the Marine Protection Rules Part 102 specifies 
that it is the owners of offshore installations that must provide insurance. It would 
be up to the Director of Maritime NZ to ensure that the regulated offshore 
installation’s certificate of insurance remained current for the entire time that the 
offshore installation posed any threat to New Zealand’s marine environment, from 
the moment it entered New Zealand waters, to the moment that it left.  
It appears that there are no fundamental disagreements between the New Zealand 
law and the IOPC Fund’s definition of offshore craft. The MTA adopts the CLC 
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Convention’s definition of ship verbatim, and draws a fairly clear distinction 
between vessels and craft involved in the carriage of oil, and those offshore 
installations used for the exploration and exploitation or processing of minerals 
from the sea or seabed. This could include a multitude of possible structures and 
craft, whether they are fixed or floating. Any attempt to make a claim to the IOPC 
Fund for damage caused by an offshore craft in New Zealand must take account of 
the IOPC Fund’s hybrid approach and that the “maritime transport chain”, 
otherwise the owner’s liability and insurance requirements will only be as specified 
under domestic legislation, such as the MTA.   
 
9.3 Concluding Remarks 
Large offshore petroleum resources are a source of immense profit, and the 
challenges of operating in deep and often storm-ridden waters have stimulated the 
development of a wide variety of fixed, floating and subsea development systems. 
The Slops case in particular demonstrated how blurred the line between ships and 
offshore craft had become. The IOPC Fund’s hybrid approach, with its prescriptive 
lists and maritime transport chain concept, provides for a more flexible 
classification system, but it does not deviate significantly from the 1992 CLC 
Convention’s basic definition of ship, as a vessel which is engaged in voyage, 
carrying bulk cargoes of oil, or which has just done so. Oil and gas exploration and 
production activities will be excluded, but the chain will not arbitrarily exclude 
claims merely because the particularly voyage was delayed, or if the cargo was in 
transit from ship-to-ship. The interpretation was crafted to eliminate the confusion 
that led to cases like the Slops, but national courts still have the competence to 
decide when and if the CLC and Fund Conventions will apply. It remains to be seen 
how they will greet the IOPC Fund’s non-binding resolutions and guidelines.  
The New Zealand and European marine pollution and environmental liability laws 
have a similar intent. The objective is to distinguish offshore installations and 
operations from CLC ships, while ensuring that the persons responsible for their 
safe maintenance and operation will be held accountable for any damage they cause. 
Both seem to distinguish a craft from a ship depending upon whether it is actually 




engaged in offshore petroleum exploration and production activities. There may 
still be some ambiguity in that those domestic laws could be better crafted to mesh 
with the CLC and Fund Conventions’ definitions, however, and it may be that 
national courts will continue to push the IOPC Fund to accept claims that it would 
rather deny.  
So long as there is no international civil liability and compensation regime for the 
offshore oil and gas industry, domestic law makers and the IOPC Fund will struggle 
to allocate responsibility for offshore oil pollution damage between them. Why is 
this the case? To understand, it is necessary to look in more detail at the 
development of international law regarding the offshore oil and gas industry, and 
that is the subject of chapter 13 below.  




10 The Road to the EU’s Environmental Liability Directive 
Like New Zealand, and many other nations around the world, the Deepwater 
Horizon has challenged the European Union (“EU”) to question its ability to cope 
with major offshore oil well disasters. The EU had to reconsider how its Member 
States were imposing liability for oil pollution damage caused by offshore 
petroleum exploration and extraction activities in the absence of an international 
offshore petroleum industry liability and fund convention.  
Just like New Zealand, the EU has chosen to expand an existing overarching legal 
liability framework to provide a neat solution to a complex problem. While New 
Zealand created its offshore marine pollution damage liability regime using 
definition of pollution damage and preventive measures from the CLC and Fund 
Conventions, the EU worked with its own Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage 
(“ELD” ).1  Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations 
(“OSD”) requires the EU’s Member States to harmonize their offshore oil and gas 
safety regulations, and it amended the ELD so that offshore oil and gas operators 
would now be held strictly liable for any environmental damage they caused in 
marine waters.2  
This thesis asks what legal liability do the operators of offshore oil and gas 
exploration and extraction activities in EU’s coastal and marine waters face under 
the ELD and OSD? To answer that question, it is necessary to first consider how 
the ELD came into existence and how that process shaped its final form as a public 
law directive. This chapter will therefore explain how the EU’s constitutional 
principles, and its previous efforts at creating industry specific liability laws, shaped 
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the decision to shift from a harmonized civil liability regime that would have 
addressed all the possible damage caused by industrial activities, to a much 
narrower public law liability system. The final outcome would give maximum 
discretion to the individual Member State to determine how that law should be 
shaped and implemented, but at the risk that the overall liability regime would 
become fragmented and that legitimate claims might go unremedied.  
Throughout this discussion, the thesis will look for parallels between the ELD and 
OSD and the CLC and Fund Conventions. In particular, it will look for similarities 
between how the two regimes define, allocate and financially secure liability for 
environmental damage. On a second level, it will consider how the EU Member 
States are also able to use their discretion to shape the law to suit their local 
conditions, and how that compares with New Zealand’s experience in shaping the 
CLC and Fund Conventions to create its own offshore petroleum liability regime. 
The intention is not just to explain the specifics of EU offshore oil and gas 
operators’ liabilities, but to ask what practical considerations will limit other 
country’s attempts to mould international law to suit domestic legal liability issues.  
 
10.1 Conferral of Competences, Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
The European Commission (“EU Commission”) is the EU’s executive branch, and 
it has the power to propose, enact and enforce legislation that will apply to all 
Member States. 3  Yet its legislative powers are limited by the constitutional 
principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.4 As Article 5(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) puts it: 
… the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred 
upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out 
therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain 
with the Member States. 
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Subsidiarity means that the EU will only intervene where necessary to achieve a 
particular objective, while proportionality means that any intervention will be 
limited to the extent necessary to achieve that objective. As a previous Protocol to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam explains:5  
The form of [EU] action shall be as simple as possible, consistent with 
satisfactory achievement of the objective of the measure and the need for 
effective enforcement. The [EU] shall legislate only to the extent necessary. 
Other things being equal, directives should be preferred to regulations and 
framework directives to detailed measures. Directives as provided for in 
Article [288] TFEU, while binding upon each Member State to which they are 
addressed as to the result to be achieved, shall leave to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods.6 
Directives are preferred to regulations because they give each Member State 
discretion to shape the EU law to suit its suit its own local conditions. Regulations, 
on the other hand, immediately form part of the legal system of all Member States, 
and they are binding in their entirety.7 This had implications for the choice to make 
the ELD a directive, as an Environmental Liability Regulation would have entailed 
instantly reshaping Member States’ environmental protections in a form chosen by 
the EU Commission, and that would have been far too intrusive to have been 
acceptable to the Member States. The ELD was not the first time that the EU 
attempted to create an environmental damage liability directive, however, and 
earlier attempts at regulating hazardous waste industries would help to shape the 
debate around the ELD and the choice of form and style of legislation.8  
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10.2 Regulating Environmental Damage: The Seveso and Waste Directives 
The toxic chemical explosion at Seveso, Italy, in 1976, and the chemical spill at a 
Sandoz storehouse in Switzerland, which devastated the River Rhine in 1986, had 
prompted the EU to address prevention and liability for pollution damage with the 
Seveso and the Waste Directives.9 The Seveso Directive would be relevant to later 
efforts to pass the OSD after the Deepwater Horizon, because the amended Seveso 
II Directive specifically excludes “the offshore exploration and exploitation of 
minerals, including hydrocarbons”, as does its complementary Directive 
2006/21/EC on the management of waste from extractive industries.10 Furthermore, 
even though the Waste Directives would fail to pass, they drew draw heavily from 
the model of the CLC and Fund Conventions in creating a blueprint for the 1993 
Green Paper to follow.  
The Seveso Directive and its subsequent iterations did provide a template for the 
OSD, however, so it is worth reviewing. Like the original Directive, Seveso II aims 
to prevent and limit the consequences of major chemical industry accidents.11 
Operators must produce a safety report providing details of site’s layout, the 
whereabouts of any dangerous chemicals, specific risk factors and any accident 
contingency systems.12 The operator must set up a major accident prevention policy 
“designed to guarantee a high level of protection for man and the environment by 
appropriate means, structures and management systems.” 13  It must inform the 
competent authorities of the circumstances of any accident, the substances 
involved, and any emergency measures they have taken. 14  The Directive also 
detailed rules for inspections by competent authorities.15   
                                                 
9 Council Directive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial 
activities [1982] OJ L 230/1; Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances [1996] OJ L 10/13. 
10 Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving 
dangerous substances [1996] OJ L 10/13, art. 4(e); Directive 2006/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the management of waste from extractive 
industries and amending Directive 2004/35/EC - Statement by the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission, Recital (9). 
11 Council Directive 96/82/EC, Recital at [1]. 
12 Recital at [17], art. 8(2)(a) and art. 9. 
13 Council Directive 96/82/EC, art. 7 and 14. 
14 Council Directive 96/82/EC, Recital at [23]. 
15 Council Directive 96/82/EC, art. 18. 




While the first two Seveso Directives established basic accident reporting and 
contingency planning standards, neither addressed operator liability.16 In 1984, the 
EC Commission proposed that the Council determine the conditions for 
implementing civil liability and insurance for damage caused by waste. The 1989 
“Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage caused by Waste” 
would have held waste producers strictly liable for harm to people, damage to 
property, and injury to the environment.17 The Waste Directive proposal argued that 
that failure to harmonize Member States’ environmental damage laws could be 
harmful to the EC’s internal market, as it would undermine competition and could 
lead to a regulatory race-to-the-bottom. Specifically, the proposal said that:18 
The occurrence of differences among national laws regarding the designation 
of the person liable (producer, holder) and the absence of a concerted 
development of notions like the damage and injury to the environment covered 
by liability, the causal relationship, the limitations of liability, etc, would lead 
to unequal conditions for competition among Member States and thus to 
artificial currents of investments and of wastes to those countries where 
conditions are least stringent for the economic operators and most 
disadvantageous to the victim. This is contrary to the philosophy of the Single 
European Act that foresees a high level of protection.  
Strict liability would also have a deterrent function, “as if the polluter knew with 
certianty [sic] that he would have to pay the cost, he would be encouraged to take 
action to minimize risks as soon as possible.”19 It cited examples of strict liability 
regimes in the nuclear industry and the CLC and Fund Conventions 1969/71, and 
in the national laws of Germany, Belgium and France.20 Both proposals would have 
included “injury to the environment” as well as physical injury or death and damage 
to property, but the Amended Proposal attempted to follow the example of the 
United States’ CERCLA legislation in allowing for claims for “any significant 
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17 Commission of the European Communities Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for 
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18 At 1. 
19 At 1. 
20 At 2. 




physical, chemical or biological deterioration of the environment”.21  While the 
original proposal accepted that “market conditions at present are such that it is not 
opportune to establish a mandatory system of insurance”, the Amended Proposal 
demanded that the “liability of the producer and eliminator of waste must be 
covered by insurance or other financial security”. 22  The Council was further 
required to consider the feasibility of establishing a European environmental 
damage compensation fund to provide for circumstances where the liable party 
could not pay for full compensation or where no liable person could be identified.23 
The Waste Directive would, therefore, have closely followed the CLC and Fund 
Convention model, but the Amended Proposal was ultimately rejected. 
Sandra Cassotta explains that the refusal to adopt either Waste Directive proposal 
may have been because of three “political barriers”.24 First, there was little interest 
from Member States, and some, like the United Kingdom, were quick to argue that 
their domestic legal protections were sufficient. Second, the Commission failed to 
satisfy the subsidiarity requirement, that the matter could only be dealt with at the 
EU level. Finally, there was vigorous opposition from “non-official actors”, that is, 
the interest groups representing the producers and eliminators of waste.25 Member 
States had few reasons to accept the economic damage that might accompany such 
a regime, and the EU Commission would be forced to reconsider its approach.  
10.3 The 1993 Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage 
The subsequent Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage replicated the 
Waste Directives in calling for a comprehensive strict civil liability regime that 
encompassed traditional damages and a wide array of environmental damages, and 
in backing up that liability with mandatory insurance and an EU-wide compensation 
                                                 
21 Article 2(1)(c)-(d; Commission of the European Communities Amended Proposal for a Council 
Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste COM(91) 219 final - SYN 217, OJ C 
192/06, art. 2(1)(c)-(d). 
22 The Amended Proposal displays both versions side-by-side, at 9. 
23 Article 11. 
24 Sandra Cassotta Environmental Damage and Liability Problems in a Multilevel Context: The Case 
of the Environmental Liability Directive (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2012) at 58–
60. 
25 At 135, Cassotta lists these non-official actors opposed to the proposed directive as including the 
Union of Industries and Employees Confederations of Europe and the European Chemical Industry 
Council amongst others. 




fund.26 Like the Waste Directives, the Green Paper also faced fierce opposition 
especially from the most heavily industrialized nations.27  
Chris Clarke explains that issues were immediately complicated by the circulation 
of a North American lawyer’s unpublished early draft in 1992, as it contained 
definitions derived from United States’ common law, necessitating comparison 
with European legal concepts.28 For example, in the United States, “civil” means 
“not criminal”, so refers to both private and public law, but in European civil code 
countries, “civil” refers only to private actions. Similarly difficulties arose around 
the term “liability”, which has different legal and financial implications depending 
upon the translation. The Green Paper concluded that civil liability meant private 
law compensation and should be distinguished from “obligations arising under 
public law, such as criminal liability and administrative liability.”29  
The problem for the EU, and the point which ultimately justified its interference in  
Member States’ environmental laws, was that the current liability laws only 
concerned themselves with damage to human life and property and “scarcely 
addressed” damage to the environment itself.30 The EU argued that a “Community-
wide system of civil liability for environmental damage would draw on a basic and 
universal principle of civil law, the concept that a person should rectify damage that 
he causes.”31 However, the Green Paper argued that liability regimes work best 
when they focus upon specific incidents involving clearly identified tortfeasors.32  
 
 
                                                 
26 Commission of the European Communities Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and Parliament and the Economic Social Committee: Green Paper on Remedying Environmental 
Damage (“Green Paper”) (Brussels, 14 May 1993) COM(93) 47 final. 
27 Chris Clarke “The Proposed EC Liability Directive: Half-Way Through Co-Decision” (2003) 12 
RECIEL 254 at 256. 
28 At 256. 
29 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper, above n 26, at 6. 
30 At 17. 
31 At 4. 
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The Green Paper used the following figure to illustrate the point:33 
Figure 1: Applicability of Civil Liability in Instances of Environmental 
Damage 
• Measurable and 
immediate damage 
→ Unbounded or latent damage 
• Fine act or incident → Cumulative acts or incidents 
• Identifiable liable parties → Unidentifiable liable parties 
• Liability (fault based or 
strict) 
→ No basis for liability 
• Causal link established → No causal link determinable 
• Party with legal interest 
who can bring action 
→ No party with legal interest to 
bring action 
   
Civil action possible 
 




The Commission concluded that civil liability regimes work best when the damage 
is measurable, immediate and caused by a single incident, when damage is clearly 
caused by an identifiable liable person or persons, and when the damaged party has 
standing to bring an action. Conversely, it may be difficult to apply strict or fault-
based liability to situations where multiple unidentified and unidentifiable polluters 
contribute small and diffuse amounts of pollution, with unknown effects, over a 
wide area impacting the environment and property owners alike. In such cases, the 
Green Paper recommended consideration should be given to “other mechanisms 
(compensation systems) to ensure that environmental restoration will take place.”34  
The Green Paper recognised that it was of “fundamental importance” to find robust 
definitions of environmental damage, yet apart from identifying the key 
components of a civil liability regime, it contributed little to that issue.35 It simply 
asked whether to include damage to cultural heritage along with damage to plant 
and animal life, and it offered some consideration of the point when sustainable use 
became unsustainable abuse. Much would depend upon how the environment was 
valued, and whether remedial measures should aim to restore the environment to a 
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pristine condition, or merely to the prevailing condition as it was at the time of the 
accident.36  
It did warn that uncertain and open ended liability laws with mandatory insurance 
requirements could make operators “captive to high premium demands from 
insurers”, and could provoke a European insurance crisis similar to the one which 
afflicted the United States after the CERCLA Superfund Act introduced an era of 
aggressive prosecution of a broad range of “potentially responsible parties” and 
property owners in the 1980s.37 The Green Paper preferred to take the approach of 
the 1993 Lugano Convention that, like the CLC and Fund Conventions, held 
operators strictly liable for the costs of preventive measures, but that also included 
claims for loss of life or personal injury, damage to property, cultural heritage and 
for damage to “characteristic aspects of the landscape”.38 
The Green Paper sought a rational solution to restoring the environment after both 
spectacular one off disasters and more pervasive diffuse industrial contamination. 
It acknowledged that civil liability regimes work best when dealing with specific 
incidents of harm caused by identifiable responsible parties, and that strict liability 
would both ease the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden and would have beneficial 
deterrent effects. Mandatory insurance provisions might prove challenging, and 
there was still a need to consider the practicalities of establishing an industry-fed 
compensation fund. The danger was that the Green Paper would be rejected 
outright, especially considering that it largely replicated the earlier Waste Directive 
proposals, but it was always intended to be a discussion paper and there was room 
to negotiate its foundation principles. 
 
10.4 The White Paper on Environmental Liability 
By 1994, the European Parliament resolved that the issues raised by the Green Paper 
demanded a firm proposal for a directive on civil liability for environmental 
                                                 
36 At 11. 
37 At 19; Annex II at 3-4. 
38 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment 
(Lugano Convention), CETS No 150 (opened for signature 21 June 1993, not in force), art. 2. 




damage.39 However, while the Green Paper had proposed a broad tort-like civil 
liability regime, the EU Commission’s “White Paper on Environmental Liability” 
(“White Paper”) opted for a new public law approach.40 The shift was based on two 
key policy papers; the 1996 CMS Cameron McKenna “Study of Civil Liability 
Systems for Remedying Environmental Damage” (“McKenna report”) and its 2001 
follow-up by Chris Clarke, the “Update Comparative Legal Study” (“Clarke 
report”).41  
The McKenna report surveyed 19 different countries, finding that few provided for 
civil type damages compensation for “pure ecological damage”, preferring to use 
regulatory enforcement mechanisms.42 Meanwhile, the Clarke report commented 
that any EC initiative should be based on existing Member State laws, and would 
have to avoid creating new rights and systems that overlapped with those long 
established traditions. 43  The White Paper therefore recommended a two-tiered 
administrative law approach. 44  Member States would create a first tier of 
enforcement by appointing environmental damage regulatory bodies known as 
competent authorities. The second tier would be made up of public interest groups 
and certain qualifying individuals, but their chief role would be to observe and 
report environmental accidents, and to request that the competent authority take 
action. Public participation and access to justice are important principles in the EU, 
and the Århus Convention guarantees that public have the right to apply for judicial 
review of administrative decisions, but this was a long way from the general right 
to bring claims for compensation for property, personal and environmental damage 
that the Green Paper had proposed.45   
                                                 
39 European Parliament Resolution on Preventing and Remedying Environmental Damage [1994] OJ 
C128/165. 
40  Commission of the European Communities White Paper on Environmental Liability (“White 
Paper”) (COM(2000) 66 final, 9 February, 2000, European Commission,). 
41 CMS Cameron McKenna Study of Civil Liability Systems for Remedying Environmental Damage 
(1996); Chris Clarke Update Comparative Legal Study (Study Contract No 201919/ MAR/B3) 
(2001). 
42 Mckenna, at 12. 
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45  UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
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Although it was based on recommendations in the McKenna and Clarke reports, the 
White Paper itself does not explain why the decision was made to change from 
general tort-like civil liability to a public law environmental damage regime. Faure 
says that the lack of explanation was because the EU Commission believed that 
there was no question that a liability regime was warranted, the only question was 
whether it should be implemented at the EU level.46 The White Paper did briefly 
consider other options, such as ratifying the Lugano Convention, adopting a 
transboundary damage directive, or else designing directives aimed at individual 
sectors continuing to address environmental damage on a sectoral basis.47 Each of 
those proposals had its downsides. The Lugano Convention was opposed by 
industry and Member States alike for being too broad, too uncertain in its legal 
effects and too vague in its definitions, and it still has never been ratified.48 The 
transboundary approach would have left the policing of most environmental 
damage to the individual Member State, but would have led to inconsistencies 
between Member States. 49  The Waste Directive proposals had already 
demonstrated the weaknesses of the sectoral approach, and it must have seemed to 
be more practical to address damage caused by all sectors, at the same time, in a 
single instrument.   
Gerd Winter, Jan Jans, Richard Macrory and Ludwig Krämer explain that the 
reason the White Paper’s United States’ styled administrative law model was most 
acceptable was because it left each country’s traditional tort law systems 
untouched.50  They describe the move as “surprising”, but necessary to respect 
individual Member State’s deeply held legal traditions.51 Many of the ELD’s key 
provisions were therefore left deliberately vague so that the Member State could 
make its own decisions about the “choice of form and methods”.52 It was this 
concession to Member State sovereignty that would be key to the ELD’s eventual 
success. 
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EU Commission’s 2015 report on the development of “financial security, 
compensation, third-party liability and criminal liability for offshore accidents”, 
provides another explanation. 53  The ELD was based on a “public approach” 
because “the affected party is not a concrete natural or legal person but society as a 
whole due to the public and universal character of the effects of any damage to 
shared natural resources.”54 The ELD’s administrative law approach is therefore 
justified by the parens patriae doctrine. As the United States court said in the Zoe 
Colocotroni case, it is the “special status of the body politic vis-a-vis its citizens 
[which] gives rise to a right to seek redress on behalf of the collective 
community”.55 As for traditional damages, “no reference is made to traditional 
kinds of damage (personal injury and damage to property), since this is assumed to 
be covered by civil liability actions, which are widely used in the Member States.”56  
The EU Commission’s strongest subsidiarity argument was to say that differences 
in environmental laws could create anti-competitive effects between Member 
States, leading to a regulatory a race-to-the-bottom. 57  Since one of the EU’s 
fundamental objectives is to protect the economic integrity of its internal market, 
framing the debate in this context is quite usual before any legislative intervention.58 
Even so, the White Paper acknowledged that the differences between national laws 
had hitherto had “no significant negative impact”, and that “the available evidence 
suggests that they have not led to any significant competitiveness problems”.59 This 
                                                 
53  Commission of the European Communities Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on liability, compensation and financial security for offshore oil and 
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pursuant to Article 39 of Directive 2013/30/EU COM(2015) 422 final at 7; The 2014 report was 
required by Article 39 of Directive 2013/30/ EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC 
[2013] OJ L 178/66. 
54 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission on liability, compensation 
and financial security for offshore oil and gas operation, at 3. 
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environmental damage” (COM(2002) 17 final - 2002/0021(COD)) at [1.6]. 
57 European Commission White Paper, above n 40, at 16. 
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European Union (2012) OJ C 326/1, art. 3 TEU and art. 3 TFEU. 
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concession has led to scepticism about the overall need for the ELD from 
academics, industry and unions.60 For example, Gerhard Roller suggests that the 
preventive effects of civil liability laws are difficult to estimate and may have been 
overestimated.61 Faure and De Smedt have said that the ELD has failed to delivery 
any significant benefits in this respect, and the evidence for any race-to-the-bottom 
effect is ambiguous at best.62  
Still, the White Paper argued that the polluter pays principle would perform an 
important deterrent function and that:63 
If polluters have to pay for damage caused, they will cut back pollution up to 
the point where the marginal cost of abatement exceeds the compensation 
avoided. Thus, environmental liability results in prevention of damage and 
internalisation of environmental costs. Liability may also lead to the 
application of more precaution, resulting in avoidance of risk and damage and 
may encourage investment in R & D for improving knowledge and 
technologies. 
The concept of “marginal cost of abatement” stems from work by Calabresi and 
Malamed, in later work by Shavell, and more recently by Bergkamp and Cassotta.64 
The proposition is that unlimited liability is redundant, as the polluter will only take 
enough care to prevent losses up to the limit of their assets. This also has 
implications for the choice between strict and fault based liability, as Bergkamp 
explains:65 
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From a deterrence efficiency viewpoint, there is no difference between strict 
and fault liability; under either regime, polluters will invest in pollution 
prevention if doing so is cheaper than paying damage awards, and will 
continue to invest in prevention up to the point where one Euro spent on 
prevention generates one Euro in prevented damage. Under neither strict nor 
fault liability do polluters invest in prevention if doing so cost more than it 
saves. 
Bergkamp argues that strict liability is actually inefficient in that it unnecessarily 
deters useful if risky industrial activities. Bergkamp even points to one empirical 
study by Alberini and Austin indicating that strict liability could result in more spills 
than fault based liability.66 His arguments would be picked up by the European 
Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise to support the point that 
that strict liability weighed too heavily on its members, and that the regime should 
only be triggered in cases of serious negligence.67  
As for the question of mandatory insurance, the White Paper’s authors were aware 
of the tactics that companies in the United States had used to avoid their CERCLA 
liabilities, including transferring their most hazardous activities to undercapitalized 
subsidiaries. 68  Even so, it recommended a “cautious approach” to mandatory 
insurance, saying that “the EC Regime should not impose an obligation to have 
financial security”. 69  Operators’ financial security requirements would be 
voluntary, and there would be no EU superfund.  
 
10.5 Concluding remarks 
What does this discussion reveal given its implications for how the EU has chosen 
to determine the offshore petroleum industry’s liability for environmental damage?  
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For one thing, the failure of the Waste Directives taught the EU Commission the 
futility of addressing environmental damage liability one sector at a time, without 
first obtaining the unequivocal support of all Member States. So, instead of seeking 
to impose strict liability for all types of environmental and traditional damages, and 
including liability for diffuse sources of harm and retrospective liability for historic 
toxic contamination, and giving EU citizens broad standing to pursue polluters, the 
ELD would become a public law system, which focussed on harm to the 
environment itself, leaving traditional damages claims to the Member States own 
legal systems. Diffuse sources of harm and historic damage would still be included, 
but only if there was a clear causal connection to the harm complained of and that 
it could be linked to a specific operator.  
These political compromises may have been necessary, but they also illustrate the 
EU’s constitutional limitations. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
require that the EU restrict its interference with Member States’ laws to the extent 
that is necessary to fulfil a given objective. In the case of the ELD, Member States 
already had well developed tort and property damage laws that their citizens could 
appeal to for personal compensation; what was missing was a harmonized system 
of liability laws that could protect the environment itself. It made sense then that 
the ELD should become a public law liability regime, as the state’s own competent 
authorities would have the best claim to represent the species, habitats, water and 
land that fell outside of those personal and private property protections. This also 
explains why the ELD was passed as a directive and not a regulation, as Member 
States should be given that discretion to decide how to shape the liability law to suit 
their own particular economic and environmental needs. It would also have 
consequences for later questions about the adequacy of the ELD’s mandatory 
insurance requirements, and whether the EU Member States had an appetite for an 
EU-wide environmental damage compensation fund. 
To see how that discretion would be employed, we must now turn to the specifics 
of the Environmental Liability Directive, explaining how it has been implemented 
at the Member State level. Only then can the discussion aim at the implications that 
this has had for the offshore oil and gas industry. 





11 The Environmental Liability Directive 
The Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage may have been inspired 
by the Waste Directives, and by other environmental damage regimes to create a 
tort-like strict liability regime for a wide range of environmental and property 
damage claims. However, as the previous chapter explained, those early ambitions 
morphed into a determination to create a public law liability regime that would 
focus only on damage to the environment itself, and which would leave many of 
the questions of how that liability was implemented to the Member States. Even 
though the ELD was modelled in part on the CLC and Fund Conventions, it would 
exclude the kinds of claims for traditional damages that the shipping conventions 
specifically addressed, insurance would not be mandatory, and it would not provide 
for an EU-wide environmental damage compensation fund. Yet despite these 
differences, the two regimes were based on a determination to make polluters pay, 
so that the affected communities did not have to. The question then is, would the 
two regimes result in outcomes that were qualitatively any different, particularly on 
the key issues of quantifying and securing claims for the costs of preventing and 
remediating environmental damage?  
To answer that question, this chapter will examine the ELD’s provisions in some 
detail. It will ask how liability is allocated, which operators will be held liable, how 
environmental damage is defined, and it will review some of the debate about what 
financial security arrangements, if any, would be required. This will tell us much, 
not only about the implications that expanded ELD liability would have for offshore 
oil and gas operator, but also as to what practical considerations need to go into 
creating an environmental damage liability regime. In turn, this will contribute to 
the thesis’ final topic for discussion, the possibility of creating an international 
petroleum industry civil liability and fund convention.   
 






11.1 A Two-Tiered Public Law System 
As the previous chapter explained, the ELD could have taken the form of a broad 
civil liability regime, were it not that the Member States were unwilling to expose 
nationally important industries to costly and unpredictable environmental and 
property damage claims from a wide range of highly motivated private individuals. 
Instead, the White Paper recommended the creation of a two-tiered public law 
approach. In what Armelle Gouritin has called evidence of an endorsement of the 
public trust doctrine, the ELD requires that Member States designate competent 
authorities as the first tier of enforcement, empowering them to pursue polluters for 
the costs of preventive and remedial measures.1 The competent authority’s primary 
responsibility is:2 
… to establish which operator has caused the damage or the 
imminent threat of damage, to assess the significance of the 
damage and to determine which remedial measures should be 
taken with reference to Annex II… 
The Member State may appoint any number of competent authorities, but the ELD 
provides little guidance as to what characteristics might make an authority 
competent.  
Natural and legal persons make up the second tier of enforcement. They have no 
standing to bring environmental damage claims themselves, and can merely request 
that a competent authority takes action. To make such a request, the person must 
have been adversely affected by environmental damage, have sufficient interest in 
environmental decision making, or be able to show that their rights to fair 
administrative procedure have been infringed. 3  Member States decide what 
constitutes sufficient interest and what rights might have been impaired, but 
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recognised non-governmental environmental organisations (“NGOS”) will qualify 
automatically. This residual oversight role is intended to give the public a voice in 
important environmental damage prosecutions, allowing them to spur reluctant 
competent authorities to take action. The competent authority or authorities must 
give reasons for their decisions and they must take account of any relevant person’s 
views.4 This two tiered system is a long way from the broad civil liability regime 
that the Green Paper first envisaged, but it should be noted that the ELD does not 
prevent Member States’ from passing their own more stringent liability laws, and 
there is no legislative bar preventing other regulators, NGOs or private citizens from 
bringing administrative, environmental or criminal prosecutions outside of the 
ELD.5  
 
11.2 Defining Environmental Damage 
The ELD states that its “fundamental principle” is that the polluter pays, and, to that 
end, each operator that causes environmental damage, or even the imminent threat 
of environmental damage, should “be held financially liable, in order to induce 
operators to adopt measures and develop practices to minimise the risks of 
environmental damage so that their exposure to financial liabilities is reduced.”6 
The logic is that operators will be deterred from taking unnecessary risks if they are 
sure they will have to pay for the consequences, and, at the same time, successful 
prosecutions will ensure that funds are available to pay for any preventive and 
remedial measures.  
In order for the polluter pays system to work, it was vital that the ELD provide a 
robust definition of environmental damage. The ELD does this by creating three 
categories of environmental damage. These are:  
1. damage to protected species and natural habitats; 
                                                 
4 Article 13 and Recital (14); Gouritin, above n 2, at 243. 
5 The ELD operates without prejudice to more stringent Community legislation or national laws under 
Article 3(2)-3(3), and shall not prevent Member States from adopting more stringent prevention and 
remediation provisions, or identifying additional responsible parties, or adopting rules to do with 
double recovery from concurrent actions by competent authorities or private persons under Article 
16. 
6 Recital (2). 




2. water damage; and  
3. land damage.7 
Protected species and habitats are those listed in the schedules and annexes of the 
Directive 92/43/EEC (“Habitats Directive”), or Article 9 of Directive 79/409/EEC 
(“Birds Directive”).8 Water damage is defined according to Directive 2000/60/EC 
(“Water Framework Directive” or “WFD”).9 Land itself is only considered to have 
been damaged if there is the possibility that human health may be adversely 
affected, but there is no Land Framework Directive to help competent authorities 
to decide the criteria by which that may be judged.  
The term “damage” was defined with the intention of injecting some objectivity 
into the assessment of environmental damage.10 It means “a measurable adverse 
change in a natural resource or measurable impairment of a natural service which 
may occur directly or indirectly”.11 “Natural resource” is a general term meant to 
refer to all three categories of protected species and natural habitats, water and land, 
and “natural resource service” means the “functions performed by a natural 
resource for the benefit of another natural resource or the public.”12 
Natural resources services was a concept adopted from the federal United States 
CERCLA and Oil Pollution Acts.13 The implication is that it is the services that the 
natural resource performs that are important, and not the natural resource itself. It 
follows that the competent authority has no obligation to save any particular animal 
                                                 
7 Article 2(1). 
8 Article 2(1). The Birds Directive is now Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds. 
9 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2006 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L 327/1. 
10 Lucas Bergkamp and Anke Van Bergeijk “Scope of the ELD Regime” in Lucas Bergkamp and 
Barbara J Goldsmith (eds) The EU Environmental Liability Directive: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2013) 51 at 55. 
11 Article 2(2). 
12 Article 2(12)-(13). 
13 Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 1980 42 USC § 9601; 
Oil Pollution Act 1990 33 USC § 2716; Environmental Liability Directive, art. 2(13); Lucas 
Bergkamp and Anke Van Bergeijk “Scope of the ELD Regime” in Lucas Bergkamp and Barbara J 
Goldsmith (eds) The EU Environmental Liability Directive: A Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2013) 51 at 56. 




or species, to or restore any specific location to its original condition, so long as an 
alternative species or ecosystem could provide the same services.  
An operator is only required to undertake preventive or remedial measures if its 
activities cause significant environmental damage, but each of the three categories 
of environmental damage has a different threshold for deciding what damage is 
significant, and it may be a challenge for the competent authority or the operator to 
decide when and if that threshold may have been breached. The issue has led some 
to question just how mandatory the ELD’s obligations are. Should the operator be 
required to immediately begin undertaking preventive and remedial measures as 
soon as it becomes aware of any environmental damage, or can it wait to be ordered 
to act by a competent authority? Vice versa, must the competent authority take 
action in all situations, or can it ignore environmental damage, for example, in the 
interests of protecting a valuable industry from further loss. To decide that point, it 
is necessary to know more about the three categories of environmental damage, and 
about how damage is assessed and quantified.   
 
11.2.1 Damage to Protected Species and Natural Habitats 
Protected species and natural habitats are those listed under the Habitats and Birds 
Directives. Those directives created the Natura 2000 network of natural habitats 
that were earmarked “to assure the long-term survival of Europe’s most valuable 
and threatened species and habitats.”14 It comprises of the Habitats Directive’s 
Special Areas of Conservation and the Birds Directive’s Special Protection Areas, 
and covers approximately 20% of the European territory.15 To give an idea of its 
scope, the Habitats Directive identified and protected approximately 200 habitat 
types and 700 species of plants and animals.16 In addition, the Habitats Directive 
lists nine marine habitats and sixteen marine species, while the Birds Directive lists 
sixty bird species, and the Directives cover more than five per cent of the EU’s total 
                                                 
14  Commission of the European Communities Commission Working Document on Natura 2000 
(Brussels, 2002) <ec.europa.eu> (accessed 21 April, 2015) at 2. 
15  Commission of the European Communities Natura 2000 networking programme 
<www.natura.org> (accessed 21 April, 2015). 
16 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Working Document on Natura 2000, at 2. 




marine area.17 This total protected area seems relatively small, but the ELD allows 
Member States to expand that list to include any additional species and habitats 
protected in their national law.18  
The Birds and Habitats Directive’s protections are not inviolable, however, and 
both Directives contain exceptions that allow the Member State to derogate from 
its duty to provide the highest levels of environmental protection. For example, 
under Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, the Member State may approve 
development adversely affecting a particular habitat if there is no alternative, if to 
do so is in the “overriding public interest”, and if all necessary compensatory 
measures are taken. The ELD itself provides defences that allow the competent 
authority to exclude any “previously identified adverse effects” if they have been 
authorized by the relevant authorities, and these will be discussed further below.19  
The threshold for damage to protected species and natural habitats is that the 
damage must have “significant effects on reaching or maintaining the favourable 
conservation status of such habitats or species.”20 The term “significant” is not 
explicitly defined, but “conservation status” means:21  
… the sum of influences acting on a natural habitat and its typical species that 
may affect its long term natural distribution, structure and functions as well as 
the long term survival of its typical species within… [the EU and Member 
States’ territories] or the natural range of that habitat. 
A habitat’s conservation status is favourable if its area is stable or increasing, if it 
is likely to maintain itself for the foreseeable future, and if the species it contains 
are also in a favourable state.22 Likewise, an individual species’ conservation status 
is favourable when its population dynamics are stable, its natural range is not being 
                                                 
17  Commission of the European Communities Natura 2000 in the Marine Environment 
<www.natura.org> (accessed 17 October 2017). 
18 ELD, art. 2(3). 
19 Article 2(1)(a). 
20 Article 2(1). 
21 See Nicholas Gard and William Desvousges “Technical and Economic Issues and Practices in ELD 
Application” in Lucas Bergkamp and Barbara J Goldsmith (eds) The EU Environmental Liability 
Directive: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2013) 220 at 229; 
ELD, art 2(4)(a). 
22 Article (2)(4)(b). 




reduced and is not likely to be reduced, and if there will continue to be sufficient 
habitat to maintain its population in the long term.  
Annex I explains that environmental damage will only have occurred if there is 
measurable data showing that the activity had significant adverse effects on the 
baseline condition. The baseline condition refers to the state the environment would 
have been in if the incident had not occurred, as “estimated on the basis of the best 
information available”.23 The baseline condition allows for “natural fluctuations”, 
so long they as are within a normal range or are “due to natural causes or resulting 
from intervention relating to the normal management” of the site. 24  “Normal 
management” could include the kinds of economic activities referred to in the above 
exceptions, and this provides some potential to undermine the ELD’s protections. 
To determine the extent of any damage, Annex I requires the competent authority 
to consider effects on:  
• the abundance of individual organisms, their concentration and 
range in the affected area; 
• the role those particular individuals or habitats play in overall 
conservation; 
• their relative rarity at the local, regional or Community level; and 
• the capacity of the species or habitat to regenerate and recover to 
the baseline state or better in a short space of time and without 
outside intervention.25  
From this, we can deduce that a significant adverse effect is not simply one which 
harms or kills wildlife, but which also affects their continued existence in a 
particular area, at least in the short to medium term. Damage is not considered to 
be significant if the species or habitat will quickly and naturally recover to the 
baseline condition without human intervention, but damage proven to affect human 
health is always significant. 
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The Habitats Directive predates the ELD by nearly two decades and contains 
similar significance thresholds, and its precedents will help to decide when the 
ELD’s obligations will be triggered.26 The difference is that while the Habitats 
Directive can be used to prevent operators from undertaking activities which might 
have a significant adverse effect, the ELD is only triggered if damage is imminent 
or after it has already occurred. Jonathan Verschuuren therefore argues that the 
Habitats Directive will provide a high level of protection because the precautionary 
principle means that most commercial activities will be found to have significant 
effects.27 On the other hand, G.M. van den Broek contends that the ELD’s high 
damage thresholds have the opposite effect.28 She explains that it will be very 
difficult for the competent authority to adduce prima facie evidence that an 
activity’s negative effects have exceeded the baseline condition’s normal rate of 
variance, or to prove that the protected species or natural habitat will fail to recover 
in a short space of time.29 Her general point is that the courts frequently lack the 
historical data needed to establish the baseline, so the thresholds will only be 
triggered in the most serious cases.30  
Gard and Desvousges suggest that the problem of establishing the baseline 
condition could be overcome by making comparisons with other similar locations, 
by use of historic, national and regional biological, geological and water quality 
data, and they suggest that this could be accomplished using tools such as 
MODELKEY. 31  MODELKEY identifies relevant stressors including, but not 
limited to:32 
                                                 
26 Gard and Desvousges “Technical and Economic Issues and Practices in ELD Application”, above 
n 22, at 230. 
27 Jonathan Verschuuren “Effectiveness of the Wild Birds and Habitats Directive in the Wadden Sea 
Area: Will the Tiger Lose its Teeth?” (paper presented to Scientific Wadden Sea Symposium: 
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(2009) 5 Utrecht Law Review 117. 
29 At 119–120. 
30 At 122. 
31 Gard and Desvousges “Technical and Economic Issues and Practices in ELD Application”, above 
n 22, at 226. 
32 Michaela Hein and others “Models for Assessing and Forecasting the Impact of Environmental Key 
Pollutants on Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Key findings and 
recommendations of MODELKEY” (15 December, 2010) MODELKEY <www.modelkey.org> 
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… toxic chemicals arising from point source discharges or diffuse 
pollution, altered habitat properties due to hydromorphological 
changes, altered species interaction due to the invasion of alien species 
or disease and increased mortalities due to the presence of emerging 
pathogens. 
MODELKEY is an acronym for “Models for Assessing and Forecasting the Impact 
of Environmental Key Pollutants on Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity” and it was developed to aid Member States in meeting the Water 
Framework Directive’s requirements. An offshore oil well blowout would have its 
greatest and most immediate impact on the marine environment and its denizens, 
so it is very important to analyse how the ELD defines water damage. 
11.2.2 Water Damage 
Under the ELD, water damage means:33 
…any damage that significantly adversely affects: 
(i) the ecological, chemical and/or quantitative status or the ecological 
potential, as defined in Directive 2000/60/EC, of the waters 
concerned, with the exception of adverse effects where Article 4(7) 
of that Directive applies; or 
At first, the ELD only applied to the EU’s inland, ground and surface waters, and 
its geographical scope was circumscribed by the outer limit of the EU’s territorial 
waters. 34  The major impact of the new Offshore Safety Directive was that it 
expanded this scope to include marine waters defined by Directive 2008/56/EC, the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (“MSFD”).35 Marine waters includes the 
“waters, the seabed and subsoil on the seaward side of the baseline from which the 
extent of territorial waters is measured extending to the outmost reach of the area 
where a Member State has and/or exercises jurisdictional rights, in accordance with 
the UNCLOS”, as well as to the coastal waters defined by the Water Framework 
Directive, as “far as the aspects of environmental states are not already addressed 
through that Directive or other Community legislation.”36 The MSFD also requires 
                                                 
33 ELD, art. 2(1)(b). 
34 See Water Framework Directive, art. 2(7). 
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Member States to take account of transboundary effects that those activities might 
have on other states in the same marine region or subregion, but it is not clear what 
affect this might have on offshore operators’ legal liability for transboundary 
pollution damage. 
The ultimate aim of the Water Framework Directive is to “achieve the elimination 
of priority hazardous substances and contribute to achieving concentrations in the 
marine environment near background values for naturally occurring substances.”37 
Under the Water Framework Directive, Member States must strive to achieve “good 
ecological status” and “good ecological potential” for all bodies of water, as defined 
by Annex V.38 Annex V measures water quality as either high, good, moderate or 
poor status, in terms of its biological quality (flora and fauna), hydromorphological 
quality (river or tidal flows and levels), and physico-chemical elements (nutrient 
concentrations, temperature, oxygen balance and transparency). Similarly, the 
MSFD aims to protect the marine environment, restoring adversely affected marine 
ecosystems, and phasing out pollution “so as to ensure that there are no significant 
impacts on or risks to marine biodiversity, marine ecosystems, human health or 
legitimate uses of the sea.” 39  The MSFD contains its own definitions of 
“environmental status” and “good environmental status” and it remains to be seen 
if there will be any noticeable difference between how the ELD is applied to 
activities in territorial waters and how it is applied to activities in marine waters.40  
When the ELD was first enacted, it was not clear whether water damage would be 
significant if only a part of a body of water was affected, or whether the competent 
authority would have to wait to make a determination until the entire body of water 
was damaged.41 One EU Commission working paper proposed that the threshold 
would be crossed once the entire water body had deteriorated from one water 
                                                 
37 Water Framework Directive, Recital (26)-(27). 
38 Water Framework Directive, art. 2. 
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a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive) [2008] OJ L 164/19, art. 2. 
40 Marine Strategy Framework Directive, art. 3 and Annex I. 
41  Stevens & Bolton LLP Study on Analysis of Integrating the ELD into 11 National Legal 
Frameworks (Final Report prepared for the European Commission, Brussels, 16 December 2013) 
(Project No 20141174) at 12. 




quality status to a lower one.42 The more authoritative Common Position held that 
“it is no longer required that water’s quality should worsen from one of the 
categories defined in the Water Framework Directive to another.”43 For example, 
in 2009 an accidental sewage discharge killed thousands of fish in Southport’s 
Three Pools waterway in the United Kingdom. The discharge reduced the water 
body’s biological quality element (the fish), from a good to a poor status along a 5 
km stretch of the 17 km water way.44 The Environment Agency decided that there 
was no need for the entire stream to have been damaged before remediation 
activities could be activated. Its task was eased considerably by good quality 
baseline data. 
In a more recent German case, the court held that a body of water will have 
deteriorated as soon as at least one of its elements has fallen by at least one class.45 
The German court referred to this as the “one out all out rule”, and said that it should 
apply even to deterioration of the most heavily modified bodies of water in the 
lowest class condition.46 Other jurisdictions have opted for different thresholds. 
Poland has set a more stringent water damage threshold to include deterioration in 
the quality of bathing water, or water intended for human consumption, as well as 
adverse changes to the quantity and quality of groundwater, and those environments 
depending upon groundwater.47  
11.2.3 Land Damage 
The threshold for damage to land is much harder to trigger, as it requires:48 
… contamination that creates a significant risk of human health being 
adversely affected as a result of the direct or indirect introduction, in, or under 
land, of substances, preparations, organisms or micro-organisms. 
                                                 
42 At 60. 
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Unlike damage to protected species and natural habitats or water damage, there is 
no external Land Framework Directive to provide guidelines against which land 
damage can be assessed, and the requirement that there be significant risk to human 
health sets a high threshold.49 This suggested that land would enjoy little protection 
unless it happens to lie inside of the Natura 2000 networks, or was close to a body 
of water protected by the Water Framework Directive. Surprisingly, the “REFIT 
Evaluation of the Environmental Liability Directive” found just the opposite, that 
more than half of all Member State’s’ reported prosecutions involved damage to 
land.50 Land law is amongst the most well-developed of pre-existing Member State 
laws, and it is possible that familiar regulatory and private property protections are 
still being employed in preference to the ELD.51 The Commission argued that the 
“forthcoming Thematic Strategy for Soil Protection” and developing a Soil 
Framework Directive will harmonize the measurement of damage to land, but at 
present the ELD contains limited guidance on the issue and the proposal for a 
directive has since been withdrawn.52  
Bergkamp and Bergeijk are troubled by the high threshold for land damage, and 
also by the lack of external guidance to decide when harm is significant.53 Despite 
their concerns, it seems that such issues can be most easily addressed at the Member 
State level. For example, the Stevens & Bolton report describes how in Hungary 
the threshold has been lowered so that is no longer limited to contamination causing 
a serious risk to human health.54 In addition, the report cites United Kingdom 
guidelines which specify that land damage will count as significant if it causes 
symptoms ranging from headaches and sore throats, to birth defects, disease, and 
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death. Bergkamp and Bergeijk are right to raise these issues, but any ambiguities 
may be dealt with at the Member State level, as the ELD intends. 
If there is any question about why a thesis on liability for offshore oil and gas 
exploration has a component on land damage, there is an answer. According to the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive, land begins above the low water mark, and 
that means that any oil contamination to land above that mark is counted as land 
damage. Oil spills at sea can easily cause damage above the low water mark. For 
example, oil spray from the 1993 Braer spill caused so much damage to farmland 
that 23,000 sheep had to be moved from their normal grazing land, and claims for 
compensation for extra labour, machinery, feed, fertilizer to regenerate the grass, 
and for lost sheep and cattle totalled $3.6m USD.55  
For oil contamination to breach the land damage thresholds, however, it would also 
have to have effects that were adverse to human health. That requirement might 
have been satisfied in the case of the Braer after 600 people claimed that wind-
blown oil had severely damaged their homes. It is reasonable to assume that the oil 
would have come into close proximity to the places where people sleep, wash and 
prepare their food, although the CLC and Fund Conventions exclude personal 
injury claims, so the issue was not addressed in that case. The Deepwater Horizon 
response on the other hand, clearly caused a threat to human health as the scientific 
literature asserts that many compounds in oil are toxic and/or carcinogenic.56 Crude 
oil contains bioavailable polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (“PAHs”) that dissolve 
easily in water, especially under the effect of dispersants. They accumulate in the 
food chain and can pose a threat to human health long after the visible effects 
disappear. 
Secondly, oil spills at sea can cause damage to land-based protected species and 
natural habitats. Much of the damage to biodiversity occurs when birds and animals 
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enter the polluted water in search of food.57 Further, disruptions in the marine food 
chain will have an impact on flora and fauna far inland. Studies of the Exxon Valdez 
showed that weathered oil could survive in pockets in the intertidal zone, impacting 
salmon, shorebirds and sea otters for decades.58 It could also impact on salmon runs 
in areas like the Pacific north-west that support apex predators, like grizzly bears, 
and provide much-needed nutrients to vegetation.59 Bears routinely scavenge along 
the shoreline, and can ingest oil directly from dead whales, fish, seal and sea and 
river otters, and indirectly from grooming their own contaminated fur.60 
Peterson et al. concluded that ingestion of oil had led to chronic exposure to toxins 
with cascading and persistent sublethal effects on many species.61 They observed 
that the indirect interactions in the rocky intertidal zone after the Exxon Valdez 
resembled the dynamics of the Torrey Canyon, and lasted for over a decade. This 
finding challenges the view of the IOPC Fund, amongst others, that the marine 
environment recovers naturally and easily without human intervention saying that 
such expectation of:62 
… rapid recovery based on short generation times of most intertidal plants and 
animals are naïve and must be replaced by a generalized concept of how 
interspecific interactions will lead to a sequence of delayed indirect effects 
over a decade or longer. 
Many years have passed since the Exxon Valdez, but researchers observed that 
harlequin ducks and sea otters were affected for two decades, and longer lived killer 
whales have yet to recover.63 The overall point is clear, marine oil spills may strike 
at sea, but their effects persist, cascade and reverberate throughout the food chain, 
up to and including humankind.  
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As for the legal liability issue, marine oil spills, whatever the source, could involve 
all three environmental damage categories. Whether the oil impacts on a marine 
habitat or species or species protected by the Habitats and Birds Directives, the 
Water Framework and Marine Strategy Framework Directives will ensure that 
offshore oil and gas operators will be held liable for any significant damage they 
cause to all coastal and marine waters. Oil spray could be blown onto land above 
the low water mark, and this could also pose a significant threat to human health. 
The Member State may prefer to let nature take care of itself, but the science shows 
that oil can have serious effects on intertidal zones and species long after the 
immediate oil pollution threat has diminished, and that could mean that competent 
authorities could find themselves processing and responding to requests for action 
well into the future. The onus then is on the Member State to treat such incidents 
seriously, to restore the impacted area to the baseline condition as effectively as 
possible, and to ensure that the liable operator pays for the costs. 
 
 
11.3 Strict and Fault Based Liability for Environmental Damage 
Where the CLC and Fund Conventions opted for strict liability to ease the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof, the ELD contains both strict and fault-based liability. Annex III 
lists a wide range of hazardous occupational activities and directives that will be 
subject to strict liability, while other unlisted activities are subject to fault-based 
liability. Unfortunately, Annex III has not been amended to include the Offshore 
Safety Directive. This raises the question, will offshore oil and gas activities be 
subject to strict or fault-based liability? 
The ELD itself does not use the term strict. It simply states that the responsible 
operator “should, in principle, bear the cost of the necessary preventive or remedial 
measures”, and the costs of assessing damage or its imminent threat.64 Liability is 
not absolute because the ELD provides a set of exceptions and defences to excuse 
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the operator from liability in “situations where the damage in question or imminent 
threat thereof is the result of certain events beyond the operator’s control.”65  
Article 3(1) ELD states that the operator is liable for: 
(a) environmental damage caused by any of the occupational 
activities listed in Annex III, and to any imminent threat of 
such damage occurring by reason of any of those activities;  
(b) damage to protected species and natural habitats caused by any 
occupational activities other than those listed in Annex III, and 
to any imminent threat of such damage occurring by reason of 
any of those activities, whenever the operator has been at fault 
or negligent.  
Annex III lists the twelve broad types of hazardous operational activities that are 
subject to strict liability for any damage they cause to any of the three categories of 
the environment.66 The list includes activities covered by the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control Directive (“IPPC Directive”), and those involving the 
discharge of toxic and persistent pollutants into surface or groundwater, but, as 
mentioned above, Annex III does not mention the OSD.67 The effect of Article 
3(1)(b) is that operators of activities that are not listed in Annex III will only be 
liable if they are at fault, and then only for damage to protected species and natural 
habitats. Operators of these non-hazardous activities will not be responsible for 
water or land damage, regardless of how negligent their conduct may have been. 
This makes it critical to ensure that offshore activities are actually included in the 
Annex, and that topic will be addressed in the next chapter. 
 
11.3.1 Strict Liability in the United Kingdom and Germany 
The McKenna and Clarke reports argued that any environmental liability directive 
should be consistent with Member State laws, and the strict liability rules from the 
United Kingdom’s common law and the German Civil Code have had an influence. 
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Like the case of Rylands v Fletcher, the ELD also imposes strict liability for 
hazardous activities, which are those most likely to do mischief if their products 
escape, so that the operator must keep them at their own peril.68 Rylands v Fletcher 
provides that the defendant can “excuse himself by shewing that the escape was 
owing to the plaintiff’s default; or perhaps if the escape was the consequence of vis 
major, or the act of God”.69 Similarly, the ELD provides operators should not be held 
liable for events that are outside of their control, such as third party intervention, 
and, just like the 1992 CLC Convention, it excludes damage or its imminent threat 
if it is caused by acts of war or “natural phenomenon of exception, inevitable and 
irresistible character.70 Lord Goff later held that questions of strict liability should 
be left to Parliament, and the ELD likewise provides that its strict liability 
provisions are subject to Member States’ transposing legislation.71  
Strict liability is also central to Germany’s Law on Environmental Liability, and 
Article 1(1) of that law stated that:72 
If a person suffers death or injury to his body or health, or if property is 
damaged due to an environmental impact that issues from one of the facilities 
named in Appendix 1, then the operator of the facility shall be liable to the 
injured person for the damage caused thereby. 
As the provision only applies to damage to health or property, the German law, like 
so many other Member States, omits claims for damage to the environment itself.  
The German Act also provides an Annex that listing specific installations whose 
owners will be subject to strict liability.73 It then creates a presumption that the most 
inherently suited facility will be assumed to be responsible. The presumption is only 
rebuttable if the circumstances showed that some other facility was more inherently 
suited. As Article 1(6)(1) puts it: 
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Inherent suitedness in a particular case is determined on the basis of the course 
of business, the structures used, the nature and concentration of the materials 
used and released, the weather conditions, the time and place at which the 
damage occurred, the nature of the damage, as well as other conditions which 
speak for or against the causation of the damage in the particular case. 
The ELD therefore mirrors the German law in that both impose strict liability on 
certain listed hazardous activities or facilities, and, as is discussed below, both 
consider proximity as a factor in determining causation.74  
 
11.3.2 Causation 
Whether liability is strict or fault based the competent authority must prove that the 
operator did in fact cause the damage, and that the damage falls within the scope of 
the ELD. The ELD is broadly worded to include both direct and indirect causation. 
Indirect causation includes circumstances where damage in one area, or to one 
species, has cascading effects as predators and prey move away from the directly 
polluted areas.75 Indirect damage claims may call for a great deal of speculation on 
the part of expert witnesses and it may be difficult to prove that physical changes 
in one environment are due to changes elsewhere, or that the damage was significant 
enough to trigger the ELD’s thresholds. 
The ELD does not provide a standard test for causation, leaving the issue to be 
decided by Member State law. This often involves asking the “but-for” question, 
which asks if the damage would have happened but-for the defendants actions.76 
One common law option is the “proximate cause” test, which considers issues of 
foreseeability of harm, proximity in both space and time, and policy questions such 
as the floodgates argument. 77  Another alternative frequently used in France, 
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Germany, Greece and Austria, is the “adequacy” or “effective cause” theory, which 
asks whether the defendant’s conduct would have been sufficient to cause the harm 
suffered.78  
The Raffinerie Mediterranee case provides the definitive judicial statement on 
causation in the ELD. The case involved consideration of Article 4(5) of the ELD, 
which allows liability to be attributed for “pollution of a diffuse character”, as it 
concerned contamination of a site by many different petrochemical operators dating 
back to the 1960s. The ECJ ruled that:79 
Directive 2004/35 does not preclude national legislation which allows the 
competent authority acting with the framework of the directive to operate on 
the presumption, also in cases involving diffuse pollution, that there is a causal 
link between operators and the pollution found on account of the fact that the 
operators’ installations were located close to the polluted area. However, in 
accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, in order for such a causal link 
thus to be presumed, that authority must have plausible evidence capable of 
justifying its presumption, such as the fact that the operator’s installation is 
located close to the pollution found and there is a correlation between the 
pollutants identified and the substances used by the operator in connection 
with his activities.  
The Grand Chamber affirmed that it is not necessary that the competent authority 
prove that the operators were at fault, negligent or had intent to cause damage, but 
there must be, “inter alia, a causal link established between one or more identifiable 
polluters and concrete and quantifiable environmental damage.”80  
The case may not be entirely relevant to the problem that this thesis is most 
concerned with, as offshore oil well blowouts and explosions can be seen from 
miles away, leaving no question about which operation is the source of the 
pollution. However, one of the problems which prosecutors of Deepwater Horizon 
claims had to deal with was the legacy of pollution damage caused by natural 
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sources and by many years of offshore petroleum activities in the Gulf of Mexico.81 
Investigators were required to use chemical fingerprints to decide whether oil 
pollution damage had actually come from the Macondo well. Future OSD litigation 
could well involve the same sorts of causation difficulties. 
 
11.3.3 The Operator  
Having established what the ELD means by environmental damage, how it 
allocated strict and fault-based liability, and how it deals with questions of 
causation, the thesis should turn to the question of deciding who exactly is to be 
held liable. The ELD defines the “operator” as:82 
…any natural or legal, private or public person who operates or controls the 
occupational activity or, where this is provided for in national legislation, to 
whom decisive economic power over the technical functioning of such an 
activity has been delegated, including the holder of a permit or authorisation 
for such an activity or the person registering or notifying such an activity. 
It should also be noted that, consistent with Article 193 TFEU, the ELD:83 
… shall not prevent Member States from maintaining or adopting more 
stringent provisions in relation to the prevention and remedying of 
environmental damage, including the identification of additional activities to 
be subject to the prevention and remediation requirements of this Directive, 
and the identification of additional responsible parties (emphasis added). 
Member States can expand the term “operator” to include the person “to whom 
decisive economic power over the technical functioning of such an activity has been 
delegated”, or who is permitted or authorised to carry out the activity, and even the 
person who registers or notifies that activity, if the Member State so chooses. The 
phrasing has its roots in the 1994 Directive on the incineration of waste, and the 
1996 IPPC Directive which defined the operator as “any natural or legal person who 
operates or controls the installation or, where this is provided for in national 
legislation, to whom decisive economic power over the technical functioning of the 
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installation has been delegated.”84 The European Economic and Social Committee 
(“ESC”) has recognized that the definition exposed banks and insurers, and that 
they “should therefore be safeguarded and not given inappropriate responsibilities 
such as prior assessment of risks which do not fall within their traditional sphere of 
responsibilities.”85 The White Paper also had concluded that liability should only 
be directed at the persons exercising active control of the activity causing the 
damage; “Lenders not exercising operational control should not be liable.”86  
Boyer and Porrini examine the issue and conclude that widening liability to include 
lenders does not address the problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information 
sharing.87 Bergkamp asked whether liability rules are preferable to regulatory rules, 
as regulation is more predictable, but there are efficiency advantages to be had in 
governing a free market by tort.88 Bergkamp and van Bergeijk characterise the 
regime as one of “producer-notifier-parent-corporation-manager-operator” 
liability, and suggest that liability should be allocated according to a hierarchy.89 
The competent authority should look first to the permitted operator, and only after 
that to other persons and only if they exercise effective operational control. Martin 
Hedemann-Robinson supports the view that the operator definition should be very 
broad, however, and could capture persons with legal and de facto control such as 
major shareholders and directors with joint and several liability.90 Like Bergkamp 
and van Bergeijk, he anticipates that the broad definition will increase litigation, 
                                                 
84 See Marie-Louise Larsson The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability and Reparation (Kluwer 
Law International ; Norstedts Juridik, The Hague ; Boston : Stockholm, 1999) at 244–245; Council 
Directive 94/67/EC of 16 December 1994 on the incineration of hazardous waste [1994] OJ L 
365/34, art. 2(6).Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution 
prevention and control [1996] OJ L 257/26, art. 2(12). 
85 Economic and Social Committee Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Green Paper on Remedying 
Environmental Damage [1994] OJ C 133/02 at [4.4]. 
86 Commission of the European Communities White Paper on Environmental Liability (COM(2000) 
66 final, 9 February 2000 European Commission,) at [4.4]. 
87 Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini “The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability 
or Regulation” in Timothy Swanson (ed) An Introduction to the Law and Economics of 
Environmental Policy: Issues in Institutional Design (JAI, Amsterdam; Boston, 2002) 245. 
88 Lucas Bergkamp Liability and Environment: Private and Public Law Aspects of Civil Liability for 
Environmental Harm in an International Context (Kluwer Law International, Hague; London; New 
York, 2001) at 213. 
89 At 54. 
90 Martin Hedemann-Robinson Enforcement of European Union Environental Law: Legal Issues and 
Challenges (2nd ed, Routledge, London ; New York, 2015) at 604–606. 




despite the intention to avoid the complex legal machinations which accompanied 
the CERCLA Superfund’s nebulously termed “potentially responsible party”.91 
In practice, several Member States have transposed legislation to include their 
particular concepts of secondary liability.92 The Bio Intelligence report explains 
how in Portugal, directors, officers and managers will be held jointly and severally 
liable along with the company, and the parent company too can be held liable if 
there is “an abuse of legal personality or contravention of the law.”93 In Spain, the 
legal and de facto managers and administrators may be held liable for decisions not 
to comply with the ELD. The liable parties may include successor companies, 
manufacturers, importers and suppliers of the product which caused the damage, 
and receivers and liquidators may also be held liable. In general, Bergkamp and van 
Bergeijk’s concerns have not been borne out, however, as report explains that the 
majority of Member States have opted for minimum levels of transposition and the 
narrowest possible definition of operator.  
A broader operator definition of operator raises the problem of how liability should 
be allocated amongst multiple defendants. Article 9 of the ELD allows Member 
States to set their own rules on issues such as multiple party causation, vicarious 
liability and veil piercing, and also allows for liability to be apportioned between 
the producer and the end-user of the product. This will be particularly important in 
relation to complex offshore petroleum activities, as they typically involve attempts 
to reallocate liability proportionately according to joint operator agreements, and 
third party service contracts, as has been discussed above.  
Chris Clarke argues that proportionate liability is rarely used in the United States 
because it increases transaction costs and expenses, because it shifts the risks to the 
public purse, and because it discourages settlement between defendants.94 In the 
EU, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
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Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, have opted for joint and several ELD 
liability.95 Only Bulgaria, Finland, France, Lithuania and Slovakia have chosen 
proportionate liability. No Member State has opted to channel liability to a single 
party, but the OSD may change this picture, as it directs that Member States must 
be certain that the permitted operator is also the party which will be held liable for 
ELD environmental damage claims.96 It will be up Member States to decide how 
far their OSD implementing laws go towards capturing the full range of lenders, 
directors, company officers and managers or other parties that the term “operator” 
could apply to. 
 
11.4 Preventive and Remedial Measures 
As explained above, the ELD’s obligations are enforced by Member State 
appointed competent authorities. It is up to the competent authority to decide 
whether the operator has caused significant environmental damage, and what 
preventive and remedial measures it must undertake. Some academics have 
suggested that these obligations are “self-executing”, in that the operator must 
undertake preventive and remedial measures as soon as significant damage occurs, 
and the competent authority has no choice but to enforce those obligations. 
However, we know that Member States have discretion about how they interpret 
the ELD, and there are exceptions in the Habitats and Birds Directive allowing it to 
forgive a certain amount of environmental damage. So the question is, just how 
discretionary is the ELD? To understand that, this section will review the ELD’s 
instructions concerning preventive and remedial measures.   
11.4.1 Preventive Measures  
As Benjamin Franklin once said, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” 
If an industrial accident ever happens, the best-case outcome would be that no 
environmental damage occurs at all. The ELD adopts this wisdom, and Article 5(1) 
provides that if there is “an imminent threat of such damage occurring, the operator 
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shall, without delay, take the necessary preventive measures.” If the operator fails 
to avert the danger, then it must immediately inform the competent authority so that 
remedial measures can begin without delay.97  
Imminent threat of damage means that there must be “sufficient likelihood that 
environmental damage will occur in the near future.” 98  The term “sufficient 
likelihood” is not defined, and neither is “near future”. This could make it more 
difficult for either the competent authority or the operator to decide just how 
imminent and significant that threat might be. Much will depend upon the Member 
State’s industry regulations and the operator’s safety case and emergency 
management procedures, but the instruction that the operator acts without delay 
suggests that it would not wait for the competent authority’s orders. In the case of 
preventive measures then, the ELD is self-executing, but does that mean that the 
competent authority must also act? 
The competent authority has four specific powers with regard to preventive action. 
It may:99 
(a) require the operator to provide information on any imminent 
threat of environmental damage or in suspected cases of such 
an imminent threat; 
(b) require the operator to take the necessary preventive measures; 
(c) give instructions to the operator to be followed on the 
necessary preventive measures to be taken; or 
(d) itself take the necessary preventive measures. 
Article 5(4) states that the competent authority “shall require that the preventive 
measures are taken by the operator.” The competent authority will work with the 
operator in the initial stages of any incident to decide what those measures should 
be. It is only if they operator fails to comply with the competent authority’s 
instructions, “cannot be identified, or is not required to bear the costs under this 
Directive” because it did not cause the incident, or because it was excused from 
liability under one of the ELD’s defences and exceptions, that the competent 
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authority may take the preventive measures itself.100  The term to note there is 
“may”, the article cannot be used to compel the competent authority to undertake 
any preventive measures, with good reason as the next section will explain. 
11.4.2 Remedial Measures 
If preventive measures fail to prevent significant environmental damage from 
occurring, then remedial measures should begin and should overlap with any 
ongoing preventive measures. Thus, the operator “shall, without delay, inform the 
competent authority of all relevant aspects of the situation”, and take:101 
… all practicable steps to immediately control, contain, remove, or otherwise 
manage the relevant contaminants and/or any other damage factors in order to 
limit or to prevent further environmental damage and adverse effects on 
human health or further impairment of services… 
According to Annex II, the operator must identify a range of appropriate “potential 
remedial measures” and submit them to the competent authority for approval, 
unless the competent authority has already taken its own actions under Article 
6(2)(e) and (3).102 As with preventive measures, the competent authority has broad 
powers to manage the emergency response and environmental restoration.103 While 
the competent authority can undertake remedial measures itself “at any time”, the 
ELD states that the competent authority “shall require that the remedial measures 
are taken by the operator”. 104  Again, it leaves that decision in the competent 
authority’s hands, recommending that it “may” undertake remedial measures itself 
if the operator has failed to comply with obligations, cannot be identified, or is 
excused from bearing the costs, and only as a “last resort”. 105  Even then, the 
operator will still be held liable for those costs.106 
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The competent authority decides which remedial measures should be undertaken, 
taking into consideration “the nature, extent and gravity of the various instances of 
environmental damage concerned … the possibility of natural recovery” and any 
“risks to human health”.107 It must invite “observations” from non-governmental 
organisations or other people affected under Article 12, including the people on 
whose land the remedial measures are carried out, and the operator has a right of 
response.108 If the competent authority decides to disregard those comments, then 
it must provide reasons for doing so, and the decision may be reviewed in court or 
by some other competent “independent and impartial public body”.109 That review 
procedure must be subject to any national laws regulating access to justice, and any 
administrative review process must be “exhausted prior to recourse to judicial 
proceedings.”110 
11.4.3 Are Preventive and Remedial Measures Self-Executing? 
The general instructions that the operator is to act “without delay” and 
“immediately”, have led Edward Brans to conclude that both the preventive and 
remedial measures requirements are “self-executing”, meaning that “no legal order 
of a public authority is necessary to make them binding and enforceable.”111 The 
logic is that self-executing provisions can significantly reduce delays and prevent 
further costly damage. The obvious disadvantage is that the operator may be 
required to undertake expensive and unnecessary operations before the competent 
authority has decided what measures are necessary, or even whether any action is 
needed at all.112 If the measures were unnecessary, then the operator could have 
grounds to seek reimbursement, and that could lead to further transaction costs.  
Valerie Fogleman says that such provisions are quite rare in environmental 
legislation but she agrees with Andrew Waite’s statement that mandatory 
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enforcement was “one of the most significant features of the new regime.”113 In 
their view, the competent authority has no choice but to compel the responsible 
operator to undertake preventive and remedial measures. She argues that the 
instruction that the competent authority should undertake measures as a “last resort” 
instruction means that the competent authority actually cannot undertake any 
preventive or remedial measures unless and until the operator has failed to comply 
with its obligations. 114  However, it is important to pay close attention to the 
interplay between Article 6(2) and Article 6(3). Article 6(2) only says that the 
competent authority “may, at any time” require the operator to take action, 
including any necessary remedial measures. Article 6(3) simply makes it clear that 
if any remedial measures are to be undertaken then that responsibility falls upon the 
operator. Neither Article specifies that the competent authority must compel an 
operator to do anything, or that it must do anything itself. 
This point was acknowledged by the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
of the Environment. 115  The EU Commission had originally recommended that 
Member States be compelled to undertake preventive and restorative measures 
whenever the operator could not be identified, was insolvent, or was not liable for 
the costs. 116  The Common Position deleted this requirement, saying that it 
“considered such a requirement as being too strict and preferred to leave full 
discretion to competent authorities in deciding whether environmental damage 
should be remedied or not”.117 This may reduce the ELD’s long-term impact, but it 
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only reinforces the theme that the ELD intends to leave key decisions to the 
discretion of the Member State.  
 
11.4.4 Primary, Complementary and Compensatory Measures 
The ELD was designed to cover all industries and any source of environmental 
damage, so the term remedial measures has be crafted to maximise flexibility of 
application. Remedial measures means:118 
… any action, or combination of actions, including mitigating or interim 
measures to restore, rehabilitate or replace damaged natural resources and/or 
impaired services, or to provide an equivalent alternative to those resources or 
services as foreseen in Annex II.  
Annex II of the ELD provides two separate frameworks for remedial measures. The 
first framework provides guidance on “primary”, “complementary” and 
“compensatory” measures that are to be used in relation to damage to water, or to 
protected species and natural habitats. The second contains a much less detailed set 
of instructions relating to land damage.  
Primary measures are those intended to return the damaged natural resources or 
services to, or towards, the baseline condition.119 Complementary or compensatory 
measures may be used to provide a “similar level of natural resources/and or 
services as were foregone” if the primary measures are ineffective or slow to take 
effect.120 Complementary measures could include creating a replacement habitat 
elsewhere, geographically linked to the original site where possible. Compensatory 
remedial measures are actions taken to compensate for interim losses until primary 
remediation measures can take effect. These are additional measures that may be 
undertaken either at the damaged site, or at an alternative site. “Interim losses” 
refers to the loss of functionality of the natural resources or services, but, because 
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the ELD intended to exclude traditional damages claims, the term specifies that it 
“does not consist of financial compensation to members of the public.”121  
The competent authority must select the most appropriate restoration option 
considering the following criteria:122 
• Effects on public health and safety; 
• the cost of implementation; 
• the likelihood of success; 
• prevention of future and collateral damage; 
• benefits to each component of the natural resource and/or service; 
• impacts on relevant social, economic, cultural concerns and other 
locally specific factors; 
• time taken for effective restoration; 
• extent of restoration at the site; and 
• geographical linkage to the site. 
The competent authority also has the option to take no further action if:123 
(a) the remedial measures already taken secure that there is no 
longer any significant risk of adversely affecting human 
health, water or protected species or natural habitats, and 
(b) the cost of the remedial measures that should be taken to reach 
baseline condition or similar level would be disproportionate 
to the environmental benefits to be obtained. 
These factors are very similar to the IOPC Fund’s compensation criteria for claims 
for the costs of measures of reinstatement of the environment, in that both regimes 
balance feasibility against cost and the desire to prevent further damage to the 
environment.124 One marked difference is that the IOPC Fund frowns upon what it 
calls “compensatory restoration” measures.125 This is because the assumption is that 
the marine environment will restore itself naturally and human interventions are 
just as likely to cause more harm than good. The ELD, on the other hand, was 
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designed to address a much broader range of environmental damage to land and to 
protected species and habitats, and its reinstatement measures are much more 
interventionist. The convergence between the two systems is still remarkable given 
the IOPC Fund’s experience with environmental damage per claims in cases like 
the Antoni Gramsci and the Patmos. It seems that pragmatism and common sense 
are universal virtues.  
Gard and Desvousges explain that an environmental accident may be so severe that 
it may irretrievably shift the baseline condition.126 Carlos Duarte also explains that 
the chance of an ecosystem returning to its pristine state is as likely as finding 
“Neverland”.127 Targets need to be practical, and rather than focussing on returning 
to a long lost state of nature, they should concentrate on maintaining “functional 
integrity and services of ecosystems conducive to a sustainable future.”128 Whether 
or not cost and feasibility will be the determining factors will depend upon the 
priorities of the Member State, and perhaps on how actively non-governmental 
organisations and affected private citizens pursue the competent authority with 
requests for action.  
Environmental valuation methods may determine the appropriate scale of 
complementary and compensatory remedial measures, and will help competent 
authorities determine how much equivalent habitat is needed to offset the loss.129 
In the first instance, the ELD recommends “the use of resource-to-resource or 
service-to-service equivalence approaches”, otherwise known as habitat 
equivalency analysis and resource equivalency analysis.130 The two methodologies 
are very similar; the only difference being that habitat equivalence analysis focusses 
on “acre-years of equivalent habitat (e.g. the number of acres required to offset the 
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lost productivity per year)”, while resource equivalency analysis expresses losses 
and gains in terms of the resource, for example, counting numbers of fish killed.131  
If it is not possible to provide an alternative equivalent habitat or to offset the loss 
of life, then monetary valuation may be used, so long as the monies raised are spent 
on “remedial measures whose cost is equivalent to the estimated monetary value of 
the lost natural resources and/or services.”132 The time taken to restore the natural 
resources and/or services is also a factor, as compensatory measures will continue 
as long as necessary to return to the baseline.  
 
11.4.5 Remediating Damage to Land 
Annex II’s guidelines for remedying damage to land are far less detailed. Annex II, 
“Remediation of land damage”, explains that the relevant contaminants must be “… 
removed, controlled, contained or diminished so that the contaminated land, taking 
account of its current use or approved future use at the time of the damage”, no 
longer poses a significant threat to human health. Risk assessment procedures must 
take into account the “characteristics and function of the soil, the type and 
concentration of the [relevant contaminants] … their risk and the possibility of their 
dispersion.” Relevant contaminants might include, “harmful substances, 
preparations, organisms or micro-organisms.” “Harmful substances” presumably 
includes oil, but there is no external Land Framework Directive to give guidance 
on that issue and it is up the Member State to collate its own list of “harmful 
substances, preparations, organisms or micro-organisms”. 
Whether the land damage contains a potential risk to human health may depend 
upon what use the land is being put to. Residential land, leisure areas, or areas of 
historical or cultural significance, will receive more attention than heavy industry 
zones, or remote and inaccessible regions. In the latter case, the competent authority 
would be more likely to elect a “natural recovery option, that is to say an option in 
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which no direct human intervention in the recovery process would be taken”.133 
While remediation measures for protected species and natural habitats and water 
must continue until they are restored to the baseline condition, land remediation 
may cease as soon as there is no further risk of adverse effects on human health. 
The earlier analysis of Article 3(1) suggests that it is only the operators of Annex 
III listed hazardous activities that will be held liable for any damage to land, and 
then only so long as the damage poses some threat to human health.134 Operators of 
non-hazardous activities will only be held liable for damage to protected species 
and natural habitats, and then only if they have been at fault or negligence. This 
suggests a significant gap in the ELD’s protection of land. However, the Natura 
2000 network protects a much of the EU’s land area, and areas outside of that 
network will be protected by Member States existing land use regulations and 
private property protections. Indeed, the ELD was designed to focus on damage to 
biodiversity because Member States already had stringent land contamination 
regimes featuring lower thresholds, strict liability for polluters, and no limitation 
periods.135 Any overall assessment of the ELD’s effectiveness then needs to take 
Member State’s legal systems into account, but that is level of detail that goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
11.5 Cost recovery 
The key principle of the ELD is, of course, that the polluter must pay. There are 
two aspects to the ELD’s cost recovery mechanisms. Article 8 provides that the 
operator “shall bear the costs for the preventive and remedial actions taken pursuant 
to this Directive”. Article 14 requires that Member States take steps to ensure that 
operators can obtain the appropriate financial security instruments to meet those 
costs.  
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As with the issue of preventive and remedial measures, there is a question about 
whether the competent authority must pursue the operator for costs. Article 8(2) 
states that: 
Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4, the competent authority shall recover, inter alia, 
via security over property or other appropriate guarantees from the operator 
who has caused the damage or the imminent threat of damage, the costs it has 
incurred in relation to the preventive or remedial actions taken under this 
Directive. 
Article 14(1) of the ELD requires that: 
Member States shall take measures to encourage the development of financial 
security instruments and markets by the appropriate economic and financial 
operators, including financial mechanisms in case of insolvency, with the aim 
of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities 
under this Directive. 
Does the use of the term “shall” mean that the competent authority must pursue the 
operator for costs in every instance? The competent authority does have the option 
of not seeking to recover those full costs “where the expenditure required to do so 
would be greater than the recoverable sum or where the operator cannot be 
identified.”136  This suggests that the Member States do have discretion not to 
undertake prosecutions, for example, when the costs outweigh the benefits. 
Hubert Bocken has pointed out that Article 8(2) is meaningless unless the Member 
State ensures that the guarantees are effective.137 Bocken contends that:138 
…[rationally] speaking, guarantees which are only put in place after an 
incident causing environmental damage has actually occurred cannot 
be considered as appropriate, as they provide no protection in the event 
of environmentally dangerous activities being carried out by 
undercapitalized undertakings or undertakings overburdened by 
liabilities. 
Financial guarantees will only be effective if they are in place before any incident 
occurs, and for Bocken that means insurance must be mandatory. Bocken compares 
Article 8 with Article 14, and says that it would be contradictory to hold that 
Member States must provide financial mechanisms, but that operators are not 
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required to make use of them.139 He says that the contradiction can only be resolved 
if by accepting that the two articles are complementary. Article 14 is intended to 
encourage the Member State to ensure that the financial mechanisms are developed 
to protect the operator against liability, while Article 8(2) protects the competent 
authority and the public against the consequences of operator insolvency.  
Bocken bases his analysis on the French, German and Dutch translations of the term 
“guarantee” in the 2002 ELD Proposal and the EU Commission’s Common 
Position.140  A guarantee or security over property must be the equivalent of a 
“security interest”, which grants the creditor “substantive rights against a debtor or 
a third party that will allow him to satisfy his claim with priority over other 
creditors.”141 He argues that the EU never intended to leave the competent authority 
in the position of a general creditor, and therefore the operator must provide these 
guarantees before they are needed.142  
Bergkamp et al., on the other hand, argue that the ELD does not make insurance 
mandatory, and Article 8(2) clearly only requires the operator to make ex post 
measures.143 They interpret Bocken to have meant that:144 
… even though the ELD does not impose ex ante compulsory insurance, there 
is a duty to provide ‘security or other appropriate guarantees’ from the 
moment liability has actually arisen under the ELD, ie immediately after the 
damage has occurred and the operator’s responsibility for it has been 
established.  
However, this is a misreading of Bocken. What he actually says is that:145 
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Although the Directive does not instruct the Member State directly to do so, 
it necessarily requires them to set up a system of security interests in order to 
effectively enable the competent authority to recover from a defaulting 
operator the costs it has made. 
Bocken means that the Member State must establish a system of security interests, 
which the operator must make use of, and in order to be appropriate and effective, 
this system must be in place before any accident happens.  
While Bocken’s insight that Articles 8 and 14 are complementary is illuminating, 
and it may be rational to put security interests in place before an incident occurs, 
the principle of subsidiarity insists that the Member States are free to take that risk 
if they choose. Equal attention should be paid to Article 8(2)’s use of the term “inter 
alia”. The term indicates that the competent authorities’ cost recovery powers are 
intended to be broad. That could mean requiring mandatory insurance, bank 
guarantees or catastrophe bonds be in place before any accident happens. Or it 
might entail simply seizing the operator’s property, demanding that the operator 
raise capital via bank loans, issues of shares, or even holding directors, managers 
and shareholders personally liable. The point is that the choice is up to the Member 
States and its competent authority or authorities, and that could mean securing those 
costs with ex post or ex ante measures, or a mixture of both, or neither if the Member 
State and its regulatory agencies determine that the costs of recovery outweighed 
the benefits.  
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Article 14(2) required the EU 
Commission to report back by the 30th of April 2010 on the Directive’s 
effectiveness, on the availability of insurance and other kinds of financial security, 
and to submit “proposals for a system of harmonised mandatory financial 
security.”146 The report considered:147 
… the use of a graduated approach allowing Member States to gradually phase 
in mandatory financial security, starting with riskier activities and operators 
and with damage to soil and water; setting ceilings for financial guarantees; 
excluding low-risk activities. 
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The report clearly assumes that Member States would not automatically enact ex 
ante mandatory financial security requirements. Even so, by 2010 eight Member 
States had introduced mandatory financial security, but the difficult transposition 
process had delayed the development of insurance products.148 France, Spain and 
Italy reported that their existing insurance pools offered sufficient coverage to cope 
with any extra demand.149 Insurance was the preferred option, followed by bank 
guarantees and other Market Based Instruments such as funds and bonds. 150 
Germany also reported advances in the development of ELD specific insurance, 
while integrated insurance policies covering both environmental damage and 
financial losses are now available across the EU.151  
Bocken addressed the issue again in 2009, and finally conceded that the ELD:152 
… while not imposing compulsory insurance or another specific system of 
financial guarantees, requires that member states set up a system of financial 
guarantees enabling the competent authority to recover the costs it made in 
carrying out ex officio measures. … The text however does not clarify when 
guarantees are to be considered ‘appropriate’ nor whether the security should 
be available from the beginning and during the whole period of the operation 
or, as is the majority opinion, only from the moment liability has actually 
arisen under the directive. It has been pointed out that the latter solution may 
very well be insufficient to ensure cost recovery by the authorities. 
Since 2010, it has been reported that there is now sufficient capacity and products 
to cover ELD liabilities. 153  The actual experience has been that demand is 
significantly lower than expected, due to a low number of reported incidents, 
especially in newer markets, and possibly because of problems with the ELD’s 
implementation. The result is that there is weak support for, and active opposition 
against, a stronger mandatory insurance requirement. This debate would have an 
impact on the development of the OSD, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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11.6 Mandatory Defences, Optional Defences and Exceptions 
As was mentioned above, the ELD makes it clear that operators will not be required 
to bear the costs “in situations where the damage in question or imminent threat 
thereof is the result of certain events beyond the operator’s control.”154 Operators 
must be notified and told the exact grounds of the decision, their available legal 
remedies, and any time limits those remedies are subject to, which gives them a 
chance to look at defending the case against them. 155  The ELD provides that 
Member States transposing legislation must implement two mandatory defences, 
and may incorporate two additional optional defences.  
As well as that, Article IV species that it will not include environmental damage 
caused by Acts of War and overwhelming natural phenomenon. The article further 
provides that it does not apply to a number of International Conventions listed in 
Annex V, which includes the CLC and Fund Conventions, it will not apply to 
nuclear activities covered by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Community, to pollution of a diffuse character unless it is possible to prove a causal 
link to an individual operator, or to activities aimed at serving national defence, 
international security, or where the “sole purpose” is to protect against natural 
disasters. The exceptions are evidence of the influence that the CLC and Fund 
Conventions had on the ELD, and that the ELD was based on the assumption that 
great risk of oil pollution damage would come from shipping, and that there was no 
need to account for possible damage from offshore oil and gas activities.  
The ELD’s two mandatory defences are the “third party” and the “compliance” 
defences. The third party defence applies on the condition that the operator has 
ensured that “appropriate safety measures were in place".156 The operator is not 
required to make use of every possible safety measure, but only to make the 
appropriate preparations for reasonably foreseeable events.157 Third party damage 
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may include a range of intentional or negligent acts committed by a wide range of 
actors, but third party acts which are normal and familiar facts of life, like petty 
vandalism, will not break the chain of causation.158 Acts of terrorism were assumed 
to be so extraordinary that the operator could never be considered liable. This 
assumption may not be so sound in the current era, but the nature of the act may 
still indicate whether or not the safety measures were indeed adequate. As an 
example, at the time of writing Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
was being sued by the residents of the Ogale Community in Ogoniland and the Bille 
Kingdom for failing to guard against spills caused by vandalism to pipelines.159 
Shell’s response was that they bore no responsibility for acts of theft or vandalism. 
Under the ELD, Shell would still be required to show that they had reasonably 
adequate safeguards in place. 
The compliance defence applies when the damage resulted from “compliance with 
a compulsory order or instruction emanating from a public authority”.160 The act 
causing the damage must have been specifically required by that order, and the 
operator cannot claim immunity for any damage resulting from orders given 
subsequent to the initial accident. It is sound that operators should not be penalised 
for obeying lawful instructions, but the subsequent condition puts operators in a 
difficult position. The operator may be required to carry out preventive measures 
that it knows will cause more damage, and it may incur further penalties if it refuses 
to comply.  
Article 8(4) allows Member States the option of including two additional and 
possibly more controversial defences. The optional defences only apply to the costs 
of remedial measures, and require that the operator must demonstrate that they were 
not at fault or negligent. First, the “permit defence” excuses the operator when the 
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“emission or event was expressly authorised by, and fully in accordance with the 
conditions of, an authorisation conferred by or given under applicable national 
laws”. 161  Second, the “state-of-the-art defence” allows the operator to avoid 
liability if they can prove that the activity “was not considered likely to cause 
environmental damage according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge 
at the time when the emission was released or the activity took place.”162  
The permit defence has a similar policy rationale to the compliance defence. If the 
emission or event was expressly authorised by a regulatory body, and was carried 
out in accordance with conditions set by that body, then it would be unjust to impose 
liability for any resulting damage.163 This creates incentives for operators to comply 
with environmental laws and work place safety standards. The danger is that it also 
creates the potential for Member States to authorise damaging emissions or events 
and to exclude them from the scope of the ELD. It would then take political pressure 
from non-governmental organisations or citizens to force the Member State to 
review that authorisation, or even court action by the EU itself to test whether or 
not the ELD was being properly implemented. 
Lucas Bergkamp criticises the ELD for creating unnecessary compliance costs, but 
in doing so he provides indirect support for the permit and state-of-the-art 
defences. 164  He complains that the polluter is required to pay twice, first in 
complying with inflexible regulations which best practice or technological 
innovation, and second when they are fined or forced to pay compensation for 
pollution damage. However, the state-of-the-art defence assumes that the operator 
should not be held liable for environmental risks that are unknown to science. It 
only requires the operator to invest in the best available precautionary measures, 
without specifying what that might entail, and if that prevents accidents then it is 
all to the good. 
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Bergkamp remains sceptical that the polluter pays principle alone will force 
operators to comply with safety regulations, and argues that the opposite is just as 
plausible. Likewise, Michael Faure says that a permit defence will be likely to result 
in regulatory capture as “[if] a permit would always release from liability, all a plant 
operator would have to do, is get a good permit with easy conditions from a friendly 
civil servant.”165 The polluter has no incentive to take any more precautions than 
the regulations ask for, or which exceed the marginal cost of abatement, even if 
added care would lead to greater reductions in future costs.166 Mark Wilde has also 
criticised the optional defences for reintroducing a fault qualification. Strict liability 
should mean strict liability, and the “fault qualification is an entirely superfluous 
and potentially costly complication which serves no real purpose.”167 Perhaps it is 
not surprising then that one of the most recent and extensive evaluations of the ELD 
concluded that the optional defences should be deleted altogether on the grounds 
that they were contrary to the polluter pays principle and increased the ELD’s 
complexity by adding a weak fault-based system that removed the operator’s 
incentive to take any more care than required by the conditions of their permit.168  
Andrew Waite sees the operator’s strict liability as virtually absolute, and that once 
the competent authority has established a direct causal link between the operator’s 
activities and the damage, then the operator must pay.169 Valerie Fogleman agrees 
and argues that the defences are not technically defences. The operator will already 
have been required to carry out the preventive or remedial measures, so that the 
defences, along with Article 8(3), merely provide grounds so that the operator can 
recover its costs, either from a third party which caused the accident or from the 
competent authority which ordered it to carry out those measures.170  
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Bergkamp and van Bergeijk say that such a reading makes no sense and would 
render the defences “largely meaningless”.171 If the defences are to be meaningful, 
then not only should the operator be excused from the obligation to bear costs, it 
must also be excused from the obligation to undertake preventive or remedial 
measures at all. Yet that would run counter to the ELD’s policy of ensuring that 
preventive and remedial measures are activated immediately and without delay. The 
competent authority’s investigations must run concurrent with any emergency 
responses, and it would be foolish in the extreme to delay contingency plans while 
questions of liability and causation were determined.  
These arguments appear to obfuscate what should be straightforward matters. 
Polluters should pay for the damage they have caused, and be excused from paying 
if they are not responsible. The self-executing provisions should only operate to the 
extent necessary to ensure that preventive and remedial measures are activated 
according to pre-determined contingency plans, and the bill for any expenses should 
be settled once the most appropriate response has been determined. The debate has 
resurfaced at the implementation stage, however, with some Member States 
interpreting the defences as “defences to liability”, meaning that the operator is 
excused from the obligation to remediate, while others have interpreted defences as 
“defences to costs”, meaning that operators must undertake preventive and remedial 
measures, but can expect to be reimbursed. 172  Fifteen Member States have 
implemented the permit defence and 14 Member States have incorporated the state-
of-the-art defence. 173  Sweden has not transposed either but considers permit 
compliance and state-of-the-art as mitigating factors in liability. Finland’s 
legislation only imposes reasonable costs for damage resulting from activities that 
comply with a relevant permit, and the Dutch permit defence allows the competent 
authority to recover only part of the remedial costs if they “cannot, in whole or in 
part, be reasonably attributed to the operator”.   
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11.7  Implementation Issues 
The ELD was intended to harmonize Member State liability laws with respect to 
environmental damage per se, and to provide a minimum framework of polluter 
pays liability for Member States to follow. Yet despite the avowed intention to 
protect the internal market of the EU from the destabilizing effects of divergent 
liability laws, the ELD has provided Member States with partial or complete 
discretion in the areas of:174  
• permit and state-of-the-art defences;  
• defining the operator;  
• whether to include pre-existing nationally protected species and habitats;  
• the choice between joint and several or proportional liability;  
• whether to include additional activities within the strict liability scope of 
Annex III;  
• whether remediation and preventive measures should be more stringent; and 
• whether to make financial security requirements mandatory, and if so, what 
kind of securities would be adequate. 
 
The result was that Member States had to make more difficult choices than the 
Directive’s framers had perhaps considered, and only four Member States were able 
to meet the 30th of April 2007, deadline.175 Article 4(3) of the TEU contains the 
principle of “sincere cooperation”, and the failure to transpose EU legislation in a 
timely and accurate fashion can see the Member State prosecuted before the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).176 Infringement notices were therefore issued 
to 23 Member States, and judgments were imposed against seven Member States in 
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2008 and 2009.177 The Member States would all eventually transpose the ELD, 
even though the EU Commission’s 2010 report noted a “broad divergence” between 
these laws.178  
Member States were to report their experiences to the Commission by 30 April 
2013, which provided another opportunity to review the implementation process.179 
A 2013 study by Deloitte’s Bio Intelligence Service Ltd, “Implementation 
challenges and obstacles of the Environmental Liability Directive” (“Bio 
Intelligence study”), examines the ELD’s implementation in sixteen Member States 
with case studies from seven Member States.180 A follow up report by Stevens & 
Bolton LLP, entitled “Study on Analysis of integrating the ELD into 11 national 
legal frameworks” (“Stevens & Bolton report”), reviewed the transposition in the 
remaining Member States, with the exception of Croatia.181 Both studies confirm 
the EU Commission’s finding that, far from harmonising EU liability law, the ELD 
has resulted in “a patchwork of liability systems”.182  
The Bio Intelligence report categorises the variations as either procedural or 
substantial.183 The procedural variations included:184 
• Legislation could either copy-and-paste the ELD, or contain complex and 
lengthy provisions amending and covering gaps. 
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• The number of competent authorities could vary between one, a few, or 
several hundred, with efficiency decreasing as the number increased. 
• Some Member States chose to publish guidelines and policy documents, and 
data on implementation and enforcement, which increased stakeholder 
understanding and cooperation. 
 
Substantive variations included:185 
• There is wide variety in operator definitions, in choosing between joint or 
proportionate liability, and in the standing requirements for those making 
observations or requests for action. 
• Lack of precision and translation difficulties have caused confusion, for 
example, whether the defences excuse operators from liability to carry out 
preventive or remedial measures, or merely grant them the right to 
reimbursement for costs, and whether the word “shall” means that the 
competent must recover costs in all situations.  
• There are major difficulties in deciding when the thresholds for significant 
damage requiring preventive or remedial measures have been breached. 
 
There were major differences in the number of ELD cases before the courts, with 
some Member States finding none, one, or a few instances, and Poland experiencing 
more than 400.186 Factors explaining this paucity of cases included the pre-existing 
Member State liability codes were preferred to the ELD, some Member States have 
more Natura 2000 area than others, and a general confusion and ignorance amongst 
operators about their obligations.187 In some instances the thresholds for remedial 
action were thought to be too high, in others, the competent authorities claimed that 
there was no need to activate ELD provisions because of the “expertise, experience, 
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proactivity of liable operators in implementing remedial actions, and robustness of 
traditional legislation”.188 As one environmental underwriter stated:189 
If you take the UK, I would say the ELD has barely caused a ripple, largely 
down to regulators apparently preferring to use legislation they have more 
experience of, such as the Water Resources Act for example, plus a lack of 
support in the UK for a regime of mandatory financial provision for the ELD. 
In reply to accusations of regulatory capture, or that the law might be too 
complicated to apply, the report argued that the ELD was fulfilling its deterrent 
function and that operators were simply not causing as much damage as they had 
before.190 Commercial Risk Europe cited Client Earth lawyer Dawid Szescilo as 
saying that non-governmental organisations were very able at using request for 
action procedures.191 The requests had to be supported by some evidence, but as the 
administrative procedures were less stringent than court proceedings, non-
governmental organisations were able to initiate cases quite easily. The large 
number of cases in Poland therefore may have been down to local activism, low 
damage thresholds, and user friendly administrative law provisions. 
A 2016 review reveals the depth of the EU’s evaluation of the implementation 
process.192 As well as the Bolton and Stevens and Bio Intelligence study and the 
Stevens & Bolton report, the EU Commission commissioned a further report into 
the feasibility of creating an environmental damage compensation fund, the “REFIT 
Evaluation of the Environmental Liability Directive”, a fourth implementation 
study on “ELD Effectiveness: Scope and Exceptions”, and a fifth study on 
“Experience Gained in the Application of ELD Biodiversity Damage”. 193  The 
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general theme of these reports is that there is a need for further harmonisation of 
Member State’s policies regarding environmental damage. 
The widely differing transposing laws and small number of ELD cases in many 
Member States makes it difficult to identify any clear trends. The ELD may have 
failed in its goal of harmonizing Member State legislation, but not if the intent was 
to allow Member States to introduce environmental liability laws to some extent. It 
is also not clear whether polluters are being deterred from carrying out damaging 
activities, or whether the ELD is not being enforced because existing laws are 
sufficient, or whether competent authorities are struggling with an overly complex 
system, or are being deterred from bringing prosecutions because they have been 
subjected to political pressures from industry. Without more empirical evidence it 
is simply too soon to tell.  
 
11.8 Concluding Remarks 
The ELD was the culmination of decades of discussion and negotiation stretching 
back at least to the Waste Directives of the 1980s. It drew inspiration from elements 
of the common law and from civil codes like Germany’s BGB, and from 
international liability regimes like the Lugano and CLC and Fund Conventions. 
However, the ELD has diverged significantly from the CLC and Fund Convention’s 
basic structures, and there is a good reason for this.  
Where the CLC and Fund Conventions were based on a strong consensus between 
shipowners, insurers and oil importers, the ELD had to be developed within the 
EU’s historical, political and constitutional context. The Waste Directives had 
taught the EU Commission the futility of targeting environmental damaging sectors 
one industry at a time, but a much broader liability regime could only be justified 
if left the details of implementing its many optional clauses and ambiguous 
terminology to the individual Member States. The result is that Member States have 
implemented widely differing ELD transposing laws, there is no one EU 
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environmental liability regime, and no agreement about how liability should be 
shared between individual operators and the insurance industry or industry sectors 
as a whole.  
Instead of channelling liability to a single operator, the ELD was designed to 
capture both the permitted operators and those in charge of occupational activities, 
and that could include employees, contractors, parent companies and even creditors 
such as banks and insurers. Environmental damage was defined to exclude 
traditional personal injury or property damage claims, and would focus protecting 
habitats, species and areas of land and water that existing Member State laws had 
neglected. Instead of granting broad standing to citizens, competent authorities 
would have the power to oblige operators to undertake or pay for the appropriate 
preventive and remedial measures. That liability is unlimited, subject to certain 
defences, and it can be either strict or fault-based. Insurance is not mandatory, 
although nearly of a third of the Member States have opted for more stringent 
financial guarantees, and it is unlikely that the EU will seek to establish an 
environmental damage compensation fund. 
There is a strong sense that operators and competent authorities alike are troubled 
by the ELD’s complexities. Critics feared that the ELD would undermine economic 
efficiency, and that Member States could be forced to implement contradictory and 
nonsensical laws. The inevitable conclusion is that these fears are mostly 
unfounded. Member States can make their own choices of form and method in 
implementing directives. However, there is nothing to stop the Member States from 
misapplying the law. Some Member States could develop complicated regulatory 
regimes, generating a great deal of ELD caselaw, others could ignore the ELD in 
favour of their existing legal traditions. 
Britain’s exit from the EU could raise other unexpected issues, particularly for 
offshore oil and gas operators operating on the United Kingdom’s Continental 
Shelf. Concerns that the EU itself could dissolve are very likely to distract from 
environmental issues that many will see as a peripheral issue. This complicated 
picture would not make it any easier to make predictions about how the ELD would 




apply offshore oil and gas activities, and what effect that reform would have on the 
ELD itself, as the following chapter will explain.  




12 The EU’s Offshore Safety Directive 
  
 
The Deepwater Horizon accident caused a good deal more soul-searching amongst 
EU academics and leaders about the suitability of its safety and liability regulations 
than appears to have taken place in New Zealand. This is not surprising considering 
the already tremendous economic importance of the North Sea’s offshore oil 
industry, and its hopes for developing oil and gas reserves in the Arctic and in other 
EU marine regions. While New Zealand has a mere half dozen offshore 
installations, the European Maritime Safety Agency estimated that, as of 2013, 
there were more than 1000 oil and gas installations in the North Sea, the Adriatic, 
the Mediterranean, off the Iberian Peninsula, the Baltic, and in the Black Sea.1 
These mostly operate in waters of a depth of less than 300m, but offshore petroleum 
exploration and production activities are becoming more difficult and complex as 
these easy to reach oil and gas deposits are depleted. 
As this chapter will explain, much of the debate on the issue would focus on the 
likelihood and probable cost of a major offshore oil well accident. The EU 
Commission would test the waters regarding whether or not the ELD’s scope of 
liability should be broadened, and whether it should conform more closely to the 
CLC and Fund Conventions’ strict liability, mandatory insurance and compensation 
fund model, but would ultimately continue to leave such matters to the Member 
States. 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster may have been unprecedented in scale, but the EU 
has also had its own experiences with offshore oil spills and accidents. Notable 
amongst them were the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster, which cost $1.6bn USD and the 
lives of 167 men, and the 1977 Ekofisk Bravo platform blowout, which spilled 
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between 80,000 and 126,000 barrels of oil.2 More recently the EU and Norway have 
witnessed:3 
• The Statfjord Field oil spill (12 December 2007), where a ruptured loading 
hose spilled 4400 tonnes of crude oil causing Norway’s second largest ever 
oil spill; 
• The Gulfaks C incident (19 May 2010), a near-miss saw Norway’s Statoil 
fight for over two months to regain control of the well; 
• The Valhall PCP production platform fire (13 July 2011), emergency 
responders took an hour and thirty-seven minutes to extinguish the flames; 
• The Gannet Alpha oil spill (10 August 2011), 216 tonnes of oil leaked from 
the Shell owned platform, raising concerns about the continuing safety of 
offshore installations which are approaching or have exceeded their 
expected 20-25 year life-span;4 
• The Elgin Platform blowout (26 March 2012), a two month crisis off the 
coast of Scotland which forced the evacuation of 238 men and the shutdown 
of neighbouring facilities, and which may have been caused by cost cutting 
measures delaying maintenance of critical safety equipment.  
• The Norway Ula Field spill (12 September 2012), where the production 
platform had to be evacuated after a significant quantify of oil escaped from 
a separator module. 
Despite the seriousness of some of these incidents, the United Kingdom’s 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (“DECC”) only issued seven fines for 
the 4,123 oil spills that occurred in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf between 
2000 and 2012.5 The volume of oil released in these spills may have been small, 
                                                 
2 Commission of the European Communities Commission Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the Document “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
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3 Kristel de Smedt and others Civil Liability and Financial Security for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities 
(Maastricht European Institute for Transnational Legal Research, Maastricht University, the 
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totalling only 1,226 tonnes, but the sheer number of accidents was a poor reflection 
of the quality of the existing safety and regulatory systems.  
After the Deepwater Horizon, the EU Commission feared that that operators 
worldwide were moving into “environments characterised by high pressure/high 
temperature reservoirs, deeper waters and/or extreme climatic conditions that may 
complicate the control of subsea installations and incident response.”6 As a result, 
the European Parliament characterized deepwater drilling as “hyper-hazardous” 
and in need of regulation beyond what might usually have been acceptable in a free 
market.7 It resolved that:8 
… it is imperative for the EU and its Member States urgently to examine all 
aspects of oil extraction and exploration in the European Union and to take all 
necessary steps thereafter to ensure that such an environmental catastrophe 
will not occur in EU waters. 
The EU Commission subsequently published a Communication lamenting the 
incoherent mixture of EEZ regulations and Member State laws, and it employed the 
familiar argument that this could be harmful to the smooth functioning of the EU’s 
internal market. 9  It would enact a regulation (not a directive) to ensure that 
operators provide a full safety case demonstrating their capacity to “prevent and 
respond to critical events”, and proving their “[financial] capability to handle the 
consequences of unforeseen events, including possible participation in suitable 
insurance schemes or risk-coverage instruments.”10 The regulation would expand 
the ELD to include offshore oil and gas activities in the EU’s marine waters in the 
hope that clear liability provisions would “discourage the operators from 
underestimating risks or compromising on safety measures”.11   
In 2011, the EU Commission produced a working paper impact assessment to 
accompany its proposal for an offshore regulation (“EC Impact Assessment”).12 
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Essentially, the EU Commission’s case was to argue that the costs of a one in 35 
year blowout were high enough justify an EU regulation. That assertion would be 
strenuously tested when the EU Commission convened meetings between its own 
in-house science advisory group, the Joint Research Centre, Oil & Gas UK and 
Norway’s Oil & Gas Association, as each group debated the true cost of offshore 
oil and gas accidents, and the chances that the EU would suffer its own Deepwater 
Horizon.13  
The EU Commission noted the difficulties of estimating the costs of offshore 
accidents, but it aimed to “present policymakers with a broad, but reliable, cost 
range that is based on the best available data as well as notable case studies.”14 It 
set the lower bound cost according to a 2011 Hess report, that a blowout off the 
Shetland Islands could release up to 88,000 bpd and take at least a week to bring 
under control.15 The upper bound cost was based on one the size of the Deepwater 
Horizon, and used oil spill cost models developed for tanker spills, such as the 
IMO’s “Non-linear functions of total spill costs (obtained by regression)” and the 
US EPA’s Basic Oil Cost Estimation Model (“BOSCEM”).16 The IMO’s model 
estimates costs as a function of volume of oil spilled, which only goes to show that 
the IMO has significantly changed its stance from the days of the Antonio 
Gramsci.17 The EU Commission’s DG TREN SKEMA project has used the IMO’s 
model to estimate that the costs of oil spill accidents in Europe could be as much as 
$13,100 USD per ton of oil spilled.18  
BOSCEM incorporates “spill specific factors that influence costs – spill amount; 
oil type; response methodology and effectiveness; impacted medium; location-
                                                 
13 European Commission Peer Review Meetings on the Assessment of Risks in the Offshore Oil and 
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14 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, above n 2, at 4. 
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specific socioeconomic value, freshwater vulnerability, habitat/wildlife sensitivity; 
and location type.”19 As Dagmar Etkin explains, each oil spill is unique and models 
can never exactly determine the costs.20 For example, while heavy persistent oils 
may cause more damage to resort beaches, lighter oils may have greater toxicity 
and have more of an impact on biodiversity. Emergency responses may remove all 
the visible appearance of oil, but cause greater environmental damage than the spill 
itself, while smaller spills may cost more per unit of oil than larger ones.21   
The EC Impact Assessment concluded that, while it was difficult to generalise, the 
average costs of a blowout releasing over 500,000 tonnes of oil into EU waters 
would be between €5 billion and €30 billion.22 As such disasters were estimated to 
occur once every 35 years, the average cost would be between €205m and €915m 
per year.23 If all possible types of blowouts were combined, then the average annual 
probability of some kind of well release rose to a staggering 65%, however it 
expected that only 56% would be likely to last 2 days or less and only 15% would 
last more than 2 weeks.24  
Practically and politically, this presented an unacceptable situation for the EU 
Commission. However, before presenting its final proposal, the EU Commission 
would convene two peer review meetings that would pit its own Joint Research 
Centre (“JRC”) against the United Kingdom’s Oil & Gas and Norway’s Oil & Gas 
Association. Each would be asked to report on the potential risk and costs of future 
offshore oil and gas accidents. The groups’ various findings would determine the 
EU Commission’s final approach to the problem, but would also represent entirely 
approaches to the problems of quantifying and costing offshore oil spill accidents.  
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12.1.1 The JRC Report: Lessons from past accident analysis 
The JRC duly submitted a report entitled “Safety of offshore oil and gas operations: 
Lessons from past accident analysis” (“JRC report”).25 The JRC report sought to 
aggregate an entire “mosaic” of lessons learned from “landmark past accidents” as 
well as the less well-known incidents recorded in the Det Norske Veritas (“DNV”) 
international accredited registration and classification association’s World Offshore 
Accident Dataset (“WOAD”). 26  According to WOAD, there have been 6183 
“incidents, accidents and near-misses” between 1970 and 2009, with 228 out of the 
total 359 blowouts occurring during initial drilling.27 The total also included 285 
incidents of capsizing, 278 collisions involving offshore units, 192 explosions, 1030 
fires, 1851 gas releases, and 556 well problems that did not result in a well 
blowout.28 
Of the 14% of total accidents which were caused by people, only 9% were due to 
human error, 2% were due to act of war, sabotage or other, while the remaining 
89% were due to a combination of design error, unsafe procedures, or acts or 
omissions.29 The remaining 5323 events were due to equipment failure, and that 
term included equipment malfunctions, structural failures, safety system 
malfunction, and many kinds of ignition, all of which could be due, wholly or in 
part, to human error.30 
To put these findings in context, only 2.24% of the 6183 incidents ended in 
significant to severe damage or total loss of the installation. However, if all 
blowouts and the near misses had resulted in a catastrophic failure, then the 
percentage rises to a more significant 5.8%, still less than the EU Commission’s 
earlier estimates, but high enough to justify legislative intervention.  
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12.1.2 The DNV Memo 
Meanwhile, Norway’s Oil & Gas Association commissioned DNV to undertake its 
own review using blowout frequency data from the Scandpower Annual SINTEF 
report (2011).31 Scandpower’s analysis is based on the SINTEF Offshore Blowout 
Database, which contains information on 611 blowouts or well releases that have 
occurred around the world since 1955.32 The Scandpower report is proprietary and 
confidential and so was not available for direct analysis for this thesis. Even so, the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producer’s 2010 report “Blowout 
frequencies” also made use of SINTEF data. That report showed that out of 6,257 
Appraisal and 7,505 Wildcat wells, only 8 and 14 surface flow blowouts occurred 
respectively, and out of 20,328 completed wells, which between them that operated 
for a combined total of 211,142 well years, only 9 suffered surface flow blowouts.33  
DNV’s memo does not explain why it used Scandpower data instead of its own 
WOAD dataset, but one possibility is that it is because of the way that the data is 
expressed. Where JRC estimated the chance of an accident occurring in any one 
year, and seems to have counted many accidents that were not included in the 
Scandpower database, the Scandpower data is expressed in terms of frequency of 
accidents per operation, or per well year. This led to the DNV Memo’s final 
estimate, that the total blowout frequency for all wells was just 1.50x10-1 per year, 
or one blowout every 6.7 years.34 It asserted that a 15-50 day blowout might happen 
once every 61 years, while a 50-120 day blowout would likely only happen once 
every 222 years. The conclusion was that blowouts in United Kingdom waters will 
be small and will almost never reach shore, and the annualised costs should only be 
between about €4m and €9m.35 The memo concludes by saying that “Macondo 
numbers represent an outlier compared with the other data. So while Macondo 
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consequences are unlikely but possible, they do not represent expected 
outcomes.”36 
12.1.3 Oil & Gas UK’s Report 
Oil & Gas UK and Norway’s Oil & Gas Association commissioned oil and gas 
industry advisor GL Noble Denton to submit a second report which also challenged 
the EC Impact Assessment’s estimates.37 GL Noble Denton is a subsidiary of Det 
Norske Veritas Germanischer Lloyd, and its report would largely agree with DNV’s 
findings.38 For example, GL Noble Denton’s report declared that 70% of blowout 
events were to production wells, and that, as 46% of production wells could not 
flow naturally and as only 22% flowed at more than 1000 bpd, there was little 
likelihood of another Deepwater Horizon.39 
Oil & Gas UK argued that an EU regulation would dismantle the goal-setting 
regime that had been the industry standard since Lord Cullen’s Piper Alpha report.40 
A regulation would replace national specialist regulators with unknown EU bodies 
without necessarily improving safety. Furthermore, the EU would have the power 
to amend a prescriptive regime without consulting the United Kingdom, and that 
would conflict with the Lisbon Treaty’s guarantees that the Member States have a 
right to control their own resources.41 
GL Noble Denton added that it was inappropriate for the EC Impact Assessment to 
rely on tanker oil spill models because tanker accidents tend to happen right on the 
shoreline.42 This makes them far more damaging than the vast majority of offshore 
spills that disperse further out to sea. However, it should be noted that the EC 
Impact Assessment had anticipated this objection, and asserted that the IMO’s 
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models tended to underestimate spill costs as the CLC and Fund Conventions only 
require that the shipowner must pay for “reasonable” preventive and remedial 
measures.43  
The EU Commission’s summary report commented that the differences in the 
various reports findings may have been down to the fact that the JRC study focussed 
on large release incidents such as Deepwater Horizon, while DNV and GL Noble 
Denton emphasized the many years the large number of offshore oil wells had 
operated in safety.44 Its diplomatically phrased closing remark was that neither 
approach was “wholly right or wrong”, but each study simply reflected the “effect 
of differing assumptions and approaches”.45 It was the process of technical review 
itself which was more important. The ultimate result was that the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy recommended that the 
regulation be changed to a directive, and the details of that will be explore below.46  
 
12.2 The Offshore Safety Directive 
The final Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations 
(“OSD”) was built on the existing UK Offshore Installations Safety Case 
Regulations 2005.47 Its most basic requirement is that the operators and owners of 
offshore installations should be required to prepare safety cases before any 
operations are allowed to begin.48 As explained above, it amends the ELD so that it 
will include occupational activities in the EU’s marine waters, as defined by the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (“MSFD”), but it does little to bolster any 
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mandatory insurance requirements, and it still excludes traditional damages 
claims.49  
12.2.1 The OSD’s Definitions  
The OSD defines “major accident” as any accident involving “explosion, fire, loss 
of well control, or release of oil, gas or dangerous substances involving, or with a 
significant potential to cause, fatalities or serious personal injury”, which may cause 
serious damage to the installation, or which may cause fatalities either on the 
installation or on “connected infrastructure”.50 A “major environmental incident” 
means an incident which results from a major accident and “which results, or is 
likely to result, in significant adverse effects on the environment” in accordance 
with the ELD.51  
Article 2(3) states that: 
‘offshore oil and gas operations’ means all activities associated with an 
installation or connected infrastructure, including design, planning, 
construction, operation and decommissioning thereof, relating to exploration 
and production of oil or gas but excluding conveyance of oil and gas from one 
coast to another; 
Article 2(19) defines an installation as: 
… a stationary fixed or mobile facility, or a combination of facilities 
permanently inter-connected by bridges or other structures, used for oil and 
gas operations or in connection with such operations. Installations include 
mobile offshore drilling units only when they are stationed in offshore waters 
for drilling, production or other activities associated with offshore oil and gas 
operations. 
Article 2(19) introduces the term “mobile offshore drilling unit” (“MODU”). The 
term draws to mind drillships and semi-submersibles, but MODU refers to any 
development system that can be moved without substantial effort and there are more 
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jack-up rigs than any other type of MODU.52 A MODU is only considered to be an 
installation if it is stationed in the EU’s offshore waters for the purpose of carrying 
out oil and gas operations. It is treated as a ship when it is in transit and it must 
abide by international maritime conventions such as SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea), 
MARPOL, and the standards of the Code for the construction and equipment of 
mobile offshore drilling units. 53  That New Zealand takes the same approach 
indicates that this is an internationally accepted policy. 
12.2.2 The OSD’s Financial Security Requirements 
In terms of financial liability it OSD states that:54 
…there is a need to clarify that holders of authorisations for offshore oil and 
gas operations pursuant to Directive 94/22/EC55 are also the liable ‘operators’ 
within the meaning of [the ELD], and should not delegate their responsibilities 
in this regard to third parties contracted to them. 
The objective is that the operator “should always be the entity with the primary 
responsibility for safety of operations and should be at all times competent to act in 
that regard.”56 We recall that, just as in New Zealand, the ELD’s definition of 
operator is very broad, focussing first on the “natural or legal, private or public 
person who operates or controls the occupational activity”.57 Furthermore, Article 
7 states that: 
Without prejudice to the existing scope of liability relating to the prevention 
and remediation of environmental damage pursuant to Directive 2004/35/EC, 
Member States shall ensure that the licensee is financially liable for the 
prevention and remediation of environmental damage as defined in that 
Directive, caused by offshore oil and gas operations carried out by, or on 
behalf of the licensee or the operator. 
This suggested that one effect of the OSD will be that it requires Member States to 
take more of a channelling style approach, directing liability squarely at the 
licensee.  
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As in Article 14 of the ELD, the OSD requires Member States to “facilitate the 
deployment of sustainable financial instruments and other arrangements to assist 
applicants for licences in demonstrating their financial capacity”.58 The Member 
State must ensure that the licensee maintains “sufficient capacity to meet their 
financial obligations resulting from liabilities for offshore oil and gas operations 
including liability for potential economic damages where such liability is provided 
for by national law”, and “having sufficient resources for the immediate launch and 
uninterrupted continuation of all measures necessary for effective emergency 
response and subsequent remediation.”59  
It is for the Member State to decide what financial capacity is sufficient and what 
emergency responses or remediation measures will be effective. The United 
Kingdom already provided that membership in OPOL was a prerequisite for any 
application to operate on the United Kingdom’s continental shelf, and this is likely 
to continue even after Britain leaves the European Union. Other states may develop 
their own regional mutual indemnity agreements, particularly those in the 
Mediterranean since the European Union has acceded to the Offshore Protocol to 
the 1976 Barcelona Convention, which, amongst other things, calls upon its 
signatories to establish mandatory insurance requirements and a Mediterranean 
Compensation Fund.60 The OSD itself acknowledges that “no existing financial 
security instruments, including risk pooling arrangements, can accommodate all 
possible consequences of major accidents” and states that further studies are 
required. 61  However, the danger with relying upon private mutual indemnity 
agreements is that their terms may not mesh with the ELD’s categories of 
environmental damage liability, and they may not provide compensation for third 
party damage.  
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12.2.3 Strict or Fault-based Liability? 
It was less clear whether that liability would be strict or fault-based, however. The 
ELD lists all hazardous occupational activities that are to be subject to strict liability 
in its Annex III, and this annex has not been amended to include the OSD. Unlisted 
activities are only subject to fault-based liability, and then only for damage to the 
category of protected species and natural habitats. Without a clear reference to the 
OSD, the Directive runs the risk that Member States will only apply a fault-based 
standard, and that would exclude liability for damage to water. How then does the 
Annex III include offshore oil and gas activities?   
Faure et al. address this issue by pointing out that the EU Commission has stated 
that the ELD is already applicable to offshore drilling activities, because Annex III 
7(a) already refers to Council Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967.62 This 1967 
Directive applies to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous 
substances, that is, substances that are explosive, oxidising, easily flammable, 
flammable, toxic, harmful, corrosive or an irritant, either in their “natural state or 
as produced by industry”.63 Petroleum could easily fall within a number of these 
categories, but it seems a stretch to say that offshore oil and gas activities should be 
covered by a directive on packaging dangerous substances. Indeed, the EU 
Commission had lamented that offshore installations were not covered by the 
existing environmental legislation on pollution control and major accident 
hazards.64 However, the EU Commission’s working paper asserted that Regulation 
(EC) 1272/2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and 
mixtures, which has repealed and succeeded Directive 67/548/EEC and the more 
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recent 1995/45/EC Directive, will apply to oil spills from 1 December 2010.65 This 
is because Article 2(14) of the Regulation defines “manufacturing” as “production 
or extraction of substances in the natural state”, and that would include the 
production or extraction of oil and gas.  
Annex III also includes the 1975 Waste Framework Directive, which applies to all 
“Waste management operations, including the collection transport recover and 
disposal of waste and hazardous waste, including the supervision of such operations 
and after-care of disposal sites”.66 The Waste Framework Directive’s applicability 
to oil spills caused by tanker accidents was discussed in the 2008 Mesquer case, 
which addressed the sinking of the Erika.67 The issue was whether hydrocarbons 
mixed with water and sediment should be considered waste that the shipping 
company would be obliged to recover, or whether the spill would be excluded by 
the application of the CLC and Fund Conventions.68  
The Court found that the term “discard” would not normally apply to hydrocarbons 
accidentally spilled at sea. 69  However, once the spill mixed with water and 
sediment, the hydrocarbons would need further processing before they could be 
sold or used, and must be classified as waste. It follows that any oil spill, whether 
from shipping or from offshore oil and gas activities, could produce waste for the 
purposes of the Waste Framework Directive, and that would bring such spills within 
Annex III of the ELD. Indeed, the Directorate-General of the Environment’s report 
on “Guidance on the interpretation of key provisions of Directive 2008/98/EC on 
waste” has confirmed that offshore oil spills would fall within the EU’s waste 
legislation.70 Therefore, whether offshore oil and gas activities are considered a 
dangerous activity, or a waste producing activity, they will fall under Annex III of 
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the ELD, and be subject to the strict liability standard. It would have been more 
straightforward to simply amend the Annex to include the Offshore Safety 
Directive; one can only wonder why that did not happen.  
 
12.2.4 An EU Environmental Compensation Fund? 
At the same time as the OSD was in development, NGOs and lobby groups were 
calling on Member States to work towards some form of environmental 
compensation fund. Support for such a fund came from ClientEarth, a group of 
activist lawyers whose number included notable ELD academic Ludwig Krämer. It 
was ClientEarth who called on the United Kingdom’s House of Commons to amend 
its legislation transposing the EU Hydrocarbons Directive 94/22/EC, so that 
licences would only be granted once environmental protections and financial 
security were in place. 71  ClientEarth argued that the ELD was “badly 
underequipped” and that a “mandatory collective compensation scheme or other 
system of financial security is required as a key element of the liability regime.”72 
The EU does have its own environmental compensation instrument, the Solidarity 
Fund, but that was established mainly to provide assistance for natural disasters, 
and it does not apply to industrial accidents.73 In 2006, the European Parliament did 
adopt a proposal to extend the fund to include man-made disasters, threats to public 
health and terrorist attacks, but this was opposed by the European Council.74 After 
the 1999 Erika sinking demonstrated the inadequacy of the IOPC Fund’s 
compensation limits, the EU Commission had also proposed the establishment of a 
supplementary €1 billion Compensation for Oil Pollution in European Waters, or 
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COPE Fund.75 The COPE Fund became redundant after the IMO established its 
own Supplementary Fund Protocol, creating a third tier of funding of up to 750 
million SDR, $1.057bn USD at the time of writing.76 It is possible that the same 
considerations went into the decision to establish the OSD, as it would not have 
been necessary to amend the ELD if the IMO had decided that offshore oil and gas 
operations should fall under the CLC and Fund Conventions. 
The ELD specified that the EU Commission must report back on the feasibility of 
a general environmental compensation fund, leading it to commission the Bio 
Intelligence Service’s “Study to explore the feasibility of creating a fund to cover 
environmental liability and losses occurring from industrial accidents”.77 This study 
described a Hungarian proposal following the tremendous sludge pond dam burst 
at Kolontár in 2010.78 The proposed fund would have replicated the CLC and Fund 
Conventions to a certain extent, limiting the operator’s liability to €100 million, 
with complementary insurance and a fund, and could easily have applied to ELD 
liabilities. However, a survey of stakeholder’s views showed that they were 
generally happy with the availability of insurance for pollution damage and were 
negative about the proposed compensation fund.79 The general sense was that an 
EU-wide compensation fund would be too difficult to coordinate with existing 
liability laws, that it would be too difficult to combine traditional and environmental 
damages, and that it would contribute to moral hazard by allowing operators to 
neglect their financial responsibilities in the knowledge that they could always rely 
upon the fund.  
The OSD also directed the EU Commission to submit a further report on the general 
“availability of financial security instruments, and on the handling of compensation 
claims” and on “the effectiveness of the liability regimes in the Union in respect of 
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damage caused by offshore oil and gas operations”.80 The subsequent 2014 report 
explored the effectiveness of liability and financial security regimes with respect to 
bodily injury, property damage and economic loss, but excluded environmental 
damage liability as being outside of its scope.81 In 2015, the Committee on Legal 
Affairs built on this report, and submitted a motion to the European Parliament 
which fiercely criticized the ELD and the OSD. 82  It called upon the EU 
Commission to develop a compensation mechanism that would cover liability for 
damage to fisheries, coastal tourism and other marine sectors, that would include 
third-party claims for bodily injury, property damage and pure economic losses, 
that would diversify and strengthen the minimum financial security requirements, 
and that would add the OSD to the scope of the Environmental Crime Directive 
2008/99/EC. It will be interesting to see how the EU Commission responds to this 
motion. 
 
12.3 Academic Commentary on the OSD 
The OSD has prompted an outpouring of commentary as industry consultants, law 
firms, insurers and classification societies, amongst others, strive to position 
themselves to address the needs of concerned petroleum licensees.83 At the time of 
writing there has been little consideration of the issue in the peer reviewed journals, 
however. The paucity of academic commentary makes a thorough and methodical 
research of the issue more difficult, but still it is necessary to review some of what 
has been written. 
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Some of the articles focus on the health and safety aspects, while others attend to 
the Major Accident Prevention Policies.84  Bernd Bluhm and Lito Xirotyri ask 
“What has Europe learned after the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Incident?” but 
only to focus on oil spill contingency planning between Member States.85 Barbara 
Goldsmith, Tara Waikem and Tara Franey explore “Environmental Damage 
Liability Regimes Concerning Oil Spills – A Global Review and Comparison”, but 
only give a brief precis of the ELD, noting that it was intended to supplement 
existing national environmental legislation, and commenting that it is too soon to 
say how and whether the ELD will be applied to onshore and offshore spills.86 
Tullio Scovazzi places the OSD in the context of the difficulties of compensating 
for environmental damage per se, and says that the absence of an international 
offshore convention can be explained by an industry preference for self-
regulation.87 He speculated that the most likely result of the Deepwater Horizon 
will be to increase the liability limits and ceilings of regional and national liability 
and compensation schemes. Alex Wawryk also mentions concerns that the new 
Directives would “dramatically increase the potential liability of companies” and 
would force SMEs from the market.88 She explains that insurance and oil industry 
representatives both opposed mandatory insurance, preferring the flexibility offered 
by voluntary schemes such as OPOL.  
Peter Cameron directly addresses the environmental damage issue and claims that 
the OSD will make almost no change to the existing EU civil liability regimes.89 
Writing in 2012, he said that the draft Regulation:90 
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… is unlikely to have any direct relevance: it does not (at least in its present 
form) add to the debate on liability allocation nor does it address issues of who 
pays for oil spills. It is principally a regulatory instrument targeted at health 
and safety issues. 
He suggests further that holding offshore operators liable would be fruitless as 
“there is no established means of restoring the marine environment after an oil spill; 
damages under the ELD would therefore be unquantifiable, making it difficult to 
provide insurance to cover the damage.”91   
A more comprehensive review comes from Greg Gordon, who details how oil 
discharges could trigger both civil and criminal penalties under United Kingdom 
law.92 Gordon is sceptical that the ELD will have a meaningful impact on the 
offshore industry for three main reasons.93 First, the ELD focuses on remediating 
areas that are useful to people, and most of the areas (including the North Sea) are 
not used for leisure activities. Secondly, at the time he was writing the OSD had yet 
to be transposed, so the ELD’s scope was confined to coastal waters covered by the 
Water Framework Directive. Finally, the damage thresholds were too high and they 
did not apply to many habitats and species outside of the areas of the Natura 2000 
network specified by the Birds and Habitats Directives. For Gordon, the ELD’s 
reliance on external directives posed difficulties that were “even more 
fundamental” and were more likely to increase confusion than to plug perceived 
gaps in the Member States’ environmental protections.94 OPOL may not provide 
the best possible solution either, as the ELD’s and OPOL’s definitions have not 
been coordinated, and, as OPOL is a mutual indemnity agreement between offshore 
oil and gas operators, the doctrine of privity may prevent third parties from seeking 
to enforce its arbitration clauses.95   
Michael Faure and Hui Wang were concerned that OPOL was limited to United 
Kingdom waters, and that its $250m limit might prove inadequate, but they spent 
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little time considering the ELD. 96  Rather, their article compares and contrasts 
OPOL with the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions, and explores how operators 
might meet their financial security obligations via various possible combinations of 
insurance, pooling mechanisms and self-insurance. The article is comprehensive as 
far as it goes, but by failing to consider the impact of the ELD, it may be missing a 
significant opportunity. Likewise their work with Liu Jing, “A Multilayered 
Approach to Cover Damage Caused by Offshore Facilities”, describes the European 
legal framework for offshore activities as an “interesting regional arrangement”, 
but one which only really concerns “regulation rather than liability and 
compensation.”97  
Michael Faure collaborated again with Wang Hui, Liu Jing, Philipsen Niels and 
Kristel de Smedt on what is undoubtedly the most comprehensive review of 
currently available financial security arrangements: “Civil Liability and Financial 
Security for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities.”98 In what is sometimes referred to as 
the Metro report, De Smedt et al. speculated that EU activism following the 
Deepwater Horizon could spark a response from the IMO, similar to the way the 
proposed COPE Fund forced the IOPC Fund to establish the Supplementary Fund 
Protocol.99 The actual experience is that the IMO has tabled the suggestion that it 
should take responsibility for the offshore oil industry.100 
The Metro report describes the ELD as a “starting point” and not the “final 
stage”.101 The major contention is that the ELD will not reach that final stage until 
it includes traditional damages and provides for an industry-fed compensation fund. 
De Smedt et al. rightly point out that the weaknesses in the ELD will also be 
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relevant to the OSD, in that it only protects specific categories of environmental 
damage, its thresholds are too high and subject to interpretation at the national level, 
and because there is no single financial security instrument which could cover the 
full costs of a catastrophic accident.102 The solution is to provide “an integrated 
system aiming at an efficient compensation for all offshore-related damage, 
including efficient liability rules and a compulsory financial guarantee.”103 The EU 
should actively collaborate with oil and gas producers to develop appropriate 
insurance products and sensible safety standards, and with the international 
community to create an international agreement for “offshore-related incidents with 
a transboundary character.”104  
Their criticism of the ELD fails to account for the fact that such ideas had already 
been proposed and abandoned in the ELD’s long difficult path from conception to 
adoption, however. The EU should keep working towards developing appropriate 
and flexible financial security arrangements, but the Member States would not 
accept more interference with their domestic legal traditions and industry groups 
are not interested in paying towards a compensation fund or risk pooling scheme. 
Without that buy-in from all the interested parties, no further reform will be 
possible.  
 
12.4 Concluding Remarks 
The OSD has amended the ELD so that operators are liable for the costs of 
preventing and remediating environmental damage from oil and gas activities in the 
EU’s EEZ and continental shelf. The first issue is whether those operators will be 
held liable to the strict or fault-based standard, and that question had to be clarified. 
Strict liability only applies to listed hazardous activities, but the OSD has not been 
added to the ELD’s Annex III. Faure et al. have made a strong argument for strict 
liability, on the basis that the EU Commission already believes that offshore oil and 
gas activities are covered by the EU’s regulation on the classification, labelling and 
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packaging of substances and mixtures. 105  Alternatively, offshore petroleum 
activities would fall under the Waste Framework Directive as spilled oil would 
require further processing before it could be used again and therefore qualifies as 
“waste”. This should have resolved the matter, but it remains to be seen whether 
the Member States will implement the appropriate legislation.  
In recent times offshore petroleum operations were curtailed and decommissioning 
is becoming more of a priority as maturing fields and ageing installations reach the 
end of their productive lifespans. 106  The Brexit vote caught most pundits by 
surprise, heralding a new era of populism and nationalist politics, and that may stall 
further investment or reform. Even without such political upheavals, the early 
indications are that Member States have had a great deal of difficulty with 
implementing the ELD, their experiences vary widely, and that makes it extremely 
difficult to make blanket predictions about how the different Member States would 
respond to a future offshore oil well disaster. This is a rapidly developing field, and 
the danger that a thesis such as this faces is in attempting to predict future events, 
or even to keep pace with current events. It is possible that some Member States 
will continue to reply upon their pre-existing statutory and tortious liability 
arrangements, while others may establish their own OPOL style indemnity 
agreement. What is clear is that the lack of harmonization of the ELD’s 
implementing laws will complicate operators’ efforts to understand their host 
Member State’s regulatory requirements for some time to come.  
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13 Establishing an International Offshore Petroleum Liability 
and Fund Convention  
So far this thesis has examined how the CLC and Fund Conventions came into 
existence to provide liability and compensation for ship-source oil pollution 
damage, and how they provided a model and a context within which New Zealand 
and the European Union created their own offshore petroleum industry marine 
pollution or environmental damage liability regimes. New Zealand used definitions 
of oil pollution damage and preventive measures from the CLC and Fund 
Conventions to create a marine pollution damage liability regime for offshore 
installations and operations, but has only recently come to grips with designing a 
functional mandatory insurance regime. The EU’s Environmental Liability 
Directive was also heavily influenced by the CLC and Fund Conventions, and the 
implementation of the Offshore Oil and Gas Safety Directive briefly reignited the 
debate about whether the EU should strengthen the ELD’s financial security 
requirements and whether it should establish an environmental damage 
compensation fund.  
This raises the question, why has it been so difficult to establish any international 
offshore petroleum industry liability and fund convention? The CLC and Fund 
Conventions were able to proceed because there was a strong international 
consensus that something must be done about a problem that affected all coastal 
states equally, because the leaders of the shipping, oil and insurance industries were 
able to agree to share the costs, and because it was possible to adapt existing legal 
principles and insurance systems to meet the international community’s demands. 
The problem with applying this model to offshore oil and gas activities is that the 
general international law of the sea is predicated on the assumption that nations 
have sovereign rights to exploit their own seabed mineral reserves, and, unlike ships, 
platforms tend to be fixed in one country’s space.1 While ships travel the world, 
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international boundaries all the time, whereas platforms remain fixed in place." See Kate 
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having little to no connection to the coastal states whose waters and territory might 
be affected by mishaps and the related pollution damage, offshore installations 
operate entirely within the jurisdiction of the host nation. Under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (“UNCLOS”), nations are only expected 
to cooperate with other nations at the regional level when it comes to protecting the 
marine environment or providing for liability and compensation regimes. At the 
same time, UNCLOS expanded the geographical reach of its participating states by 
granting them sovereign rights to govern their 200nm EEZs. It could be argued that 
that the nation which benefits from allowing offshore oil and gas exploration and 
extraction activities is also the one which is best placed to regulate those activities, 
and, consequently, is also the one which should bear the risk of any accidental 
damage. This is particularly true if the state fails in its duty to properly oversee 
those activities, and it is that failure to take reasonable care which results in harm. 
Why should the international community be expected to foot the bill for what could 
be seen as essentially an act of self-sabotage? This could be the main reason for the 
lack of consensus that an international convention is needed. 
The result is that the various attempts to create an international offshore industry 
convention have faltered, with the only tangible result leading to the creation of the 
North Sea’s Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (“OPOL”). Even in the 
aftermath of the Montara and Deepwater Horizon disasters, there is no similar 
consensus about how an international convention on liability and compensation for 
oil pollution damage caused by the offshore petroleum industry would work, or how 
it would be financial secured. As this chapter will explain, when the question was 
most recently put to the IMO, their response was that the offshore petroleum 
industry was already subject to numerous international legal regimes, and that the 
IMO should retain its focus on regulating shipping activities. The question is, is the 
fact that offshore oil and gas activities fall directly within the jurisdiction of host 
states enough of a reason to deny the institution of an international civil liability 
and fund convention regime? Furthermore, given that offshore oil and gas 
exploration and extraction activities produce the cargo which is the subject of the 
CLC and Fund Conventions, is there any reason why those conventions should not 
be expanded to include compensation for pollution damage and preventive 
measures resulting from those activities? 




This chapter asks how the general law of the sea developed in relation to marine 
pollution damage caused by the offshore petroleum industry, what international 
laws specifically apply to pollution damage from the offshore oil and gas activities 
and installations, what attempts have been made to create an international offshore 
petroleum industry liability and fund convention, and what are the prospects for one 
in the future? 
13.1.1 The Truman Proclamation and UNCLOS 
By 1945, the United States of America was becoming concerned about intrusions 
from foreign commercial fishing fleets and about the problem of marine pollution 
damage from both onshore and offshore industrial activities. President Harry 
Truman was confident that the United States had a legitimate claim to all of the 
resources of the ocean and seabed to the limits of the United States’ continental 
shelf and that it had the technological and industrial capacity to profitably exploit 
those resources. As the United States’ Proclamation asserted, “new sources of 
petroleum and other minerals” might be found under the continental shelf of the 
United States, and “with modern technological progress their utilization is already 
practicable or will become so at an early date.”2  
The United States’ Proclamation unleashed a wave of similar annexations around 
the world, and in 1967 Arvid Pardo, Malta’s ambassador to the United Nations, 
warned the General Assembly that Cold War superpower rivalry might result in 
actions that would despoil the oceans. 3  He complained that the current laws 
primarily benefitted those countries with the power and technical competence to 
exert control over the seabed and ocean’s immense resources, and that they had the 
potential to “lead to a competitive scramble for sovereign rights over the land 
underlying the world’s seas and oceans, surpassing in magnitude and in its 
                                                 
2 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective) (1998) (accessed 8 April 2015) <www.un.org>; 
Proclamation 2667 of September 28 1945 - Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (1945). 
3
 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective) (1998) (accessed 8 April, 2015) <www.un.org>.; 
United Nations General Assembly Agenda Item 92: Examination of the question of the reservation 
exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, 
underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their 
resources in the interests of mankind (Twenty-Second Session, New York, 1 November 1967). 




implications last century’s colonial scramble for territory in Asian and Africa.”4 
The challenges and opportunities were urgent and warranted that “clear legal 
provision be made for an international regime, administered by an efficient 
international authority over the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond a variously 
defined continental shelf.”5 There was already an international authority and an 
international regime in place at the time, however. The United Nations had 
established the International Maritime Consultative Organization in 1948, although 
that specialist agency’s empowering convention did not come into force until 1958.  
That same year, the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met with 
the intention of surveying and unifying the law of the sea, not just in the legal, but 
also in the technological, economic and political sense. 6  The 1958 conference 
oversaw the drafting of four major Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Seas; the 
Convention on the High Seas (“CHS”); the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
(“CCS”); the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; 
and the Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes.7 The 1958 Geneva Conventions had several articles pertinent to the safe 
and continuing development of seabed mineral resources. For example, Article 24 
of the CHS required states to “draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the sea 
by discharges of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation of the 
seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaty provisions on the subject.”8 
That the international effort resulted in the formation of four separate conventions 
                                                 
4 United Nations General Assembly Agenda Item 92: Examination of the question of the reservation 
exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, 
underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their 
resources in the interests of mankind (Twenty-Second Session, New York, 1 November 1967) at 12. 
5 At 14. 
6 Tullio Treves “1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea” (2008) Audovisual Library of 
International Law <untreaty.un.org>. 
7 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 450 UNTS 11 (opened for signature 29 April 1958, entered into 
force 30 September 1962); 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 UNTS 311 (opened for 
signature 29 April 1958, entered into force 10 June 1964); 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone, 516 UNTS 205 (opened for signature 29 April 1958, entered into force 
10 September 1964); 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas, 559 UNTS 285, (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 20 March 1966); Optional 
Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 450 UNTS 169 (adopted 
20 April 1958). 
8 LHJ Legault “The Freedom of the Seas: A Licence to Pollute?” (1971) 21 UTLJ 211 at 213. 




and a protocol did illustrate the perennial difficulty of gaining widespread 
acceptance of international legal norms.9 
In the 15 years after Arvid Parvo’s call for leadership in international marine law, 
the United Nations created a treaty banning the seabed deployment of nuclear 
weapons, declared that seabed resources outside of national territorial waters should 
be treated as the common heritage of mankind, convened the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment (“UNCHE”), and established the United 
Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”). 10  The 1972 UNCHE conference 
established much of the terminology that came to be enshrined in UNCLOS.11 For 
example, it was at UNCHE that marine pollution came to be defined as:12 
… the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into 
the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in such deleterious 
effects as harm to living resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to 
marine activities including fishing, impairment of quality of use of sea water 
and reduction of amenities. 
Similar to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, UNCLOS aimed to provide a 
comprehensive “legal order for the seas and oceans”, codifying all aspects of 
navigation, with sovereign rights and environmental protections for seabed 
resources outside of territorial waters, a suite of dispute resolution procedures, and 
several provisions that are applicable to offshore petroleum exploration and 
production activities and provide a justification for creating a liability and 
compensation regime.13 For example, Article 79 guarantees that states have the 
“right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the 
exploitation of its natural resource and the prevention, reduction and control of 
                                                 
9 Tullio Treves “Historical Development of the Law of the Sea” in Donald Rothwell and others (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 
2015) 1 at 14. 
10 UNEP aims “to be the leading global environmental authority that sets the global environmental 
agenda, that promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development within the United Nations system and that serves as an authoritative advocate for the 
global environment” “About UNEP” (accessed 8 April 2015) <www.unep.org>. 
11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982) (opened 
for signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994). 
12 United Nations Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 
5-16 June 1972) 11 ILM 1416 at 73, Annex III. 
13 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective) (1998) <www.un.org> (accessed 8 April 2015). 




pollution from pipelines.” However, under Article 194, states must “take all 
measures necessary” to ensure that such activities do not cause pollution damage to 
other states’ and their environments. The Seabed Disputes Tribunal assessed these 
obligations in its advisory opinion on the subject of seabed mining in international 
waters, and opined that states owe an obligation to ensure that they exercise due 
diligence in monitoring sponsored contractors mining activities.14 If a state fails in 
that obligation then it could be held liable for transboundary damage. However, the 
due diligence standard requires a finding of fault, and that it led to the damage 
complained of. It is a lesser standard than strict liability, and it is an obligation only 
between one state and another. This thesis focussed on the liability that operators 
of offshore oil and gas activities owe to their host nation and its citizens. Questions 
of transboundary liability, while interesting, are outside of the scope of this work.  
Under Article 235, states must ensure that their national legal systems provide for 
“prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by 
pollution of the marine environment by natural juridical persons under their 
jurisdictions”. Further, states are expected to: 
… cooperate in the implementation of existing international law and the 
further development of international law relating to responsibility and liability 
for the assessment of and compensation for damage and the settlement of 
related disputes, as well as where appropriate, development of criteria and 
procedures for payment of adequate compensation, such as compulsory 
insurance or compensation funds. 
These statements are more aspirational than mandatory, however, and UNCLOS 
provides little detail about how a “prompt and adequate compensation” regime 
might be developed, or what pollution damage should be compensated, and who 
that compensation should be paid to. States are merely required to take account of 
international rules and standards and many still resist interference with their historic 
freedoms to navigate and to use or to pollute the global commons.15 As a result, 
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neither UNCLOS nor its subsequent regional conventions have provided sufficient 
impetus to institute a true international offshore petroleum industry liability and 
fund convention.16  
 
13.2 International and Regional Marine Pollution Conventions 
The three major international conventions that usually feature in discussions of this 
nature are: 
• The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships, 
(“MARPOL 73/78”);17 
• The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (“London Dumping 
Convention”), and its 1996 Protocol;18 
• The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation (“OPRC”).19 
These may oblige the owners and operators of fixed and floating offshore 
installations to limit and manage their waste disposal, but they do not contain rules 
pertaining to liability for any subsequent pollution damage. The laws have limited 
application to such installations, being generally created to regulate shipping 
activities, but there is some overlap with mining activities, particularly when they 
are carried out by ships or shiplike structures. 
                                                 
The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 
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16 See Tullio Scovazzi “Maritime Accidents with Particular Emphasis on Liability and Compensation 
for Damage from the Exploitation of Mineral Resources of the Seabed” in Andrea De Guttry, Marco 
Gestri and Gabriella Venturini (eds) International Disaster Response Law (TMC Asser Press ; 
Springer, Hague, the Netherlands; Berlin, 2012) 287. 
17 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its Protocol of 1978 
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MARPOL 73/78 was adopted at a time when routine operational discharges from 
ships were seen as a greater threat to ocean health than the more spectacular 
accidental oil spills, either from ships or from offshore petroleum exploration and 
production activities.20 It was intended to prevent ships from scrubbing ballast and 
fuel tanks in prohibited areas of the ocean and obliging port states to develop 
facilities to allow ships’ oily wastes to be retrieved and safely processed. It 
specifically excludes the “release of harmful substances directly arising from the 
exploration, exploitation and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral 
resources” or related activities such as hydrocarbon flaring.21 However, it does 
oblige fixed and floating rigs to comply with the requirements applying to ships 
over 400 gross tonnage other than oil tankers.22 Like ships, fixed and floating rigs 
must maintain a record of operations involving oil and oily mixture discharges, and 
are prohibited from discharging oil or oil mixtures into the sea, except if the 
discharge is diluted to less than 15 parts per million, and they must also comply 
with coastal states requirements regarding oil pollution emergency plans.23  
MARPOL’s Annex V also prohibits the dumping of garbage within 500 m of 
platforms, and that could include drill cuttings and other solid waste gathered during 
construction and operation. On the other hand, the London Dumping Convention 
does not apply to drill cuttings and other wastes arising from the “exploration, 
exploitation and associated off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources”, but 
the rig itself may be deliberately disposed of at sea so long as the operator 
undertakes precautionary actions, such as removing as much debris and oil waste 
as possible.24 Likewise, the OPRC requires Contracting Parties to develop plans 
and to provide equipment to deal with oil spills from ships, offshore and onshore 
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Matter, 1046 UNTS 120 (opened for signature 29 December 1972, entered into force 30 August 
1975), art. III(1)(c) and Annex I, art. 11(d). 




installations.25 It obliges states to cooperate in preventing transboundary pollution, 
and addresses issues such as sharing advice and technical support and facilitating 
emergency responses, but it also does not require signatories to provide rules for 
liability and compensation for pollution damage caused by those oil spills.  
Another possibly related convention, but one which would not normally be 
associated with offshore craft, is the 2001 International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (“Bunkers Convention”). 26  That 
convention was modelled on the CLC and Fund Conventions and was meant to 
capture oil pollution damage when it resulted from accidents involving non-CLC 
ships. It applies to “any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, of any type 
whatsoever”.27 The inclusion of “seaborne craft” captures a wide variety of offshore 
craft, whether or not they are self-propelled or engaged in an international voyage, 
so long as the damage they caused was in the territorial sea or EEZ of contracting 
states.28 The Bunkers Convention does not provide for a separate compensation 
fund, but shipowners are entitled to limit their liability according to the international 
law described below.29 We recall that the Bunkers Convention was only ratified in 
New Zealand after the Rena disaster. 
The 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims and its 
Protocol of 1996 (“LLMC”) was designed to limit shipowners liabilities, but it 
specifically excludes “floating platforms constructed for the purpose of exploring 
or exploiting the natural resources of the seabed or the subsoil thereof” or even 
“ships constructed for, or adapted to, and engaged in, drilling”. 30  The LLMC 
originally would have covered drillships but not floating platforms, and the travaux 
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préparatoire noted the Norwegian delegate’s objection to what he saw as an 
incongruous result. 31  The delegates considered whether limitation of liability 
should not be conditional on the tonnage of the craft, as the damage that relatively 
light drillships and platforms could cause bore no relationship to their actual weight, 
but ultimately opted to exclude both floating platforms and drillships.  
13.2.1 Relevant Regional Conventions 
New Zealand is a party to the Noumea Convention, along with Australia (as far as 
its East Coast and islands to the east up to Macquarie Island are concerned), and 21 
other island nations including the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, 
Vanuatu and American and Western Samoa.32 The Noumea Convention is typical 
of many of the regional conventions which followed UNCLOS. It calls upon the 
parties to “endeavour to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements, including 
regional or sub-regional agreements, for the protection, development and 
management of the marine and coastal environment of the Convention Area.”33 
However, nothing in the Convention or its Protocols “shall affect the sovereign right 
of States to exploit develop and manage their own natural resources pursuant to 
their own policies”. The parties are only required to consider their “duty to protect 
and preserve the environment”, and to ensure that the activities under their 
“jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond the limits of [their] national jurisdiction”, suggesting that states will 
only be obliged to pay compensation for transboundary damage, but not for the 
costs of restoring their own environment or the financial and property losses and 
damages their own citizens might suffer.34 Further, the parties are to “co-operate in 
the formulation and adoption of appropriate rules and procedures in conformity 
with international law”, but this has not resulted in the creation of any international 
offshore petroleum liability and compensation agreement.35  
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Several other regional conventions do address liability and compensation issues. 
For example, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden adopted the Nordic 
Environmental Protection Convention which allows any person affected by 
environmental nuisances in any contracting state to challenge the permissibility of 
such activities and to sue for compensation.36 In the Baltic Sea, Article 25 of the 
1992 Helsinki Convention asks that Contracting Parties jointly develop rules to 
determine liability and remedies for damage resulting from acts or omissions.37 The 
north-east Atlantic’s 1992 OSPAR Convention requires Contracting Parties to 
apply “the polluter pays principle, by virtue of which the costs of pollution 
prevention, control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter.”38 The 
North Sea area is covered by the 1983 Bonn Agreement, which obliges the 
contracting parties to cooperate whenever oil or other harmful substances present a 
“grave and imminent danger” to their coastlines or other related interests.39 Again, 
none of these conventions led to any serious attempt to create a liability and fund 
convention to compensate for environmental damage that might be caused by either 
seabed mining or by offshore petroleum exploration, extraction and production 
activities. 
13.2.2 The Barcelona Convention and the Offshore Protocol 
The 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
and its 1994 Offshore Protocol (“Barcelona Convention”) goes much further than 
other regional conventions towards creating a proper liability and compensation 
regime, in that it requires that each signatory:40 
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(a) Shall take all measures necessary to ensure that liability for damage 
caused by activities is imposed on operators, and they shall be required 
to pay prompt and adequate compensation; 
(b) Shall take all measures necessary to ensure that operators shall have and 
maintain insurance cover or other financial security of such type and 
under such terms as the Contracting Party shall specify in order to 
ensure compensation for damages caused by activities covered by this 
Protocol. 
The Barcelona Convention and Offshore Protocol continue to be relevant to the 
UNEP’s efforts towards adopting the 1975 Mediterranean Action Plan (“UNEP-
MAP”). 41  For example, in 2006, the UNEP convened a meeting of technical 
experts, including renowned Professor Tullio Scovazzi, to discuss a liability and 
compensation regime feasibility study. 42  This pointed out that the insurance 
industry might struggle to provide suitable insurance products, which was why 
some states had opted for national compensation funds.43 The parties met in 2008 
to adopt guidelines intended to take a broader approach to marine pollution damage 
liability than that taken by the CLC and Fund Conventions, and that would include 
both traditional and environmental damages.44 Interestingly, it drew its definitions 
of such things as primary, complementary and compensatory remediation and 
baseline condition from the ELD.45  The contracting parties have five years to 
impose mandatory insurance, and must consider establishing a Mediterranean 
Compensation Fund.46 The compensation fund issue continues to be postponed, but 
gained new prominence after the OSD stated that the European Union had 
undertaken the actions necessary to accede to the Barcelona Convention and 
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Offshore Protocol.47 Affairs in European politics have been moving very quickly in 
the years since then, but if the EU Member States do take their commitments to the 
health of the Mediterranean seriously, then one result could be the development of 
a Mediterranean mutual indemnity association along the lines of the United 
Kingdom’s OPOL agreement.48  
13.2.3 The Rio and Canadian Draft Conventions on Offshore Mobile Craft 
There have been a handful of attempts to develop specific offshore petroleum 
liability conventions along the lines of the CLC and Fund Convention. For example, 
the Comité Maritime International’s (“CMI”) 1977 Rio Draft International 
Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft was an early attempt to convince the IMO to 
develop a more targeted international offshore mining industry liability regime.49 
Commonly known as the “Rio Draft”, this defines a craft as:50 
… any marine structure of whatever nature not permanently fixed into the 
seabed which a) is capable of moving or being moved whilst floating in or on 
water, whether or not attached to the seabed during operations, and b) is used 
or intended for use in the exploration, exploitation, processing, transport or 
storage of the mineral resources of the seabed or its subsoil or in ancillary 
activities. 
A second Draft Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft 1994 addressed the Rio 
Draft’s deficiencies, but met fierce opposition from the International Association 
of Drilling Contractors and the United States Maritime Law Association.51 Even so, 
a CMI working group continued working with the Canadian Maritime Law 
Association, and was able to develop the Draft Convention on Offshore Units, 
Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration for and 
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Exploitation of Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources 2001 (“Canadian 
Draft”).52  
The Canadian Draft is a possible template for a future offshore liability convention, 
and it contains features that could now be considered standard.53 The owner would 
be strictly liable for all “pollution damage caused by or arising from the emission 
or discharge of pollutants from Offshore Units, Artificial Islands or Related 
Appurtenances”, while the licensee would be responsible for eruptions from the 
seabed.54 “Offshore Unit” refers to MODUs, while “Artificial Islands” are any fixed 
structures, excluding pipelines and installations made up of dredged or natural filled 
materials.55 Like the CLC Convention, owners and licensees were to be entitled to 
limit their liability, with the limit to be calculated by multiplying the mass tonnage 
of the rig by a to-be-determined number of units of account.  
The Canadian Draft did not go so far as to recommend the institution of a 
compensation fund, but it did require Coastal State Parties to ensure “that Owners 
have administrative and financial resources appropriate to the effective 
implementation of standards and activities” up to the limits of liability.56 Financial 
security arrangements could include attaching liens to the offshore unit and its 
related appurtenances, and would have to cover claims for:57 
(a) Loss of life or personal injury to Offshore Unit Occupants or arising 
from operation of Offshore Units [and Related Appurtenances]; 
(b) claims of Offshore Unit Workers for wages and social benefits; 
(c) salvage; 
(d) tortious or delictual physical loss, in direct connection with the 
operation or navigation of the Offshore Unit. 
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Liens were to be given priority over creditors’ remedies, such as registered 
mortgages or hypothecs.58 An accident which destroyed the unit would render such 
remedies worthless, however, and there was a six year time limit on compensation 
claims.59 
13.2.4 CLEE and OPOL 
This thesis has frequently referenced the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement 
(“OPOL”), but it has not explained how the agreement came to be. The OPOL 
agreement only came about because of the 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed 
Mineral Resources (“CLEE”). 60  CLEE was intended to create a strict liability 
system to hold the owner and licensees operating any offshore installation liable for 
the costs of pollution damage and preventive measures resulting from accidents  in 
the contracting parties’ territory, internal waters and territorial seas. Like other 
liability regimes, CLEE would have limited the owners and licensees’ liability, and 
provided Act of God, Act of War and third-party defences. Insurance was 
mandatory, but the minimum financial security was set at a figure less than the limit 
of liability and there was no complementary compensation fund. CLEE was the first 
serious effort to draft an international offshore petroleum industry pollution damage 
liability convention. However, it would have been restricted to the nations 
bordering the North Sea, the Baltic and the North Atlantic, and, although it even if 
it ultimately never entered into force, it did prompt a number of those states to join 
OPOL.61 
                                                 
58 A hypothec is “a creditor’s right established over a debtor’s property that continues in the debtor’s 
possession”; William R Trumble, Angus Stevenson and Lesley Brown Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary on Historical Principles (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2002) at 
1304. 
59 Draft Convention on Offshore Units, art. XI (11.8). 
60 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (“OPOL”) (effective as of 1 April 2015) www.opol.org.uk; 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, London, 1977 16 ILM 1451 (opened for signature 1 May 
1977, not in force). 
61 See Allen, “A Global Oil Stain”, above n 49, at 94; Wylie Spicer “International Regulation of the 
Offshore Oil Business in the Arctic: The Case For and Against”, above n 53, at 4; Julien Rochette 
and others Seeing beyond the horizon for deepwater oil and gas: strengthening the international 
regulation of offshore exploration and exploitation (Institut du developpment durable et des 
relations internationales, 2014) at 22; Scovazzi, “Maritime Accidents”, above n 16, at 297; 
Radovich, “International Legal Regime of Offshore Structures” above n 20; Nicholas Gaskell 
“Compensation for Offshore Pollution: Ships and Platforms” in Malcolm A Clarke and University 




OPOL is a private agreement between 16 offshore oil and gas operators within the 
jurisdiction of any of the “Designated States”; the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, Denmark, Germany, France, Republic of Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Isles of Man, Faroe Islands and Greenland.62 The operators 
agree to be held strictly liable to compensate and reimburse “any Person sustaining 
Pollution Damage and any Public Authority which occurs costs for taking Remedial 
Measures as a result of a Discharge of Oil” from an offshore facility within its 
jurisdiction.63  It is not a compensation fund per se, rather the parties’ mutual 
indemnity commitments are activated if any member is unable to fulfil its financial 
obligations. Since the Deepwater Horizon, the compensation level was raised to 
$250 million USD.64 However, there have very rarely ever been claims against the 
agreement, and this may account for its popularity and longevity.65 
OPOL provides that the operator of the offshore facility or facilities is strictly liable 
for the costs of pollution damage and for remedial measures that either they or a 
“Public Authority” have taken, up to the maximum of $125 million USD per 
category, or a total of $250 million USD per incident.66 Pollution damage means 
“direct loss or damage (other than loss or damage to any Offshore Facility involved) 
by contamination which results from a Discharge of Oil.”67 “Remedial measures” 
mean the actions that are taken to “prevent, mitigate or eliminate pollution damage, 
including efforts to “remove or neutralize the Oil involved in such discharge, 
excluding however, well control measures and measures taken to protect, repair or 
replace any such Offshore Facility.”68  
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OPOL’s guidelines state that admissible claims must be “reasonable, quantifiable 
and justifiable” and must fall into the categories of:69 
• Clean up operations on shore or at sea. 
• Property damage 
• Disposal costs of collected material 
• Other losses which must be quantifiable and which must result from the 
contamination itself. 
This indicates that claims that were unreasonable, unquantifiable or unjustifiable 
would not be compensated, though it is not clear how that determination would be 
made. Similar to the CLC and Fund Conventions, OPOL contains defences if the 
incident was caused by an act of war or natural phenomenon, or by a third party, if 
it was the result of the “negligence or wrongful act of any Government or other 
authority”, or from compliance with permitting conditions, or if it was wholly or 
partially caused by a claimant’s act or omission with the intent to cause damage.70  
If the responsible operator “fails to satisfy its obligations to Claimants”, then the 
remaining parties agree to contribute jointly until the damages are paid for.71 Each 
is required to:72 
 … establish and maintain its financial responsibility to fulfil its obligations 
under Clause IV… [to] become a member of the Association… [and to] make 
payment to the Association of all dues, assessments and other sums properly 
payable to the Association to enable it to fulfil its purposes as described herein 
and in its Memorandum and Articles of Association… [and to] make payment 
to the Association of the Party’s share of any such sum as is referred to in 
Clause III, that share being determined in accordance with its Articles of 
Association… 
Each party must, on request, provide to the government of any of the Designated 
States evidence that it is “complying with the Rules with respect to financial 
responsibility”.73 This may be in the form of insurance, guarantee or self-insurance, 
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but OPOL must be satisfied as to the insurer’s or guarantor’s credit or financial 
strength.74 To qualify as a self-insurer the operator must demonstrate its financial 
strength by having qualified for one or more financial strength ratings, for example, 
‘A-’ or higher from Standard & Poors.75  
Any disputes arising out of the contract may be settled under the Rules of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce at London, or by one or 
more arbitrators appointed in accordance with that body’s rules. 76  Disputes or 
claims are to be governed and construed in accordance with English law. 77 
Arbitration has the advantage of leading to speedier and cheaper resolution than 
protracted court actions witnessed in the case of the Amoco Cadiz and Exxon 
Valdez; 18 and 21 years respectively.78 Awards are final, binding and confidential, 
although OPOL preserves claimants’ rights to seek redress for losses beyond the 
maximum recoverable or outside of the scope of the agreement. 79  There is a 
question mark over whether claimants may make use of the arbitration clause, 
however, as the agreement is a private contract between offshore operators and 
therefore is subject to rules on privity. 80  The lack of third party enforcement 
mechanism mean that members will probably only recognise the most tradition of 
damages claims, and remedial measures costs incurred by public authorities.81 
OPOL may be a voluntary agreement, but the Petroleum Act 1998 (UK) provided 
operators had to be members of OPOL to obtain consent to explore for or produce 
on oil and gas on the United Kingdom’s continental shelf. 82  Specifically, the 
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Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1988 (UK) require that the 
Licensee:83 
… comply with any reasonable instructions from time to time given by the 
Minister with a view to ensuring that funds are available to discharge any 
liability for damage attributable to the release or escape of petroleum in the 
course of activities connected with the exercise of rights granted by this 
licence… 
The DECC guidelines specified that, in order to ensure that funds are available:84 
Operators may be required to provide proof of OPOL membership, and that it 
covers the proposed activity, and to provide confirmation that their insurance 
indemnity provision includes the following: 
• Operations to stop or control the release of hydrocarbons in the event 
of a well blow-out, such as the deployment of a capping device and the 
drilling of a relief well; 
• Clean-up costs associated with any spill, including a worst-case well 
blow-out; and 
• Remediation of pollution damage, including liability to third parties. 
OPOL has been successfully integrated into the United Kingdom’s offshore liability 
regime, which suggests that similar agreements could perform the same function 
elsewhere. The United Kingdom’s House of Commons Energy and Climate Change 
Committee has expressed concern at OPOL’s adequacy and scope, however, saying 
that:85 
Given the high costs of the incident in the Gulf of Mexico, we believe that the 
… limit of $250 million is insufficient. We are concerned that the OPOL 
provisions only cover direct damage and also that the precise definition of 
‘direct damage’ is unclear. While membership of OPOL remains voluntary – 
despite it being a prerequisite for a licence – its voluntary nature weakens its 
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legality and the control and deployment of its funds. We believe this lack of 
legal control will allow polluters to claim that damages to biodiversity and 
ecosystems are indirect, and therefore do not qualify for compensation.  
The requirement that losses be “direct” may exclude claims for pure economic 
losses or damage to the environment itself, but measures which will restore fisheries 
or tourism will also benefit the environment. One clear deficiency is that OPOL 
will not pay for “well control measures and measures taken to protect, repair or 
replace any such Offshore Facility.”86 The measures taken to control the well might 
include sub-surface operations to deploy a capping stacker, or hiring a second rig 
to drill a relief well which could take many months and prove to be the most 
expensive part of the preventive operation. That exclusion is concerning, but 
generally speaking OPOL’s compensation rules are no worse than the best 
available. Again, there has never been a major claim against OPOL, so it remains 
to be seen how its provisions would be tested in practice. 
Another opinion about OPOL came from Oil & Gas UK’s recently formed joint 
industry, regulator and trade union taskforce, the UK Oil Spill Prevention and 
Response Advisory Group (“OSPRAG”).87 OSPRAG’s Indemnity and Insurance 
Review Group (“Insurance Group”) focussed on the “potential control, remediation 
and compensation costs associated with a large oil spill in the UKCS, to determine 
how these are provided for and whether the provisions the UK has in place require 
improving.”88 The Insurance Group said that OPOL “is neither a fund, nor is it a 
limitation of liability regime”, but it does provide “one element of the overall 
financial responsibility that operators may be required to provide to regulators”.89 
If the main criticism of OPOL then is that it fails to pay for all damages which could 
result from an offshore oil accident, then the answer is to require operators to 
provide additional financial security.  
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None of this explicitly recognises how OPOL might relate to operators’ liabilities 
under the ELD since the EU’s expansion of that liability regime to offshore 
petroleum activities via the OSD.  Indeed, the DECC’s 2015 document makes no 
mention of the EU directives. Given that OPOL predates the ELD by several 
decades, it is not surprising that its admissible categories do not exactly match the 
ELD’s three categories of environmental damage. However, we recall that the effect 
of the ELD is only to direct that Member States encourage the development of 
financial security mechanisms. Even with the advent of the OSD there is no 
mandatory insurance regulation. It follows that the United Kingdom’s reliance upon 
OPOL cannot be faulted for failing to account for the ELD. No Member State is 
required to do so. 
The recent decision by the British public to exit the EU may stall any further 
developments in the near to medium future. EU based operators seeking consent to 
explore for oil and gas on the United Kingdom’s continental shelf will still be 
required to join OPOL, but it remains to be seen whether the United Kingdom’s 
ELD and OSD transposing legislation will survive in their current form.  
 
13.3 An Offshore Petroleum Industry Liability and Fund Convention? 
Both the Deepwater Horizon and the Montara incidents have highlighted the 
absence of an international offshore oil pollution regime, prompting calls for 
reforms of industry safety and environmental regulation, and for the establishment 
of some form of an international liability and compensation regime.90 This too has 
led to a debate about why there is yet now such regime in place. Agyebeng has 
explained that the global community’s failure to agree on a comprehensive 
international compensation and liability instrument may be due to the relative rarity 
of oil rig blowouts.91 Ships regularly pass through international shipping lanes and 
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multiple states’ marine and territorial waters, which is why it is necessary to take 
an international approach to shipping pollution damage liability laws. Offshore 
operations, on the other hand, are fixed in place and fall naturally within an 
individual state’s jurisdiction.  
Steven Rares has argued that the continuing demand for hydrocarbons will push 
further high-risk exploration of the deep seabed, and that it would be sensible to 
establish an international offshore industry pollution damage compensation fund.92 
He points out that, according to the Seabed Disputes Chamber, states could be held 
liable by other states for failing to prevent transboundary pollution damage.93 Rares 
proposes that a fund could be established by requiring “rig controllers” to pay a 
levy based on the volume of oil produced.94 However, such a fund would need to 
have the cooperation of both the United States and the EU and he concedes that 
consensus could be impossible.  
Shane Bosma and Mikhail Kashubsky both make the same point that, despite the 
emphasis on international cooperation in both UNCLOS and the OPRC, there is a 
lack of global consensus on the liability issue.95 This means that operators are only 
subject to national or at most regional liability laws, their obligations are allocated 
according to standardized joint operating agreements, and their financial security 
partially provided by P & I Clubs and partially by private insurance policies. Like 
Rares, Bosma concludes that states themselves could be held liable for oil pollution 
damage claims, both from their own citizens and from transboundary pollution 
claims by other states, and that it would be in their best interests to throw their 
support behind an international offshore oil pollution damage treaty.96 Meanwhile, 
Wylie Spicer has said that the lack of consensus is because, unlike the shipping 
industry, offshore oil and gas industry associations, coastal states, international 
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organizations and the United Nations have been unable to create a “seamless web” 
of “marindustrial” laws.97  
Many have come to believe that the CLC and Fund Conventions should be 
expanded to include the offshore oil and gas industry. As described above, the CMI 
has been seeking to craft a suitable regulatory regime which would include a 
liability and compensation component, with little result beyond a handful of draft 
conventions. As long ago as 1998, Richard Shaw, Comité Maritime International’s 
representative to the IMO and the IOPC Fund, called on the IMO to address 
omissions in national and regional liability regimes relating to offshore craft.98 The 
latest proposal came about after the Montara platform exploded into flames on the 
21st of August 2009, spilling oil and gas condensate into the Timor Sea for 74 
days. 99  Indonesia was most directly affected, and it requested that the IMO’s 
Strategic Direction 7.2 be amended to include:100 
… reducing and eliminating any adverse impact by shipping or by offshore oil 
exploration and exploitation activities on the environment by developing 
effective measures for mitigating and responding to the impact on the 
environment caused by shipping incidents and operational pollution from 
ships and liability and compensation issues connected with transboundary 
pollution damage resulting from offshore oil exploration and exploitation 
activities. 
The Indonesians were concerned that offshore operations were only subject to 
national or regional regulatory arrangements, and that the insurance requirements 
varied widely, and were often insufficient to cover the costs of a major accident.101 
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Their view was that the IMO was the body with the best mandate to give serious 
consideration to the establishment of an offshore petroleum industry civil liability 
and fund convention.  
The proposal was opposed by Brazil amongst others, and the IMO’s Marine 
Environment Protection Committee elected not to expand its work programme, but 
left the topic open for future discussion.102 The Secretariat justified the decision 
saying that a number of international and regional instruments, such as UNCLOS, 
CLEE, OPOL, OPRC and MARPOL 73/78, were already available to deal with 
safety regulation, liability and compensation issues. 103  This claim was curious 
given that UNCLOS has no enforceable liability and compensation mechanisms, 
CLEE is not in force, OPOL is limited to a handful of Designated States bordering 
the North Sea, the Baltic and the North Atlantic, and OPRC and MARPOL 73/78 
focus on planning to prevent operational and accidental discharges. The Secretariat 
referred to the EU’s ELD and OSD, but it conceded that there was no single 
international instrument that could cope with the issue and that any “[enhanced] 
licensing of new drilling activities needs to be backed up by an unequivocal liability 
regime, including adequate financial security arrangements to cover major 
incidents.”104 
In May 2014, the IMO reviewed the issue but only to confirm its earlier findings.105 
The Committee was happy to “analyse further the liability and compensation issues 
connected with transboundary pollution damage resulting from offshore oil and 
exploration activities”, with the aim of providing guidance to “States interested in 
pursuing bilateral or regional arrangements”, but would not revise its overall 
strategic focus on shipping accidents. 106  Indonesia and Denmark subsequently 
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submitted a report on the Second International Conference on Liability and 
Compensation Regime for Transboundary Oil Damage Resulting from Offshore 
Exploration Activities held at Bali, Indonesia in 2012, to provide guidance for 
establishing bilateral or regional arrangements.107 No further action has been taken 
on the issue at the time of writing. 
The CMI observer did draw the Legal Committee’s attention to a February 2014 
study by the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations 
(“IDDR”) entitled “Seeing beyond the horizon for deepwater oil and gas: 
strengthening the international regulation of offshore exploration and 
exploitation.”108 The IDDR report points out that there is a “never-ending rush to 
offshore oil and gas” and that January 2013 saw a new world record drilling depth 
of 3,165 m off the coast of India.109 After surveying the various attempts to institute 
an international offshore convention, the report concludes that “developing regional 
agreements appears to be one way to move forward and fill the regulatory gaps” 
even if differences in scope, implementation and a lack of coordination results in a 
highly fragmented approach.110 
The Secretariat also mentioned an announcement by the President of the Russian 
Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, at the Toronto G20 Summit in June 2010, to 
establish the G20 Global Marine Environment Protection initiative (“GMEP”) to 
prevent and minimise offshore accidents.111 The Russian initiative would create a 
compensation fund with payments in proportion to the profits earned by 
international oil companies, and would include a mandatory insurance programme. 
Its early ambitious intent has waned, and GMEP’s mission statement now merely 
involves “Sharing Best Practices to Protect the Marine Environment, to Prevent 
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Accidents related to Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Development, as well 
as Marine Transportation, and to Deal with Their Consequences.”112  
Is the IMO correct in assuming that the only way forward is a regional approach to 
liability and compensation for offshore oil pollution damage claims? By looking at 
one of the most substantive objections to the international option, it may be possible 
to assess and refute the major arguments against the idea of an international offshore 
petroleum industry liability and fund convention.  
Bariş Soyer argues that the proposal to expand the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions  
from shipping to include offshore activities faces a number of political and practical 
difficulties, and that it would be more sensible to develop a global regime from 
scratch.113 Like the IDDR report, he suggests that a more sensible solution would 
be to encourage the development of a number of regional OPOL style mutual 
indemnity arrangements. 114  This proposition has merit, and would offer an 
opportunity for states most concerned with offshore industry pollution damage to 
negotiate with their neighbours and not to be held back by the reluctance of far-
flung neighbours. 
Soyer states that the first problem is in deciding how contributions would be made 
to such a fund. The 1992 Fund Convention bases contributions upon the quantity of 
oil each participating state has imported by sea, which clearly ties it to the objectives 
that the conventions have, of sharing liability for oil pollution damage between the 
shipowners and the cargo owners. An offshore compensation fund would have to 
find a way to share contributions between a multiplicity of operators, licence 
holders, third party contractors, as well as the coastal states that sponsor and benefit 
most directly from their activities. Secondly, the compulsory insurance requirement 
would be difficult to satisfy given that the P & I Clubs that back the CLC 
Convention do not provide insurance cover for many aspects of offshore activities, 
such as pollution damage from drilling, blowouts, connected infrastructure, or 
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resulting clean-up costs. 115  The greatest danger, he says, is that any proposed 
expansion of the CLC and Fund Convention regime could lead to substantial cost 
increases, and that might encourage many states to withdraw from the scheme 
altogether.116 
Soyer’s objections may be countered. First, there is no convincing reason why 
offshore installation owners and operators could not stand in the shoes of 
shipowners and masters, with pre-set limited liability and an obligation to maintain 
insurance up to that limit. The Fund’s revenues could continue to be provided by 
oil importing countries as before, but instead of basing funding on the quantities of 
oil imported, contributions could be made in proportion to the amount of oil which 
is sourced from offshore activities.  
Second, New Zealand’s mandatory insurance regime shows that it is possible to 
obtain insurance to cover the costs of well control, clean-up and property damage, 
although it may be difficult to source insurance for third party claims. Insurance 
markets could respond to demand for an expansion of the third-party liability cover 
and would create appropriate products. Alternatively, third-party claims could be 
covered by a parent company’s general liability insurance, or by properly vetted 
parent company guarantees. Additional financial security could be provided by 
obliging the owners and operators of offshore installations to join regional OPOL 
style mutual indemnity associations, which would have the advantage that funding 
would only have to be found in the event of an actual oil polluting incident. 
Furthermore, if offshore installation operators knew that they faced mutual liability 
there would be more incentive to monitor and report other operators whose 
standards of operation fell below best practice oilfield standards. Shipowners 
already manage their financial security obligations through membership with 
Protection and Indemnity Clubs, and the same system could be applied. Mutual 
indemnity associations and insurance providers could then help provide a 
regulatory role, preventing the moral hazard and regulatory capture issues which 
increase the risks of accidents occurring and which can lead to insurance crises.  
                                                 
115 At 73. 
116 At 74. 




Soyer’s third objection, that an offshore liability and fund convention regime would 
substantially increase liability costs, is on the face of it, a serious challenge to any 
future offshore petroleum liability and fund convention. Nicholas Gaskell has also 
observed that the costs that could be caused by incidents like the Deepwater 
Horizon could be immense, outweighing the capacities of even the CLC and Fund 
Conventions model, and that there could be instances where the losses may just 
have to lie where they fall.117 He argues that the IMO’s decision has effectively 
blocked the prospects for the discussion of any multilateral offshore transboundary 
pollution damage convention, but that the IMO will assist states wishing to create 
regional or bilateral schemes.118 Again, he points out that it would be very difficult 
to guarantee the appropriate insurance arrangements, particularly as there is no 
offshore group equivalent to the International Group of P&I Clubs. He cautions 
against smaller nations attempting to replicate the United States’ system of 
unlimited liability for oil pollution damage, however, as it would be extremely 
difficult for smaller players to forge the special insurance arrangements required to 
enforce such judgments.  
What many observers fail to have noticed about the Deepwater Horizon, however, 
is that most of the $40bn liability bill was due to the punitive penalties in United 
States’ federal law. Under the Clean Water Act, if the violator acts with due 
diligence then they are fined $1,100 per barrel spilled, and $37,500 per day the spill 
continues. 119  If the violator acts with gross negligence or wilful misconduct, 
however, then the fines rise to $4,300 USD per barrel and $140,000 per day. In 
addition, BP and its partners were subject to clams for damage to natural resources 
under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, loss of life and other traditional damage claims 
for financial losses suffered by property owners and local businesses, all of which 
contributed to the unprecedented total cost. Soyer cites the Deepwater Horizon 
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incident only as evidence that the major oil companies will do the right thing in 
these circumstances, and to argue that further regulation is unnecessary. 120 
However, BP only voluntarily established a $20bn USD fund knowing that it could 
be involved in decades of protracted litigation, and that an early announcement of 
contrition would offset and mitigate later claims. Its purpose was to avoid 
punishment. This was legal manoeuvre, not philanthropy.  
If the rules of the 1992 CLC and Fund Convention regime had been applied, then 
the outcome would have been quite different, and, in most cases, far less expensive. 
As an example of what not to do, the most recent case of the Prestige saw the 
Spanish Supreme Court levy the maximum compensation pay-out against 
shipowner, insurer and IOPC Fund, but that outcome could have been quite 
different if the captain, shipowner and insurer had behaved more responsibly.121 
The master was found to have been criminally negligent and lost the protection 
afforded by the CLC Convention’s channelling provisions. Mare Shipping lost the 
owner’s limitation right, first, because it was vicariously liable for the master’s 
decisions, and second, because it played an active role in knowingly maintaining 
and operating a defective vessel. As one employee testified, the Mare Shipping 
“knew the state of the ship and that it had gone to St Petersburg to die.”122 The 
London P&I Club attempted to obstruct the proceedings by failing to appear before 
the court, evidently believing that the arbitration clause in its $1 billion USD 
insurance contract excluded the jurisdiction of the Spanish court. In failing to 
appear, it lost its opportunity to raise any defence.123 As for the IOPC Fund, none 
of the exceptions to liability applied, and it was found liable to pay compensation 
up to the limits of the 1992 Fund Convention, or 135 million SDR.124 The IOPC 
Fund’s Secretariat lamented the multi-billion dollar impact of the judgment, but the 
Director accepted that the London Club only had itself to blame, and that the result 
was based on a fair interpretation of the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions.125  
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The point is that the shipowners’, insurers’ and IOPC Fund’s limits of liability and 
compensation are liability are usually set by pre-agreed limits, and that right to limit 
liability is only lost in the most extreme circumstances. Pollution damage is defined 
by the reasonable costs of remedying the harm that has been caused and not out of 
a desire to punish the shipowner, the insurer or the Fund. Further, the IOPC Fund 
has proven itself to be highly adaptable and adroit at managing claims guidelines 
for oil pollution damage caused by shipping. There is no reason to think it could 
not help to shape the system to manage future claims for damage caused by offshore 
petroleum activities. Indeed, if offshore oil well disasters are as rare as the various 
oil and gas industry groups have argued, then it would make more sense to fold that 
liability into the existing CLC and Fund Convention regime, rather than creating an 
entirely new system with additional administrative and transaction costs for an 
eventuality which, however expensive, may only occur once in a generation. 
 
13.4 Concluding Remarks 
Even after the experience of Deepwater Horizon and Montara, there is a lack of 
consensus over the need for an international offshore liability and compensation 
convention. The current relevant international and regional conventions call upon 
nations to cooperate in managing the global marine commons, and do provide some 
rules regarding pollution damage from offshore installations. However, in the main 
they focus on shipping and it has proven impossible to subject the offshore mining 
industries to more than domestic regulation. Nation states have much to benefit 
from attracting international investment in offshore mining and drilling activities, 
and the international community has demonstrated a marked aversion to dealing 
with the environmentally damaging consequences. Activities which are carried out 
within a single nation’s EEZ are seen as being solely within the jurisdiction of that 
nation. Any proposal for an international liability and fund convention must 
therefore overcome the objection that such matters are solely the concern of the 
nation where the activity is carried out. Shipping is more naturally the concern of 
the international community because ships, by their nature, travel around the world, 
bearing little legal connection to the nations whose waters they may pass through, 
and whose interests they may damage.  Offshore oil pollution damage, on that 




rationale, only has an international dimension when it travels beyond the waters 
controlled by that state. At most then, states may face liability between one another 
for transboundary damage caused by offshore activities within their jurisdiction, 
but even then, only if it could be proven that the state failed in its due diligence duty 
to monitor those activities, and that failure led to the damage suffered.  
Discussions about whether the IMO should take a lead in adapting the CLC and 
Fund Conventions to include oil pollution damage from offshore petroleum 
activities have yet to bear fruit, and it is possible that it would take another 
Deepwater Horizon, or even a string of such disasters for the global community to 
gather its resolve. At most, the IMO has suggested that existing international law is 
sufficient to guarantee the safety of offshore operations, and that a regional 
approach to liability and compensation issues is best. OPOL provides a template 
for a strong regional solution liability and compensation for offshore oil spills. Yet 
it was only originally proposed because the oil industry assumed that the CLEE 
convention was to be imminently ratified. Much like the TOVALOP and CRISTAL 
agreements before it, the industry felt that it was better to make its own 
arrangements than to be pushed into something far more stringent. Further, the 
agreement garnered the support of a number of powerful coastal states that had a 
clear interest in exploiting their offshore oil and gas resources, but whose close 
proximity made them equally highly motivated to harmonize their oil spill liability 
and compensation laws.  
The problem that New Zealand faces is that it is geographically isolated from any 
potential regional partners. Its EEZ does touch the boundaries of the EEZ’s of 
Tonga, Fiji and Australia, so there is a distant possibility that an incident in New 
Zealand waters would cause damage to the fishing interests of those nations, but 
there is practically no likelihood that an oil spill from activities on New Zealand’s 
continental shelf would seriously impact the coastline of any other nation.126 The 
result is that there is little prospect that the nations of the South Pacific will do more 
than cooperate in offering aid and advice in the aftermath of oil well disasters, but 
will be restrained out of respect for each other’s sovereign rights to develop their 
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own seabed mineral resources. In the absence of some international or regional 
liability and compensation agreement, New Zealand will have to continue to rely 
upon its current safety regulations to prevent accidents from occurring and upon its 
offshore petroleum liability to impose liability for pollution damage. 
If we see the international petroleum industry as being truly international, then the 
objections to the establishment of an international liability and fund convention 
become less convincing. The line between a ship and an offshore installation, 
especially one which bears most of the characteristics of a ship, has always been 
somewhat arbitrary.  In fact, it would benefit international operators to be subject 
to known and agreed liability rules. At present, each coastal state has its own legal 
traditions and environmental regulations, which presents international operators 
with a myriad of rules to negotiate. Complicated and open-ended liabilities make it 
difficult to obtain insurance and increase operating costs.  One consistent and 
consistently applied international regime would level the playing field, protecting 
the interests of both host state and offshore operator.  In the meantime, there will 
be plenty of work for lawyers.





14 Conclusions and Recommendations  
The world looked on in amazement when the Deepwater Horizon exploded into 
flame on April 20 2010, killing 11 men and spilling 4.9 million barrels of oil into 
the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. For 87 days, a vast, seemingly unstoppable plume 
of oil gouted from the seabed over 1.5kms below the surface of the ocean, defying 
the combined efforts of the BP, Transocean and Halliburton, the US Coastguard, 
five state governments and the federal government. Yet at the same time, New 
Zealand’s government was endeavouring to increase revenues from offshore 
petroleum exploration and extraction activities, encouraging petroleum companies 
to operate at even greater depths, and seemingly with little consideration of the 
potential liability issues.  
It was for this reason that this thesis chose to ask, what would happen if a Deepwater 
Horizon sized blowout occurred in New Zealand waters? Was the New Zealand law 
prepared to address basic issues of liability? Who would be held liable to bring 
claims for pollution damage, and who would have standing to pursue those claims? 
How would pollution damage claims be defined and quantified? What financial 
security, if any, would the owners and operators of offshore petroleum exploration 
and extraction activities be required to provide and would that be sufficient to cover 
the costs of all subsequent claims? The answers to these questions are not 
straightforward, but they do tell us much about the sorts of considerations that need 
to go into developing a liability regime to provide funding for preventing, 
remediating and restoring environmental damage. 
This thesis can be thought of as being organized into three main parts. First, it 
looked at New Zealand’s current offshore energy policy and how its offshore 
petroleum liability regime was adapted from the international shipping civil liability 
and fund conventions. Secondly, it explored how and why whose international 
conventions were conceived and developed. Finally, it analysed the EU’s 
Environmental Liability Directive to see how it would apply to offshore oil and gas 
activities in the EU’s marine waters since the advent of the Offshore Safety 




Directive. Before deciding what lessons New Zealand should take from the 
international shipping conventions and the EU’s experience, let us review the thesis.  
 
14.1 Thesis Review 
Originally, this thesis began as an attempt to ascertain what New Zealand’s 
Maritime Transport Act 1994 meant by the term “pollution damage”. The first thing 
that that author realised, as a newcomer to this field, is that there is no international 
offshore liability and compensation fund convention. The sole international 
convention providing agreed upon rules enforcing liability for oil pollution damage 
was the 1992 CLC Convention, and the only international compensation fund for 
oil pollution damage is its complementary 1992 Fund Convention. However, these 
conventions only apply to ship-source oil spills. All efforts to expand that regime 
to include offshore oil spills, pollution damage caused by offshore petroleum 
exploration and extraction activities have been blocked.   
In order to understand how CLC and Fund Convention system would work, and 
why New Zealand may have been mistaken in its approach to marine pollution 
damage caused by offshore oil spills, it was necessary for this thesis to begin by 
understanding how the CLC and Fund Conventions formed through a coalition of 
shipowners, insurers and the cargo-owning oil importers. Meanwhile, the EU took 
much longer in developing its own Environmental Liability Directive (“ELD”), but 
its objective was to create a supranational framework legislation that would allow 
its Member States to hold operators of any occupational activity liable for any 
damage they caused, so long as that damage fell within one of three categories of 
damage to protected species and natural habitats, water or land. Both New Zealand 
and the EU have struggled with the problems of defining, quantifying and 
financially securing pollution or environmental damage caused by offshore oil 
spills, and both regimes are in need of amendment. 
14.1.1 New Zealand’s Offshore Marine Pollution Damage Liability Laws 
At its root, New Zealand’s recent energy policy has been marked by a reluctance to 
create harsh regulatory or liability laws that could deter investment in emerging 




offshore oil and gas exploration areas. As the government prepared legislation to 
regulate the country’s vast EEZ, it sponsored a series of petroleum expert reports 
which unanimously argued that the EEZ must contain tremendous mineral and 
petroleum resources and that every effort should be made to help operators to 
exploit them. The question of liability for any subsequent offshore oil spills was 
barely raised. The assumption appears to have been that offshore oil well blowouts 
are so rare, and the permitting process so robust, that it was not necessary to 
reconsider the potential risks and costs of any particular offshore oil well blowout 
scenario. The Deepwater Horizon was quickly followed by the Rena disaster, and 
public outcry in New Zealand forced the government to revisit these assumptions, 
only to insist that New Zealand’s petroleum permitting, oil spill prevention, and 
liability regimes were already adequate. However, this thesis has demonstrated that 
those claims were inaccurate at best. Indeed, when we look back at New Zealand’s 
historic legislation, we can see that successive governments have failed to consider 
whether the offshore petroleum liability regime is fit for purpose.  
New Zealand has developed marine pollution laws over many decades. The pre-
War Petroleum and Public Works Acts, and later the Oil in Navigable Waters Act 
1965, already contained obligations and penalties for discharging harmful 
substances into New Zealand waters, but property damage compensation was based 
on market valuations, and offshore operators were not subject to mandatory 
insurance requirements.  
These penalties live on in today’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012 (“EEZ Act”) and in the Resource Management 
Act 1991, which gives local and regional authorities power to prosecute polluters 
in New Zealand’s internal and coastal waters. These penalties can range from clean-
up costs, triple damages on any profit is earned, and ongoing fines for every day 
that the discharge continues. The Maritime Transport Act 1994 also included 
custodial sentences for discharging harmful substances from marine installations, 
until 2015 when the EEZ Act empowered the Environmental Protection Authority 
to prosecute offshore petroleum exploration and extraction activities for that 
offense, but removed their ability to jail guilty owners or operators. The Crown 
Minerals Act 1991 contains penalties for the failure to abide by good industry 




practice. There are also penalties for the failure to maintain a safe work environment 
in the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, and an employer could have to pay 
serious reparations or even be imprisoned for causing an employee’s death. The 
liability picture could become even more complicated when operator’s and permit 
participants’ joint operating agreements come into play. 
The issue of civil liability for marine oil pollution damage came to the forefront of 
international attention following the 1967 sinking of the Torrey Canyon, and the 
1969 Santa Barbara oil well blowout. New Zealand played an active part in drafting 
the CLC Convention 1969 and the Fund Convention 1971, and it accepted and 
ratified both conventions into law with the enactment of the Marine Pollution Act 
1974 (“MPA”). The 1974 Act provided the opportunity to capture pollution damage 
caused by other sources of oil pollution damage, such as non-CLC ships, offshore 
installations and pipelines, but its drafters appeared not to realise how important it 
was to be sure that liability would be guaranteed with mandatory insurance 
requirements. It was not until 1998, four years after the Maritime Transport Act 
1994 (“MTA”) came into force, that New Zealand created Marine Protection Rules: 
Part 102 mandatory insurance regulations. These provided that the owners of 
offshore installations must obtain pollution damage insurance to the minimum level 
of 14m IMF units of account, or approximately $26m NZD, an amount which was 
objectively insufficient to cover any major offshore oil spill. 
This thesis could find no evidence that any New Zealand government had seriously 
considered how either the MPA’s or the MTA’s offshore marine pollution damage 
liability regimes would work in practice. Both the MPA and the MTA expanded 
pollution damage liability to cover ever-wider categories of owners of offshore 
installations, presumably with the intent of ensuring that the persons responsible for 
causing the damage would escape liability. Unfortunately, this occurred without 
those acts authors leaving policy documents indicating what that liability might 
entail, or how they intended any damages to be financially secured. As Chapter Five 
pointed out, the critics of the policy insist that mandatory insurance regulations only 
increase the cost of doing business and the risk of moral hazard, thereby creating 
the conditions for market collapse. However, mandatory insurance is the bedrock 




of the CLC and Fund Conventions, and it is difficult to see how a strict liability 
regime can work without some financial security guarantees. 
Sometime in 2013, and prompted by the Deepwater Horizon and by its experience 
with the Rena, Maritime NZ revised its approach to the Marine Protection Rules: 
Part 102 mandatory insurance requirements, issuing a statement to the offshore 
installation owners indicating that it would be taking a much harder look at the 
adequacy of their insurance arrangements. In 2014, the Ministry of Transport issued 
a Consultation Document on a proposal to increase the mandatory insurance level 
to $300m NZD. However, this document seemed more concerned with assuring the 
public that offshore oil and gas activities were already well regulated than it was 
with ensuring that the mandatory insurance regulations were based on a sound 
understanding of the MTA’s offshore petroleum liability regime. The various 
permitting, health and safety and environmental regulatory regimes did give some 
consideration to operators’ financial capacities, but the Consultation Document was 
somewhat disingenuous in asserting that those obligations had anything to do with 
compensating third parties for pollution damage. 
The final financial assurance regime proposes that offshore installations are to be 
individually assessed and placed into one of eight insurance bands ranging from 
$25m NZD to $600m NZD. The new regime appears to have designed so that the 
coverage requirements can be easily met with standard first party property damage 
and Operators Extra Expense insurance forms. Owners will still be strictly liable 
for the full range of damages under the MTA, but they only have to find insurance 
to cover liability for the direct costs of dealing with pollution, for pollution damage 
to property, for the costs of reasonable preventive measures and for reinstatement 
measures. It is not clear whether this last term refers to “reasonable measures of 
reinstatement of the environment”, or to reinstatement directed at “losses of profit 
from impairment of the environment”. The MOT’s subsequent Invitation to 
Comment leaves further room for doubt as it promises to provide a set of liability 
guidelines at some point in the future, indicating that the financial assurance regime 
is still not based on an informed analysis of the MTA’s structure, scope and 
definitions.  




14.1.2 Lessons from Tort Law 
Prior to the CLC and Fund Conventions, the primary remedies for marine oil spills 
were to be found in the common law of tort. The Conventions have occupied the 
field for claims for tanker spills, and New Zealand’s Maritime Transport Act 1994 
bars claims in tort for spills caused by CLC ships. There is no such statutory bar 
preventing any person from bringing a tortious claim for marine pollution damage 
caused by offshore petroleum activities or installations, however. It follows that tort 
law remains significant to this discussion of offshore installation owners’ liabilities. 
The Inverpool was the first oil pollution damage case to reach the House of Lords. 
The Lords were unable to fault the master’s decision to spill his ship’s cargo of oil 
onto the Southport township’s river bank, and even after evidence emerged of the 
shipowner’s actual fault and privity in sending an unseaworthy ship to sea. The case 
demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining compensation in tort law, difficulties which 
persist to this day, but it is even more relevant to this thesis considering that the 
High Court Judge in the original action would go on to represent the United 
Kingdom at the CLC Convention Conference in Brussels in 1969. Devlin J, later 
Lord Devlin, would be instrumental in supporting the CLC Convention’s choice of 
a strict liability, mandatory insurance and compensation fund model to cover just 
the kinds of damages which had escaped the net of the common law. 
The Inverpool, and later the Wagon Mound (No 2), also established that the most 
appropriate cause of action for a marine oil spills was in negligence, not trespass or 
nuisance. According to the highway rule, the innocent bystander must bear the cost 
of any accident unless he or she can prove that the defendant was at fault.1 That 
burden of proof can be heavy, and the Inverpool demonstrated how even valid 
claims could be derailed by mistakes in civil procedure. The court refused to allow 
the plaintiffs to make use of the res ipsa loquitur principle to reverse that burden of 
proof; a stance that the judiciary holds to this day.  
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As an alternative to negligence, the tort of public nuisance does offer the advantage 
of strict liability, but it can be difficult for individual members of the public to 
establish their standing, and, even if they do, the normal remedy is injunction not 
damages. The Canadian case of British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products 
demonstrated that the Crown could assert its role as parens patriae to obtain 
compensatory damages for damage to the environment, so long as the claim is 
backed by some practicable environmental valuation methodology.2 Suggestions 
that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher could offer a happier solution for plaintiffs 
seeking a strict liability remedy have been criticized, and the tort has largely been 
subsumed within nuisance.  
The conclusion we can draw from this is that while tort law remains relevant to 
marine oil spill liability, it does not offer any easy solutions to plaintiffs. Unless the 
innocent victim of an offshore oil spill can prove that the owner or operator of the 
offshore installation or activity can be shown to have been negligent, and that 
negligence caused the damage being complained of, then the claim will fail. 
Offshore petroleum exploration and extraction activities are inherently hazardous. 
It cannot be assumed that just because an accident has occurred, that anyone 
involved was negligent.  It also does not follow that the person who caused the 
accident will also have the funds to cover any claims. It is for this reason that the 
MTA and its strict liability provisions for marine pollution damage, backed up by 
the mandatory insurance requirements in MPR Part 102, is so important. Tortious 
liability may only complicate and prolong the legal consequences of any future 
offshore accident in New Zealand waters, without any guarantees that fair 
compensation will be paid for any damage those accidents may cause, and that 
benefits nobody.  
14.1.3 The CLC and Fund Convention Regime 
The CLC and Fund Conventions intended to offer an international solution for the 
liability and compensation problems marine disasters that tort law apparently could 
not solve. Most accounts of the Conventions therefore begin with that terrible 
accident, delving into the extraordinary circumstances around its sinking: the 
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fantastical images of fighter bombers attacking the sunken wreck, the vast plume 
of oil crossing the breadth of the English Channel, and the tremendous difficulties 
the United Kingdom and French governments had in bringing its owners to court.  
The authors of the CLC and Fund Convention were able to achieve a relatively 
straightforward approach to a single issue, liability and compensation for oil 
pollution damage from tankers, because they were able to learn lessons from the 
accident, and to take advantage of well-established concepts in international 
maritime law. The privilege to limit liability according to the value of the thing 
causing the harm dated back to Roman times, but the utter destruction of the Torrey 
Canyon showed the futility of securing those with the value of the ship and cargo 
only if they survived to the end of the voyage. The Conventions would therefore 
base their limits on the size of the ship, and not its value. The TOVALOP and 
CRISTAL agreements showed that the shipping and oil industries were prepared to 
accept fault-based liability with a reversed burden of proof, and this eased the road 
to choosing strict liability. The battle that the French and United Kingdom 
governments faced in bringing the owners of the Torrey Canyon, only resolved by 
the seizures of the Lake Palourde, first by the United Kingdom and then by the 
French officials, showed how important it was to grant sole competence to 
adjudicate pollution damage claims to the courts of the affected states. Perhaps most 
importantly, the International Protection and Indemnity Societies provided standard 
insurance policies that could be linked to those limits of liability, guaranteeing that 
compensation would be paid regardless of the shipowner’s financial solvency.  
All the appropriate liability tools and concepts were available, but even so, the 1969 
CLC Convention Conference very nearly ended in stalemate. The key moment 
came late in the process, when Lord Devlin threw the United Kingdom delegation’s 
support behind the Belgian proposal for an industry-fed compensation fund, on the 
understanding that the insurance industry would guarantee the shipowner’s strict 
liability up to pre-set limits calculated on the ship’s gross tonnage. It would take a 
further conference to hammer out more of the crucial details, and to decide on the 
Fund Convention 1971’s appropriate scope, but essentially the agreement had been 
reached. 




The CLC and Fund Convention regime provided general terms of liability for the 
costs of pollution damage and preventive measures, but defining and quantifying 
damages would be left to the national courts of the territory where the damage 
occurred. This policy was politically necessary, but it quickly led to a handful of 
large and unexpected claims. For example, the Antonio Gramsci case witnessed the 
use of the Soviet Methodica, which calculated liability according to estimates of 
how much seawater had been contaminated, and, outside of the Conventions but 
still relevant to debate, the Zoe Colocotroni’s so-called “bug-count” damage claims 
were generated from surveys estimating the numbers of marine life forms lost, and 
then calculating their replacement cost on hypothetical laboratory supply market.3 
Both methodologies were problematic, not only because they increased the 
quantum of damages significantly, but because neither guaranteed that any sum of 
monies could or would actually be spent on restoring the environment to its original 
state. The IOPC Fund responded with a 1980 Resolution declaring its determination 
that compensation claims should no longer be based on “an abstract quantification 
of damage calculated in accordance with theoretical models” and that compensation 
claims would be based on actual funds spent on reasonable preventive and remedial 
measures.4 However, later cases like that of the Patmos would show that national 
courts remained willing to make their own determinations of what pollution damage 
liability meant. The IOPC Fund’s decisions and recommendations are not binding 
and there is still the potential for further unforeseen claims in the future. 
As international crises, steadily increasing consumption of petroleum and rapid 
advances in shipbuilding technology combined to supersize tankers, the 
Conventions’ limits of liability and compensation quickly became obsolete. In 
1984, the International Maritime Organization convened a further conference 
update the Conventions’ limits, and to amend their definitions. Rather than simply 
excluding environmental damage per se claims, the new definition of pollution 
damage would allow businesses to claim for losses of profit caused by the 
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impairment of the environment, and participating states would be able to claim for 
the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the environment. Thus, the 
focus would remain on the actual harm that oil pollution causes, and the true cost 
of measures aimed at remediating that harm, rather than on speculative or punitive 
damages. The 1984 Protocols were initially rejected after the United States of 
America withdrew its support but formed the basis of the 1992 CLC and Fund 
Conventions once it was agreed that there would be a cap on contributions from the 
major importers of oil. 
In contrast to early criticism of bug counting, the IOPC Fund now accepts that post-
spill pollution damage studies can aid in quantifying compensation claims. 
However, the prevailing view is that the marine environment is capable of 
recovering naturally without human interference and should be allowed to do so. 
Environmental reinstatement measures must be quantifiable and shown to 
effectively accelerate that natural recovery. Businesses can only claim for losses of 
profit if they are directly impacted by the oil spill, and lack of proximity to the 
affected area is a factor in denying claims.  
The case of the Slops provided further evidence of national courts’ tendency to 
expand the scope of the Conventions, and prompted the IOPC Fund to review its 
policy on the distinction between ships and offshore craft. A Greek court decided 
that a decommissioned tanker, which had been moored for five years and which 
lacked an engine, or propeller, and had been converted into an FPSO, was a “ship” 
for the purposes of the CLC and Fund Conventions.5 Faced with claims involving 
vessels used as MARPOL waste processing installations like the Slops, or which 
combined drilling and petroleum processing, the IOPC Fund need to clarify when 
a ship ceased to be a ship, and when it became a ship again.  
The solution was to develop a hybrid approach. This involves considering lists of 
possible ships and offshore craft and asking what role they play in the maritime 
transport chain. CLC-ships must be capable of carrying bulk cargoes of oil on 
voyages at sea, and actually be doing so. Permanently moored FPSOs, or drillships 
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that are actively involved in offshore petroleum activities, are not covered, even if 
they are carrying bulk quantities of petroleum and have the potential to cause major 
damage.  
The IMO would later refuse to expand its work schedule to include offshore 
petroleum activities after Indonesia raised the issue following the Montara accident, 
and that has again stalled efforts to create a true international petroleum industry 
liability and fund convention regime. Their current recommendation is that it is up 
to regional groupings to form their own compensation and liability arrangements, 
and it is very unlikely that an international offshore CLC and Fund Convention will 
be adopted in the near to medium future. Another massive Deepwater Horizon sized 
disaster could change those calculations, however, especially if it affected the 
Conventions’ major participating states. New Zealand should be prepared to 
support or oppose such a proposal on its merits, should that time come. 
14.1.4 The EU’s Directives on Environmental Liability and their application 
to the Offshore Industry 
Meanwhile, the Deepwater Horizon prompted the European Union to expand its 
own Environmental Liability Directive to include offshore oil and gas activities 
with the Offshore Safety Directive.6 The ELD also has strong links to the CLC and 
Fund Conventions, and the original Green Paper would have imposed strict liability 
for a wide range of environmental, property and personal damages, enforcing 
mandatory insurance and obliging industry operators to contribute to an 
environmental damage compensation fund. Political necessity would force the EU 
Commission to drastically narrow the ELD’s focus, and the subsequent White Paper 
dictated that the ELD exclude traditional damages claims, focussing only on 
damage to the environment itself, leaving many crucial issues, including the 
question of mandatory insurance, to the Member States.  
                                                 
6 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage 
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Examining this process provides golden opportunity for a lesson in comparative 
law. It demonstrates the tremendous difficulties that international organizations 
face in creating liability frameworks to suit their participating states’ needs, while 
fulfilling the objective of making polluters pay, and, vice versa, that participating 
states face in adopting those frameworks into domestic law. Not only that, but by 
examining how those legal liability frameworks are implemented and enforced, we 
can see practical solutions evolving in real time, and adopt the best solutions to the 
complexities of assessing and remediating environmental and financial damages 
caused by hazardous activities, wherever those solutions might be found. 
This is even more clear, considering that while the CLC and Fund Conventions 
initially focussed solely on traditional damages claims, the ELD was specifically 
designed to exclude traditional damages claims in favour of environmental damage. 
Yet, even with their diametrically opposed starting points, each has produced 
markedly similar outcomes in terms of how preventive and remedial measures are 
to be assessed. Both provide strict liability for damage to the environment, both 
contain expectations concerning financial security arrangements. Member States 
are expected to work towards developing financial security markets and products 
to enable operators to meet those costs, and the EU Commission has given serious 
thought to the notion of establishing an environmental damage compensation fund.  
The failure of two Waste Directive proposals in the 1980s taught the EU 
Commission that it could not directly replicate the CLC Convention’s approach of 
addressing pollution damage one industrial sector at a time. The 1993 Green Paper 
therefore proposed to create an all-encompassing tort-like civil liability framework. 
This would address all the consequences of industrial disasters, including damage 
to the environment itself, traditional damages claims for loss of life or personal 
injury, for property damage, and consequential economic losses, retrospective 
liability for historically contaminated sites and pollution contributed by a multitude 
of diffuse sources. The Waste Directives had sought to copy the CLC Convention 
and Fund Conventions’ blue print for a strict liability regime, backed up by 
mandatory insurance and a compensation fund, and their failure did not augur well 
for the Green Paper’s proposal to do the same. 




The Green Paper met staunch opposition from Member States and powerful 
industrial lobby groups, forcing the subsequent White Paper to narrow its scope and 
to shift to a two-tiered system of administrative liability. Citizens and non-
governmental organizations would only have a right to request that the competent 
authority took action, and the focus would now be on recovering the costs of 
preventing and remediating damage to the environment itself. The competent 
authority would play the primary role in enforcing environmental damage cost 
recovery, and traditional damages claims would be left Member States’ laws. There 
would be no CERCLA-style retrospective liability for historic contamination. 
Claims for diffuse pollution damage would be allowed, but only if they could show 
a clear causal connection to a specific operator’s occupational activities.  
One of the reasons for this shift is that the EU must justify any legislation in terms 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. These fundamental constitutional principles 
dictate that the EU should only legislate on issues that cannot be dealt with at the 
Member State level, and then only to the extent that is necessary to reach a specific 
objective. The EU Commission attempted to argue that harmonized environmental 
liability laws were necessary to protect the integrity of the EU’s internal market, to 
prevent Member States from shattering the concord the EU depends upon by 
engaging in an anti-competitive and self-destructive race-to-the-bottom, trading 
loose environmental protections for economic growth. The Member States already 
had well developed legal traditions concerning liability for such things as property 
damage and personal injury, and those laws would be left untouched. It was only 
the omission to protect the environment itself which would be corrected. 
As a further concession to Member States’ fears of overly intrusive legislation, and 
much like the CLC and Fund Conventions, the ELD leaves the specific matters of 
interpretation and implementation to the Member States. This rule is not specific to 
the ELD, Article 288 TEU specifies that directives are to be preferred to regulations, 
and that Member States are always entitled to make their own choice of the forma 
and method of implementation of a directive, so long as the overall objective is 
achieved. This is a key reason as to why, in spite of the fears of many of its critics, 
the ELD does not attempt to bind its Member States’ hands with mandatory or self-
executing provisions. Member States have discretion in deciding about how many 




competent authorities to appoint, how to quantify environmental damage and 
whether that damage has been significant enough to breach the ELD’s activating 
thresholds, what preventive and remedial activities may be reasonable and 
necessary, and what measures it may take to secure costs, amongst other things. 
The result is that, far from harmonizing the EU’s environmental damage liability 
laws, the ELD has resulted in complicated patchwork of laws. This makes it 
difficult to assess the ELD’s overall implementation, or to predict how future 
environmental catastrophes will be litigated.  
Following the Deepwater Horizon, the EU Commission quickly reached the view 
that deepwater drilling was hazardous and demanded greater regulation than might 
otherwise be expected. Debates between Oil & Gas UK and Norway’s Oil and Gas 
Association and the EU Commission’s Joint Research Centre demonstrated a great 
deal of disagreement about the risks and expenses of any future European 
Deepwater Horizon, however. The JRC believed that the Deepwater Horizon’s 
$40bn USD figured provided an upper-bound cost, while the Norwegians based 
their estimates on the hundreds of thousands of well years that offshore installations 
had been safely operating around the world since 1955. The disputed figures 
softened the EU Parliament’s resolve somewhat, leading it to call for a directive 
rather than a regulation. 
Much like New Zealand’s EEZ Act, Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil 
and gas operations (“OSD”) focuses on safety regulations aimed at improving major 
hazard contingency planning. The Member State must ensure that the liable 
operator clearly identified, and that it will have the financial capability to deal with 
claims under the ELD and for any economic damages claims in Member States’ 
laws. There was some confusion over whether that liability would be strict or not, 
however, as the ELD’s Annex III has not been amended to include the OSD. 
Instead, the EU Commission has indicated that offshore oil and gas activities do fall 
within Annex III because they are covered by the directive concerning the 
classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances. Also, there is 
caselaw arguing that oil spills should be covered by the EU’s Waste Framework 
Directive. 




The EU Commission commissioned reports to assess the ELD and the OSD, and 
these concluded that it was not necessary to institute mandatory insurance 
regulations or to establish an industry-fed environmental damage compensation 
fund. However, the reports did recommend that Member States in other regions, 
like the Mediterranean, might adopt their own OPOL style mutual indemnity 
associations. The EU Commission also considered whether the OSD should be 
included in the Environmental Crimes Directive, but again resolved that it was too 
soon to say whether that was necessary.  
This thesis identified points of convergence between the IOPC Fund’s Claims 
Manuals and the ELD’s Annexes on the terms for assessing the effectiveness of 
preventive and remedial measures. This provides some evidence that, in spite of 
their very different starting points, liability regimes have a tendency towards 
practicality. As the ELD is tested in the field, each Member State will observe and 
learn from the lessons provided by others.  The most optimistic end result, therefore, 
could be that Member States’ laws will eventually converge, and that an EU-wide 
regime will emerge which makes the best use of each Member State’s solutions. 
14.1.5 An International Offshore Petroleum Industry Convention? 
Historically, there have been a handful of attempts to develop an alternative 
offshore liability and compensation system and that has had an influence on how 
today’s offshore oil and gas activities are conducted. For example, the 1977 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from Exploration 
for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources or CLEE Convention, never 
entered into force, but it did stimulate industry operators in the North Sea area to 
come together to form the OPOL mutual indemnity agreement. 7  Other later 
attempts to engage the IMO more deeply in offshore oil and gas exploration and 
extraction activities have been considered and dismissed. Most recently, the 
Deepwater Horizon and Montara incidents have had their impact on the IMO too, 
forcing it to respond to calls for the CLC and Fund Conventions to be expanded to 
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include oil pollution damage from the offshore petroleum industry, or to create an 
industry specific liability and compensation convention.  
Why is it so difficult to develop an offshore industry pollution damage liability and 
compensation regime, even in light of recent events? First, the offshore industry 
enjoyed a prolonged period of relatively safe operations and it was not clear if the 
Montara and Deepwater Horizon accidents represented a new norm. The Torrey 
Canyon was quickly followed by two more major incidents and heralded a new era 
of environmental catastrophes. The risk was real, and the international community 
was deeply invested in serving up a legal solution. 
Paradoxically, it may be that it is because the shipping conventions have been so 
successful at extracting large compensation claims from the shipping, insurance and 
oil industries, that those industries will strongly resist any further expansion in 
liability. So, what justifies the creation of an offshore CLC and Fund Convention, 
assuming that is the appropriate response? There are significant differences 
between shipping oil and drilling for oil. Ships travel the world, skipping from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Happenstance dictates when an accident may occur. The 
existing limited liability laws protected shipowners to the extent that, if the ship 
was lost, it was possible that the owners would owe no compensation to third party 
victims at all. At the same time, it could be so difficult to bring the owners before a 
competent court that plaintiffs could find it impossible to enforce any judgment. As 
we recall from the cast of the Torrey Canyon, the governments of the United 
Kingdom and France only succeeded in obtaining a pay-out from the ship’s owners 
by seizing another one of their ships.  
Offshore petroleum exploration and extraction activities, on the other hand, usually 
occur within the jurisdiction of a single country. Under UNCLOS, each state has 
sovereign rights to the resources of its EEZ and continental shelf, and while it has 
obligations to carry out those activities safely, it is also the primary beneficiary. The 
host nation enjoys revenues from those activities and should have little difficult in 
bringing actions within the competence of its courts. Strictly speaking, the only time 
that international law should be engaged is if those activities cause harm to a 




neighbouring nation, and then the host nation is only liable if it can be shown to 
have failed in its due diligence duties.  
The result is that there is no great appetite for any expansion of the CLC and 
Convention regime or the creation of a similar international offshore liability and 
fund convention in the short to medium future. Of course, the situation could change 
if there were another devastating disaster on the scale of the Deepwater Horizon, 
especially if it caused widespread transboundary damage that the responsible 
parties could not or would not recompense. Otherwise, the status quo remains, and 
the most likely result, absent an incident provoking another furious public outcry, 
is that reform is most likely to be restricted to the national or at most regional level.  
 
14.2 Implications for the Reform of New Zealand’s Marine Pollution Damage 
Liability Regime.  
What does an analysis of New Zealand’s marine pollution damage liability regime, 
its roots in the CLC and Fund Conventions, and the comparison with the EU’s ELD 
and OSD tell us about the difficulties of building a functional and effective pollution 
damage liability regime?  
Perhaps the chief lesson is that the legal structures, institutions and policy objectives 
matter. It is not enough to say that the owners and operators of offshore petroleum 
installations will be liable for the pollution damage that their activities cause. It is 
vital that lawmakers have a clear idea of how and who that liability is to be enforced 
upon, who has standing to bring a claim, and how those claims are to be interpreted 
and quantified, and how the costs of compensation and for preventive and remedial 
measures are to be allocated and secured. Each stage of the process needs to be 
assessed on its merits, and it is hoped that this thesis will contribute to that 
discussion. 
The basis of the CLC and Fund Conventions regime’s success is the alliance 
between the shipowners, insurers, and the oil industry. Strict liability ensures that 
victims do not waste time and energy in proving that the shipowner is at fault. In 




return for accepting that liability will be strict, shipowners enjoy the benefit of clear 
limits of liability, with certain exceptions and defences. Limits of liability are based 
upon the size of the ship and not its value at the end of the voyage. This ensures 
that the limits may be predetermined, and that not only secures the rights of third 
party claimants, but it also makes it possible to obtain the appropriate insurance. 
The P&I Clubs play a key role in ensuring that shipowners abide by international 
safety regulations, and this contributes to reducing the overall tanker accident rate.  
Meanwhile, the IOPC Fund has a general standing to represents the interests of oil 
importers in any CLC court action. It provides ongoing information and policy 
recommendations about the nature and scope of that liability, but leaves the final 
determination and quantification of damage claims to the competent courts of the 
country where the damage occurred. This protects the integrity and stability of the 
Fund, assuring its contributors that expenses will not be overblown, while giving 
the affected nation direct control of the process. As for regulators and the general 
public, any person can bring a claim for compensation, so long as they can prove 
their losses with such things as receipts or some accepted economic model or 
valuation methodology. The overall outcome is that tanker spills have steadily 
decreased, the consensus that the Convention regime relies upon is assured, and the 
regime has survived to this day.  
Both the EU’s ELD and New Zealand’s marine pollution damage liability regime 
have struggled with the issue of mandatory insurance, because they were adopted 
without first creating that crucial alliance. New Zealand’s broad approach may have 
been dictated by fears that the responsible owner would escape liability, but it also 
has roots in the paucity of available insurance.  The recent review of the financial 
assurance regime has significantly strengthened the minimum mandatory insurance 
requirements, but it needs to do more to create that strong triumvirate strict liability 
channelled to the installation owner, backed up by mandatory insurance, and 
compensated by an industry-fed compensation fund. New Zealand’s shotgun 
approach to strict liability was created to capture every potentially responsible party 
to unlimited tort-like civil liability. Furthermore, it still appears to be based on 
inaccurate assumptions about the possible financial cost of a New Zealand 
Deepwater Horizon sized accident. This means it may be difficult to anticipate the 




costs of any future accidents. That could increase the costs of insurance premiums, 
and make it difficult to get insurance coverage at all. This all increases uncertainty 
of outcome for owners, operators, insurers, government and claimants alike. 
 It must be remembered that much of the $40bn USD bill of the Deepwater Horizon 
was due to penalties under the United States’ federal laws have no equivalent in 
New Zealand law. In fact, the whole thrust of the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions 
was to exclude claims based on abstract and hypothetical damages claims, and that 
included punitive damages methodologies such as the Soviet Methodica which, like 
the United States’ Clean Water Act, calculated damages according to the volume 
of oil spilled. Both the CLC and Fund Conventions focus on reasonable and 
practical expense claims, and when the IMO’s methodologies were applied to the 
Deepwater Horizon, the bill was far smaller and much more manageable. New 
Zealand policy should welcome that approach, not shy away from it.  
The most rational approach would be to make great efforts to emulate the CLC and 
Fund Conventions’ model. That means strict liability should be channelled directly 
to the actual owner of the installation in question, and to the permitted operator 
directly responsible for managing day-to-day operations. Liability should be 
limited, according to the capacity of the current insurance market, and additionally 
compensation should be recoverable from either an industry-fed fund, or from an 
OPOL-style mutual indemnity agreement. Rather than automatically subjecting all 
claims to litigation, compensation claims should, in the first instance, be 
administered by a specialist regulator. This would streamline the compensation 
process, largely eliminating the vagaries of litigation, and, as well as that, a 
specialist compensation authority could facilitate payments, provide valuable 
information to operators and applicants, and develop compensation policy specific 
to the changing local regulatory environment. Claimants should still have a right to 
appeal those decisions, but as long as the regulatory body was performing its 
compensation adjudication function fairly and efficiently, then most claims could 
be met quickly and expediently. 
Who should take on the role of compensation administration and policy 
development? MOT led the review of the marine pollution damage financial 




assurance regime, and it should continue that good work by also taking the 
responsibility for adjudicating claims after any future accidents. Maritime NZ has 
demonstrated their ability to rapidly upskill during the Rena disaster, but it also 
displayed valuable inside knowledge during its review of MPR Part 102 from 2014 
on. Indeed, the 2015 financial assurance review was driven in large part because of 
the concerns that Maritime NZ expressed about the adequacy of installation owners’ 
financial security arrangements. It is Maritime NZ which must cleanup after any oil 
spill incident, and it is well placed to fulfil that role. Alternatively, the EPA has 
been given authority to prosecute owners and operators of marine structures and 
operations for causing discharges of harmful substances. The EPA also has 
competence to  deal with civil liability issues, and it might also make sense to 
combine those roles.  
Maritime NZ, the EPA, or some other appropriate body, should be given clear 
parameters on its authority, however. New Zealand’s MOT has already signalled 
its commitment to creating liability guidelines, and this should culminate in the 
publication of New Zealand’s own Marine Pollution Damage Claims Manual. This 
task must be completed thoroughly and systematically, but also objectively. Every 
effort must be made to instil public confidence in the outcome. It follows that any 
New Zealand Claims Manual should be completed by expert lawyers, not 
inexperienced graduate interns or outside consultants with their own agendas. If 
Maritime NZ is to enforce pollution damage liability, and if it is to authorise 
payments, then it should also play a central role in setting compensation policy. 
The scope of that inquiry should be expanded to include consideration of other 
applicable administrative and criminal penalties, as well as tortious liability. At 
present, the MTA is silent on the rules of standing, pollution damage includes any 
kind of loss or damage, that liability is unlimited and there is no bar on claims in 
tort arising from the same incident. The MTA bars tortious claims from arising from 
oil pollution damage caused by CLC ships, because the CLC and Fund Conventions 
largely occupy the field. The question is, should the MTA also bar claims in tort for 
oil pollution damage caused by offshore installations and activities?  




This thesis has explained how the CLC and Fund Conventions were originally 
established because tort law failed to protect the interests of victims of accidents 
like the those involving the Inverpool and the Torrey Canyon. In return for 
accepting strict liability, shipowners were promised the certainty of channelled and 
limited liability, supported by mandatory insurance and allied to the oil industry-
fed IOPC Fund. New Zealand could and should make the same bargain with the 
offshore petroleum industry. Instead of pursuing every possible owner and operator 
of an offshore installation, including directors, managers, permit participants, 
subcontractors, joint venture partners and employees, liability could be channelled 
to the actual owner of the installation, and to the operator named in the Crown’s 
minerals exploration and extraction permits.  
At present, both the owner and the operator are required to provide certain financial 
assurances in order to carry out their operations. Obviously, the installation owner 
must provide Maritime NZ with a certificate of insurance, but the operator is also 
required to prove their financial capacity to carry out the work programme to New 
Zealand Petroleum Minerals in order to obtain an exploration permit, and to the 
EPA as part of the marine consent application.  Those financial assurances must be 
tied closely to their marine pollution damage obligations, and it will be up to the 
relevant regulatory bodies to ensure that the owner and the operator are prepared 
for any emergency, including a major oil well blowout and subsequent spill 
response.  
Liability should be limited, not according to the size of the installation, but 
according to the capacity of currently available insurance products. Insurance could 
be supplemented or substituted by other financial security arrangements, and 
Maritime NZ must continue to be trusted to vet any applications for financial 
security certificates. For example, parent company guarantees could be accepted, 
but only if the parent company provided ample evidence of its solvency, perhaps in 
the form of catastrophe bonds, to prove that it was providing more than a bare 
assurances of a willingness to pay. A bar on tortious claims would help to ensure 
that proceedings were res judicata. This would cut the costs and complexity of 
litigation, it would save plaintiffs from shouldering the burden of proof necessitated 




by negligence actions, and it would ensure that compensation claims were speedily 
resolved. 
In return for these concessions, permit holders should be compelled to join a New 
Zealand Oil Pollution Liability agreement, or NZOPOL. Just as in the United 
Kingdom system, NZOPOL membership should be a necessary part of the 
permitting regime, and a basic element in establishing that the operator had the 
financial capacity to carry out its Discharge Management Plan. New Zealand has 
fewer operators than the North Sea, but given that compensation would only be 
activated if the responsible operator and its insurer were unable to pay, or if 
damages claims exceeded the operator’s limits of liability, then such a system 
would provide additional financial assurance without necessarily increasing the 
costs of operating in New Zealand.  
Also, New Zealand is a party to the Noumea Convention, and the argument could 
be made that such an agreement could be folded into its liability and compensation 
requirements. Thus, all participating states, including New Zealand, Australia and 
21 other island nations, could throw their support behind such a scheme. That would 
increase the number of operators subjected to mutual indemnity, spreading the risk 
and costs of any claims, and allowing New Zealand and Australia to support each 
other, as well as their Pacific Island neighbours. A Noumea Convention OPOL 
would therefore support diplomatic ties between the nations of the Pacific, and that 
could have flow-on effects in other areas. 
Are there any aspects of the EU’s ELD and OSD that could be adopted into New 
Zealand law? The ELD was created to fill a specific gap in EU Member States’ 
laws. That is, the Member States’ laws provided good protections for personal 
injury and property damage claims, but neglected to provide compensation for 
damage to the environment itself. It is for this reason that the ELD created a 
complicated system for categorizing damage to protected species and natural 
habitats, water or land, assessing the significance of that damage in relation to the 
baseline condition, and then requiring operators to carry out preventive or remedial 
measures, or to reimburse the competent authority for those costs. It was necessary 
to grant standing to the competent authority to pursue such claims, because only the 




state could be said to have the general interest in protecting the environment. In 
other words, the ELD was the embodiment of the parens patriae doctrine.  
It was also necessary to expand that regime to the offshore oil and gas industry, 
because the drafters of the ELD had excluded oil pollution damage, in the belief 
that any such claim would fall under the auspices of the CLC and Fund 
Conventions. The Deepwater Horizon demonstrated the flaw in that reasoning, and 
rather than creating a new category of oil pollution damage, the ELD was simply 
expanded. This creates the problem, however, that the ELD/OSD regime will not 
provide compensation for the traditional damages claims that fishing, tourism, 
aquaculture and other coastal property owners are likely to bring. The result is that 
claimants will  be likely to ignore the ELD/OSD regime, and bring action either in 
tort or under other statutory regimes. This is contrary to the ELD’s founding 
justification, that it was necessary to harmonize Member States’ laws with respect 
to environmental damage. By failing to account for a wide enough array of 
environmental, financial and property damage claims, the ELD/OSD runs the risk 
of irrelevancy. 
New Zealand’s marine pollution damage regime already includes the costs of both 
traditional and environmental damages, however. The CLC and Fund Conventions’ 
definitions, as adopted into New Zealand law and applied to offshore mining and 
petroleum activities, were designed to capture both traditional and environmental 
damage claims. Thus, private individuals can bring a claim for damage to their 
property or business, and the state can sue for the costs of remediating the 
environment. It is not necessary then to institute an ELD-style system of pure 
environmental damage claims in New Zealand law. 
What will be necessary, is ensuring that offshore operators carry out their activities 
according to best practice, and without taking unnecessary risks, and that 
emergency response and discharge management plans are in place, properly 
equipped and resourced, and practised in cooperation with Maritime NZ and other 
local authorities. Operators’ liabilities under the MTA and other statutory regimes 
must be clearly spelled out, and financial security arrangements must be appropriate 
and sufficient to meet those obligations. Regulators must do more than simply 




accept operators’ assurances that plans are in place. All aspects of planning and 
liability must be in place, before an accident occurs, not after. 
New Zealand’s small size and geographical isolation makes it more difficult to 
either prepare for a major incident or to obtain timely international assistance. This 
also makes it difficult to produce the kind of multi-state united front which made 
the OPOL agreement possible. Subsequently, New Zealand is poorly placed to 
negotiate strong agreements with international petroleum operators or insurance 
providers, and must rely upon their assurances of financial solvency, and the 
capacity of generally available insurance products. Saying that, it is still possible 
for New Zealand to take a firm stance regarding how its national resources are to 
be developed. It is incumbent upon us, for our own sake, and for the sake of future 
generations, to do so. 
 
14.3 Finally 
The 2017 election has seen the formation of a Labour-NZ First coalition 
government with the support of a confidence and supply agreement with the Green 
Party, and this could have significant implications for the offshore petroleum 
industry. The Green Party has long been opposed to the use of fossil fuels and 
strongly advocates for “leave fossil fuels in the ground and learn to live without 
them” approach to energy policy.8 However, the majority coalition partner, the 
Labour Party, accepted that the world is still strongly dependent upon oil and gas.9 
Meanwhile, NZ First supported a balancing of economic development and 
environmental protection, and continuing all marine drilling, exploration and 
extraction projects with guarantees of public consultation, strong safety regulations 
and prompt emergency response mechanisms.10 The two coalition partners were 
apparently satisfied with the prospect of continuing New Zealand’s current level of 
offshore petroleum activities, however, the Green Party will hold ministerial 
positions in Climate Change and Conservation, as well as Associate Environment 
                                                 
8 Green Party “Empowering NZ” <www.greens.org.nz> (accessed 24 October 2017). 
9 Labour “Protecting Our Environment” <www.labour.org.nz> (accessed 24  
October 2017). 
10 NZ First “Environment and Conservation” <www.nzfirst.org.nz> (accessed 24 October 2017). 




and Associate Transport.11 These are all positions which would give the Green 
Party a great deal of discretion to reshape New Zealand’s offshore marine pollution 
damage policy. 
As it happened, the Labour-New Zealand First coalition apparently bowed to 
pressure from the Green Party, and unexpectedly announced a moratorium on any 
future offshore oil and gas exploration. All existing permits will be honoured, but 
the government will not offer any further exploration permits from 2018. The move 
has sparked a great deal of comment and opposition, and the National Party has 
assured the industry that it will reverse the policy when it is next in government. As 
far as this thesis is concerned then, the move may have merely postponed the issue, 
as a later government could reverse that policy. At the time of writing, the MTA’s 
pollution damage requirements have not been amended, and future offshore oil and 
gas developments could still cause blowouts and pollution damage that will engage 
the law. 
New Zealand’s marine pollution damage liability laws have been uncertain for far 
too long. The Deepwater Horizon, dreadful as that incident was, represents a golden 
opportunity to sensibly reform our offshore petroleum liability laws. More work 
needs to be done to explore how other countries are addressing these issues, but it 
is hoped that this thesis helps to provide a basis for examining how pollution 
damage liability and compensation frameworks can and should be developed.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Jacinda Ardern and James Shaw Confidence and Supply Agreement between the New Zealand 
Labour Party and the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand (24 October 2017) 
<www.interest.co.nz> (accessed 25 October 2017). 
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